ML20038C964
| ML20038C964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1981 |
| From: | Bordenick B, Latham S, Reveley W LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO., NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD), SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038C956 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112140298 | |
| Download: ML20038C964 (28) | |
Text
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DREtEh2E_21 12B1 U N I T E T: STATES CF Ar.EFICA FUrLEAS PECULATCRY CCMMISSICN lEiEIC lhE h12Eif SaiE1Y dDd_11CfDS1HS h9aEd In the ?.attet oi
)
)
LChG ISIANE LIGh11hG CC.*.FAhY
)
Docket No. 50-322 (CL)
)
(Shcrehar Nuclear Fewer Station,
)
Jnit 1)
)
XCTICN FCF ECCEPTANCr CF 8,
ST1PULATICN hECI.F. LING FCC CG.ThNTICNS 3, 6(a)(i), 7(a)(li),
hi 21 12 1 ELL 1 il1_lks 151 12 kna 12_----_
I.
As the Eccrd knows, SOC, LILCC and the NEC Staff have teen conductinc inferral discersient aired at fccusing, clarifying an-;/cr resolvina ECC's rencining contentions in this 1
t 1
troceeding.
As a result, the f ollowin: stipulation has been i
cgrced tc Ly these parties.J/ It covers all of SCC's rcraining l
l l
contentient except Scs. 1 tnd 2,2/ which are the subject of l
l i
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Throughout thiL stipulation, LILCO and the NPC Etaff l
have agreed that varicus cententions are adequately l
Laticularized.
sy doing this, hcwever, they do not intend to
.aive the r i; t. t to seek summary disposition cf any contention.
2/
Centention 12 (Fait 2) wts received conditionally ty the l
- j. d r t ies ' stitulatien of I.ugust 6,
19E1.
The Board has yet to j
tult en the stipulaticn.
l 0och2
/
d PDR
1 -
summary disporition caterials new before the Ecard.
II.
E9EIfhIICE_2 SCC Cententien 3 was adritted by the Eoard on March 5, 1060 as follows:
The recent Reviticn 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for light-Water Cooled i
huclear Pcwer Flants'tc Assess Plant Envirens Ccnditions During and Following an Accident" details the nfeded devices and qualifications of instrunents, rany of which are not presently a part of the Shoreham decion.
I In its r.otion for summary disposition of this contention, LILCO indicated hcw it intends to comply with Eegulatory Guide 1.97.
Furthcr infornation was provided by LILCO during the parties' recent diccuccions.
7fter reviewing all of this information, SGC was able tc narrow its concerns tc a numter of I
discrete issues.
Thus, the partier ask that Contention 3 he rerarticularized as fc11cvs:3/
The recent Fevision 2 of Pegulatcry Guide 1.97, "1r.stramentation f or Light-Wa ter Cooled Nuclear i
Pcwer Flants to Assess Flant Envirens Ccnditiens During and Following an Accident" details needed devices and qualifications of instruments.
Shorehar is deficient in the following areas:
(a) Fadiatien Exrosure Pate Mcnitoring (Ite 15, Table 1; I t e m r. 20 and 41, Table 2);*
4 h/
LILCO and the SRC Staff accept the level of particu-larization agrred to for this and other contentions belcw (1) in order to ecve the proceeding fcrward and (2) in reliance on i
turther communications with SCC, inclucing formal discovery, to achieve greater specificity.
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(t) Radicactivity Concentraticn or Radiation Level in Circulating. Primary Coolant (Item i
11, Table 1; Item 14, Table'2);
}
(c) Continucus Cn-Line Monitoring of Halogen in Effluent (Item 39, Table 1;. Item 43, Table 2);
(?) Eecondary Containnent Area Radiation Monitor I
(Item 36, Table 1; Item 17, Table 2);
(e) Fencter Coolant System Soluble Boron Cencantration (Item 3, Table 1; Item 4,
Table 2);
(:) Analysis cf Primary Ccclant (Gamma Srectrun)
(Item 12, Table 1: Iter 15, Table 2):
1 (c) Cryvc11 Spray flew and Suppression Chamber l
Spray Flcw.(Itcmc 21 and 24, Table 1; Items 23 and 231., Tetle 2):
(h) Standby liquid Control System Flow (Item 2E, Table 1; Iter 37, Table 2);
(i) Plant and Environment Radiation Monitoring (Itc-30, Table 1; Item u5, Table 2);
(j) Icst-Acciuent Sampling Caratility (Item 42, Tatle 1: Iter L7, Tatlo 2); and (k) EW. Ccre Ihsrmccouples (Iter 5, Table 1; Iten 13, Tatle 2).4/
- The item and tatic nunbers used in this contentien refer tc the information provided in the Affidatit of Frian E.
?.cCaffrey sutaitted in support of LILCC's Motion for Summary Disposition of SCC Ccntortion 3, dated July 13, 1961.
In responce tc thic narrowing cf the issues, LILCC' withdra.s its rotion fer summary dicrosition of Contention 3.
4/
LILCO telicvec that the need for BWE thermocouples cculd be adequately litigated under SCC Contention 8 but does not object to its inclurion here.
1 e
s,
_g.
CcEIIEIIg3_gic1111 SCC Contentien 6(a)(1) involves quality assurance and i
quality control (CA/CC) matters.
In the course of settlement negotiations that are currently underway with another party in i
thic treceeding, Sutfolk.Ccunty, LILCC has tentatively agreed
]
to hire an incerendent consultant to conduct a non-NRC, third-; arty review of tr.e 0A/0C program for Shoreham.
