ML20038C470
| ML20038C470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038C469 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112110093 | |
| Download: ML20038C470 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIGSION 2
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,I WASHINGTON D. C. 20555
%,%......i' SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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RELATED TO EXEMPTION AND AMENDMENT NO.10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Introduction Alabama Power Company (APCo), the licensee, requested by letter dated October 8, 1981 a one-time exemption from the requirements of Sections III..D..E.(a) and III.D.3 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors. Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d agrees with Appendix J and requires local lear rate tests (Type B and C) to be conducted during each reactor shutdown for refueling but in no case at intervals greater than every two years.
The licensee's request is prompted by a delay in the initial plant startup after the initial fuel load which has resulted in the need to perform the first periodic Type B and C leak rate tests before the first refueling outage which is scheduled for late 1982. To comply with the regulation and Technical Sgcification 4.6.1.2.d. the first periodic local leak rate tests (Type B and C) must be performed between November 1981 and June 1982. Since the preservice tests demonstrated extremely lo'., leakage rates (less than 5 percent of allowable),
APCo proposed a plan to complete most of the tests without plant shutdown to cold conditions.
Further, APCo proposed a one-time change to Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d which we modified slightly. APCo staff agreed to our change.
Discussion and Evaluation The APCo plan proposed that of the 100 penetrations to be leak tested, 53 can be tested while the unit is at power; therefore, 53 penetrations will be tested within the prescribed two-year interval. Testing of 25 of the remaining penetrations would require that thr. unit be at cold shutdown conditions. APCo proposes to leak test the latter 47 penetrations as plant conditions permit but no later than the first refueling outage which is scheduled for the end of 1982.
8112110093811119 PDR ADOCK 05000364 P
. 1 Within the next year, we consider it very likely that plant conditions will permit leak testing of some of the 47 penetrations. We consider that any remaining penetration-that is not tested until the first refueling outage is likely to maintain its leak tight integrity past the two year interval. This is because the pre-operational Type B and C tests demonstrated extremely low leakage rates. Moreover, incidents which could cause abnormal degradation to the integrity of the penetrations have not occurred. Based on the results"of the pre-operational local leak rate tests the total leakage of these remaining 47 penetrations represents only 2.3 percent of the maximum allowable leakage (0.6 La).
Penetrations which could provide a direct leakage path to the environment, e.g., personnel access hatches, containment purge lines, equipment hatch, and fuel transfer tube, have been or will be tested (due to test provisions which allow testing while at power) on a schedule consistent with the provisions of the current Technical Specifications. All the other penetrations do not constitute direct leakage paths from the containment. A pipe failure in conjunction with valve degradation would be necessary for any post accident release to occur outside of containment.
Furthermore, the penetration room i
filtration system meintains the auxiliary building rooms adjacent to the containment at a slightly negative pressure during accident conditions. The filtration system would recirculate and filter any such releases prior to exhausting to the environment. Thus, the negative pressure ensures inleakage into the penetration rooms and filtration of any containment penetration f
leakage. The functional capability of this filtration system is periodically verified in accordance with the surveillance requirements of the Technical Specifications, Section 4.7.8.
I Summary l
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is the NRC staff judgment that APCo's proposal for performing the local (Type B and C) leak rate tests is acceptable and presents no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. In summary, the basis for our conclusion is:
(1) Penetrations which are potentially direct release paths to the environment are being tested in accordance with the provisions of the Technical j
Speci fications ;
1 (2) Other penetrations r'equire multiple failures for post-accident containment i
releases to the auxiliary building; (3) Such releases would be processed by the penetration filtration system; (4) The 47 penetrations that cannot be tested while at power have lea ige
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expectations that consistute a small fraction of the total allowable j
local leakage; and (5) No appreciable degradation of the 47 penetrations is expected during the remainder of the first fuel cycle.
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, Since extending the time interval for Type B and C local leak rate tests on 47 penetrations does not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public, we find the proposal acceptable. Thus, we grant a one-time Exemption to Appendix J and approve a change to Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d to extend the test interval for these penetrations to no later than the first refueling outage.
If plant conditions support earlier testing of the penetrations or if incidents occur which could jeopardize.the leak tight integrity of a penetration testing will be performed at that time.
Environmental Consideration We have cetermined that the Exemption and amendment does not authorize a change in effluent type! or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the Exemption and amendment involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.l(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with this action.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the Exemption, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the public interest, and the amendment do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the Exemption and amendment do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the granting of this Exemption and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: November 19, 1981
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