ML20038C155
| ML20038C155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1981 |
| From: | Thessin J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112100167 | |
| Download: ML20038C155 (11) | |
Text
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b l3 12/08/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0til11SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the !btter of
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PUBLIC SERVICE C0tiPANY OF OKLAHOMA, Docket Nos. STN 50-S56 ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
STN 50-557 AND WESTERN FARilERS ELECTRIC C00PERAIVE, INC.
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(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
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.h RESP 0!iSE OF NRC STAFF TO PROPOSED CONTENTION CONCERNING HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUES Ti DEC9 1981 % c-
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND IU As provided in the Licensing Board's scheduling Orders of
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October 14M and November 12,1981.E Citizens' Action for Safe Energy, Lawrence Burrell, and Ilene Younghein ("Intervenors") on November 20, 1981, proposed for this proceeding a new contention on hydrogen contral i ssues.E Applicants had presented their response to the staff's y
Order (Granting, as Modified, Joint tiotion to Establish Hearing Schedule), October 14, 1981.
y Order, November 12, 1981.
y Intervenors' Proposed Contentions for the Continued Radiological and Safety Hearings Relating to Hydrogen Control Issues, dated November 20,1981 ("Intervenors' Proposed Contentions").
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i guidance on hydrogen control measures $/ n Anendment 18 to their i
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.E/
In this response, the NRC Staff
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urges that the contention advanced by the Intervenors should be rejected i
s because it locks a basis and is not adequately specific.
II.
DISCUSSION As a general matter, in order for proposed contentions to be found adnissible, they must fall within the scope of the issues set forth in th,e No,tice of Hearing initiating the proceeding,5/ and comply with the require \\ments of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b) and applicable Commission case law.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b) requires that a list of contentions which an intervenor seeks to have litigated be filed along with the bases for 4
those contentions set forth with reasonable specificity. The purpose of the requirenent of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714 for a basis is to a) assure that the contention in question raises a matter appropriately litigated in a 3
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NUREG-0718, Revision 1, " Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing License,"
published June 1981; Attachment to letter from D. G. Eisenhut to-Construction Pernit Applicants, dated July 14,1981, ("Eisenhut
.;1 Letter").
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Dated October 26, 1981.
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Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170 (1976).
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. g particular proceeding,M ) to establish a sufficient foundation to b
warrant further inquiry into the subject natter addressed by the assertion, and c) to put the other parties sufficiently on notice "so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend againstoroppose."E As the Staff has noted previously,El in analyzing Intervenors' proposed contentions Staff has assuned that the guidance articulated in fiUREG-0718, Rev. lb and in the pending rule covering near-tem construction permit applicantsE will be applicable to the y
A contention must be rejected where:
(a) it constitutes an attack on applicable statutory requirenents; (b) it challenges the basic structure of Connission's regulatory process or is an attack on the regulations; (c) it is nothing more than a generalization regarding the intervenor's view of what applicable policies ought to be (d) it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication in the proceeding or does not apply to the facility in question; or (e) it seeks to raise an issue which is not concrete or litigable.
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Botton, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974).
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Id.
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Response of fiRC Staff to Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Radiological and Safety Hearings and to Intervenors' Proposed Contentions for the Reopened Hearings, flovember 20,1981, at 20.
10/ See footnote 4.
H/ Eisenhut letter, supra.
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_4 i s Black Fox proceeding. This approach should, for the nost part, obviate a
the need for reconsideration of Intervenors' proposed contentions when the pending rule is adopted; it is expected that this will occur in the l
near future. This approach is consistent with the Commission's
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authorization to the Staff to apply the position asserted in these directives to pending construction permit applications.I2/ We will, of course, advise the Board and the parties of any changes in the status of the pending rules which have a bearing on this proceeding.
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INTERVENORS' PROPOSED CONTENTION ON HYDROGEN CONTROL f1EASURES t
The Applicant has not demonstrated that the hydrogen control measures intended for use at Black Fox will safely accommodate the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction as gntified by(a).
NUREG-0718, II.B.8 and as required by 10 CFR 9 50.34(e) and 50.35 Specifically, there are concerns regarding:
1.
