ML20038C164
| ML20038C164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1981 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CLI-81-33, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8112100185 | |
| Download: ML20038C164 (10) | |
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ro'.jgTED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSIONERS:
N Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman
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Victor Gilinsky Peter A. Bradford John F. Ahearne SERVED DEC 61931 Thomas M. Roberts
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In the Matter of
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N
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Docket Nos. 50-361 OL COMPANY, g al.
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50-362 h
(San Onofre Nuclear
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Gene a ing Station, Units
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gwggo MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
'b (CLI-81-33)
By order dated September 18, 1981, the Commission took91 its own motion the issue previously raised sua sponte by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board -- whether emergency planning should be concerned with earthquakes approaching or beyond the safe shutdown earthquake occurring with a release of radiation offsite.E After consideration of this and related issues, the Commission has decided that its current regulations do not require consideration of the impacts on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidential radiological release.
Whether or not emergency planning requirements should be amended to include these considerations is a question to be M
By definition, in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake, the plant is required to be designed to be capable of safe shutdown or the prevention of the release of radiation in excess of levels specified in current regulations.
10 CFR Part 100, App. A, III(c).
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2 addressed on a generic, as opposed to case-by-case, basis. Accordingly, the Licensing Board is hereby directed not to pursue this issue in this proceeding.
A review of the rulemaking file associated with the Comission's emergency planning regulations (see 45 FR 55402; 44 FR 75167; 44 FR 41483) reveals that the Commission did not address the question of how the consequences of a severe earthquake would influence emergency planning. Three commenters suggested that the NRC specifically require the occurren.ce of earthquakes or severe natural phenomena to be part of the basis for emergency response planning, but the comments were not accepted in the final rule.
(See NUREG-0628, NRC Staff Preliminary Analysis of Public Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Emergency Planning; NUREG-0684, Summary of Public Comments and NRC Staff Analysis Relating to Rulemaking on Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants; and NUREG/CP-0011, Proceedings of Workshops on Proposed Rulemaking on Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.) The current regulations are designed with the flexibility to accommodate a range of onsite accidents, including accidents that may be caused by severe earthquakes. This does not, however, mean that emergency plans should be tailored to accommodate specific accident sequences or that emergency plans must also take into account the disruption in implementation of offsite emergency plans caused by severe earthquakes.
The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations
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should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning.
For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidential radiological release-and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely
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that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warrar.ted. The Comission will consult with the Federal Emergency Management Agency as. it proceeds to determine a further course of action.
It is so ORDERED.
F r the Com' sion 5
SN4UEL J.
HILK Secretary of th Comission Dated at Washington, D.C.
this 8th day of December, 1981.
4 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE
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The San Onofre Licensing Board has identified two weaknesses in the NRC approach to emergency planning.
The Commission should address these weaknesses on a generic basis.
The basic assumption in emergenc'y planning is that radioactive materials are released into the area around the
- plant, i.e., emergency planning assumes failure of reactor safety systems.
The board has suggested that we should also examine our assumptions about the impact of natural disasters occurring during a release on emergency planning capability.
Reactors are built in areas of differing natural hazards:
earthquakes in California; tornadoes in Alabama; hurricanes in Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Connecticut; blizzards in Wisconsin.
The NRC emergency planning rule accommodates operation under the worst annual conditions.
The Board suggests that is correct for the basic plan, but that the plan should also be examined to see how much flexibility it l
has to provide some response capability for a once in a lifetime event.
(The Board actually discussed a once in thousands of years event.)
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In determining whether this issue should be included in the San Onofre operating license proceeding, several questions should be answered:
(1)
Will specific reactor design changes be required?
I do not believe so.
The types of changes that might be required to achieve flexibility relate to adequate preparation, i.e.,
thinking in advance about possible difficulties and developing procedures to assure the appropriate response.
Consequently, changes with respect to the reactor itself would not be necessary.
(2)
Will local governments be required to spend sizeable funds in order to implement these modifications?
I do not believe they will.
Because of the very low probability of the basic events being discussed, it is not appropriate to impose major new require-ments.
Rather, the goal is to provide for graceful degradation of the plan under worse than planned for conditions.
The most likely result would be to require exami-nation of a plan to see what kind of flexibility or stretch it has, and then perhaps to incorporate some where there is none through advance planning.
(3)
To what extent will resolution of the issue turn on expert judgment?
Examination of plans for degradation will primarily be subjective, requiring expert knowledge.
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d (4)
Why should this not be done by FEMA?
The issues involved are ones that relate primarily to the off site planning by State and local governments.
This area is reserved to FEMA in the emergency planning process.
(5)
Why should the requirements not be set generically i
rather than by an individual licensing board?
The issues raised by the board affect all emer'gency
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planning and consequently are not unique to San Onofre.
These considerations provide additional support for the Commission's decision to address this issue generically rather than in the San Onofre proceeding:
(1),(2)
My expectation that reactor design changes and large expenditures by the local governments will be unnecessary supports my belief that resolution of the issue can wait for a generic proceeding.
