ML20037A268
| ML20037A268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hart G CONGRESS (JOINT & ROTATING COMMITTEES, ETC.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037A267 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906070314 | |
| Download: ML20037A268 (5) | |
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The Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman Subcommittee on iluclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works I-United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate the consideration you have shown in limiting the request for information in your letter of April 3,1979 in connection with the Three Mile Island accident to those matters of immediate health and safety concern. Heavy demands have been placed on this agency as a result of the Three Mile Island Plant accident, and we are hard-pressed to reply promptly to the many requests made of us.
In response to item 1, one of our very early actions regarding this incident was to carry out a preliminary evaluation of possible generic problems and to take immediate actions to strongly reduce the chances for similar serious incidents at other Babcock and Wilcox operating reactors.
Based upon our early reconstruction of the sequence of events of the Three !!ile Island plant accident, action to require shutdown of the other Babcock and Wilcox operating plants does not appear necessary, in view of the additional procedural precautions taken in response to IE Bulletins 79-05 and 79-05A. The NRC staff sees no significant reduction in risk to be gained through down rating of the remaining Babcock and Wilcox plants to 50% of their power capacity. This is because the safe shutdown of systems operate in the same way--and on the same time base--whether the plant is at full power or at 50% of power capacity.
Our staff has reached preliminary conclusions concerning the principal factors which initiated the accident and contributed to its severity.
These were discussed n April 4 in an open Commission meeting and a o
list is enclosed (enclosure 1).
de have concluded that certain actions are appropriate with regard to nuclear plants similar to Three Mile Island and have taken or are taking the following specific steps:
-- An inspector was assigned full-time at each operating plant having a B&W reactor by April 2.
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.. -- An llRC Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Bulletin (enclosure 2) r was transmitted on April 1 directing licensees uperating B&W reactors to perform a series of specific reviews and actions.
Our onsite inspectors will nonitor compliance with this Bulletin. The tiRC headquarters staff will review the responses promptly and act on them accordingly.
-- A second IE Bulletin was transmitted to all B&W reactors operators on April 5 to provide specific operating instructions based on our present understanding of the events at Three !!ile Island (enclosure 3).
-- To assure that the Bulletins are fully understood and followed the full-time inspector at each of the operating plants having B&W reactors will receive additional assistance from the !!RC regional offices to assure that some inspection activities will occur during each shift.
The assigned inspector at each plant will thus be in a position to assure that plant operations on all shifts reflect a clear awareness of the factors which con-tributed to the situation at Three Mile Island. The ilRC regional and headquarters staffs will stay in close touch with the !!RC inspectors onsite to ensure that our instructions to the licensees are understood and are being followed.
-- The Commission has sent a telegram (enclosure 4) to each of the licensees with B&W reactors to underscore the seriousness with which the Commission views this situation.
-- Additional IE Bulletins (enclosures 5, 6, 7 and 8) were transmitted on April 11 and April 14 to all operators of pressurized water power reactors (PWRs), except those with B&W reactors, relating aspects of the accident having general applicability to PWRs and 4
identifying certain actions to be taken.
-- An additional IE Bulletin (enclosure 9) was transmitted on April 14 to all operators of boiling water reactcrs (BWRs) relating aspects of the accident having applicability to BURS and identifying certain actions to be taken.
Additionally, an I'lRC Task Force on Generic Review of Feedwater Transients in B&W Reactors has been formed to examine the reactor and plant systems o
at these plants that provic'e protect.on against feedwater transients. The Task Force report is expected before the end of this month.
He will care-o fully review that infermation and take whatever further action may be L
appropriate. We will, of course, keep you informed of the recommendations L
of the Task Force and of follow-up measures taken.
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. Pending completion of our review of the responses to the April 1st and April 5th Bulletins and in view of the actions described above, we believe p-there is reasonable assurance that the other B&W plants can continue to operate without danger to the public health and safety. Although Commissioner Bradford agrees fully that the aforementioned specific pro-cedures are prudent and provide a considerably enhanced level of assurance, he would await the report of this Task Force before sharing fully in this conclusion.
Beyond these immediate measures we are continuing to examine all con-tributing aspects of the incident and its implication for Till-2 and other facilities.
Additional bulletins, instruction and, if required, license modifications will be issued as may be appropriate from our continuing investigation. We ara also examining the April 9th recom-mendations of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to determine what steps may be required at other licensed reactors in addition to those already requested.
