ML20038B726
| ML20038B726 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038B714 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-29, NUDOCS 8112090050 | |
| Download: ML20038B726 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1981029
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, . . ' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION V Report No. so_312 / 81_29 Docket No. so_312 License No. DPR-54 Safeguards "2roup Licensee: Sncrnmento Municinal Utility District P_ O. Box 1s83o Ancrnmento. California 95813 Facility Name: nancho seco Unit i Inspection at: norn1d. california (Rancho Seco Site) Inspection conducted: septonber 1-30. 1981 Inspectors: M M^ //4' 8/ d vey L. Cdter, Senior [[sident Inspector Date Signed D& $U h // - Y- 2/ Unit ResidentMinspector Date Signed [ 0' Brie n / Date Signed , / &LO/ // -d-
Approved By: d 4
T .d' o u n g , Jr., Ch e Reacto P[o ects Section 2 Date Signed ., Reactor Operations ?rojects B ah h Summary: Inspection between September 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-312/ 81-29) Areas Inspected: Routine inspection during long term shutdown; monthly maintenance observations; monthly surveillance ob- servations; Quality Assurance (QA) program annual review; follow-up of licensee event reports and independent inspection effort. The inspection activities involved 139 inspector- hours by two resident inspectors. Results: Of the six areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified (failure to follow procedures - Paragraph 3). 8112090050 811110 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O PDR RV Form 219 (2) . - - - - - -. -
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. DETAILS i 'I 1. Persons C o n t a c t_e_d 1R. Rodriguez, Manger, Nuclear Operations 2P.~0ubre', Plant Superintendent , 2D. Blachly, Operating Supervisor 2N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor 1M. Caldwell, Supervisor, Nuclear Records j IQ. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician 1,2R. Colombo, Technical Assistant 1G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor B. Daniels, Supervising Electrical Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant H. Heckert, Engineering Technician J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer 2F. Kellie, Plant Chemist 2R. Lawrence, Mechanical Engineer V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer 2R. Meyers, Engineer 1R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor 1,2,3T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Raasch, Manager of Generation Engineering Department 3L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director 1,2T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator 1,2D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor B. Wichert, Mechanical Engincer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant The inspectors also t'alked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, main-- tenance, operations, and quality assurance (QA) organizations. 1 Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on September 11, 1981. 2 Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on September 30, 1981. 3 Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on October 1, 1981. 2. Inspection Duriri Long Term Shutdown During the report p c -iod , the inspector observed control room operations, reviewea :pplicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operatcra. The' inspectors verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verif-ied applicability of containment integrity. Tours of Auxiliary Building and_ Reactor Building accessible areas, including exterior areas.were made to assess equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence > + -
' , . -2- to regulatory requirements, and to verify that maintenance requests i ' had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. Tlue inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system controls. The inspectors witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 3. Monthly Maintenance Observations a. The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below and verified that work was accom- plished in accordance with approved procedures, that work was accomplished by qualified personnel, that provisions for stationing a fire watch to oversee activities involving welding and open flame were complied with, and that LCO requirements were met during repair. , 1 (1) September 8, 1981 - "B" Diesel Generator governor repair (Elect.) (See b., below.) (2) September 18, 1981 - Various Liquid Radiation Monitor calibrations and repairs (I&C) (3) September 28, 1981 - "B" Decay Heat Pump seal replacement (Mech.) (4) September 30, 1981 - Installation of personnel platform and ladders in Reactor Containment (Mech.) b. On September 8, 1981, the inspectors witnessed portions of- maintenance being performed on the "B" Diesel Generator under work request 64760. The work request was written to repair a problem with frequency meters not agreeing between a local ~ panel indicator and the control room indicator. The inspectors noted that t h e ' t h r'e e technicians performing diesel maintenance"and an operatoryhad a copy of Procedure EM 126, " Annual Testing and Maintenance of Diesel Generators," and a copy of the Woodward Governor Bulletin 37708G in their possession'. They referred to the procedure and the bulletin periodically during the inspectors' observation period. -