SCC has
~
locked at the nature of the trorcsed review and believec that it will adeguately cover its QA/CC concerns.
Thus, SCC ic
.illing to dror Cententien 6('a)(1) whar LILCC formally agrees to conduct the CA/CC review currently being negotiated with the Coanty.
T h r-results of this review are to be provided to Suffc1k County cr a timely batis; they will be provided on the sare basis to SCC's consultants.
If, in SCC's view, these
,A/CC results ccnctitute goed cause for raising new CA/CC cententient under 1C CFP ! 2.714, it will, of course, have that i
cpportunity.
Finilarly, Staff and LILCC will be free to cuppi t or crrcce the addition cf new contentions.
It should he snown withir. the next vcek or two whether a Suffolk Ccunty/LILC0 agreement will te forthcoring.
If and when SCC drops Contentien 6(a)(i), LILCC will simultaneoccly withdraw its motion for sumnary aisposition of the matter.
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i cgEIEEIIg1_2in11111 SOC Contentien 7(a)(ii) is treated in Part.III below.
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C9E1Lh11DE 2 SOC Cententien 8 was admitted by the Foard on June 26, 1920 as follows:
TVI-2 demonstrated the need to esasure fuel cladding-temperatures durirg accident conditions.
GEC 13 requires that:
"Instrumentatien shall be provided to moniter variatles and systems over their anticipated s
ranges for normal operation, for anticipated a
cperational cccurrences, and for accident ccnditiens as apprcpriate to assure adequate safety, including these variables and systers that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor ccolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated rystems.
Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these va riables and systems within trescribed operating ranges."
Intervencrs contend that the Shorehan plant design decr not have instrumentation to permit meacurement i
of fuel clad terperature, in the range exrerienced at T.M I - 2, as required by GLC 13.
Tre issue of core temperature reasurement is closely i
related to issues concerning the onset of inadequate core coolin that are withir the ambit of SCC Contention 7(a)(ii).
[
In the interest of clarity, the parties have agreed that these l
1ssues should be litigated as part of ECC Contention S.
i Therefere, the parties ask that SOC Contentien 8 he reparticularized as follows:
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. 4 TMI-2 demonstrated the need to measure-fuel cladding temperatures during accident conditions.
Criterion 13 cf 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, rcquires that:
Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systens over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational = occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.
Apptcpriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
SCC centends that the Shorehan plant design does nct have instrur.entation te perrit measurement of fuel clad temperaturc, in the rance experienced i
at TMI-2, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A,
Criterien 13.
Further, the Shoreham design dess nct previde adequate means to detect the onset of inadecuate core cocling (ICC) and this poses a threat to rublic health'and safety similar to that pesed at TMI-2.
TYI-2 cperators-did not immediately detect the onset of-ICC partly recause there was no direct indication of it.
N U F. E G - 0 7 3 7, Iter II.F.2 requires that each plant ' ave instrumentation to provide an unambigucus, easy-to-interpret indication of ILC.
The Shorehan desien is deficient in this area for the follcwing reasons:
(e) LILCO har decided that no additional instrurents, including in-core thermocouples, are needec for to detect ICC; it believes j
that water Ievel instrutents will suffice.
i Fut these instruments are not a direct indication of core cooling and core terreratura and thus cannot provide an easy-tc-interpret indicaticn cf ICC or fuel i
failure.
1 i
(b) Th( other instruments upon.hich LIlCC will rely for detection of fuel failure include fission product, steam line radiation and hydrcgcn ronitors.
These instruments may be I
effective after fuel failure but do net i
indicate the onsot of ICC.
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. Thuc, Shoreham's design does not comply with 10 CFF S 50.55a(h) and Fart 50, Appendix A, Criterien 13.
CGEIIEIIQE_1 SCC Cententien 9 was admitted by the Loard on March 5, loE0 as folless:
i As evidenced by the accident at Three-Mile Island 1
Unit 2, accident conditiens can be aggravated by the ci.eration of the plant while one er more rafety syctens are inoperable.
At Three Mile Island, two auxiliary feedvater system valves were c1csed when they should have been open.
Intervenors centend that the Shcreham plant dces not contain an adecuate system to inform the reactor operater when a safety system has been deliberatcly disabled.
Applicent must provide a systen which toets the specifications of Feculatory Guide 1.07 or its equivalent in order to adequately protect the public health and safcty and which conpliec with 10 CFS Fart 50, Aerendix
.L, Criteria 20, 21 and 22.
In rectonte to FCC's interrogatories, LILCO and the NRC Staff explained Sherehan's ccmpliance with Begulatcry Guide 1.47.
With thct inforr.ation in hand, SOC has been able to narrcw its concerns in this area.
The parties esk that a restated SCC Contention 9 he accepted as follows:
As evidenced by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 1,
accident conditions can be aggravated by the operation of the plant while one or mere safety systemr are increrable.
At Three Mile Island, two auxiliary teedwater systen valves were c1csed when they should have been open.
As stecified telcw, SCC contends that Shcreham does not contein an adequate system to inform the reactor orerator when a safety system has been deliberately disabled becauce the plant does not meet the specifications of Feculatory Guide 1.47 or its equivalent.
Therefore, it does net adeq ua tely protect the public health and safety and dces not corply wi th 10 CFh Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 20, 21 and 22.
