ML20039A219
| ML20039A219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A199 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.5, TASK-2.E.4.1, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.K.3.13, TASK-2.K.3.27, TASK-TM 50-259-81-28, 50-260-81-28, 50-296-81-28, NUDOCS 8112160378 | |
| Download: ML20039A219 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1981028
Text
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MATERIAL TRANSMITTED liEREWITH
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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
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CONTAINS 2.790@ UNITE] STATES
8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST
N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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0CT 3 01981
Report Nos. 50-259-81-28, 50-260/81-28 and 50-296/81-28
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401
Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296
License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-66
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens, Alabama
Inspectors:
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g R. F. Sul ivan
Date Signed
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f',- J. W. Chase
Date Signed
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G. L. Paulk
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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F. Cantrell,"Section Chief, Division of
Date Signed-
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Resident and Reactor Project Inspection
SUMMARY
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Inspection on August 26 to September 25, 1981
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Areas Inspected
This routine inspection involved 320 resident inspector-hours in the areas of
operational safety, reportable occurrences, plant physical protection, main -
tenance, surveillance testing, reactor trips, licensee action on previous
inspection findings, TMI action items, Unit I refueling, review of plant
operations, flooding of the residual heat removal service water pump room and an
emergency drill.
Resul ts
Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations or-deviations were identified in 9
areas. Six violations were found in 3 areas:
(failure to establish fire watch;
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MATERfAL TRANSMITTED HEREWml
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NS 2.7S0@ SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
appreval or Is:II
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MATERIA!. TRANSMITTED HEREWITH
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CONTAINS 2.790(d) SAFE 3UARDS INE0RVATl0N
failure in area of the security; failure to have special work permit (SWP);
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' failure to follow procedure paragraph 5; food found -in storage areas paragraph 7;
failure to take prompt corrective action). Two deviations were identified in two
areas:
(RHRSW pump test paragraph 9; and the failure of implementation of TVA's
response to inspection report 81-03 paragraph 3).
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MATERIAL. TRANSMITTED HEREWITH -
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CONTAINS 2.790 d) SAFEGUARDS Inf0MMTl0N
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DETAILS I
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
H. L. Abercrombie, Power Plant Superintendent
J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
J. L. Harness, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. G. Hetke, Engineering and Test- Unit Supervisor
D. C. Hims, Engineering and iest Unit Supervisor
R. G. Cockrell, Reactor Engineering Unit Supervisor
J. B. Studdard, Operation Section Supervisor
A. L. Burnette, Assistant Operations Supervisor
R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor
T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
M. W. Haney, Mechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. K. Pittman, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. E. Swindell, Outage Director
B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist
R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety
R. Cole, QA Site Representative Office of Power
Other licensee employees contacted included senior reactor operators,
reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsman, technician, public safety
officers, QA personnel and engineering personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
Management Interview was conducted on August 28, Srptember 4,11,18 and
October 2, 1981, with the Power Plant Superintendent and/or his Assistant
Power Plant Superintendents and other members of his staff. The inspectors
summarized the scope and findings of their inspection activities.
The
licensee was infonned of 6 apparent violations and 2 deviations identified
during the report period.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Violation (296/81-03-05) Welding perfomed on safety related
system in which the individual welds could not be traced to a specific
welder.
The inspector reviewed Division Procedure N74M2 and confimed that
the weld data sheet was revised to include QC verification of welder certi-
fication.
In addition, the inspector reviewed several work plans in
,n~ ogress and noted that the welder had been verified as qualified by QC
prior to welding.
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(Closed) Violation 296/81-03-03) Personnel in high radiation area with no
dose rate instrument. The inspector discussed this incident with.various
personnel on site and found that they are aware of the requirement for
having a dose rate instrument with them in a high radiation areas.
(Closed) Violation 296/81-03-04) Personnel in radiation area without proper
Special Work Permit (SWP).
The inspector reviewed the corrective action
taken by the licensee and found it to be satisfactory. The inspector agrees
with the licensee that this incident was due to an error in judgement.on the
part-of the health physics technician.
