ML20036B123

Forwards SSAR Markups Re Valve Operability Assurance, Reflecting Resolution Obtained in 930503 Telcon

ML20036B123
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	05/11/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9305180188
Download: ML20036B123 (8)

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May 11,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - Vahe Operability Assurance

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are SSAR markups that reflect the resolution obtained in the May 3,1993 telephone call between Mayann Herzog, Jim Brammer, Dave Terao and myself pertaining to valve operability assurance.

Please provide copies of this tranmsmittal to Jim Brammer and Dave Terao.

Sincerely, ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE)

Maryann Herzog (GE) 170038 l

JfWl48 9305180188 930511 PDR ADOCK 05200001 A

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'. MN 23A6100AE Standard Plant Rev. n V

Subsections 3S.2.5,3S3, and 3.9.5.

3.9.1.4.3 Core Support Structures and Other Safety Reactor Internal Components i

Deformations under faulted conditions are l

evaluated in critical areas and the necessary The core support structures and other safety i

design deformation limits, such as clearance class reactor internal components are evaluated limits, are satisfied.

for faulted conditions. The basis for deter-mining the faulted loads for seismic events and 3.9.1.4.1 Control Rod Drive System Components other dynamic events is given in Section 3.7 and Subsection 3.9.5, respectively. The allowable 3.9.1.4.1.1 Fine Motion C$ntrol Rod Drive Service Level D limits for evaluation of these structures are provided in Subsection 3.9.5.

The fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) major components that are part of the reactor 3.9.1.4.4 RPV Stabilizer and FMCRD - and coolant pressure boundary are analyzed and in-Cort Housing Restraints (Supports) evaluated for the faulted conditions in accordance with the ASME Code,Section III, The calculated maximum stresses meet the Appendix F.

allowable stress limits stated in Table 3.9-1 and 3.9-2 under faulted conditions for the RPV 3.9.1.4.1.2 Hydraulic Control Unit stabilizer and supports for the fine motion control rod drive housing and In-Core housing The hydraulic control unit (HCU) is analyzed for faulted conditions. These supports restrain and tested for withstanding the faulted condition the components during earthquake, pipe rupture loads. Dynamic tests establish the *g* loads in of other reactor building vibration events.

horizontal and vertical directions as the HCU capability for the frequency range that is likely 3.9.1.4.5 Main Steam Isolation Valve, to be experienced in the plant. These tests also Safety /Rc!!cf Valve and Other ASME Class 1 insure that the scram function of the HCU can be Valves performed under these loads. Dynamic analysis of the HCU with the mounting beams is performed to Elastic analysis methods and standard design assure that the maximum faulted condition loads rules, as defined in ASME Code Section III, are remain below the HCU capability.

utilized in the analysis of the pressure boun-dary, Seismic Category I, ASME Class 1 valves.

3.9.1.4.2 Reactor Pressurt Vessel Assembly The Code-allowable stresses are applied to as-sure integrity under applicable loading cond-The reactor pressure vessel assembly tions including faulted condition. Subsection includes: (1) the reactor pressure vessel 3.9.3.2.4 discusses the operability qualifica-boundary out to and including the nozzles and tion of the major active valves including main housings for FMCRD, internal pump and in-core steam isolation valve and the main steam instrumentation; (2) support skirt; and (3) the safety / relief valve for seismic and other shroud support, including legs, cylinder, and dynamic conditions. The aMowaWe styeggg plate. The design and analysis of these three

.$.oy w ings rating conj @ ions, parts comply with subsections NB, NF, and NG, w,, tty);nj pauhekforacti9e ASME respectively, of the ASME Code,Section III. For c{agg g gqq3 g foo-}mtey g g h g gg g faulted conditions, the reactor vessel is

,g L evaluated using elastic analysis. For the 3.9.1.4.6 ECCS and SLC Pumps, RRS and RHR Heat support skirt and shroud support, an clastic Exchangers, RCIC Turbine, and RRS Motor analysis is performed, and buckling is evaluated for compressive load cases for certain locations The ECCS (RHR, RCIC and HPCF) pumps, SLC in the assembly.