Specifically, the
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clant decs not rect Fegulatory Guide 1.u7 in the ic11owing respects:
(a) the cyrter incperative alares for the scrEOnWEll JurphcuSe vent System relay, the aiercency rwitchacar rcon exhaust air system, I
the b r. t t e r y room vent systen, the EdSWS chiller equiprent roon vent systen and the ciesel r e c r. c cr?rgency vent syster cannot lE nanually activated in the control reor; (r) the portion of the compressed air systen serving the ShV's doec not havc a unique system incperative alarr; and (c) there ir inadequrte indication of the status (includinc bypass conditions) of systems and powcr scurcer en the hemote Shutdown Fanel.
CE11LEIl0X_12_111EI_il-SLC Contentien 12 (Iart 3) conccrns the generation cf h y c'. t e c :- n d u r i n c accidentt.
SPC hac been advised of LILCC's cer Itr#nt to ure the cor.tainrent inerting system teing installod at Ehcrchar.
In light cf this inferratien, SCC dropr C e n t " r. t i e n 12 (Pert
- ).
ELSIlhIlf5_li Centention 1E cencerns IEi Eu110 tin 79-26.
In retronse to that b u l l e t i r., LI1CC har evaluated the Lcron depletion phcncernen a r. a inrtitute:. a prccrar that will assure recular conitcrinc r: u c n that boren depletion limits are not exccedec.
'epleticn licitr have tren reduced by apprcximately 255 in J
acccrdance 'ith the tulletin.
Epecitically, Staticn Trecedure
.N o. 57.010.01 tit 1cd "Contrcl Flade Management" provider for ronthly calculaticn cf tcrcn depletion.
This prccccure alec
trovides for blade replacement or reiccation as appropriate to assure actual shutdown nargins exceed technical specification requirements.
This action by LILCC resolves SCC's concern.
Accordingly, Contention 15 is dropped.
f0EIISIIOE_11 i
FCC Contention 16 was adnitted by the Board on. March 5, 1900 as f ollcws :
The ECCS at Shoreham may not reet the
. requirements cf 10 CFR, Pa rt 50 because of clad swelling and flow bicekage.
New test results cbtained by the NFC Staff and reported in NUEEG-0630 shcw that rodeling of clad swelling and flow bicekace it inadequate.
Fecently, further infernation was submitted tc the NFC.by LILCO and General Electric addressing the concerns raised in SUE"C-Of30.
Fellc.ing Etaff review, the NUEEG-0630 issue was closed en the Shcrehat cccket by the inclusion of a licente condition requiring further ECCS analysis after Shcrehat completes its first fuel cycle.
Sei Safety Evaluation Esport, 1
)
E u r. pl em e n t Nc.
1, NUREG-0420, at 4-1 to
-2.
Although ECC does not lelieve the Etaff's resciution is adequate, this additienal j
information has facilitated reparticularization of the j
contention.
The parties ask that it be admitted as follows:
i i
The FrCS at Ehcreham may nct neet the requircments of 10 CFR Fart 50 because of clad i
swelling and flow blockage.
In SOC's view, new test results etteined by the NEC Staff and reported in NURiG-0630 show that redeling of clad swelling and flev blockage is inadequate.
Sutsequent to the publication of NUEEG-0630, the NFr Ettff reviewed inf ormation subritted by LILCO and General Electric and concluded that operation of Shcrehan during the first cycle will be acceptabic.
SCC disagrees and contends that:
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(a) There is inadequate accurance that the-ECCS system at Shoreham is acceptabic because of clad s.elling and flow blockage problems in that:
)
(1) there is no marcin in the -calculated ICCA peak centerline temperature (ICT);
4 l
(ii) the ICCA analysis used assured unpressurized fuel but Shoreham will use pressurized fuel; (iii) the FCI increases due to enhanced firsion gas release are only estinates and the analysis is incenplete; (iv) tha calculated net increase in FCT (increase causet by deficiencies in the fission gas model less decrease due to improved thermal-hydraulic med(1s) is the difference between two-large, approximate numbers and therefore nay have a large degree of unccrtainty; (v) the decreases in FCI assumed as a resc1t of using new thermal-hydraulic redels are only estimates; (vi) the burst-strain sensitivity study neglected the effects of Zircaloy oxidation heat; and (vil) in the burst-strain sensitivity study, the base case flow blockage was not used in sonc of the cases analyzed.
(: ) There is inadequate assurance that the r(analysis requested by the NEC Staff for Shcrehar's second fuel cycle and beyond will shcw that the ECCS system meets 10 CFE $
50.46 and Fart 50, Appendix K with respect to clad swelline and flow blockage.
1
. E9E1EE112E 11 SOC Conter. tion 17 is droppad because its claims have become part of SCC' Contention 7.A.1.
4
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Cc311h;IoE_12 l
On July 7, 1981, the Ecard issued an order partially j
adcitting SCC Contention 19 over the objections of LILCO and the Staff.
50c disagreed with aspects of the'decirion and, on July 3C, 19E1, asken for recensideration of the order.
Befere the SEC Staff and IILCC could respond, informal discussions j
tetween the parties were resumed.
Fermission was sought and received to extend the time for retlics to SOC's motion pending l
the cutcote of the inferral ciscussions.
As a result cf information provided by LILCC and the Steif, SCC.as abic to narrow the list of Pegulatory Guides it i
kants te liticate.
.A nurtt.r of thest retaining have already i
.een admitted by the Ecard.
The rest are amonc these dismissed for lack of particularity.
Father than pursue arguments about ECC's T.otion for recensideration, the rarties elected tc reparticularize Cententien 19.