(Closed) Violation (259/81-03-01, 260/81-03-01 and 296/81-03-02) Removal of
contaminated material from a regulated area without having the material
cleared by health physics. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response
to this item with regards to the retraining of the foreman involved and
found it to have been accomplished. The licensee stated in the response to
this item that an Outage Safety Awareness Bulletin would be used to brief
all outage personnel involved in the transportation of material from the
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plant. The inspector and the licensee could find no Outage Safety Awareness
Bulletin which discussed this item. The Assistant Plant Superintendent was
informed on August 28, 1981 that this was an apparent deviation from a
commitment.
(first example) (259/81-28-01, 260/81-28-01 and 296/81-28-01).
On August 31, 1981, an Outage Safety Awareness Bulletin was issued which
satisfied the licensee's commitment.
(Closed) Violation (296/81-03-01) Failure to follow procedure which
resulted in breaching of secondary containment door. The inspector reviewed
the licensee's response and found it to be adequate in regards to the new
interlock system. A new secondary containment door interlock system has
been installed since this incident and appears to prevent similar problem of
this nature, however; the licensee also committed to issuing a Outage Safety
Awareness Bulletin to discuss the importance of observing information signs
posted in various areas of the plant.
The inspector and the licensee could
find no Bulletin which addressed this subject. This was identified to the
Assistant Plant Superintendent as an apparent deviation from a commitment
(second example) (259/81-28-01, 260/81-28-01 and 296/81-28-01) on
September 14, 1981 an Outage Safety Awareness Bulletin was issued which
satisfied the licensee's commitment.
(Closed) Violation (259/81-06-01, 260/81-06-01 and 96/81-1b 01) Failure to
maintain secondary containment.
Open (259/80-02-03) Doorwatch to be sta-
tioned in secondary containment entry way to insure that secondary contain-
ment is not violated.
In June, 1981, the licensee installed a new secondary
containment door interlock system which is designed to prevent the opening
of two doors to the same airlock at the same time thereby losing secondary
containment. The new door interlock system is working satisfactorily.
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'(Closed) Violation (260/80-15-01) Failure to follow procedure. The in-
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spector reviewed the corrective action performed by the licensee and had no
questions.
(Closed) Deviation (259/80-43-01) Failure to revise administrative pro-
cedures on firewatches by date committed to. The inspector performed an in
office review ~of the licensee's response. Since this item was identified
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the inspector have noted no similar occurrences.
(Closed) . Violation (259/80-40-01) Failure to maintain adequate records.
The inspector monitored the recording of scram discharge header water levels
frequently after this event and found no futher instances of questionable,
recordings.
In January,1981, the manual system was upgraded to alarm in
the control . room, thereby _ voiding the necessity for 30 minutes level checks-
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by the auxiliary unit operator.
(Closed) Violation (260/80-29-01) No independent fire inspection performed
within three years. The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken to
prevent exceeding the three year audit requirement and found it to be
adequate at the time of the occurrence. Since then, the Technical Specifi-
cations have been changed to place the requirement for the fire audit under
the cognizance of the Nuclear Safety Review Board vice under a surveillance
requirement.
(Closed) Violation (260/80-29-02) Failure to follow procedure for core
verification. The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the
licensee and found it to be adequate. Since this event, no further problems
of this nature have been identified.
4.
Unresolved Items
There were no new unresolved items identified during this report period.
5.
Operational Safety
The inspectors kept informed on a daily bases of the overall plant status
and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily
discussions were held each morning with plant management and various member
of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room that each was
visited ~at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observation included
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems;
status and-alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary
tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence'to
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procedures; adherence to limiting . conditions for operations; temporary
alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control
room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours.were conducted on at least a weekly bases. Portions of
the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and
hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area
controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area
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controls;. personnel badging, personnel search and escort. Informal discus-
sion were held with selected plant personnel in their functional area during
these tours.
On August 22, 1981 at 3:20 a.m. a fire was discovered in the Unit 1 Reactor
Building underneath the tours on the 519 foot level. . The fire was extin-
guished by the fire brigade using a water hose and dry chemicals. The fire
was attributed to weid slag which smoldered in combustable material and did
not erupt into flames until af ter all craft personnel had left the area for
lunch.
