ML20037B907
| ML20037B907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1977 |
| From: | Desiree Davis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bixel D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101120375 | |
| Download: ML20037B907 (4) | |
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s DISTIBUTION:
Docket JBuchanan APR 2 9 s77
[RPDR ORB #2 Rdg.
Docket No. 50-155 V. Stello KGoller OELD OI&E(3)
DDavis RDiggs JShea Consumers Power Company DEisenhut ATTH: Mr. David Bixel TAbernathy Nuclear Licensing Acainistrator 212 West !iichigan Ave.
Jackson, Michigan 49201 Gentlemen:
We have reviewed your March 21, 1977 submittal, relating to potential radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident inside containment at the Big Rock Point Plant. Please provide the additi>>nal information requested in Enclosure 1 by May 31, 1977 to permit us to continue our evaluation on schedule.
Sincerely, Don K. Davis, Acting Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Additional Infomation Request Fuel Handling Accident in Containment cc: See next page SJ01,"3373 f
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PfConnor:
JShea m er A DDL 1 / 1 9 /77 f/*+]/77 Q(.s l'T)
Forma AEC.318 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240
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Consumers Power Company cc Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Charles F. Bayless Of Counsel Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 George C. Freeman, Jr., Esquire Hunton, Williams, Gay and Gibson 700 East Main Street' Richmond, Virginia 23212 Peter W. Steketee, Esquire Freihofer, Cook, Hecht, Oosterhouse and'De Boer Union Bank Building, Suite 950 Grand Rapids, Michigan 49502 Charlevoix Public Library 107 Clinton Street
'Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 e
t REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT IN CONTAINMENT
- 1.
Provida the basis for your conclusion that the consequences of the fuel handling accident inside containment are well within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 when reliance is placed on the proposed automatic isolation of the ventilation system.
Justify your model f'or released gaseous radioactivity mixing within containment and containment isolation before the radioactivity is completely released to the environment.
s.
Describe the operation of the containment ventilation automatic isolation (system and provide schematics of the provisions for automatic isolation of the containment ventilation system. We understand that the automatic isolation of the containment ventilation system will be operative for the June 1977 and subsequent refuelings, b.
Justify the volume of containment air in which the gaseous radioactivity released from a failed fuel assembly is assumed to be mixed before release from the containment.
c.
Indicate the specific ventilation equipment required to be in service durino refueling that effects the mixing of the gaseous radioactivity inside the conta1nment.
d.
Provide the exact location of the two area monitors which will respond to the accident.
Provide a schematic showing the sur-face area of the refueling cavity that each area monitor would be exposed to.
e.
Estimate the time lapse between.the containment area monitors' response to the radioactivity from the damaged fuel assembly and radioactivity at the purge line inboard isolation valve.
Explain in detail the reasons for the range of response times for each area monitor listed in your response of March 21, 1977.
- The connitment of the licensee's November 8,1976 letter, to refuel with the containment ventilation system isolated until provisions for automatic isolation are implemented is understood to be in effect.
l
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% f. ' Provide the time lapse between receipt of the containment isolation signal and complete closure of the containment purge line valves.
g.
Provide arrangement drawings showing the relative location of the equipment listed in questions 1.a,1.c and 1.d above.
2.
Based on the above information, the source term parameters of Regulatory Guide 1.25, and the assumption that dropping the fuel transfer cask on the core would damage one-third of the core (SER dated June 1962), estimate the offsite doses assuming a postulated worst single failure as requested in our January 17, 1977 letter.
For the equipment required to reduce the consequences of this accident, including the area monitors, provide the safety class, power source and technical specification requirements.
There should be no reliance on non-safety grade equipment to reduce exposures below the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
3.
Propose any additional technical specifications needed to ensure that conditions described in items 1 and 2 will be maintained (in a conservative sense) during all fuel handling operations within the containment.
.