The following revised Contentien 19 is submitted te the Heard for itc appreval in lieu ot the contentien admitted on July 7:i/
a
==----------
h/
Sections (c), (c), (f), (1) and (j) of revised Contention 4
19 were acceptec by the roarc in its July 7 crder.
I
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. A cajor centributing factor in the TMI-2 accident was that operating plants were not required by the NFC Staff (Staff) to be in compliance with current regulatcry practices (14e.. Regulatory Guides, Eranch Technical Positions, and Standard j
Review Plans).
The TMI-2 accident also demonstrated that the current regulatory, practices, practices similar to those being applied by the Staff in their safety e v alua ti on of Shoreham, were in a number of cases not suitably conservative to properly protect the health and safety cf the public (i.e.,
hydrogen generation, radiation shielding, source terms, and tingle failure criterion).
EPC centends that the NBC Staff has not required LILCC to incorporate measures tc acsure that Shcrenat conferrs with the standards or goals of refcty criteria cortained in recent reculatory quices.
As a result, the Staff has not required that Ehcrchat structures, rystems, and components be backfit as rcquired by 10 CFR $ 50.55a, S 50.57, and S 50.109 with recard to:
(C) EfSElgtggy_Egigeg_J22_ang_J3J50. -- LILCO has nct adequately deronstrated that the design, pr e-se rvice examina tion, and in-service examination of the Shorehat reacter pressure versal and vessel nerz1ce is in compliance with the 4
requiremente of 10 CFE Part 50, Appendix A,
Criteria 1 and 31, 10 CFR S 50.55a, ano 1C CFE Fart 50,. Appendix E,
Criteria XII anc XVII, in'that:
1.
Cuality centrol of the ultrasonic testing (U1) equipacnt including the U
transducers does not meet Pegula tory Guide 1.150 and thus is inadequate to provide reliable and reprocucible UT results.
2.
UT exe cination travel time does not meet Eegulatory Guide 1.150 and thus it inadequate to assure detection of defects of rignificant lenoth (larger than the standard calibration holec) or significant depth.
3.
Eadiation exposure to examination personnel has not been deronstrated at recting ALAPA.
I I
, I 4
Structural integrity of the pressure j
vessel has net been demonstrated in i
acccrdance with Regulatory Guide 1.2 l
and thus there is inadequate assur-ance that failure of the vessel by brittle fracture as a result cf the j
design tasis accident will not occur.
(L) Eesula12ry_cniggg_212g_and_12222 IIlCC's ;eneral list of quality. group and seismic design classifications listed in FSAh Table 3.2.1-1 is not in compliance with 1C CFR Pa rt 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1 and 2, 10 CFR S 50.55a, and 10 CFE Fart 100, Appendix A in that:*
1.
the quality croup classifications centained in FSAR lable 3.2.1-1 de not comply with the regulatory pcsition of Revision 3 of Regulatory i
Guide 1.26 for safety-related ccironents containing water, steam er radioactive materials; 2.
t n c-cris ic design classifications entained in FSAh lable 3.2.1-1 do noi comply with the regulatory positien of Revision 3 of Eegulatory Guide 1.2C with regard to control i
rcer hititability and radicactive wtste systems; 3.
.LILCC has not revised the FSAE Table 3.2.1-1 to expand the list of safety-related equipment as reflected 4
in NUPEG-0737 and as a result of the NL" Staff review of the C-list as set forth in Suppletent 1 ef the SER cn page 17-1; and c.
LILCO's lict of cafety related i
equiprent contained in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 does net include equipment i con which the riant operatcrs will rely in response to accidents cutlined in the Shoreham emergency operating precedures.
- The partier disagree over who has the burden et de enstratinc compliance or non-cortliance with these regulatory guides. In order to mcyt the ;rcceeding along, they have decided I
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. tc reserve their arguments until disccvery requests are submitted should the parties be unable to resolve differences informally.
(c) Ecgulatory_ guise _J2J1. -- The control of ferrite content in stainless steel weld metal by IILCO complies with Fevision 1 cf the cuide rather than Revision 3, with regard +c verification cf delta ferrite content of filler catorials and to examination for ferrite content by a nagnetic measuring instrument.
There-fore, Sherehan does net comply with 10 Cih Fart 50, Appencix A, Criteria 1 and 14 (d) fifSlalSII_ES gg_J.44
-- LILCO has not i
adequately demonstrated control of the application and precessing cf stainless steel to avcid severe sensitizatien that could lead to stress corrosion cracking as required by 10 CFR Fart 50, Appendiy 8,
Criteria 1 and 4 and 10 CFR Part 50, I.ppendix E in that Shcrchar has failed tc comply with the NEC Staff position descrited in NUPEC-0313, Revision 1 as Ic11cws:**
(1) Fortions of the reactor recirculation systen (E31) and stainless steel to carten steel transition welds between the reactor recirculation system and the reactor water clean-up, core spray, and residual heat removal systems do not meet the guidelines set forth in NUEEG-0313, Pevision 1,
for ASEE code class I and II reactor coolant pressure roundary piping.
(2) The ccrritment to inspect porticnE of the reactor recirculation system and transition welds that have been clarrified as "non-conforring" per KUH C-0313, Revision 1,
has been conditioned by LILCO to be limited "to the extent tracticable" due to rhytical interference in some locations.
NUFIG-C313 coes not specifically allow for such dcviaticns.
Also, LI1CO has failed te identify sfocifically the nunber, lecction, and cetailed justification
r for these deviations.