The inspector investigated the cause of the fire and identified the fol-
lowing items which helped promote the occurrence of the fire:
(a) Poor housekeeping in the area of welding as combustable materials were
left around which was the main cause of the fire.
(b) The fire permit required two fire watches but only one was provided.
The single' fire watch informed his superior that he could not watch the
three areas where welding was occuring adequately, but; he was not
provided additional help.
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(c) Oxygen and acetalyne lines were not secured at the bottles during the
lunch break. The fire burned through the oxygen and acetalyne line
which then helped promote the spread of the fire.
TVA procedures
currently-require the securing of gas lines at their source only on
shift turnover. TVA has been asked to evaluate this requirement . in
light of this fire.
Prior to the fire, the single fire watch was required to observe three
different welding operations; bay 3, bay 11 and bay 16.
because of the
locations of the welding activities, the fire watch could only observe one
welding operation at a time. Technical Specification 3.11.H requires that a
continuous- fire watch shall be stationed in the immediate vicinity where
work involving open flame, welding or burning-is in progress on August 28,
1981, the assistant plant superintendent was was informed that having only
one fire watch for the three different welding operations in which the fire-
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watch could cnly . observe one operation was an apparent violation , of
Technical Specification 3.11.H. (259/81-28-02)
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While making a tour of Unit 1 reactor building on September 8,.1981, the in-
spector observed-a maintenance worker on the east. scram discharge header
(SDH). The inspector questioned the. foreman in charge of the job as to the
requirements of the SWP since the SDH area was posted as a high radiation
area.
The worker had no dose rate meter with him _ as observed by the
inspector.
.The inspector reviewed SWP 01-1-15285 which the workers
(maintenance man and foreman) used to sign in on for the work in the
vicinity of the east-SDH. The SWP was written specifically for the west SDH
only and required use of a dose - rate meter.
The workers signed in on an-
incorrect SWP and did not-use a does rate meter. No SWP was issued for work
in'the vicinity of the east SDH. The inspector immediately notified plant
staff. . Plant management was informed by the inspector on September 11,1981
that failure to have a _high radiation area controls by issuance of a SWP and
use of'a-dose rate meter was an apparent violation of -technical specifi-
cation 6.3.d.1 which requires entrance to a high radiation ' area be
controlled by issuance of a SWP and dose rate meter. (259/81-28-04) During
a tour of the Unit 2 reactor building on September 10, 1981, . the inspector
noted that weld permit no. 1748 fire prevention checkoff lists and certifi-
cation was not certified prior to welding in the vicinity of torus.griders 7
and 12. Plant management was informed that failure to provide fire preven-
tion certification prior to welding was an apparent violation of technical specification 6.3.A.10, failure to follow procedure as it relates to fire
protection and prevention (259/81-289-05).
Standard Practice 14.1 imple-
ments weld permit procedures of the DPM (Safety and Hazard'Contro! Manual -
procedure F 22).
6.
TMI Action Items
The following TMI action items were reviewed by the inspectors during this
report period. These items were due for implementation on July 1,1981.
a.
II.E.4.1.
Dedicatad Hydrogen Penetrations: The ' action item requires
the liensee to provide separate containment penetrations for the
containment atmosphere dilution system - to ensure single-failure
criteria. TVA's response dated July 16, 1981, states that some modifi-
cations to the system will be necessary to meet single-failure
criteria.
As of yet the final design has .not been approved. The
inspectors will continue to track this item.
b.
II.E.4.2.7. Closure of Containment Purge Valves on High Radiation:
The Browns Ferry primary containment isolation logic had the capability
of automatically isolating -'the containment purge valves when high
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radiation to sensed in the containment exhaust ducting. This item is-
considered closed.
c.