pumps, RHR heat exchangers, and RCIC turbine are Amendmen 23 3A2

- }gg nuto:e Standard Plant REV B analyzed for the faulted loading conditions. The 3 3.1.4.10 ASME Class 2 and 3 Pumps ECCS and SLC pumps are active ASME Class 2 compo-nents. The allowable stresses for active pumps Elastic analysis methods are used for evaluat-are provided in a footnote to Table 3.9-2.

ing faulted loading conditions for Class 2 and 3 purnps. The equivalent allowable stresses for The reactor coolant pressure boundary compo-nonactive pumps using clastic techniques are ob-nents of the reactor recirculation system (RRS) tained from NC/ND-3403 of the ASME Code Sec. ion pump motor assembly, and recirculation motor cool-III. These allowables are above clastic lim-ing (RMC) subsystem heat exchanger are ASME Class its. The allowables for active pumps are pro-1 and Class 3, respectively, and are analyzed for vided in a footnote to Table 3.9-2.

the faulted loading conditions. All equipment stresses are within the clastic limits.

3 3.1.4.11 ASME Class 2 and 3 Valves honadid 3.9.1.4.7 Fuel Storage and Refueling Equipment Elastic analysis methods and sta dard design rules are used for evaluating fan ed loading Storage, refueling, and servicing equipment conditions for Class 2, and 3 alves. The which is important to safety is classified as es-equivalent allowable stresses for valves using sential components per the requirements of clastic techniques are obtained from NC/ND-3500 10CFR50 Appendix A. This equipment and other of ASME Code,Section III. These allowables are equipment which in case of a failure would de-above clastic limits.he. allot 0Gbles for grade an essential component is defined in Sec-04Ne Valdes att prog;decf M tion 9.1 and is classified as Scismic Category. footnote 7 Of Table E.9-2.,

I. These components are subjected to an clastic 3 3.1.4.12 ASME Class i,2 and 3 Piping dynamic finite-element analysis to generate load-ings. This analysis utilizes appropriate floor Elastic analysis methods are used for evaluat-response spectra and combines loads at frequen-ing faulted loading conditions for Class 1,2, cies up to 33 Hz for seismic loads and up to 60 and 3 piping. The equiv ent allowable stresses Hz for other dynamic loads in three directions. using clastic techniques a obtained from NB/

Imposed stresses are generated and combined for NC/ND-3600 (for Class 2 and 3 piping) of the normal, upset, and faulted conditions. Stresses ASME Code Section Ill. The allowables for are compared, depending on the specific safety functional capability of the Mping class of the equipment, to Industrial Codes, are d MME C & 9^- !!! S?:: Lev:! }

ASME, ANSI or Industrial Standards, AISC, stun !imb. GC/Eiki ripc icm ouuG md allowables.

h 4 Herr! :27:b?"( b sicd su i s:: m ::, : n 9 ' 6 S L..u L m: O 3.9.1.4.8 Fuel Assembly (lacluding ChanncI) fYo N ded h.(co b oI6 6 D h

%Ne, 3.9 ~2..

GE BWR fuel assembly (including channel) de-33.1.5 Inelastic Analysis Methods sign bases, and analytical and evaluation methods including those applicable to the faulted condi-Inelastic analysis is only applied to ABWR tions are the same as those contained in Refer-components to demonstrate the acceptability of 4

ences 1 and 2.

three types of postulated events. Each event is an extremely low-probability occurence and the 3.9.1.4.9 ASME Class 2 and 3 Vessels equipment affected by these events would not be reused. These three events are:

Elastic analysis methods are used for evaluat-ing faulted loading conditions for Class 2 and 3 (1) Postulated gross piping failure.

vessels. The equivalent allowable stresses using clastic techniques are obtained from NC/ND-3300 (2) Postulated blowout of a reactor internal and NC-3200 of the ASME Code Section !!I. These recirculation (RIP) motor casing due to a allowables are above elastic limits.

weld failure.

(3) Postulated blowout of a control rod drive (CRD) housing due to a weld failure.