- Further, LILCC's objection to the " service sencitive" clacsification of recirculation riser lines and inlet lines at the cafe-end curves demonstrates a failure te comply with, the requirements of NUEEG-0313.
(3) The limiting conditions for 1cakage included as part of the technical sr.ecifications has not been cemonstrated in that the leak detection system may not adequately enhance the discovery of unidentified leakage ar required by NUETG-0313.
- It should be noted that LILCC's uce of alphanumeric designations is not in corr 11ance.ith the nemenclature set forth in NUREG-0313, Fevision 1.
This discrepancy makes LILCO's commitment inscrutable.
(e) issula12rx 221 dss 11L9 ans lkl. -- The design responce spectra for the seisnic design of Shoreham are not based en the standards in Regulatory Guide 1.60.
Thus, the spectra have not been l
demonstrated to be sufficiently I
concervative to comply with 10 CFE Part l
50, Aprendix
),
Criterion 2,
and 10 CFF Fart 100, Appendix A.
In addition, LILCC did not use the Seculatory Guide 1.61 value of damring (4%) for the operating basis earthquake analysis of Category I reinfcrccd concrete structures, but rather utilized a hichcr value of dampinc
( 5 5. ), thereby also viclatinc the reaulations just cited.
(f) fE2ElstEEZ SMisf 12[J. -- Shorehan has installed General Electric containment electrical renetrations which utilize rpcxy as a pressure sealant and as an insulater.
The GE-furn;shed epcxy hac cracked and peeled due to aginc and has deteriorated due to cisture absorption.
Th refore, it does not comply with Eevision C cf the guide.
In addition, the electrical penetrations at Shorehar have been qualified to Eevision C of the guide rather than the current Revision z.
For thcre reasons.crorehat violates 1C
CFE Fart 50, 1.ppendix A, Criteria 4 and 50.
(g) ISSMlstS11_fsisg_f.76
-- The design of 2
the Shoreham electrical system fails to provide adequa te physical independence cf electrical cables and raccways as set forth in Revision ? to Fegulatory Guide 1.75 and therefore does not comply with 1C CFR f 50.55a.and Fart 50, Appendix A, C r i t e r i e.
3, 17 and 21. -
In addition, the minirum scraration criteria for Shoreham stcted in Section 3.12 of the FSAE have not. teen fclieved as noted in Inspection Fepcrt 50-322/79-07 dated August 21, 1979 anc subsequentTreports from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Accordingly, aach deficiency in separation fcr Ehcrehan electrical cables and raceways rust te adequately demonstrated using one of the follcwing options:
1.
ccrrect the deficiency by meeting the electrical equipment separation criteria set forth in Section 3.12 of the Shcrehan Final Safety Analysis Barcrt; 2.
correct the deficiency by meeting Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence o' Ilectric Systems,"
Sevisien 2 dated Eeptenter, 1978; 3.
ccrrect tne deficiency by installing ar acceptablc barrier; or i
4 jurtify the deficiency by per f or r.ing l
a c; ecific analysis for each cable or racewey where the minimum separation j
is not met to demenstrate that a i
failure will not propagate because cf l
the inrufficient reparation.
J Ch) Ef2Hlgtgry_Egidg_l232. -- LILCO, in itr response to hUPEG-0588, failed to denonctrate adequate qualification of Class II electrical equipnent as describrd in this regulatory cuide, and as specified in IEEE Standard 323-1974.
Therefore, Shorehar dces not comply with 1C CFE lart 50, Apr.endix a, Criteria 1,
2, 4 and 23, and Arpendix P, Criteria II and III, in that:
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1.
The limited test conditions posed in the Shoreham environmental qualification-program are not sufficiently conservative.
2.
Equipment has been qualified by.
crandfatherinc to older, less, stringent standards. ' Inadequate consideration has been given to the detoriorating effects of component scing, accuracy of instrument setpcints, test documentation requirements, and tolerance margins.
3.
The list of emergency operating equirrent to bc qualified is inadequate.
4.
There has been an inadequate derenstration thet all safety-related e q u i p.T e n t has been proporly qualified to neet aaing and other life requirements.
E.
There it insufficient infctmation to evaluate'the overall adequacy of Snortham's satirfaction of environmental qualification requirements for cafety-related eculptent.
(i) Eggplategy_gyidg_J2JQQ. -- LILCO has failed tc connit tc ccnducting a seisric qualification program for Class 1E electrical equipment as prescribed by Fevision C and Fevicien 1 c: thic guide and therefcre does: not corr 11 with 10 CFF i
Fart 50, Appendix A,
Criterion 2 and Appendix F, Criterion III, with rarticular regard to the testing Irogrer, I
including multi-exic multi-frequency testing and the effectc of aging prior to I
tccting.
(j) EsgulatgII_gpidg_J2]Jh. -- The turbine crientation with respect to safety-related structures is unfavorable in the Shorehar j
decigr and thus reruits in additional probability of a turbine missile accident endancerinc puhlic health and safety.
IILCO'c design for protection aoainst low-ttc jectory turbine missiles, as I
... ~
. described in Section 10.2.3 of the FSAF, is not in conformance with the latest rrecedures outlined in Fevision 1 of this guide.and therefore does not comply with 10 CFR Fart 50, Appendix A, Criterion 4.
If the Poard finds the abcve version of Contention 19 acceptable, SCC will withdraw its motion for reconsideration of the Scard's July 7, 1981 order.-
If the Foard does not find the revised contentien accentable, then LILCO and the Staff will file their rctlies to SCC's notion within eight working days of receipt of the Poard's crder.