II.K.3.13. -Separation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Initiation Levels. TVA concurs
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with the Boiling Water. Reactor -(BWR) Owners' group recommendation that
the separation of HPCI and RCIC level setpoints' for auto start has no
substantial benefit so will not be performed. TVA is going to modify
the RCIC system to allow for auto restart to'the system. The schedule
for this modification is:
Unit 1 - 3/83 outage
Unit 2 - 3/82 outage
Unit 3 - 9/81 outage
The inspector will continue to track the modification progress.
d.
II.K.3.27. Common Reference Level: TVA's study of the proposed change
finds that the current vessel level indications are not confusing,
therefore, TVA does not plan on providing a common reference level.
This item will remain open for tracking purposes.
e.
I.C.5.
Feedback of Operating Experience. This item was previously
reviewed (IE Report 259, 260, 296/81-14) by the inspector and left open
for further verification of implementation by the licensee. A revised
division . procedure, DPM No. N72A39 was issued on July 28, 1981 to
-reflect the requirements of NUREG-0737. This in turn was implemented
at plant level by issurance of Standard - Practice 21.17, Review,
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Reporting, and Feedback of _ Operating Experience Items, September 9,
1981.
In addition provisions have been made for an annual audit of
this program by the Office of Power Quality Assurance staff. This item
is considered closed.
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In the above area, no violations or deviations were observed.
7.
Review of Plant Operations
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During this report period, the inspector conducted an inspection of the
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licensee's storage areas. ' This inspection consisted of:
a.
Verifying material and space parts are being received, inspected by
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qualified personnel and stored in accordance with licensee procedures.
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b.
Verifying non conforming items are marked / tagged,
c.
Verifying preventive maintenance on stored item was being performed.
d.
Verifying housekeeping and environmental requirements in store room
area was being met.
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Verified limited shelf-life items were controlled in accordance with
procedures.
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In addition the inspector verified traceability on selected safety related
item.
During this inspection the inspector identified food and drink being stored-
in the power stores main storage area and warehouse 3.
This is contrary to
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ANSI.N45.2.2-1972 which states that storage of food and drink in any storage
area will not be permitted.. On September 18, 1981,- the Plant Superintendent
was informed that this was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
Criteria XIII which require measures to control storage of material.
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' food and drink was immediately removed by the licensee from the warehouse
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storage. a rea s.
(259/81-28-06, 260/81-28-03 and 296/81-28-03)
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8.
Unit 1 Refueling
The inspectors reviewed documentation and observed fuel handling operations
during the Unit I refueling outage. Upon completion of fuel loading quality
assurance verification of fuel assembly orientation and location was accom-
plished with satisfactory results. In addition, the inspector verified core
map position and orientation through video recordings taken after Unit 'l
fuel reload was completed. No discrepancies were noted.
9.
Surveillance Testing Observation
The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance
procedures.
The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for
technical adeauacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of
test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal
from service and return to service of the system and review of test data.
a.
SI 4.2.B.3, Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls CSCS Equipment
(Reactor Low Water Level)
b.
Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 19, Pumping Station Flood Protec-
tion, RHRSW pump, and Unwatering Pump Test (RHRSW pump rooms "A"
and
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"B")
c.
SI 3.3.1. A, Primary plant hydro
One deviation and one violation was noted during the observation and
procedural review of item b.
The inspector observed the conduct of MMI-19
on September 14, 1981. During the procedural reviews it was determined that
the approved procedural test requirements differed from the Final Safety
Analysis Report commitments.
Specifically, FSAR answer to question 2.6-5
states that each RHR service water pump will have operability demonstrated
during the flood test procedure. MMI-19' requires only eight of the twelve
RHRSW pumps to be checked for operability. In addition, the FSAR commits to
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a -flood test to the 18 inch level vice the' MMI-19 test requirements of 6
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inches. The two above mentioned discrepancies between FSAR commitments and
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actual procedural requirements is an apparent deviation.
Plant management
was informed of the apparent- deviation, on September 18,
1981.
(259/81-28-07, 260/81-28-04, 296/81-28-04)
A review of records indicated that the annual RHRSW pump operability test,
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compartment sump pump test, and the compartment leak rate tests were not
completed in 1978 or 1980. The compartment leak rate test for 1979 was
documented as invalid for compartments "C"
and "D"
and no record of re-
-schedule and satisfactory completion of the invalid portion of the test was
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available for review.
