ML20039D120
| ML20039D120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1981 |
| From: | Callan L, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039D115 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-81-30, 50-368-81-29, NUDOCS 8112310340 | |
| Download: ML20039D120 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1981030
Text
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION
REGION IV
Reports: 50-313/81-30
Licenses: DP R-51
50-368/81-29
Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas
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Inspection Conducted: October 22 - November 21, 1981
Inspectors:
/A R7 j m m
/.2/s/ 8 /
W. D. JoMson, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector
'Da'te
Pfofel
w
14 J .
llan, Resident Reactor Inspector
/Date
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Approved:
) ')11 A b e w ,1 ~ f
/2/7/8/
D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2
'Date
Inspection Summary
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Inspection conducted during period of October 22 through November 21, 1981
(Report 50-313/81-30)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including operational safety veri-
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fication, surveillance, maintenance, follow up on IE Bulletins, follow up on IE
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Circulars, facility operating license, and health physics procedures.
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The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results : Within the seven areas inspected, three apparent violations were identi-
fied in three areas (failure to maintain a current copy of the facility operating
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license. paragraph 8; station battery rack discrepancies, paragraph 4; and improper
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control of health physics procedures, paragraph 9).
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8112310340 811208
PDR ADOCK 05000313
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Inspection conducted during period of October 22 through November 21, 1981
(Report 50-368/81-29)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including operational safety
verification, surveillance, maintenance, follow up on previously identified
items, follow up on IE Bulletins, follow up on IE Circulars, facility operating
license, and health physics procedures.
The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the eight areas inspected, four apparent violations were identi-
fied in three areas (failure to maintain a current copy of the facility operating
license, paragraph 8; failure to lock a Category E valve in position, paragraph 5;
improper installation of a seismic Class I pipe hanger, paragraph 5; and improper
control of health physics procedures, paragraph 9).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO General Manager
J. Levine, Engineering & Technical Support Manager
B. A. Baker, Operations Manager
T. N. Cogburn, Plant Analysis Superintendent
E. C. Ewing, Plant Engineering Superintendent
L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager
J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent
J. Albers, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
M. J. Bolanis, Health Physics Superintendent
R. Wewers, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent
L. Taylor, Operations Technical Engineer
C. Burchard, Health Physics Supervisor
R. Green, Health Physics Supervisor
C. Shively, Plant Performance Supervisor
R. Turner, Electrical Engineering Supervisor
L. J. Dugger, Special Projects Manager
J. Draggs, Bechtel OA
L. W. Schempp, Manager, Nuclear QC
R. A. Roderick, Human Resources Supervisor
The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,
technicians and administrative personnel.
2.
Follow up on Previously Identified Items (Unit 2)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 368/8022-03: Seismic qualifications of EG-R surp
sightglass on 2P7A.
The NRC inspector has reviewed the licensee's seismic analysis for
the EG-R sump sightglass on 2P7A and has no further questions.
(Closed) Open Item 368/8110-06: Evaluation of PIC-6A survey instrument.
The licensee's preventive maintenance program appears to provide
adequate reliability of the PIC-EA. Licensee Health Physics
technicians have been trained to perform battery checks frequently
during extended use of the PIC-6A to compensate for its more rapid
battery depletion rate compared to other commonly used radiation
survey instruments.
3.
IE Circular Followup (Units 1 and 2)
For the IE Circulars listed below, the NRC inspector verified that the
circular was received by licensee management, that a review for applica-
bility was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility,
appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
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80-10 Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification
of Equipment
80-15 Loss of RCP Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown
81-01 Honeywell Indicating Pushbutton Switches
81 -02 Perfomance of NRC-Licensed Individuals on Duty
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81-03 Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation
81 -05 Self-Aligning Rod End Bushings for Pipe Supports
81-07 Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material
81-09 Containment Effluent Water Bypasses Radiation
Monitor
81-1 0 Steam Voiding in RCS During DHR Cooldown
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
IE Bulletin Follow-up (Units 1 and 2)
For the IE Bulletins listed below the NRC inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that
the written response included the infomation required to be reported,
that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments
based on infomation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that
licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appro-
priate on-site management representatives, that infomation discussed in the
licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken
by the licensee was as described in the written response.
IE Bulletin 79-16_
This bulletin was issued'on July 26, 1979, and addressed " Vital Area Access
Controls." The licensee's response to this bulletin was dated September 13,
1979. The NRC inspector discussed this bulletin and response with the
licensee's site Security Ccordinator.
This bulletin was issued on July 26, 1979, and addressed " Pipe Cracks in
Stagnant Borated Water Systems at pWR Plants." Revision 1 to this bulletin
was issued on October 29, 1981. Licensee responses to this bulletin were
submitted on the following dates:
August 24, 1979
March 7,1980
October 16, 1980
November 11, 1980
These responses provided the results of the reviews and inspections performed
in response to the requirements of IEB 79-17.
