ML20038A521
| ML20038A521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1981 |
| From: | Houston M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111120814 | |
| Download: ML20038A521 (6) | |
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v DISTRIBUTION F Docket?
'NRCLPDR OCT2i L cal PDR TERA be, e :
NSIC Docket Nos. 50-416 TIC and 50 417 ACRS(16)
LB#2 Rea ng s
- ' ' '$s ASchwencer (ish*d Mr. J. P. McGaughy.Jr.
MService Assistant Vice President DHous ton E'3 00730 /pg7,L Nuclear Production OELD Mississipp* Power & Light Company I&E(3)
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Du$rcer' Post Office Box 1640 CTinkler Jackson, Mississippi 39205 PMa tthe,.s A
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Dear Hr. McGaughy:
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Subject:
Request for Additional Infomation - Ilydrogen Control Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 In the perfonnance of the Grand Gulf licensing review, the staff has identified concerns in regard to hydrogen control. 'The information that we require is identified in the _ enclosure.
We request that you provide the information in your submittal on this subject scheduled for December 15, 1981.
If you require any clarification of this request, please contact me at (301) 492-8430.
Sincerely, Odginal signed by M. Dean Houston, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional information cc w/ encl:
See next page I
8111120814 811028 PDR ADOCK 05000416 A
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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 024a OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usom an-m,=
. Mr. J. P. McGaugby OC'T 2 8 1991 Assistant Vic2 President Nuclear Production Mississippi Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1640
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Jackson, Mississippi 39205 cc: Robert B. McGehee, Esquire -
Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway-P. O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire Conner and Wetterhahn 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.
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Washington, D. C. 20006 Dr. D. C. Gibbs, Vice President Middle South Energy, Inc.
225 Baronne Street P. O. Box 6100 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Mr. John Richardson Mississippi Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 11r. R. Trickovic, Project Engineer Grand-Gulf Nuclear Station Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760 Mr. Alan G. Wagner Resident Inspectcr Route 2, Box 150 Port Gibson, Mississippi 3815C 9
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GRAtiD GULF Uri!TS 1 Arid 2 00CKETS 50-369/370 REQUEST F.OR ADDITI0nAL IriFORMATIO!1 CHEMICAL EllGItiEERIriG BRAT 1CH
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We have reviewe.d the June 19 and August 18, 1981 letters by Mississippi Light and Power Co, and understand.that the applicant plans to submit a report in December 1981 containing updated results of analysis regarding postulated hydrogen burns and survivability of equipment inside containment is part.of the Grand Gulf Mark III containment plant hydrogen control program.
Recently, as a result of our review of analysis results hydrogen burn / equipment survivability for Sequoyah station, we prepared a request for additional infor-mation. We consider some'of the requested information to be generic with respect to hydrogen burn / equipment surviabaility concerns in both PWR ice review of your planned submittal, we are transmitting the, to f acilitate our condenser and BWR Mark III' containment plants. Therefore Sequoyah request for information with the request that your submittal address these concerns as they apply to Grand Gulf.
If your submittal will reference results of analysis performed *for other plants or states conclusions regarding Grand Gulf plant equipment survivability based upon similarities with other plant equipment, your submittal should include infcrmation to demonstrate ~that the similarities are close.enough to justify that the analysis and conclusions can be applied directly to Grand Gulf' This information should include similarities in equipment design, materials, and environmental exposure. Where Grand Gulf plant equipment cannot be shown to be similar to other plant.eauipment, provide separate Grand Gulf plant equipment temperature / pressure surviv' ability response analysis.
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iVA - SEQUOYAH STATION UNITS NO. 1 AND 2 DOCKETS 50-327/328 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
' CHEMTCAL ENGINEERING BRANCH We have reviewed the information regarding Seg'uoyah plant equipment temperature response to hydrogen burns submitted in the TVA letter dated June 2,1981.
We need the following additional information before we can complete-our evaluation:
A.
Equipment Survivability 1.a.
Describe the specific criteria used for only discussing in the June 2, 1981 submittal certaih of the equipment items identified in the Sequoyah SER as essential for safe plant shutdoan. Justify that the results presented provide a bounding case for equipment required to survive the hydrogen burn environment; that is, show ' hat the results t
apply to equipment of given type that is most sensitive to the temperature / pressure environment.
Also demonstrate that the equipment response results are associated with modified CLASIX analysis which will result in the maximum temperature / pressure respepse of essential equipment; e.g., minimum flame front velocity.
b.
provide analyses that demonstrate that the equipment temperature response to modified CLASIX results used in a above will not exceed the temperature rise of the same equipment when analyzed for exposure to the thermal environment profile used for qualifying thi equipment.
The equipment temperature analysis method should be the same for bcth
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exposures.
Describe the assumptions made in modelling the equipment for analysis.
.To provide experimental verificiation of the equipment temperature c.
response analysis method, submit the results of analyzing the temper-ature response of the cable containing Teflon insulation which was exposed in the Fenwal tests and exhib.ited some melting of the Teflon.
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- 2. ' For 'that equipment,.e.g., transmitters, that tust f uncticr. during tht- '
burn, provide inf ormation that will assure that curinc a hydroger.,
burn, the equipment will not only r-etain its integrity, but also will perform continuously its function.
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In crder for the staff to perf orm independent thermal response analysis 3.
of essential equipment on a selected basis, provide drawings (equipment
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dimensions and containmen't arrangement) and a detailed description of the d.esign and materials of the equipment selected for survivability analyses and tests such as transmitter, igniter assembly, cable in conduit ~, exposed RTD and thermoccuple cable.
Singleton Tests - Explain how the thermal rad-iation from the cicud of 4.
burning gas was accounted for.in calculating thermal energy exchange What
'between the environment of burning hydrogen and the equipment.
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was the velocity and temperature of the flame and the basis for their.
What view f actors (geometrical factors) were.used in thes.e selection?
calt'ulations?
Singleton Tests - Explain how the radiation fran the flame was simulated 5.
or compensated for in the tests perf ormed in Singleton Laboratory on thermoccupies, RTD and igniter cables.
Singleten Tests - Describe in acre detail the tests performed on 6
icniter cabies.
Especially, specify the temperatures and the times of exposure used during the tests.
Explain he,e the exposure to maximum temperature of 700T wculd simulate hydrogen burn enfironment in the upper plenum where air temperatures were estimated to reach 1192% and where the cables would be expcsed to radiant energy fra the cicud of burning. gas..
At the 7/23/81 meeting between NRC and TVA/AEP/ Duke pcser co., it was 7
indicated that the test chamber environments to which equipment was exposed was more severe than the predicted centainment eniironment. Confirm that this is. a correct understanding.
Show that the equipment temperature
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respcase and functional b.ehavior following exposure to the test chamber,
environments is more severe than that expectec following Exposure to
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the predicted containment environments.
Explain the basis for ccm-paring test chamber results with equipment survivability predictions in the containment.
B.
Potential Sbcondary Fire 1.
Review the various types of cable ( Efety or non-safety) in containment having insulation directly exposed t the hydrogen burn and provide information' that demonstrates that th;re will be no cable fire initiated.
State which of this.information is based on analysis er test results
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or both.
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