ML20039A682
| ML20039A682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1981 |
| From: | Haroldsen R, Mays S EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Scholl R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425, TASK-05-02, TASK-5-2, TASK-RR EGG-EA-5646, NUDOCS 8112210127 | |
| Download: ML20039A682 (10) | |
Text
EGG-EA-5646 NOVEMBER 1981 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM, TOPIC V-ll.A,
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ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES L%
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This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6425 U E G n G ,o,u 8112210127 811130 PDR RES
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FORM EG6G-396 en n m -
INTERIM REPORT '-
Accession No.
Report No. EGG-EA-5646 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentatien, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)
Subject of this Document Systematic Evaluation Program, Topic V-ll. A, Electrical, Instrumentation,
. and Contrcl Features for Isolation of High and Low Pressure Systems, Palisades Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-255 -
Type of Document:
o' Informal Report Author (s):
R. O. Haroldsen S. E. Mays Dal of Document:
November 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Divislori:
- R. F. Scholl, Jr., Division of Licensing This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internat use. it has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.
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EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
Under DOE Contract NRC FIN No. A No.6425DE-AC07 761D01570 INTERIM REPORT l
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SYSTEMATIC. EVALUATION PROGRAM
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TOPIC y-11,A
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_f,LECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR
.lSOLATION OF HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS
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PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION
, Docket No. 50-255 November 1981 R. O. Haroldsen S. E. Mays RELIABILITY AND STATISTICS BRANCH
! ENGINEERING ANALYSIS DIVISION EG&G IDAH0, INC.
O 10-23-81 l l
ABSTRACT This SEP technical evaluation, for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, reviews the electrical, instrumentation and control features used to isolate low pressure systems from the reactor coolant primary system.
5 FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the " Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)"
being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear 9eactor Regulation, Division of Licensing by EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
Reliability & Statisitics Branch.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization B&R 20-10-02-05, FIN A6425.
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CONTENTS 1.0 I N TR O D UC T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 CRITERIA ........................................................ 1 2.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System ........................ 1 2.2 Emergency Core Cooling System ............................. 2 2.3 Other Systems ............................................. 2 3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION ....................................... 2 3.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System ........................ 3
, 3.2 Safety Injection System ................................... 3 3.3 Cnemical and Vol ume Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.4 Radioactive Waste Treatment System ........................ 4 4.0
SUMMARY
......................................................... 4
5.0 REFERENCES
...................................................... 5 G
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC V-11.A ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this review is to determine if the electrical, instru-mentation, and control (EI&C) features used to isolate systems with a lower
. pressure rating than the reactor coolant primary system are in compliance with current licensing criteria as outlined in SEP Topic V-ll.A. Current guidance for isolation of high and low pressure systems is contained in Branch Technical Position (BTP) EICSB-3, BTP RSB-5-1, and the Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 6.3.
2.0 CRITERIA 2.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems. Isolation criteria for RHR systems contained in BTP RSB-5-1 are:
(1) The suction side must be provided with the following isolation features:
(a) Two power-operated valves in series, with posi-tion indicated in the control room.
i (b) The valves must have independent and diverse interlocks to prevent opening if the reactor
' coolant system (RCS) pressure is above the design pressure of the RHR system.
(c) The valves must have independent and diverse interlocks to ensure at least one valve closes upon an increase in RCS pressure above the design pressure of the RHR system.
(2) The discharge side must De provided with one of the following features:
(a) The valves, position indicators, and interlocks described in (1)(a) through (1)(c) above.
(b) One or more check valves in series with a nor-mally-closed power-operated valve which has its position indicated in the control room. If this valve is used for an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) function, the valve must open upon receipt of a safety injection signal (SIS) when I
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RCS pressure has decreased below RHR system design pressure.
(c) Three check valves in series.
(d) Two check valves in series, provided that both may be periodically checked for leak tightness and are checked at least annually.
2.2 Emergency Core Cooling System. Isolation criteria for ECCS are contained in SRP 6.3. Isolation of ECCS to prevent overpressurization must meet one of the following features:
(1) One or more check valves in series with a normally- '
closed motor-operated valve (MOV) which is to be opened upon receipt of a SIS when RCS pressure is less than the ECCS design pressure ,
(2) Three check valves in series (3) Two check valves in series, provided that both may be periodically checked for leak tightness and are checked at least annually.
2.3 Other Systems. All other low pressure systems interfacing with the RCS must meet the following isolation criteria from BTP EICSB-3:
(1) At least two valves in series must be provided to isolate the system when RCS pressure is above the system design pressure und valve position should De indicated in the control room (2) For systems with two MOVs, each MOV should have independent and diverse interlocks to prevent opening until RCS pressure is below the system design pres-sure and should automatically close when RCS pressure increases above system design pressure (3) For systems with one check valve and a MOV, the MOV should be interlocked to prevent opening if RCS pres-sure is above system design pressure and should auto-matically close whenever RCS pressure exceeds system design pressure.
3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION There are four systems at Palisades Nuclear Station which have a direct interface with the RCS pressure boundary and have a design pressure rating of all or part of the system which is less than that of the RCS. These sys-i tems are the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), the Safety Injection System (SIS), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Radioactive Waste Treatment System (RWTS).
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3.1 Residual Heat Removal System. Evaluation of the isolation func-tions of the RHR system nave oeen previously conducted and are included in a memorandum to D. M. Crutchfield (SEP Branch Chief) from J. Knox (Plant Syste,n Branch) of 31 Mar 1980. Deviations from current licensing criteria noted included the lack of independent and diverse interlocks to prevent opening or to automatically close the RHR system isolation valves when RCS pressure exceeds RHR system design pressure.