III.
The parties heve had extensive disconsions concernino 5 0 C ' t-Centention 7(a)(ii) ( T!:I issues).f/ As a result of the discource, it has baccre apparent that complete agreement cannct te reached on a justiciable T P. I contention.
Cne aspect of justiciatility the.rartier have tee n able to agree on, however, is particularication.
SOC, LILCO and the NEC Staff have drafted a cent (ntion that raises the irsues of interect tc SCC anc, in the parties' view, is adequately pa rticula rized.
Ic a creater or lesccr cxtent, LILCC and the Nhc Staff telieve thct cart :- cf the-Tr,I contention curritted belew is net adrissible for teacons other than lack of particularity.
The parties will cutmit tc the Peard by December 18, 1981 their arguments in surrort of or opposition to part E of Contention 7.
1/
Hereafter, SCC's TYI contention.ill be referred to as SOC Centration 7; its cutrarts will be numbered appropriately.
. The text of the preposed contention is as fc11cvs:
COEIIEII95_2 SCC contends that the NRC Staff has not ade-quately assessed and LILCC has not adequately resolved, both singularly and cumulatively, the c.neric unresolved issues alplicable to a *WR cf the Ehcreham design.
As a result, the' Staff has not required the Shorehan structures, systems, ar.d components to be backfit to current reaulatcry practices as required by 10 CFB 5 SC.55(a), 5 50.R7, and S 50.10c, with regard to the follcwing:
LIICC has failed to resolve adequately certain generic sefety itens identified as a result of the T!I-2 accident and contained in NUREG-0737, ClalliiEa11EE_91_Idl_hE112D_21aL_EEEE1EfE2 Dis-(1980).
(1) The operatcr's decision to cut off coolant injection at TXI-2 contributed to the accident sequence and fuel damage.
hUPEC-0737, Iten II..K.3.21 requires that thc majcr Icw pressure. emergency cooling systems for PWP's (core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LFCI))
inccrrerate an automatic restart en loss of water level if an initiation signal is still present.
Since the operator can shut cff the flow from these systems at any time, there are conditions wherc it i
IdV be DeCessary to override the l
operator's action.
LILCO has not demonstrated that preter core cooling capability will ba available for all plant conditions, narely, shutdown of the CS or LPCI systems by the operator.
l Thus, it has not ensured corpliance with l
10 CEF 50.46 and S 50.55a(h).
l l
(2) The Snorehat control room is an older design which evc1ved withcut benefit of well-cefined human facters criteria.
To correct the hunan factors deficiencies I
that centributed te the TMI-2 accident as well as other deficiencies that may bc l
tuilt into today's reactors, SURFC-0737, Itan I.P.1 called for control reon audits.
The NFC's Euman Factors Fncineeerinc Franch carried out the t
(
l l
l l
i
1 Shorehan centrol room audit in Ipril, 1961 using the latest guideliner.
Their findings included 195 itens, of which 97 were classed as hich priority items based en the increased pctential for cperatcr error and the possihle consequences of that error.
IILCO has declined'to change
- any ci these high pricrity-items.
This leeves a control rcom design that-does not provide the necessary information and operator actions to ensure safe plant operation.
Thus, Shorchar is net in compliance with 10 CFR Part SC, Appendix A,
Criterion 13 and human factors criteria set forth in NUPEG-0700.
The 1
fellcwing deficiencies exist:
(a) The automatic depressurization (ADS) and safety / relief valve (SRV) systens are critical te operation in accident conditient where depressurization is required.
The SPV prescure and terreraturs annunciator controls are not lecated in a manner consistent with reliable and safe operation.
(b) The Shoreham annunciator system design does not provide a "first cut" alarr capability.
Instead, reliance is placed on a non-redundant, low reliability plant computer which has teen shown to becoce evericaded by r.ajcr accidents and to be incapable of cupplying tirely information on accident sequences.
The computer printcut is net readily visible and is r.corly located for use by the operators under accident conditionr.
(c) The centrol room has not been reviewed againct the desicn criterie of section 6 ci NUPEG-0700.
1 (3) Tha monitoring of iodine releases in the IM1-2 accident was both untimely and censlicated by the iodine sampling and coasuring techniques ured.
The equipecnt needed for continuour on-line iodine c a s c-c u s cffluent r.onitoring is not prcsently available et Shorehsm.
i i
NUP G-0737, Item II.F.1 allows the alternative of vent release sampling, I
. provided it is powered by vital bus power and ir accorsible during an accident.
The Shoreham design aces not satisfy either of these alternatives.
LILCO prcrosts instead to =casure two other strears, these from the turbine building and radwaste buildinc, while assumine the reacter building ventilation contribution is zero.
These tvc carpling instruments are net powered by vital bus power.
Thus, LILCC's iodine measurement system cannot ccccunt for leakage, incomplete isoletion, or systoc risoperation and thus nay not be capable of accurately assessina the quantity of iodinc released in the station vent.
The design is, therefere, not in compliance with-10 CFF Fart 50, Appendix A,
Criteria 13 and 64.
(4) The snort-terr design of the Safety Parameters risplay Consele (NUEEG-0737, Iten I.T.2) prorosed by LILCO dces not provice a high reliability display conscle in that the CFT and plant computer are not safety-related equipment and cannet le relied upcn to function durinc and fcillowino an accident.
For this reason, Shcreham violates 10 CFE Iart EC, ?ppendix 4,
Criterion 13.
