ML20038B867
| ML20038B867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1981 |
| From: | Tauber H DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EF2-55-639, NUDOCS 8112090200 | |
| Download: ML20038B867 (4) | |
Text
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Harry Tcuber nt.
nd Const ucton Detroit Edison E!E==
j December 1, 1981 EF2 - 55,639 y
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Mr. L. L. Kintner 6
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'c-P['k Division of Project Management
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p
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Washington, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Kintner:
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References:
1.
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 2.
NRC letter dated 10/29/81 in regard to the July 13-17, 1981, Equipment Environmental Qualification Audit at the Fermi 2 Plan *.
Subject:
Responses to Open Items This letter addresses the open items of the-referenced letter written by J. E. Kennedy to Z. R.
Rosztoczy of the Equipment Qualification Branch.
1.
Primary Containment Temperature Profile The basis for the Fermi 2 maximum abnormal environ-mental condition in the drywell was provided in our letter EF2-54,643 sent to you on September 4, 1981.
It is our understanding, based on our telephone conversation of September 11, 1981, that this is acceptable.
2.
High Energy Line Break (HELB) Profile The Detroit Edison Design Calculation No. 591 was provided for the NRC review.
It is our under-standing, based our the telephone conversation of September 10, 1981, that the profile was acceptable.
It is our understanding that the computer code will be verified by the NRC.
We have yet to receive results of this verification.
O!ook C
A g
a Mr. L. L. Kintner December 1, 1981 EF2 - 55,639 Page 2 3
FSAR Table 3 11.1 FSAR Table 3 11.1 lists the components which are located inside the primary containment, the tem-perature, pressure and. relative humidity to which the components will be exposed and the time duration through which the components are required to operate.
Although components are not referred to by Plant Identification System (PIS) numbers, the func-tional descriptions provided permit identification of the PIS numbers.
- 4. LOCA Effect in the Secondary Containment There is no effect in the auxiliary building from a postulated LOCA, except for the loss of HVAC and heat gain from emergency equipment and lighting.
This is considered to be an abnormal condition.
In the reactor building, equipment needed for HELB mitigation is evaluated against the HELB environmen-tal condition.
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) are provided to assure that if, after completing this short term operability requirement, the equipment should fail, its failure would not jeopardize the integrity of the system or plant safety.
For equipment needed for LOCA mitigation, such as equipment associated with a " path to cold shutdown" or equipment mentioned in the Emergency Operating Procedures, both LOCA and HELB environmental con-ditions are considered.
5 Radiation Source Term Additional information was provided in the Edison letter, EF2-54,825, dated September 18, 1981.
During NRC review of this information, an addi-tional question was raised regarding the 25% plate-out of core halogens.
NUREG-0588 requires an instantaneous release of 50%
of all core halogens to the drywell atmosphere.
During blowdown of the reactor vessel all airborne halogens will be swept through the downcomers and bubble up through the suppression pool water.
Since the NRC Staff allows a DF of 10 for halogens passing through the suppression pool, only 5% of core halo-gens remain airborne after rising out of the water.
Pressure equalization after blowdown will eventually return part of this 5% to the drywell atmosphere.
Mr. L. L. Kintner December 1, 1981 EF2 - 55,639 Page 3 I
Since less than this 5% of core halogens is available for plateout in the drywell, and our model assumes that 25% of core halogens is plated on the drywell surfaces, our assumption is conservative when compared to NUREG-0588 requirements.
6.Sym A review of the Detroit Edison Containment Design Specification 3071-9, Addendum D, page 3 indicates that the containment spray system would be manually-initiated if the containment temperature reaches 340*F.
This 340* F temperature only occurs in a small line break which is not considered to be a Design Basis Event (DBE).
In addition, only a few pieces of equipment would be needed to mitigate a small line break.
The Emergency Operating Procedures currently contain the 275* F temperature, which will be revised.
For equipment environmental qualifica-tion evaluation, the effect of demineralized water spray is considered for safety related equipment located inside the containment.
7 Bearing Grease Bearing grease associated with safety-related electrical equipment will be purchased and used according to the vendor's recommendations, the result cf the environmental qualification test programs or an equivalent approved by the Detroit Edison Nuclear Production Department.
8.
Arrhenius Methodclogy Arrhenius methodology is being used by Edison and 4
i its consultant to determine qualified life or to extend short term test data into a long term opera-bility.
This methodology is an acceptable method allowed in NUREG-0588.
9 Test and Similarity Analysis All summary sheets in the coming revision of Detroit Edison's response to NUREG-0588 will identify quali-fication by test, analysis or combination.
_ _ _ _ - ~.
. _ _ ~ _.
Mr. L. L. Kintner December 1, 19881 EF2 - 55,639
? age 4 10.
NSSS and BOP Designation In the revised response to NUREG-0588, NSSS or BOP components can be recognized by reviewing the actions plans in Volume 3 These action plans will list components by PIS numbers and associated test reports.
Generally, General Electric test reports are proprietary while B0P test reports are obtained and kept in our central file.
11.
Replacement Parts Policy The replacement parts policy has been included in Volume 1 of the revised response to NUREG-0588.
These parts will be required to meet requirements of NUREG-05S8 Category 1.
- 12. Central File The Fermi 2 central file will contain tangible evi-dence to support equipment environmental qualifica-tion.
This includes Qualification Summary Reports (QSR), Qualification Evaluation Reports (QER),
Qualification Summary Sheets, Action Plans with deficiencies and corrective actions together with schedules of completion, and all other supporting documents such as analyses, correspondence, etc.
Any design changes to safety related electrical equipment such as replacement, relocation, etc.
will be reviewed and controlled. Summary sheets will be revised to reflect new changes.
These design changes will be filed in our Document i
Control Center, not necessarily in the EQ Central file.
However, they can be traced easily.
I.
l Should you have any questions or comments, please con-l tact John W. Honkala.
l Sincerely, OdMMi' g g/wuv l
cc:
Mr. L. L. Kintner Mr. B. Little l
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