3.2 Safety Injection System. One SIS subsystem consists of four pressurized accumulators with each accumulator isolated from the RCS by a pair of check valves. Tnere are connections upstream of each check valve that can allow them to be tested. A normally-open motor-operated isolation valve upstream of the check valves for each accumulator has position indi-cation in the control room. Each MOV is locked open during reactor opera-tion.
The second SIS subsystem consists of two loops, each supplied by a high pressure safety injection pump. Each loop discharges through a common header to each of the four RCS cold legs. Isolation is provided by two check valves in series, one in each of the four common injection headers and one in each header supply branch line. The check valves in each high pressure SIS loop are not testable since there are no locations where leak-age could be determined from tne outboard valve (farthest from the RCS). A motor-operated isolation valve with position indication in the control room is provided in each branch of the SIS loops. Tnese valves open upon receipt of a safety injection signal, but have no interlocks preventing opening when RCS pressure is above SIS design pressure.
The third SIS subsystem uses the low pressure injection pumps to pro-vide low pressure water from the refueling water storage tank to the reactor vessel through the same lines used for high pressure injection. Isolation is provided by an MOV in each of the branches in series with two check valves, one in each branch line and one in each of the common injection headers. The MOVs open upon receipt of a safety injection signal but have no interlocks to prevent opening when RCS pressure is above SIS design pressure. The outboard (farthest from RCS) check valves are not testable since there are no locations to determine leakage.
The SIS is not in compliance with the current licensing criteria of SRP 6.3 since the 12 outboard check valves in the high and low pressure safety injection lines to the RCS are not testable, and the MOVs in the high and low pressure injection lines have no interlocks to prevent opening when RCS pressure exceeds system design pressure.
3.3 Chemical and Volume Control System. The CVCS takes water from the RCS and passes it through a regenerative heat exchanger, an orifice to reduce its pressure, and a nonregenerative heat exchanger before sending it to the filtering and cleanup portions of the system. After filtering and cleanup, the water may be returned to the RCS by the use of the chargirc pumps, which increase the water pressure and passes it through the regener-ative heat exchanger to either RCS loop iA, RCS loop 2A, or to the pressur-izer auxiliary spray line.
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The CVCS suction line isolation is provided by a solenoid-controlled air-operated valve in series with four parallel solenoid-controlled air-operated valves. Each of these valves is operated from the control room and has valve position indicated. One of the four parallel valves has r'edundant interlocks to prevent opening or to automatically close if the pressure exceeds the design rating of the low pressure portions of the system. The remaining three paral haveautomaticclosureinterlocks.jelvalvesandtheseriesvalvedonot The CVCS discharge line isolation is provided by a common discharge line check valve, a branch check valve in each of the three branches down-stream of the common check valve, and a check valve at each pump discharge. i There is no position indication available in the control room for the check l valves. Tnere are solenoid-controlled air-operated isolation valves in each discharge line branch which have position indication in the control ,
room, but these valves have no interlocks to prevent system overpressuriza-tion.
t Tne CVCS is not in compliance with current licensing criteria for isolation of high and low pressure systems contained in BTP EICSB-3 since the suction and discharge line solenoid-controlled air-operated valves have no interlocks to prevent system overpressurization, and the discharge line check valves have no position indication available in the control room.
The systems does include restrictive orifices and a relief valve designed to limit pressure to below the system rating. Administrative control requires that valves to the purification system be opened prior to those emitting flow to the system to ensure that a flow path is established to permit the required pressure drop.5 3.4 Radioactive Waste Treatment System. The RWTS takes water from the CVCS through four pressure control valves located between the Safety Injection Tank check valves and the RCS check valves for each tank. These valves are controlled by pressure indicating controllers and are used for leak testing the check valves. Isolation is provided by these valves in series with the RCS check valves. The four air operated control valves have position indication in the control room. The valves are interlocked to initiate closure and prevent opening if the pressure exceeds the design rating of the low pressure portions of the systems. This portion of the RWTS is not in compliance with current licensing criteria of BTP ICSB-3 ,
since the RCS check valves do not nave position indication in the control room.5 4.0
SUMMARY
The Palisades Nuclear Station has three systems with a lower design pressure rating than the RCS, which are directly connected to the RCS. The CVCS, SIS, RHR and RWTS systems do not meet current licensing criteria for isolation of high and low pressure systems as specified below.
(1) The CVCS solenoid-controlled air-operated valves have no pressure-related interlocks, and the discharge line check valves have no position indication avail-ab h in the control room as required by BTP EICSB-3 4
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(2) The SIS outboard (farthest from RCS) check valves in the lines going to the RCS from the high and low pressure injection pumps are not testable, and the motor-operated isolation valves in these lines have no pressure-related interlocks as required by SRP 6.3 (3) None of the P.HR system isolation valves automatically close if RCS pressure increases above RHR system design pressure during RHR system operation, and they have no pressure-related interlocks as required by BTP RSB-5-1 (4) The RC3 check valves which protect the RWTS from over
- pressure have no position indication available in the control room as required by BTP ICSB-3.
5.0 REFERENCES
, 1. NUREG-0800, Brancn Technical Positions EICSB-3, RSB-5-1; Standard Review Plan 6.3.
- 2. NRC Memo (Knox to Crutchfield) dated 31 Mar 1980, SEP Review Topic V-llB: RHR Interlock Requirements--Palisades.
- 3. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Palisades Plant.
- 4. Palidades Drawings M-201, -202, -203, -204, and -219.
- 5. Letter, Consumers Power Co. (Vincent) to NRR (Crutchfield), dated 3 July 1981.
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