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The pump operability test, sump pump test, and leak rate test are required
to be completed annually in accordance with Mechanical Maintenance
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Instruction 19. This is an apparent violation of technical specification
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6.3.A as an example of failure to follow procedures. Plant management was
informed of the apparent violation (259/81-28-08, 260/81-28-05 and
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296/81-28-05) on October 2, 1981.
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10. Maintenance Observation
The inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities for
procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, and proper performance of the
maintenance.
a.
Repair / Installation of residual heat removal service water pump
discharge air relief valve.
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b.
Torus modification for Unit 1
c.
LPCI MG set installation for Unit 1
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No violations or deviations were identified in the above area. For further
discussion on item "a", refer to paragraph 12.
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11.
Reportable Occurrences
The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination
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included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
significance of each event. Additional in plant reviews and discussion with
plant personnel as appropriate were conducted ~ for those indicated by an
. asterisk.
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LER'NO.
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7-25-81
Secondary containment 30-day
. report
- 259/81-33
6-14-81
Primary containment leak rate -
- 259/81-32
6/9/81
Reactor pressure switches out of
limits
259/81-41
7/22/81
Turbine building vent monitor
260/81-36
7/7/81
- Smoke detector alarm
260/81-42
-8/3/81
Suppression chamber high level-
switches
296/81-33
7/6/81
3C diesel generator start relay
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- 296/81-38
8/2/81
Valve 3-FCV-71-3 on RCIP. inoperable
In the above area no violations or deviations were identified.
12. -Flooding of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Room
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Onl August 22, 1981, the "A" RHRSW pump room was flooded to a level of 6
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feet which resulted:in the 3 RHRSW pumps in this room being made-inoperablec
(LER 259/81-47) The cause was attributed to failure of the air _ vacuum' val _ve
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associated with RHRSW pump ' A2 to properly seal after the pump _ was placed
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into operation. Water leakage past the valve exceeded the_ capacity of the
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two sump-pumps located in the room. The three RHRSW pumps were not damaged
although water was found.in-the pump oil.
Maintenance' tar performed on
transmitters which had been flooded to return them to operacie condition.
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The inspector reviewed the details of the flooding incident which included
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the history of maintenance on the air vacuum valves.
Their findings
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included the following:
a.
The air vacuum valves in service on the 12 RHRSW pumps were made by two
different manufactors, 6 by Valve and Primer Corporati.on (APCO)'and 6
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by Crispin Manufacturing. Both are float type valves where the float
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rises to seat against a rubber sealing material. The main difference-
is that the APC0' valves have floats with. guide tubes on the upper and
lower ends. '.The Crispin valve has a float weighted on one end and no
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. guide tubes.
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b.
Three of-the APC0 valves had the upper guide bar missing including the
valve ' assigned to pump A2.
The bar, about 3 inches in length, had
broken off at both ends.
From examination of the break surface, TVA
concluded that the bars had been missing for a long period of time.
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Inspection verified that floats in valve with the~ upper guide bar
missing could come free from the lower guide and be subject to force
which _ caused varying ~ degrees ' of deformation.
Float seating was
adversely affected.
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d.
The maintenance record card for the valve associated with pump A2
revealed that the rubber valve seat was replaced on May 15, 1981 and
again on July 7,1981 to correct valve leakage. Valve maintenance over
the years has been performed by " skill of the trades" method without
the benefit of written procedures or manuals. There was no evidence
that personnel recognized during maintenance that the guide bar was
missing on some valves or if .they did that such a condition was
identified as a defective component.
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The practice that has been in existence is to rotate the ' float, with
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v .rbal concurrence of the vendor, on occasions where the top of the
-float is deformed and the bottom is not damaged and thus makes a better
sealing surface. Although the float is not symetrical TVA stated that
the vendor advised that it would function either way.
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f.