With respect to your concern about the capability c? State and local authorities to respond effectively to a civilian nuclear accident, let me say that the flRC has exerted substential effort to improve this capability over the past few years. At present, NRC has no statutory authority to require State and local governments to devise and test radiological emergency response plans. The Commission's regulations recognize the States' authority and responsibility to respond to emer-gencies within their jurisdictions.
Our efforts so far have been essentially cooperative rather than mandatory.
fiRC conducts training courses for State and local personnel engagad in emergency response activities and evaluates State Incy plans against a checklist of 70 essential elements. Through a
. assistance program fiRC and other Federal agencies make recommendatio..
tor improvement.
i;RC also exercises a lead agency role in a Federal interagency program which provides guidance and assistance to State and local governments in developing and testing their radiological emergency response capabilities.
In the last two years llRC has concurred in the plans of 11 States. These
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States are Alabama, Cali fornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, y
Kansas, New Jersey,ilew York, South Carolina, and Washington.
Facility operators view emergency actions to protect public health and safety outside a facility's boundaries as the responsibility of State and local governments.
Under flRC regulations.(10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E) licensees are required to have procedures in place for notifying local, State and Federal officials in the event of an emergency.
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. The flRC, as part of its procedures for granting an operating license,
~r does review the adequacy of the license applicant's emergency response plan. This review includes the verification that there are appropriate agreements between the applicant and local emergency response units such as hospitals, police and firefighters. Also, NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcemeut (0IE) observes an emergency response exercise carried out by the applicant.
Local emergency response units are invited to participate in these exercises, but their participation is not mandatory.
The OIE observation focuses primarily on the adequacy of the applicant's performance. A copy of the OIE report on the Three 1111e Island exercise, which was conducted on llovember 8, 1978 is enclosed.
(enclosure
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The incident at the Three fille Island station has already caused many States to look seriously at their radiological emergency planning posture.
The ilRC staff is currently preparing for my signature within the next few days letters to the governors of each of the States in which commercial power reactors are located, but whose plans have not yet achieved an liRC concurrence. 14y letters will urge those States to take immediate actions to improve and update their radiological response plans and will offer whatever assistance might be necessary to bring about an early concurrence by ilRC. The liRC Office of State Programs has already been in touch with the responsible state agencies to comunicate vc bally this offer to work closely with them on an expedited basis.
Although the State of Pennsylvania has developed and tested a radiological emergency plan of its own, the State has not formally transmitted its most recent radiological plan to I;RC for review and concurrence, Governor Shapp supplied a copy of the Three liile Islar.d Annex to the Pennsylvania' Plan for implementation of Protective Action Guides to IIRC on April 3,1975.
Pennsylvania has participated in a limited fashion in our training programs which are offered free ci charge to State and local officials.
We also understand that all of the four counties near the Three 1411e 1
Island station currently have formal plans for dealing with general emergency situations. I!RC has not reviewed these local plans.
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Your letter emphasizes the unique statutory obligation imposed on the
(;RC to keep the Congress fully and currently informed.
In the case of the accident at Three ilile Island, the intensity of interest on i
the part of the Congress, press and public and the limited resources available to the Coarnission have made it particularly difficult to provide all relevant information in a timely fashion.
L Besides responding to specific requests for inforaation, we have attempted to keep your and our other oversight subcommittees, as well as those members of the Pennsylvania delegation most directly affected, currently informed w
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. primarily by neans of prompt delivery of the updated preliminary notifi-cations received by the Commission and of other related materials, such as press releases, meeting transcripts and so forth.
In the case of your own Subcommittae on Nuclear Regulation, ti.is written material has been supplemented by frequent calls to staff from our Office of Congressional Affairs, periodic briefir.gs in person and by telephone for Subcommittee members and by the Commission's own Espaarance and testimony of April 10.
You have already received copics of the transcripts of Commission closed meetings on TMI-2 during the first days of the crisis.
Additional transcripts and materials related to THI-2 will be made available to the Congress and the public on a expedited basis.
The file on Three Mile Island prior to the accident is estimated to fill approximately 30 feet of shelf space. Arranger.ents are underway to reproduce this file for use by the Presidential Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, the Congress, the press and the public.
A microfiche copy will be provided to the Library of Congress for the convenience of Members of Congress.
In addition, a complete set of these documents can be made available to your Subcommittee if you wish.
We regret any inconvenience or embarrassment which might have been caused you by failure to receive a particular document in a timely fashion.
We are working to avoid such reoccurrences in the future by responding to specific requests for information as quickly as possible and by providing partinent updating inforitation on the TMI-2 situation as soon as it is available.
Sincerely, Joseph M. Hendrie Chai rman
Enclosures:
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As stated l
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