(5) The tccting cf the Shcrehat safety / relief valvsc (NUEFG-0737, Item II.D.1) has net been ccerleted and the results for the Shereht? piping arrangement have net been evcluated.
Moreover, the proposed tert cenditicns are not inclusive of worst case conditiens, such as ATWS.
- Thus, Ehcreham has net tcen demonstrated to comply with 10 CFE Tart 50, Appencix A,
Criteria 14 and 30.
($) LILCC hcres to accomplish a reduction in challenges te safety / relief valves (NUREG-0737, Iter II.K.3.10) by procedural techniques, rather than by syster modifications.
Put the reliability of the FEV's chosen for Ehorehcm has been historically poor.
Thus, LILCC has not denonstrated SRV ccrpliance with 10 CFh Tart 50, Appendix A,
Criterion 30.
. e.
The NEC has not required LILCO to reselve for Shoreham certain iters centained in NUEEG-Of60, EEC_letign_ Elan Ef1fl2Lfd_aE_S_ffEull_gf_thg_Ihl-2_3ggident (1980), or to resc1ve certain IMI related Unresolved Safety Issues.
(1) Irghabiliglig_Eigh_Agggggggni "he NSC Staff +s safety review of Shorehar has largely relict on design basic accidents and the single. failure criterien.
The Staff's review of TKI-2 used this same generic approach but did net anticipate the accident sequence, magnitude of core canage or types of rysterr used to ritigate the TMI-2 accident.
TXI demonstrated that sericus reactor core damag( accidents are a possitility and thht consideration of cert decradation and meltino beyond the design tesis accidente set forth in Chepter 7 of the i? and Chapter 15 of the F S I.F should be conducted.
NUFEG-0660, vel.
1, at II-1.
Such evaluation of the sc-called " Class Ninc" accidents cinaularly and cumulatively has not been cenducted fcr Shoreham.
Further, the issuance cf an operating license may foreclece or preclude the modification of the Shorehar facility to accommodate the edditienal safety features, both preventive and mitigative, which have the
- ctentiel for significant risk reduction.
Thece additional safety features include itcms such as filtered vented containment, melten core retention Fevices, and groundwater interdiction measuret.
~he desinn of Shorehat does not prcvide 1
protection against Class Nine accidents.
There is no Lasis fcr concluding that such accidente are not credible.
- Indeed, i
the Staff has conceced that the accident at TMI-2 falls within that classification.
The neec for plant-specific assessnent of accident protabilities, including Clacs Nine cvents, at all U.S.
reacters has been recognized following the TMI-2 accident by a number of groups, includinc the NEC's Adviscry Co.Tnittee on Reactc; S g Letter fron Safecuards (ACES).
i
4
. Milton Plesset to John F. Ahearne, entitled " ACES Report on Ncar Term Cperating license Iters-From traft 3 of NUEEG-0660," dated March 11, 1980, NRC News Felease 60-56.
NUREG-0660,' Item II.C.1 identifies the need for an improved systens-oriented approach to safety review.
This approach, called an Interim Seliability Evaluation Program (IREF), uses probabilistic risk assessment-techniqces to find risk-dominant sequences, consider multiple failures and assess the reliability of systems that may be called on to mitigate an accident but that are not norr. ally considered as ECCS (e.g.,
the reactor core isolation cooling systen).
The assessment may be used to evaluate the need for plant specific safety imprcvements.
Techniques developed by the Staff in the Reactor Scfety Study, WASH-1400 (e.g.,
event-tree and fault-trea techniques, accident radioective release categorization) are being used on indiviaual plants in conjunction with cata compiled in WASH-14C0 and in subsequent data cc11ecticn Frejects.
Eborehan has not had an IEEF analysis.
SCC centends that LILCC shculd perform sitglified syster reliability analyses prior to issuance of an operating license for the fcilowing key plant systems-:
subcriticality systems, reactor cere isolation ecolinc systems, ECCS injection and recirculation systems, safety features actuation systems, and auxiliary systems uten which these depend (alternating and cirect current systems, compressed air systems, essential service water or cooling systens, and heating, ventilatien and air ccnditioning systems).
These analyses should use event-tree anc fault-tree logic techniques to identify design weaknesses and rescirlc system rodifications that could be made te inprove the capability and relianility of the above systems under various transient and LOCA events.
Ferticular cnphasis should be given to
. determining rotential failures tnat could result from human errors, common causes, single peint vulnerabilities, and test ar.d naintenance outages.
Without such an IEEF, it cannot be assured that Shoreham complies with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 1.,
Criteria 10, 13, 21, 22, 35 and 37.
(2) The T"I-2 accident shewed how non-safety systers enn interact with safety systems to cause or exacerbate an accident.
Systers interaction (SI) has also been the sciject.cf an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI A-17).
NUESG-060C, Etrgsolygg fliftI_lEESfE_EMEERII (Aqua Scok).
N U P E'a - 0 6 6 0, Item II.C.3 described approaches for analycis of systems interaction on plants either completed er very near ccmpletion.
The Shoreham cecign has not been subject to an SI analysis.
Until such an analysis is cer.pletod for Shoreham and reviewed by the NEC Staff, there is nc assurance that.
the nacessary interactions, failure combinations and accident sequences have boon censidered in assessing the ability cf the slant design te Teet 10 CFS S 50.46.
(3) The SRC Staff has failed to require dccutentatien and jurtification of all Shorehan devia tions f ron current requiatory practices.
