ML20037A398
| ML20037A398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1973 |
| From: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Mangelsadorf H Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140767 | |
| Download: ML20037A398 (3) | |
Text
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90'r JUL 6 ?)73 DocketNos.b-270 and 50-287 hWp
,a b[h;[ [T $b Mr. H. G. Mangelsdorf n
Chairnan, Mvisory Co nittee on Reactor Safeguards U. S. Atonic Energy Co nission s
Washington, D. C.
20545 f
Dear Mr. Mangelsdorf:
Sixteen copies of the Safety Evaluation prepared by the D* rectorate of Licensing in the matter of Duke Power Conpany's (Duke) Cconce Units 2 and 3 are enclosed for review by the Comittee. Copies of the Safety Evaluation have been forwarded to the applicant and the Tablic Decrent Rooms.
We consider our radiological safety review of Ocence Units 2 and 3 to be essentially complete.
In perforcing our review, we have elected to defer final cenclusions on several r.atters.
These r:atters and our renscus for deferring them are su~irited below. We plan to assure that each of these ratters is saticfactorily resolved prior to our
' final determination on issuance of operating licenses for the Oconce Units 2 and 3.
1.
Tuel Densification (SER Section 4.2.6): The Oconce Units 2 and 3 plants are two cf a ceries of Babcock and Wilcox plants of which 4conee 1 is the lead plant and prototype. Our review of the fuel udensification phenonenon has concentrated first on Oconee Unit 1 I
and has been completed to the point where operation at full power is ncepti.ble vithin specific operating lirits established for I
that plant. Meanwhile, Duhe Power Conpany has furnished us a fuel densification analysis of Oconee Unit 2 in which they, similarly, have proposed reduction in allowable flux inbalance limits and a two percent reduction in the overpower trip setpoint. We vill coeplete our fuel densiru:ation analysis for Oconee 2 and 3 in e manpr?r consistent with our analysis of Oconee Unit 1.
We are s
natisfied at this point, however, that operation at full power within_ operating linits approximately the sane as those proposed h
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JUL' g 7p3 by the applicant vill be acceptable for Oconee Units 2 and 3.
We vill nodify the Technical Specifications to establish the required limitations before issuance of an operating license for ocones Units 2 and 3.-
2.
High-Energy Line Rupture (SER Section 7.1.11)_: Our review of Oconee Units 2 and 3 for high-energy line rupture external to the reactor building has been completed. The applicant submitted its final detailed analyses and the staff has co:apleted its review. We are satisfied that the applicant hcs used our criteria and identified those areas where design nodifications are necessary.
These are discussed in the Safety Evaluation. None of the required nodifications constitute a najor change in plant design and the applicant has co=mitted to make.the necessary changes to Unit 3 prior to startup and to Unit 2 prior to the end of 1973.
- i' 3.
F.eactor Building Structural Design (SER Section 6.2): The staff and the applicant have reexamined the LOCA generated overpressure analysis for the Oconee Units 2 and 3 steam generator subco=partments.
The staff and applicant agree that the conservatively calculated overpressure is slightly less than 15 psi. The design overpressure for these subcompartments was 11.1 psi. ' The applicant has reevaluated the structural ~ capability of the subcompartnent valls and concluded that they vill withstand an overpressure of 15 psi with 30% eargin. The staff has not completed its review of the subcompartment vall overpressure capability but plans to do so prior to permitting reactor operation.
4.
Spent Fuel Handling System (SER Section 10.6):' The staff has reexanined the design of the spent fuel handling facility with regard to radiological releases resulting from a fuel handling accident. Although the releases are well below 10 CFR Part 100 without iodine filters in the facility vent systen, the staff-considers that the addition of filters is practical and prudent.
because of the relatively higher probability of the fuel handling accident. The applicant vill be required to co==it to this
. podification prior to startup and to r.ake the modification in some reasonable time period.-
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5.
QA for operations '(SER Section 12.6): The staff is' performing a periodic review of the applicant's QA for Operations Program _and will resolve any areas that require upgrading with the applicant prior to operation of Oconee Units.2 and 3.'
Sincerely, R. C. DeToung, Assistant Director for Trescurized Vater Reactors Directorate of Licensing i
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