Attached to the side of the large air vacuum valve is a small air
relief valve to vent small releases of air during pump operation after
the large valve has seated. On some of the small valves the vents were
plugged and on others the vents were covered with insulation. The
determental affect of having these small valves inoperable was not yet
determined.
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The failed-valve from pump A2 has been sent to TVA metallurgical staff
for evaluation of the broken on missing guide bar and of a small
hairline crack observed at the base of the valve. A report of their
findings is planned.
h.
Another problem identified by TVA was that the flood switches in the
"A" room did not appear to function properly. A wiring error was found
which prevented the system from alarming at the 2 inch level. An alarm
that did come in during the room flooding was apparently initialed at
the 18 inch level when the transmitter for the level sensor was
flooded. There was no evidence that the switches had been tested since
they were installed in 1973.
The wiring error was corrected and an
annual test program was established.
The above findings revealed that there has been a history of air vacuum
valves failures with repeated float and seal damage occurring and of missing
upper guide- bars without adequate problem identification er corrective
action taking place until the recent flooding incident of August 22.
Another adverse finding was that the vents for some of the small
.r relief
valves had been plugged or covered with insulation.
Plant mana gen ant was
informed on October 2,
1981 that these adverse findings represented an
apparent violation (259/81-28-09, 260/81-28-06 and 296/81-28-06) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for failure to promptly identify and take
corrective action on conditions adverse to quality.
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-13.- - Reactor Trips
The inspector reviewed activities associated with the below list'ed _ reactor
trips during this report pe ri od.-
The review included determination of
cause, safety significance, ~ performance of personnel and systems, and
corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer
. printouts, ~ operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions
~
with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appro-
,
!
priate.
On August 22, 1981, Unit 3 tripped at 1:24 a.m. from 85% power due to main
steam -isolation valve (MSIV) closure during as surveillance test of main
steam tunnel high temperature switches.
Th'e problem was attributed to
faulty test circuitry which introduced a second extraneous'high temperature
signal which satisfied the logic to close the MSIVs.
Three main steam
relief valves were operated to control reactor pressure. No emergency core-
cooling systems were initiated. Required systems performed satisfactorily.
On August 23,1981, Unit 2 tripped at 2:01 a.m.
from 82% power during a
surveillance test of APRMs when one channel was placed in the standby
,
condition while the previous channel tested had not been returned to operate
-
which satisfied the - trip logic.
No emergency core cooling systems were
initiated. Plant safety systems operated satisfactorily.
On August 30, 1981, Unit 3 tripped at 1:49 p.m. from 97% power due to a
power load unbalance.
The cause was attributed to false operation of a
breaker failure relay in the 500 kV system which caused a voltage surge. No
relief valves were initiated nor were any emergency core cooling systems
initiated. Required systems performed satisfactorily.
On September 7, 1981, Unit 2 tripped at 12:02 p.m. from 90% power due to a
power load unbalance. A generator breaker underwent spurious opening which
produced the unbalance. The .cause of breaker operation was 'not determined.
RCIC was manually initiated but only operated for 1 minute. Required safety
systems performed satisfactorily.
On September 15,1981, Unit 2 tripped at 8:44 a.m. from 96% power due to
turbine trip which was caused by the loss of stator cooling. Stator cooling
pump "A" tripped due to a faulty overload relay and pump "B" was out of
service for seal maintenance. Both pumps were repaired before returning the
unit to the system.
HPCI and RCIC were manually initiated to control
reactor water level. Required safety systems performed satisfactorily.
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Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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14. ' Emergency Drill
An emergency drill:to test the_ Brown Ferry radiological emergency plan was
conducted on September 9,
1981.-
The : drill ' involved wide- participation
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. including local, state and federal . agencies. The NRC emergency response
' team was dispatched from Region II for on . site observation and participation
'in the excercise. Details of the drill were reported in IE Report 259, 260,
and 296/81-24.
'
The three' resident inspectors reported to the- site after receiving telephone-
notification and instructions-from Region II. On September 11, 1981 one oft
the= inspectors attended the public meeting in Decatur, Alabama. Where -the
results of' the drill were discussed 'by members of the participating
agencies.
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