The time rate of hydrogen generation within the degraded core.
2.
The rate at which the hydrogen would be released to containment.
3.
Verification of the hydrogen migration model.
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Acceptability of the manual initiation control systen.
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Qualification of the ignitors and associated components.
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12/ Id. The Staff has also assumed for the sake of this response -- as l
qualified in the November 20 Response of NRC Staff, supra, at 4 et seq. -- that the closed evidentary record has been reopened, to the extent a valid contention is eventually accepted concerning Applicants' compliance with energency planning and Tiil-related requirements.
13] The portions of proposed Rule 9 50.34(e) dealing with hydrogen control measures are contained in Appendix I.
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Qualification of in-containment safety-related equipment to withstand the conditions associated with repeated hydrogen burns.
7.
Qualification of the containment itself to withstand repeated hydrogen burns.
8.
Effectiveness of the distributed ignition system (DIS) surveillance testing to assure a fully operable system.
The preliminary nature of the verification program is evidenced by, anong other things, the list of ongoing and planned verification tests contained in Table (2)(ix)-1 of hiendment 18.
Since the proposed DIS system is still under development, it obviously has not been demonstrated to be fully effective for the control of a large hydrogen release.
This contention should be rejected because Intervenors have failed to state an acceptable basis or specify adequately the nature of their concerns. Several points support this conclusion.
First, Intervenors' contention fails to articulate a basis for asserting that Applicants must provide a level of detail on hydrogen control neasures which exceeds that required by the standard Intervenors contend has been violated.
Intervenors assert in substance that Applicants at this point in the proceeding nust provide a system which has already been demonstrated "to be fully effective for the control of a large hydrogen release." Yet the proposed rule,10 C.F.R. 9 50.34(e)(2)(ix) which sets forth the requirements for a hydrogen control systen, requires only that an applicant demonstrate _ "that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage." N And proposed rule 9 50.34(e)(3)(v), which lists 14/ Id.
certain required elements of this system, nandates only that applicants provide " preliminary design information."E In light of Intervenors' assertion that Applicar.ts have violated proposed rule 9 50.34(e),
Intervenors have failed to specify a basis for requiring more of Applicants than is compelled by the proposed rule.
For this reason alone, the proposed contention should be rejected.
Second, Intervenors fail to state specifically what their " concerns" are and what is the basis for them.
In view of the Applicants' extended discussion of their models for hydrogen generation and for hydrogen migration,E ntervenors must do nore than state that they have I
" concerns" with the rate of hydrogen generation E the rate of release of hydrogen to the containment,18f and verification of the hydrogen migration model.19/
Intervenors have failed to put the parties 15/ Id.
Intervenors' assertion that Applicants have also violated 9 50.35(a) is similarly nisplaced. That section, like the relevant sections of the proposed rule, nakes clear that a construction permit applicant need not first demonstrate full effectiveness of a system to receive a construction pennit.
-16/ Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Amendment 18, pp. 277, et seq.,
and 301, et seq. Staff's reference to the Applicants' PSAR7s not offered f E the truth of the statement so referenced.
It is well established that a Licensing Board should not consider the nerits of a contention in deciding its admissibility; Houston Lighting and Power Company ( Allens Creek), ALAB-590,11 NRC 542, 546, et seq.
Instead the PSAR amendment is referenced to show how the Intervenors' failure to provide any supporting basis for their assertion provides the other parties and the Board with no notice as to the issues in controversy.
Peach Bottom, supra, at 20.
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Intervenors' Proposed Contentions, supra, subparagraph 1.
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Id., subparagraph 2.
19/
M., subparagraph 3.
r and the Board on notice of what generally must be defended against or opposed.E A similar lack of specificity fatally infects 'he remaining parts of the proposed contention.
Intervenors provide no indication of what problems they perceive with the system for initiating the distributed ignition system. E Nor they indicate how the proposal of the Applicants 2/ to qualify the igniters and safety-related equipment is 2
deficient.E/ Nor do Intervenors specify, in view of Applicants' discussion of containment integrity,E ow they believe containment h
qualification is defective.El Finally, the Intervenors have not indicated in any way how the Applicants' proposal to test the ignitersEl isineffective.E g/ Peach Botton, supra, at 20.