' . . -3- k'h ile discussing with a technician the work he was doing, the technician was surprised to find out from the inspector that the bulletin described how to perform an evolution that had been performed prior to the inspectors' arrival. Discussions with the other technicians supported the fact that the evolution (speed setting stop adjustment) had been done in the past without following a procedure. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972. Paragraph I of the guide requires that maintenance which can effect the performance of safety- related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures. The failure to follow a procedure while performing this specialized maintenance function represents a Severity Level 5 violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. (81-29-01) No other items of noacompliance or deviations were identified. 4. Monthly Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the below-listed surveil- lance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with technical specification requirements; that a minimum crew requirements were met; that test prerequisites were completed; that special test equpment was calibrated and in service; and that the test results were adegoate. a. SP206.03B - (September 18, 1981) - "B" Diesel Monthly Test b. SP211.01 - (September 21, 1981)-- Emergency Control Room Filter System c. SP201.03B - (September 24, 1981) - Surveillance of Plant Fire system (Diesel) P-996 d. SP203.05G - (September 26,,1981) - Monthly DHR Venting - P261B No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. l
~ ~ - - . . - . - . , . . . ., j. . . , . -4- L 5. -Quality Assurance Program Annual Review , The' inspector examined portions of the following change packages to Quality Control Instructions- (QCI)'and Quality Assurance Procedures (Q AP) : p ' QCIs QAPs "10-9-80" "10-15-81" l "10-15-80" '"10-30-80" , { "10-24-80" "2-10-81" I. "12-3-80" "4-20-81" "5-19-81" "5-18-81" "5-28-81" "9-1-81" - - "8-3-81" "9-15-81" . A few concerns.were disclosed after the inspectors' examination 1 of these changes: a. QAP 2,'RevisionJ7,'"DesignuReview,"_ deletes Figure - 2-4,. i " Safety Analysis ~ Format";1 Figure?2-5, " Design Basis Report"; and,' Fig'ure 2-6,: " Design' Review" Checklist," without placing , these* documents in.another documenf-(ECP-1).as the QAP !
describes. ECP-1 refers back to QAP-2 and the deleted figures. , 2 4 , . '
i The licensee committed t'o place the figures in ECP-1 and correct the wrong' reference by October 31, 1981. - ,
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This item will be followed during a subsequent inspection. i (81-29-02) - r i ! b. ECP-1, " Rancho Seco. Configuration Control Revision.2," i and ECP-2, " Rancho Seco Security Drawings Control Procedure,'" l are procedures that appear to be outside the control of the ' operations department and the QA department. This is because they do not receive the Plant Review Committee review, -nor the Plant Superintendent's approval, nor the'QA department's review or approval. In the past, there was apparently no i requirement to involve either organization. But the j 9-1-81 QAP change incorporates ECP-1-and ECP-2 into the Quality Assurance program and thereby requires the. Quality , l Assurance management's approval. i ! A-licensee representative committed to place'ECP-1 and ECP-2 on othe QA review and approval list. Also, ECP-1 and ECP-2 will_ receive annual reviews through the QA audit program, , in the same manner as QAPs and QCls are presently reviewed. The QA director will be on the approval list. These
changes will be implemented by October 31, 1981.
- This item will be followed during a subsequent inspection'.
' (81-29-03)
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i . . -5- c. QAP 3, Revision 7, " Quality Assurance Classification," lists and defines five classes of systems, subsystems, components, and design characteristics. The QA program at Rancho Seco depends in every respect on a proper, clear, concise definition of these items. For example, procurement practices on QA Class 3 components are not necessarily the same as on QA Class 1 components. The references in QAP 4, " Procurement Document Control," discuss QA Class 1, Selected QA Class II and Class II systems but only sets out procurement document requirements for Class I and Class Il systems. Selected Class II systems seem to be excluded, yet Selected Class II systems have a higher classification (and hence, higher safety importance) than Class 11 systems. Also, QCI 4, Revision V, " Review and Control of Material Requisitions," states on page 9/9 that procurement of Commercial Grade Spare Parts (QA Class 1 and Selected Class II) must be originally approved by Quality Assurance. Since QA Class 1 items can be Commercial Grade items also, it's not clear whether these types of items will be handled properly. For example, under the current program it appears that a QA Class 1 item may be stored as a Class 1 item or a Commercial Grade Spare Part, depending on the way the warehouse person handles it. The licensee acknowledged that there has been some confusion generated in the latest QA program changes. A licensee representative committed to address the confusion and take appropriate action by October 31, 1981. This item will be followed during a subsequent inspection. (81-29-04) - of non[o'mpliance or-deviations were identified. No items 6. Licensee Event Report- (LERs) Followup The inspectors performed an examina' tion of LER 81-37 to ascertain whether additional inspection effort or other IE response is warranted, whether corrective action discussed in the licensee's and 'hether the information reported report appears appropriate, w to the NRC appears ,to satisfy reporting' requirements. The following was noted. _
