ML20037B082
| ML20037B082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1965 |
| From: | Jones G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037B078 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009030794 | |
| Download: ML20037B082 (4) | |
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ADDENDUM SECTION IV TF1.NMAL AND HYDRAULIC CHARACTERISTICS FUEL CENTRAL TEMPERATURE CALCULATION RESULTS FOR DRESDEN TYPE III-F RELOAD FUEL By Gary G. Jones February 4, 19o5
Subject:
Heat Transfer Coefficient Between Powder Fuel and Cladding - Powder Fuel-to-Cladding Gap Conductance The value of gap _ conductance for powder fuel used in the previous calculation is based on preliminary conclusions drawn from experi--
mental results which were interpreted using the powder fuel thermal 2
conductivity of M.F. Lyons and D.H. Coplin.
The preliminary-con-clusions show the powder fuel gap conductance to range from 4000 to 6000 Btu /hr-ft2*F.
A conservative value of 3000 Stu/hr-ft2.*p was used-in the central temperature calculation.
The reason for the difference in the pellet and the powder' fuel-to-cladding gap conductance is due to the difference in the width-of
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the gap between the fuel and the cladding.
There is no gap'between the vibratory compacted powder fuel and the cladding whereas there is l
a gap between the pellet fuel and the cladding.
This means that there is less gas space between the powder fuel and the cladding than between the pellet fuel and the cladding resulting in a higher gap co'nductance for the powder fuel.
8009030
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s ADDENDUM SECTION V SAFETY EVALUATION Fuel Handline and "torare Fncilities, Prepared by General Electric February 25, 1965 Company The basic standard criteria soplied in the desicn of fuel handling and storage facilities for nuclear nlants designed by APG are:
1.
Under normal conditions of storare and handling the maximum effective multiplication factor of the fuel array chall not exceed 0.no.
2.
Under credible abnormal conditions of storage and handling the maximum effective multiplication factor of the fuel array shall not exceed 0.95.
As standard design practice now at AFD, storace and handling facilities for BWR plants are designed to accept fuel, connistent with the above criteria, having an infinite multiolication factor, k,, of 1.35.
This provides adequate safety margin for fuel of the maxicam reactivity antic-ipated over the operating lifetime of these nlants.
D*;P III-f fuel, 'n proof test measurements at Vallecitos, has been measured as having a k, =
1.27 with no poison rods (a lh bundle minimum crit.ical) and k, = 1.21 with the poison rods in place (a 17 bundle minimum critical). Thus, the DNP III-f fuel has 0.08 ok, less than that used in the analysis of the fuel storage and nanoling facilities.
Analysis of the DNPS facilities with fuel of k, = 1.35 under normal conditions yields the following results:
,# eft 1.
New fuel storage (dry)
<<0.50 2.
Fuel transfer basket 0.80 (16 elements) 3.
Spent fuel storase
<0.87*
' Upper limit for both temporary storage and old storage racks.
The following abnormal conditions may be considered credible:
1.
Flooding of the new fuel storage - in this event the multiolication in the storage facility would be k
= 0.84 when loaded with fuel eff o f k, = 1. 35 2.
Movement or dropping of a fuel element between storage racks in either flooded new fuel storage or spent fuel storage - this occurrence adds Ak 4 0.02 to the normal condition k values gg gf above.
3.
Two four element fuel racks placed near each other - the k of this arrangement is less than a normally loaded transfeI*
basket for any conceivable arranrement of the two racks.
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Two transfer baskets olaced near each other - if the mechanical separators on the outside of the basket are ignored and two baskets are placed with a minimum distance between fuel, k
< 0.85 The 77 mechanical design of the baskets should generally 6revent an approach closer than five and one-half inches.
In all cases more than adequate safety margin exists in these facilities to handle fuel up to k, = 1.35.
As noted above,
"? III-f fuel has a measured k, = 1.27 if the burnable noison rods were inadvertently left out, providing an additional 0.08 Sk rg margin from the calculated values e
above (poisoned D?:P III-f fuel k,= 1.21).
'"herefore, no nroblem exists for the fuel under any normal or credible abnormal conditions of handling or stora6e with the existing facilities. Geonetric snacin!' and the poisoning effect of permanent structural nembers in the facilities maintain the fuel multiplication vell within safe limits.
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