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This IEB, entitled, " Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume
Control System Holdup Tanks," was issued on March 10, 1980. The licensee's
response was dated June 10, 1980. This response outlined the actions
required to preclude problems of the sort described in the bulletin. These
actions included addition of vacuum breakers on the Unit 2 Boron Management
Holdup Tanks, installing heat tracing to protect certain tank vacuum breakers
from freezing, development of procedures for periodic surveillance on the
vacuum protection valves on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Refueling Water Tanks and
on the Unit 2 NaOH tanks, and construction of a platform to allow inspection
of the Unit 2 RWT vacuum breaker during icing conditions. A review of li-
censee records indicated that these actions have all been completed.
This bulletin was issued on April 17, 1980, and addressed "Hydramotor Actu-
ator Deficiencies." The licensee has provided responses dated July 8
July 31, and December 4, 1980. Additional written response from the licen-
sea is required to provide the information required by this bulletin.
This bulletin, entitled, " Potential idsapplication of Rosemount Inc.
Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters," was issued on June 27, 1980.
The licensee's response was dated July 31, 1981. This letter provided the
required information and stated that the model 1152 transmitters used for
emergency feedwater flow would be replaced. DCP-80-1084 has been perforrced,
replacing the four model 1152 transmitters with model ll53-HA5.
This bulletin, entitled, " Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru
Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side High Energy Line
Break," was issued on July 24, 1980. The licensee's response dated
September 22, 1980, demonstrated that adequate flow would be maintainSu
through the AND high pressure safety injection pumps during worst case RCS
system pressure and flow pressure drop conditions.
This bulletin, dated November 6,1980, dealt with valve yokes supplied by
Malcolm Foundry Company. The licensee's response, dated Decenber 8, 1980,
reported that no valve parts used in safety-related systen at ANO were
cast by Malcolm Foundry.
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This bulletin, dated November 14, 1980, dealt with Valcor solenoid valves
having part numbers V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3. The licensee's response,
dated November 24, 1980, reported that none of the subject solenoid valves
were installed at ANO.
This bulletin was issued on April 9,1981, and supplemented on August 18, 1981.
This bulletin addressed " Failure of Gate Valves to Close Against Differential
Pressure." The licensee responded to this bulletin and supplement by letters
dated May 22, September 10, and November 6,1981.
The NRC inspector reviewed tne licensee's responses, discussed this bulletin
with licensee representatives, and had no further questions.
This bulletin, dated April 10, 1981, addressed cooling water flow blockage
to safety system components by Corbicula. The experience at ANO in
September 1980, with Corbicula formed much of the basis for this bulletin.
The licensee's response, dated May 22, 1981, provided the required informa-
tion, giving design change descriptions, inspection results, and flow veri-
fication test results for the service water systems at ANO. This response
also addressed the fire water system and detection and prevention of clam
fouling.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors
verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout
records and verified proper return-to-service of affected components. Tours
of accessible areas of the units were conducted to obsers a plant equipment
conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive
vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors, by observation and direct
interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented
in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified
implementation of radiation protection controls. The NRC inspectors walked
down the accessible portions of the Unit 1 Train B High Pressure Injection,
Unit 2 Containment Spray (both trains), Unit 2 Sodium Hydroxide Addition
(both trains) systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed
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portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste
shipments and barreling. On October 30, 1981, the NRC inspector performed
an independent radiation survey of the licensee's land-fill disposal site.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
A.
Unit 2 Motor Control Centers
Using checklists from Operating Procedure 2107.01, the NRC inspector
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checked the following switchgear and Motor Control Centers:
2A3
2A4
2B5
2B6
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2B51
2B61
2B52
2B62
2B53
2B63
2854
2B64
Although no breakers were found to be in the wrong position, numerous
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other discrepancies were identified. A list of the identified discrep-
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ancies was given to the Unit 2 Operations Superintendent. This list
included:
32 breakers with one or more burned out
.
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status lamps
9 checklist discrepancies
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10 breaker label discrepancies
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2 breakers with status lamps missing
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colored lenses
,
The correction of the identified discrepancies and the establishment of
a program to periodically inspect vital Motor Control Centers for burned
out status lamps will be reviewed by the NRC inspector during a future
inspection. This is an open item.
(368/8129-06)
B.
Unit 2 Pipe Hanger
On October 29, 1981, the NRC inspector performed a follow-up inspection
of the seismic Class I critical pipe hanger on the service water return
line from 2E52A, the Unit 2 "A" Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump seal
cooler which was installed under Job Order 15557 in response to violation
3F8/8128-04
The inspector found that the bolts on the pipe clamp of
tais hanger were all loose. This is an apparent violation.
(368/8129-05)
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C.
Unit 2 Category E Valve
During a routine tour on October 27, 1981, the NRC inspector found that
manual valve 2SW-38, the "B" Service Water Pump discharge valve, was open
but not locked as required by Operating Procedure 2102.01, Attachment E,
" Category E Valve Position Verification." This is an apparent violation.
(368/8129-04)
D.
Unit 1 Station Battery Rack
During a routine tour on October 27, 1981, the NRC inspector noted the
following discrepancies in the north upper rack of the Unit 1 #1 Station
Battery Bank:
Three polystyrene cell spacers missing
.
One end rail missing
.
One end rail secured at only one end
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Three of six required tie rods missing
.