.; ~ -6- LER 81-37 (OPEN) - Instrument Air (IA) This LER dealt with the failure to an air operated valve to operate during the performance of a surveillance test. The failure resulted in HV-20593, the OISG-A Sample Line Isolation Valve, closing in 12.9. seconds rather than the acceptable value of 12 seconds. The corrective action taken for the failure to close in the required time consisted of cleaning the foreign. material out of the air discharge port and retesting the valve. The licensee stated in the LER that they will continue to monitor and test the operation of this and all safety related,-pneumatically operated valves to assure proper operation. Because of the_ similarity;between-the stated mode of failure (desiccant from the air driers in the' solenoid operated pilot valve) of this valve and those as San: Onofre Unit 1 in 1980, the inspector was.givensthe following commitments for further corrective action to prevent recurrence: a. Change the Preventative Maintenance (PM) schedule on the three sets o f. 'I . A. ' filter s z such that each set is replaced every.90 days, ~ b. Clearly state,in the PMicomputer. listing that Item a is to occur. c. Perform an, engineering justification for the close proximity of the I.A. filters to the I.A. dryer outlet ports. The Pall-Trinity Maintenance Manual for the "PL" type of dryer used at Rancho Seco states the fallowing on Page 5 of manual M9.03-IM01, Y910 C&D, IAS, as: "(PL) dryers do not have a cooling cycle. To prevent over temperature and damage to the filter cartridge, the after- filter must be located a sufficient distance from the dryer (100 feet) to allow for dissipation of heat. Alternate -- if the installation of the dryer makes it. imperative to install the filter less than 100 feet from the dryer, an outlet cooler must be provided." At Rancho Seco, the Y910 C&D dryer outlet is about 25 feet upstream of the I.A. filter bank and no cooler is installed in this copper line between the dryer and the filters. 2
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, '. - , .;- - , 4 ) . e e , -7- ,..a - - , . d. The licensee did not commit it 'o a sampling of Safety Features Valve solenoid operated air pilot valves to attempt-to determine the extent-of desiccant, corrosion, and/or moisture problems that may exist in the system. However, an in-line dew cell has been installed'at the filter suction. This cell signal feeds a display of the dew point locally (in degrees). Once this monitoring system is.made operational, the licensee will read and log the dew p o ir.t on each shift. They will develop a process standard for the dew point value that will require corrective action, and they-will define what that corrective action will be. No commitment as to a date for the completion of these items was given to the inspector. Until these items have been completed, this LER will remain OPEN. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 7. Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the resident inspectors and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard practice. On numerous occasions, during the month of September 1981, the resident inspectors attended outage status meetings. These meetings are held by the Plant Scheduler to provide all disciplines onsite with an update on the plant status and on-- going maintenance work. In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed on the following items: a. Reactor building internal structures. b. Turbine-generator repairs. c. Nuclear Services Electrical building construction. d. RadLological controls during the cycle 4 reactor head lift. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. .
. , . . -8- 8. NRR/ Licensee Meeting on TMI Issues on September 17, 1981, the Senior Resident Inspector attended a meeting with the licensee and Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) regarding NUREG-0757 schedules. The meeting involved schedule changes in the hardware additions and modifications areas. The following areas were discussed at the meeting: a. Restrictions on public utilities. . b. Factors affecting schedule. c. Status of NUREG-0737 items. At this meeting, the licensee requested the NRC approval of their p ropos ed TM1 mod if ica t ion' s c hedule . They also requested to delay the planned April 1982 refueling outage to September 1982. NRD is evaluating the presented information and requests at the present time. 9. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the mouth and at the conclusion of the inspection on September 30, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors's comments. In addition, the Quality Assurance Director and On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor met with the Senior Resident Inspector on October 1, 1981, to discuss the inspector's concerns in the Quality Assurance area. The inspector was given various commitments in the September 30, 1981 and October 1, 1961 exits which are described in this report (see Paragraphs 5 and 6). }}