Otherwise it might be difficult to backfit any final decision concerning the need to incorporate flexibility.
(3)
Input from a Licensing Board is less useful for areas which turn primarily on expert judgment than.for areas which can be resolved largely by using logic and general scientific principles.
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p, (4)
The structure of the hearing decision process is not consistent with the need to have FEMA take the lead in resolution of this issue.
(5)
The fundamental question is how to approach this area of emergency planning.
Issues of basic policy should be set by the Commission, not an individual Licensing Board.
Therefore, I conclude the Commission should (1) direct the Licensing Board not to take up this issue, (2) direct the staff to work with FEMA to develop an approach for checking the flexibility of plans and develop guidelines as to what i
should be included in those plans, (3) direct the staff to work with FEMA in examining existing plans for San Onofre and other appropriate reactors to determine whether adequate flexibility appears to be present, and finally (4) based on this work prepare and publish for public comment the necessary revisions to our emergency planning rule.
Having outlined my position as to why I recommend support of the Commission order, I believe I must respond to several points made by Commissioner Gilinsky.
I do not see us going to greath lengths to avoid having a licensing board deal with a question.
I strongly disagree with the implication in Commissioner Gilinsky's remarks that 4
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i having a board examine and decide issues can be done simply and quickly.
In fact, experience shows that putting complex issues into the adjudicatory system without adequate guidance leads to a long drawn out process and a poor decision.
What l
is all too familiar is the willingness of Commissioners to abdicate their responsibility to develop policy for the agency.
The responsibility for long rulemakings resides with the people who run the agency, namely', the Commissioners.
The Reorganization Act reserves formulation of basic p'olicy I
to the Commissioners.
Let us do it.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY REGARDING THE SAN ONOFRE.SUA SPONTE ISSUE It appears the Commission will go to any length to avoid having a Licensing Board deal with a question the Board itself has raised.
The San Onofre Board asked, in effect, whether the applicant and NRC staff had considered the possibility that an earthquake which damages the reactor might simultaneously disrupt evacuation routes and sever offsite communication.
Such an earthquake need not necessarily exceed the limiting earthquake considered in the safety review process.
It seems a reasonable question to ask about a nuclear plant in an earthquake-prone area.
A common sense approach would let the Board examine and decide the issue in the particular circumstances of this case.
This could be done simply and quickly and the Commission would have a chance to review the result.
Instead, to take the matter outside the adjudicatory process, the Commission has decided that the question affects all plants and that it should therefore be handled "on a generic basis".
It will consult with the Federal Emergency Management Agency on the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning "as it proceeds to determine a further course of action".
If past practice is a guide-Interagency meetings will be held.
Memoranda will be written.
The Commission will be briefed.
Contracts to study the question will be awarded to national laboratories.
Increased budget requests will be received from our staff..The Commission will be drawn into ponderous rulemaking.
But the most elementary steps to assure public protection will not be taken.
An all too familiar story.
f SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER BRADFORD REGARDING THE SAN ON0FRE SUA SPONTE ISSUE
' I agree with the views of Commissioner Gilinsky.
In addition, I would note that the Commission has had a number of opportunities over the last three years to review on-going proceedings to correct problems arising from Licensing or Appeal Board decisions or from staff 2.206 denials.
When it has stepped into proceedings in progress, it has curtailed investigation of issues unfavorable to the applicant; the Commission has stayed its hand when that action upholds Board or staff conduct favorable to the applicant.1/
It has rarely required a Board or the staff to expand safety or environmental considerations.
This case presents an especially unfortunate manifestation of that tendency.
Despite a recent demonstration of the value of sua sponte review,2/ the Commission is telling a Board that has had the foresight to uncover "a serious safety matter" within the meaning of 10 CFR 2.760a that it may not inquire into the matter further, even though the Board apparently doubts that it has " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (10 CFR 50.47)." The result of this action could easily be an inadequacy in San Onofre emergency planning that goes unremedied for a long time.
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See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Unit 1), 11 NRC 674 (1980), restricting the manner of litigation of hydrogen control issues; Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),12 NRC 607 (1980),
foreclosing any consideration of psychological stress arising from the reopening of Three Mile Island; Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1),10 NRC 733 (1979),
refusing a hearing on a change in plant foundations, reversed sub nom, People of the State of. Illinois v. NRC, No. 80-1163 (D.C.
Cir., July 1,1981); Houston Lighting and Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI 81-28 (November 4,1981), declining to review an Appeal Board order reversing a Licensing Board decision to furnish names of witnesses interviewed during an NRC investigation; and an unmemorialized 2-2 decision in May 1981, not to review errors by a Diablo Canyon Licensing Board, see Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
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2), CLI 81-22 (September 21,1981), Commissioner Gilinsky's Separate l
Opinion, Slip at 10.
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Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), 12 NRC 30 (1980).
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