The other three tie rods not connected to rack
.
These conditions were contrary to the design configuration shnwn on
drawing 6600-E-16-3-5. The licensee's failure to maintain this battery
rack in its design configuration had the potential to degrade the rack's
seismic response capability. This is an apparent violation.
(313/8130-04)
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required surveillance
testing on the Unit 1
'B' High Pressure Injection Pump (Procedure 1104.02
Supplement II) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with
adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting
conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected
conponents were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical
Specifications and procedure requirements, that test results were reviewed
by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any defi-
ancies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Diesel-driven Emergency Firewater Pump (Procedure 1104.32)
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Unit 2 'A' Containment Spray Pump, 2P35A (Procedure 2104.05
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SupplementI)
Unit 1 Lead System Hydrogen Purge Monthly Test (Procedure 1104.33
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Supplement I)
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Electric Fire Pump (Procedure 1104.32 Supplement I)
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Fire System Flush and Alarm Check (Procedure 1104.32
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SupplementIX)
Unit 2 "A" Service Wattr Pump (Procedure 2104.29 SupplementIA)
.
Unit 2 "A" Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (Procedure 2104.40
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Supplement I)
Unit 2 Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (Procedure 2104.36
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Supplement I)
Unit 2 Quarterly Boric Acid Valve Stroke Test (Procedure 2104.03
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Supplement 3)
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or
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standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting con-
ditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activ-
ities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as
applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; quality control records were
maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were imple-
mented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance
which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Unit 2 Refueling Water Tank Level Transmitter Freeze Protection
.
Upgrade (DCP-81-2018 and J.0.16930)
Replace oil in Unit 1 Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump bearing
.
(J.0. 07500)
Test run Unit 2 "A" High Pressure Safety Injection Pump motor
.
following bearing replacement (J.0.16861)
Repair leaks on Unit 2 "B" Charging Pump discharge relief valve,
.
suction relief valve, and discharge check valve (J.O.19096,
19100, and 19097)
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Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 2 "A" Pump Motor, the
inspector verified that this system had been returned to service properly.
The NRC inspector expressed concern to plant management about the number of
annunciator alarms that are usually present in the Control Rooms. A
coordinated effort is needed to verify the necessity of these alarms and
to delete the ones which are determined to be more of a nuisance than an
aid to the operators,
In addition, there exists a backlog of job orders
for repair of malfunctioning alarms or instruments which are causing invalid
alarms. This is an open item.
(313/8130-01; 368/8129-01)
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Facility Operating Licenses (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector found that the licensee does not maintain current copies of
the Facility Operating Licenses on site, and that the copies of the licenses
maintained at the corporate office were not current.
Lacking current
copies of the Facility Operating Licenses, the licensee was in apparent
noncompliance with 10 CFR 19.11 which requires that a current copy cf the
license be posted.
(313/8130-03; 368/8129-03)
9.
Health Physics Procedures
During a review of current health physics procedures on November 9,1981, the
NRC inspector noted numerous examples of superseded procedures that had not
been cancclled as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedure 1000.06,
" Procedure Review, Approval and Revision Control." This administrative
procedure requires that, as part of the review process for safety-related
procedures, a Form 1013.02M, " Deletion to Station Procedures," be completed
to cancel any superseded procedures. The following health physics precedures
were issued without cancelling the superseded procedures:
New Procedure
Superseded Procedure
a.
1632.008 " Portal
1602.31
Monitors"
b.
1632.009 " Condenser
1602.26
R-Meter"
c.
1632.006 " Continuous
1602.22
Air Monitors"
d.
1622.004 " Radiological
1602.17 and
Survey Pethodology"
1602.18
e.
1632.005 " Portable
1602.19
Air Samplers"
f.
1612.010 " Decontamination
1602.67
g.
1632.013 "Harshaw 2271 TLD
1602.50
System Operation"
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The licensee's failure to maintain these safety-related procedures in
accordance with Administrative Procedure 1000.06 is an apparent violation
(313/8130-02; 368/8129-02).
Additionally, the NRC inspector noted that during the past few weeks the
licensee has implemented a number of significant procedural chances in the
health physics area without adequate training for those personnel affected
by the changes. These procedural changes include the following:
Removal of the portal radiation monitor and the hand-and-foot
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radiation monitor from the exit point of the controlled access
area, and the corresponding increased reliance on the use of the
"frisker" to detect personnel contamination.
Issuance of one personal dosimeter, instead of the previous two,
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for access to areas with less than 100 millirems per hour radiation
levels.
Extensive modifications to the prescribed protective clothing to
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be worn by personnel entering controlled access areas.
Modification to the procedures used to avoid the spread of contami-
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nation within controlled access areas.
The above changes were implemented without preliminary training or explana-
tions for the majority of the non-health physics personnel who frequent the
licensee's controlled access areas. The inspector is particularly concerned
about the licensee's failure to provide adequate training for these changes
due to their effect on the many contractor personnel who work inside
controlled access.
10. Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant General Manager) and
other members of the AP&L staff at the end of various segments of this
inspection. At these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the
inspection and the findings.
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