ML20039A099
| ML20039A099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A090 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112160226 | |
| Download: ML20039A099 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ll U/{iC REG!y;
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CH ATTANOOGA, TEN N ESSE E 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II 3l DEC l P 2, gg November 27, 1981 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-0IE INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/81-36 AND 50-328/81 RESPONSE TO VIOLATION The subject inspection report dated October 27, 1981 cited TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201.
Enclosed is our response.
If you have any questions, pleasa get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
,],
V L'.' M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure oc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 fpyICIAt;CO%1 8112160226 811207 DR ADOCK 05000 An Equal Opportunity Employer
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o ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 327/81-36 AND 50-328/81-45 R. C. LEWIS' LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS DATED OCTOBER 27, 1981'
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Violation 50-327/81-36-01 Technical Specification 3 7.8.1 requires that two trains of Auxiliary Building Gas T*eatment System (ABGTS) shall be operable in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Contrary to the above, two trains of ABGTS were not operable with unit 1 l
in mode 4 in that, on April 28, 1981 the inspector found the railroad bay outer door open without an operator in attendance to shut'it immediately if necessary. This compensatory measure was established by the licensee to ensure ABGTS operability when they determined that the railroad bay door seals were inadequate to enable the ABGTS to maintain the fuel handling area at the required negative pressure unless both sets of doors were shut.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.3).
Admission cr Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
Reasons for the Violation if Admitted The procedural control which required personnel to be present at the door when it is open was misinterpreted. The interpretation was based on an NRR special exception allowing the auxiliary building to containment equipment access door to be opened during unit -2 construction provided the door-could be closed within 10 minutes if required. This was inappropriately applied to the auxiliary building railroad door.
I Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved i:
The door was closed upon discovery. Personnel were reinstructed to remain at the door while it was open.
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations Modifications, repair work, and testing have been performed to ensure the 1/4-inch water vacuum can be maintained when the railroad door is opened.
The success of the test has eliminated the need for the compensatory
' measures.
Date When Full Conpliance Will Be Achieved TVA was in full compliance on July 6, 1981.
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