ML20039D303

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IE Insp Rept 50-382/81-29 on 811102-06.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Follow Procedures for Protection of Electrical Penetration Assemblies
ML20039D303
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/10/1981
From: Crossman W, Randy Hall, Clay Johnson, Martin L, Whittlesey K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20039D296 List:
References
50-382-81-29, NUDOCS 8112310506
Download: ML20039D303 (7)


See also: IR 05000382/1981029

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APPENDIX B

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Report No. 50-382/81-29

Docket:

50-382

Category A2-

Licensee:

Louisiana Power and Light Company

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Facility Name:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana

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Inspection Conducted:

November 2-6, 1981

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Inspectors:

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L. Ec Martin, Reactor _ Inspector, Projects Section 3

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(Paragraphs 1, 2~&;6)

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C. E.. Johnson, Reactor Inspector,-Engineering &

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Materials Section (Paragraphs 2 &'5)

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[K.A.Whittlesey,ReactorInspectorTrainee,

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Engineering ~& Materials Section (Paragraphs 2, 3 & 4)

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Accompanying

Personnel:

R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering & Materials Section

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Approved:

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W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section 3 , f

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R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering & Materials Section

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 2-6, 1981 (Report 50-382/81-29)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of safety-related construction

activities, including follow up on licensee identified Construction Deficiencies

(50.55(e)); site tour; electrical penetration assembly installation; and safety-

related pipe support and restraint installation.

The inspection involved 99

inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors.

Results:

Of the four areas inspected, one violation was identified during the

site tour (violation - failure to follow procedures for the protection of electrical

penetration assemblies, paragraph 3).

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

Louisiana Power & Light' Company

T. F. Gerrets, QA Manager

D. B.-Lester, Plant Manager, Nuclear

W. M. Morgan, QA Supervisor

J. Woods, QC Engineer

B. P. Brown, QA Engineer

R. G. Bennet,-QA Engineer

R. G. Pittman, QA Engineer

B. M. Toups, QA Engineering Technician

C. J. Decareaux, Project Coordinator

Other Personnel

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J. Cutierrez, QA Site Supervisor,-Ebasco_ Services, Inc. (Ebasco)_

L. A. Stinson, Manager, Site Quality Program, Ebasco

R. J. Milhiser, Site Manager, Ebasco

W. Yaeger, Senior Resident Engineer, Ebasco

J. DeBreaux, Site Support Project Engineer, Ebasco

J. D. Kenney, Project Manager, Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc. (T-B)

_ L. Richardson, QA Supervisor, T-B

R. L. Hadley, Chief Engineer, Fischbach & Moore, Inc. (F&M)

E..J. Ritzmann, Project ~QC-Manager, F&M

R. M. Ronquillo, QA Manager, Gulf Engineering (Gulf)

J. Abbott, QA Supervisor, Mercury Company (Mercury)

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel

during the course of the inspection.

All of the above listed personnel attended the exit interview held on

November 6, 1981.

2.

Review of Items Reported Under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)

During this inspection, a review was conducted of quality assurance documen-

tation relative to the following items reported under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).

(Closed) 'Significant Construction Deficiency:

" Containment Electrical

Penetration Bolting Failure," reported in licensee _ letter LPL 9865,

~ September 27, 1978.

Subsequant to the_ final report of December 29, 1978, for the subject signi-

ficant construction deficiency, problems encountered while implementing

corrective action necessitated additional repair.

On November 5, 1981, the

NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's supplemental final report, dated July 14,

1981, and the F&M documentation of the rework. Weld repairs were performed

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in accordance with FCR-E-911, and sandblasting and priming of the flanges

conform to Ebasco Specification LOU 1564.734.

F&M Inspection Report 306-46-337

shows work complete (flanges installed and mounting bolts torqued in accord-

ance with Conax Procedure IPS-374, and IPS-151, Rev. 1, respectively).

Based on the review conducted during this inspection, this item is consid-

ered closed.

(Closed) Significant Construction Deficiency:

Eight Reactor Coolant Loop

"D" Stops, manufactured by Industrial Engineering Works, were received on

site with obvious weld deficiencies.

These were reported to the NRC under

the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) as Serious Construction Deficiency

(SCD) 15, after the conditions had been noted by an NRC inspector and docu-

mented as an item of noncompliance in NRC Report 50-382/80-07.

Follow-up

inspections were performed and this infraction was closed in NRC Report

50-382/81-07.

Further follow-up actions were performed and documented in

NRC Report 50-382/81-12, after access was gained to the area of the eight

"D" stops.

Based on the actions documented in the above reports, SCD-15 is considered

closed.

(Closed) Inadequate Clearance Between Process Pipe' System and Box-Type

Supports / Restraints.

The NRC inspector reviewed the corrective action plan for this deficiency, and

discussed corrective action steps with Ebasco Engineering and T-B.

Correc-

tive action is being implemented and is in process.

Ebasco Engineering

has performed stress analyses on the supports in question, and has submitted

results to T-B.

Ebasco has indicated to T-B which supports are to be

accepted as-is, and which ones need to be reworked.

Supplemental work order 103 to contract W3-NY-ll, changes the contract require-

ments on restraint gap clearances to prevent this deficiency from recurring.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Significant Construction Deficiency:

Flexible Liquid Tight Wir-

ing Conduit Covering Failure (Anaconda), reported in licensee letter LPL 15027

on September 2, 1980.

The NRC inspector inspected the replacement and repair of conduit inside

containment and reviewed NRC-W3-2175 and rework assignments 2460 and 2086.

