ML20039B364
| ML20039B364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B362 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112220582 | |
| Download: ML20039B364 (3) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.11 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAM POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
_ DOCKET NO. S0-364 INTRODUCTION During routine preventive maintenance on diesel generator (DG) 1-2A the engine driven jacket water pump bearing required replacement. A spare replacement bearing was dropped during an attempt to install it. Additional spares were unavailable on site.
Colt Industries, the DG representative, was on site to assist Alabama Power Company (APCo) representatives during DG maintenance.
It was estimated that between 48 and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> would be needed after receipt of a new bearing. The new bearing was scheduled to arrive late on October 12. On this basis, the currently allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> would be exceeded at 11:31 PM on October 12.
Therefore, APCo advised the NRC staff by phone of its request for a temporary authorization for a three-day extension to DG l-2A allowed outage time. The action would preclude a Unit No. 2 shutdown.
Unit No.1 is currently in a refueling shutdown, thus there is enough excess emergency power available from the other DG sets to allow continued operation of Unit No.
2.
A follow-up telecopy letter was sent to NRC. Subsequently, the NRC staff reviewedthe safety aspects of the request as discussed below and then granted the emergency authorization on October 12, 1981 by telephone. Our letter of October 13, 1981 confirmed the autnorization.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUTION The Farley site emergency powar system has a total of five DG's to furnish standby emergency power.
Such power would only be needed if the off-site elec-trical grids were to fail.
This event is described as a loss of Off-Site Power (LOSP).
For this case, Unit No. 2 energency power would be provided to both safety trains from DG's 1C and 2B.
Unit No.1 (shutdown for refueling) would have energency power to safety train B from DG 18.
For an event requiring safety injection (SI) actuation on Unit No. 2 concurrent with the LOSP to both Units No.1 and No. 2, DG 2B would provide the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) loads for Unit No. 2 (safety train B). Operator action (using established manual loadings procedures) could then provide many of redundant safety train A loads. Thus, all of one safety train loads would be provided automatically.
In addition, many of the redundant train A loads would be available.
The probability of the coincident event described above during the three-day extension period requested is acceptably low. Adequate safety train power is available.
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. For the more unlikely case of failure of the service water pord (ultimatt heat sink) concurrent with the LOSP, sufficient emergency power is also available..Six river water pumps provide make-up water to the service water' pond. With Unit No. I shutdown and Unit No. 2 operating (current situation) only two river water pumps are needed for accident conditions. APCo evaluated a further, more extreme case where the train B river water pipe line to the service water pond also failed.
This would result in only one river water pump operating in train A.
The probability of this more unlikely event during the three-day extension period requested is acceptably low.
APCo also requested that for the added three days the surveillance testing of the remaining AC sources be reduced. The current Technical Specification requires tests within one hour and at least once every eight hours for all remaining power sources.
Such tests would start and run the remaining DG's about thirty additional times.
APCo considers added starts and test runs excessive due to the potential for accelerr ted wear on the DG's.
Off-site power transmission lines are operable and have no scheduled outages during the repair period on DG l-2A.
We have granted such relief previously during repairs to DG-lC and DG-2C.
We are currently reviewing the need for such accelerated testing of the operable DG units during maintenance or repairs to inoperable DG units.
For the three day extension period, we agree that the requested reduction in additional checks is pradent and acceptable.
SU0!ARY During the short interval of time while one DG is being repaired at Farley site the emergency power supplies are adequate..Four other DG's are available for use either automatically or by manual switching. Written procedures are availa bl e.
Senior Reactor Operators and Shift Technical Advisors are trained and briefed on the power capabilities existing during the short period with a non-standard power lineup. We consider that adequate safety margin exists at Farley site with Unit No. I shutdown and Unit No. 2 operating during the three-day extension needed to repair DG l-2A.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 651.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
. CONCLUSION ka have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the proba-bility or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
DEC 3 1931 I
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