21/ Intervenors' Proposed Contentions, supra, subparagraph 4.
- 2_2/ PSAR Amendment 18, supra, at 291 et seq. This discussion has been
,2 expanded upon in PSAR Mendment 1 Fat 298-299.
M/ Intervenors' Proposed Contentions, supra, subparagraphs 5 and 6.
24/ PSAR Mendment 18, supra, at 293 g. seq.
M/ Intervenors' Proposed Contentions, supra, subparagraph 7.
26/ PSAR Mendment 18, supra, at 283 -284.
M/ Intervenors' Proposed Contentions, supra, subparagraph 8.
. 1 III.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Intervenors' proposed contention on 4
hydrogen control measures should be rejected because it lacks basis and i
is not adequately specific.
Respectfully submitted, h-l W
James H. Thessin i
Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, !!aryland this 8th day of December,1981 l
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APPENDIX I ELEMENTS OF PROPOSED RULE 10 C.F.R. 6 50.34 WHICH ADDRESS HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUES (e)(2)
To satisfy the following requirenent, the application i
shall provide suf ficient information to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage. This information is of the type custonarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 6 50.35(a)(2) or to address unreolved generic safety issues.
(ix) Provida a system for hydrogen control that can safely accorm,odate hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad netal water reaction.
(e)(3)
To satisfy the following requirements, the application shall provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the requirement has been met. This information is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 6 50.34(a)(1) or to address the applicant's technical qualifications and management structure and competence.
(v)
Provide preliminary design information at a level of detail consistent with that normally required at the construction permit stage of review sufficient to demonstrate that:
(A) Containment integrity will be maintained (i.e., for steel containments by meeting the requirements of the ASf1E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Subarticle NE-3220, Service Level C limits, except that evaluation of instability is not required, considering pressure and dead load alone.
For concrete containments by meeting the requirenents of the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3720, factored load category, considering pressure and dead lone alone) during an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100 percent fuel-clad metal-water v-.
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. a reaction accompanied by either hydrogen burning or the added pressure from post-accident inerting assuming carbon dioxide is the inerting agent, depending upon which option is chosen for control of hydrogen. As a ninimum the specific code requirements set forth aoove appropriate for each type of containment will be met for a combination of dead load and an internal pressure of 45 psig. flodest deviations from these criteria will be considered by the staff, if good cause is shown by an applicant. Systens necessary to ensure containment integrity shall also be demonstrated to perfonn their function under these conditions.
(B) The containment and associated systems will provide reasonable assurance that uniformly distributed hydrogen concentrations do not exceed 10 percent during and following an accident that releases an equivalent amount of hydrogen as would be generated from a 100 percent fuel-clad metal-water reaction, or that the post-accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion.
(C) The facility design will provide reasonable assurance that, based on a 100 percent fuel-clad metal-water reaction, conbustible concentrations of hydrogen will not collect in areas where unintended combustion or detonation could cause loss of containment integrity or loss of appropriate mitigating features.
(D)
If the option chosen for hydrogen control is post-accident inerting:
(1) Containment structure loadings produced by an inadvertent full inerting (assuming carbon dioxide), but not including seismic or design basis accident loadings will not produce stresses in steel containments in excess of the limits set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Subarticle NE-3220, Service Level A Limits, except that evaluation of instability is not required (for concrete containments the loadings specified above will not produce strains in the containment liner in excess of the limits set forth in the ASf1E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3720, Service Load Category), (2) A pressure test, which is required, of the containments, at 1.10 and 1.15 times (for steel and concrete containments, respectively) the pressure calculated to result from carbon dioxide inerting can be safety conducted, (3) Inadvertent full inerting of the containment can be safely accommodated during plant operation.
O 1 (E)
If the option chosen for hydrogen control is a distributed ignition system, equipnent necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant and maintaining containment integrity shall be designed to perfonn its function during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions created by activation of the distributed ignition system.