The Shoreham facility, due to its long licensing seriod, is basically of 196C's design anc, in many instances has been reviewed ty the Staff against guides and standardt
'hich are no lonocr in use.
Seither l
LILCC in the FSAE nor the Staff in the SEF has systematically described the standard against which Shoreham has been revie.ec and the baris for and accept-l atility of any deviations from current regulatcry practices.
This void in the reccrd is not acceptable, particularly since the Board must make findings based upon the applicable regulatory requirements.
The T"I-2 accident demonstrated the need for decurentation of deviations.
A rajor contrituting facter in the TMI-2 accident l
V wac that the plant had not been required by tha NRC Staff to ceiply with then-current regulatory practices.
(For example, the absence of an automatic indication system meeting Eeoulatory Guide 1.47 contributed to operation of the plant with the auxiliary feedwater syster completely disabled.)
The TMI-2 accident also demonstrated that past Staff practices were not suitably conservative to protect the health and safety of the public.
The Kemeny Commissicr (foreny Report, at 20, 35, 65-66), the Regovin Special Inquiry (Sogovin Seport, vol.
2, at 21), Congress (Fut.
L.
No.96-195, Eection 110), and the Ccanirsion in a recent proposed rulemaking (45 Fed. Reg. 67099 (1960))
have all recognized the need for such acccTentatien.
The need for docucen-tatien ci dcviations procedures for Shcrehan was recognized by Een C.
- Eusche, NFC Eirector of Nuclear Reactor Ferulatien, in a letter dated September 20, 1976.
SCC contends that the NEC Staff has (1) failed to require LILCC to document in the FSAE where the Shorehar desien, structuroc and components de not ecnform with current regulatory practices (i.s.,
Eeculatory Guides, Branch Technical Fositions, and Standard Review Flens) and the basis fer and acceptability of these-deviations anc (ii) failed to set forth in the Safety Evalecticn Percrt the standards acainst which Shorehar hac teen reviewed and the besis for any deviations from current regulatcry practices apprcved by the Etaff. Absent such documentation, there is nc basis for any Peard finding that a Ifvel of safety equivalent to current reguletory practicer does, in fact, exist as required by 10 CFF f 50.34t, 5 50.57, and ! 50.1C9.
(4) The TMI-2 accident was partially r.cnitcred and mitigated by components and cysters classed as non-safety-related.
Thc accident deconstrated that the licensing review cf TMI-2 and the generic arrreach tc clasificatien cf " safety" and "non-cefety" equipment was not adequate
s
. to identify all equipment important to safety, to define the design basis for such (quir. ment and ensure safe operation cf the plant.
Shoreham equipment, reviewed and classified by the'same general approach as used at TMI-2, should te subjacted to a re-evaluation oi its importance tc safety.
All equipment subsequer.tly identified as important to safety should be properly qualified.
The IMI Action Flan calls'for revising safety classifications and expanding the QA list for plants such as Shoreham (Items I.F.1 and Il.F.5).
SCC contends tnis shouH be dene before fuel Icad.
Failure to do se may result in violaticns of 10 CFF Fart 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1,
2 and 4 and
-the conditions set forth in NUREG-0586, 1:12Eir Estit E2 sill 2D 9D EDvlLSDE2D1al Cualificalient 91 sait1I:Eelales Ilfs1Ilsal IsuiEIsni (1979).
IV.
Energency Flanning is an issue properly within the secte of ECC Contentien 7.
Egg SUEEG-0737, Item III.A.2.
Eut ccaplete particularizatien cf an emergency planning contention is nct yet possible.
The scope of the centention will depend, in large meature, on th( cize of the Emergency Flanning 7Cnes that must te used.
As indicated in the summary dispositien La; ers subnitted by the parties en SCC Contentions 1 and 2, there is fundamental disagreement en this issue.
Until the restd rules c a.
these mctions ter sunmary disposition, attempts to particularize an energency planning contention would nct prove fruitful.
Iurtheracre, althouch LILCO's emergency plan has been availarle si r. c c June 1981,.ork is still in progress en the Shorehar-specific crergency plans for Suffolk Ccunty and
, ': e w York State.
Fecause of'the close relationship between all three emergency rians, it is reasonable to rostpone particularizaticn of crergency planning issues until all are available.
The parties raquest that subnission of a particularized erercency plannino contention be held in abeyance until after the ccard rules on Contentiens 1 and 2 and siter the stato and ccunty corplete their emergency plans.2/
V.
i SCC, LILCG ant the SEC Staff request
- t. h a t the Eoard accept the acreements sct out in Isrts II and IV abovs as soon as i
I ressible.
As tc Fart !!!, fellowing the submission on recember 16 cf tne Staff's and LILCO's objections to the justiciability 4
cf certain of the prcpored Th! cententions, and SOC's defense of t h e.:, the ;atties ask that the Beard rule expeditiously on SCC Contention 7.
Eespectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COEFANY t
/
k'. Iayle-Eaveley, III Anthony F.
Earley, Jr
/
i I
i 4
i 2/
In addition tc the reasons cited above, SCC believes rarticulariration shculd await closure of the ECEF open iters on LILCC's cr.ercency p i e. n.
LILLC and the NcC Stafr de ret i
agret.
4
.--,-,r_-,_.,_
-,,_,--,_,.,.,---r
. SHCFEHAM OFFONENTS CCALITION
/2_
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_ _._ _ _ _'. S_ _ _ _ _
Step n L.
Latham NEC STAFF t
_ _k Eernard M.
Forden ek
- A T E *' :
Escc-lor 2,
19E1