The repair materials and the procedu e were approved by Anaconda and met

the requirements of IEEE 384.

This item is considered closed.

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3.

Site Tour

On November 2, 1981, the NRC inspectors walked through the Reactor and

Auxiliary Buildings to observe the progress of construction and con-

struction practices involved.

During the site tour, the NRC inspector observed that clamshell covers were

missing or. dangling loose from numerous electrical penetrations on both the

primary and secondary sides.

Penetrations 1075B and 10lSA were observed

in such an unprotected condition, with no-ongoing construction related

activities.

A gauge for monitoring pressure was also observed missing from

penetration 120SMD.

Closer inspection revealed tools and trash in pull boxes,

junction boxes, and electrical cabinets.

Discussion with licens~ee QA repre-

sentatives confirmed that these conditions had been observed and were addressed

in memoranda referencing CMI deficiencies.

Despite acknowledgement of the

conditions, penetrations throug..out the plant remained unprotected.

Paragraph 8.1.4.e of the LP&L Final Safety Analysis Report requires that

electrical penetration assemblies-be maintained to meet the requirements

of IEEE Standard 336-1971, paragraph 5.'l.2, which requires adequate barriers

and protsctive covers to assu.re items will not be damaged as a result of

adjacent construction. activity. -Ebasco CMI 28, Revision 8, " Care and

Maintenance Instruction for Electrical Penetration Assemblies," paragraph D.2,

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requires adequate protection during in place storage from damage and deter-

ioration.as'a result of activities >and conditions.in the vicinity.

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conditions observed at tne time of this inspection were contrary to the

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above.

This istconsidered aliolationiof Criterion V of Appendix 8 to

10 CFR 50.

In response. to the f nspector's1 concerns, on No' ember 4,1981,-

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F&M generated' Surveillance Inspection Report IRil22-52-698, identifying

unprotected electrical penetrations and~ initiated replacement of protectiv'e

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barriers.

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Electrical Penetration' Assemblies

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The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures, drawings, and instructions

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relative to electrical penetrations:

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CP 314, Rev. 5

Insta_Ilation of Electrical Penetrations

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CP 406, Rev. 4

Testing and Maintaining Electrical Penetration

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Assemblies

QCP 314, Rev. 0

Installation of Electrical Penetrations

IPS 151.

Installation and Maintenance of Electrical

Penetration Assemblies

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C0nax Dwg. 73320-10002-01 : Assembly Drawing

LOU 1564.258-

ContainmentEleitricalEquipment;ClasslEEquipment

CHI 28, Rev._8

Care and Maintenance Instructions for Electrical

Penetration Assemblies.

Initial review of records relative to quality aspects of penetrations will

be continued on subsequent inspections.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems

A.

Review of Work Procedures

The NRC inspector reviewed work procedures prepared by T-B.

All

procedures reviewed pertaining to sa.fety-related pipe support and

restraint systems were. approved by,a.uthorized licensee personnel.

Procedures reviewed appear to assure the~ technical _ adequacy of.

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activities pertaining to: safety-related' pipe supports and restraint

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systems, and they appear to comply with:NRC requirements and licensee

commitments.

Procedures reviewed included:

TBP-24, Rev. J

Hanger an'd{Sup ort Iristallation Procedure

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TBP-44,'Rev. D

Installation and_ Inspection of-Pipe Rupture and/or-

Whip Restraints and Seismic I Structural Steel

TBP-23, Rev. B

Inspection of High Strength Bolts and Calibration

of Inspection Hand Torque Wrench

TBP-33, Rev. D

Procedure for Inspecting Drilled - In Expansion-

Type Anchors for Seismic Class I Structures

All procedures contained appropriate inspection checklist forms for

complete inspection sign-off.

B.

Records Review

The NRC inspector reviewed records of completed pipe supports and-

restraints in the T-B records vault.

The completed supports contained

all required documents such as the weld control-record, and field

inspection checklist.

All documents were' signed,- initialed _and

dated'in the appropriate spaces'as required by~. procedure.

Some of the records reviewed also contained inspection records for

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high strength bolts and expansion type anchors for the structural

plate attachment to the wall.

The NRC inspector reviewed the_ test

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and inspection data of both expansion type anchors and high strength

bolts.

All test and inspection data appeared to comply with the

acceptance criteria as required by procedure.

The NRC inspector checked the calibration records of torque wrenches

used in the tests and inspections performed.

This was done by tracing

the control tool number from the inspection data forms from the pipe

supports records. All torque wrenches appeared to be in calibration

during the period of their use.

Records reviewed are listed below by support number.

CSRR-329 Containment Spray System

CCRR-995 Component Cooling System

CCRR-241 Component Cooling System

CDRR-244 Condensate System

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CSRR-316 Containment Spray System

CCRR-525 Component Cooling System

The NRC inspector reviewed the welders qualification records on work

performed on the above supports.

All welders appeared to be qualified

for the work performed to the specified weld procedures.

C.

Observation of Work

The NRC inspector accompanied a T-B Quality Control inspector on a

routine inspection of completed pipe supports and restraints in safety-

related areas.

The'NRC inspector discussed procedural requirements

and acceptance criteria for the supports under inspection.

The

Quality Control inspector appeared to have adequate knowledge of both

procedural requirements and inspection. criteria.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Exit Interview

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The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the

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inspection on November 6, 1981.

The NRC inspectors summarized the purpose,

scope, and findings-of the inspection.

The licensee representatives acknowl-

edged the statements with regard to tite violation.

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