Amendment 23 39-3

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ABWR Standard Pitmt nry n to accomplish its safety functions as required The MS system piping extending from the out-by any subseouent desien condition event.

board main steam isolation valve to the turbine

@d acfiac. C/ns5 f,2. awl J VaM stop valve is constructed in accordance with the I

For active Class 2 and 3 pumps! specific ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section stress criteria to meet the functional III, Class 2 Criteria.

requirements are identified in a footnote to Table 3.9 2. For piping r> "- '" # ;;

Turbine stop valve (TSV) closure in the main SOpecific stress criteria fot-functional steam (MS) piping system results in a transient requirements. Th: M",E reh &nM: ;;;cascs that produces momentary unbalanced forces acting a p:; l w u suic-in.:c: c;.j,M 4

h-on the MS piping system. Upon closure of the 4

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TSV, a pressure wave is created and it travels i.

are ioleN//[itcf b MNofe. 6 of LNd Uf-2, at sonic velacity toward the reactor vessel 3.93.1.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Assembly through each MS line. Flow of steam into each MS line from the reactor vessel continues until The reactor vessel assembly consists of the the steam compression wave reaches the reactor 4

4.

reactor pressure vessel, vessel support skirt, vessel. Repeated reflection of the pressure f and shroud support, wave at the reactor vessel and the TSV produce time varying pressures and velocities, The reactor pressure vessel, vessel support throughout the MS lines, skirt, and shroud support are constructed in a

k accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure The analysis of the MS piping TSV closure Vessel Code Section 111. The shroud support transient consists of a stepwise time history consists of the shroud support plate and the solution of the steam flow equation to generate shroud support cylinder and its legs. The a time-history of the steam properties at reactor pressure vessel assembly components are numerous locations along the pipe. Reaction classified as an ASME Class 1. Complete stress loads on the pipe are determined at each cibow.

reports on these components are prepared in These loads are composed of pressure-times-area, accordance with ASME Code requirements.

momentum change and fluid-friction terms.

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NUREG-0619 (Reference 5) is also considered for feedwater nozzle and other such RPV inlet nozzle The time-history direct integration method of i

design.

analysis is used to determine the response of the MS piping system to TSV closure. The forces l

The stress analysis is performed on the are applied at locations on the piping system reactor pressure vessel, vessel suppon skirt, where steam flow changes direction thus causing and shroud support for various plant operating momentary reactions. The resulting loads on the

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conditions (including faulted conditions) by MS piping are combined with loads due to other using the clastic methods except as noted in effects as specified in Subsection 3.93.1.

Subsection 3.9.1.4.2. Loading conditions, design stress limits, and methods of stress analysis for 3.93.1.4 Recirculation Motor Cooling (RMC) the core support structures and other reactor Subsystem internals are discussed in Subsection 3.9.5.

The RMC system piping loop between the recir-l 3.93.13 Main Steam (MS) System Piping culation motor casing and the heat exchanger is constructed in accordance with the ASME Boiler The piping systems extending from the reactor and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Subsection i

pressure vessel to and including the outboard NB-3600. Strest,es are calculated on am clastic main steam isolation valve are constructed in ac-basis and evaluated in accordance with NB-3600 cordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel of the ASME Code,Section III.

Code Section III, Class I criteria. Stresses are calculated on an elastic basis and evaluated in 3.93.1.5 Recirculation Pump Motor Pressure accordance with NB-3600 of the ASME Code Section Boundary i

III.

The motor casing of the recirculation inter-nal pump is a part of and welded into an RPV l

Amendment 23 3 S-20 i

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3.9.3.1.1.7 Environmental Effects on Fatigue Evaluation of Carbon Steel Piping Environmental effects on the fatigue design of ASME Section III Class 1 carbon steel piping will be evaluated in accordance with i

GE document, 408HA414 (Reference 9). Additional fatigue evaluations for environmental effects are not required for any of the followind conditions: (a) Water temperature is below 245*C, (b) Fittings, such as elbows and tees, that are

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conctcvatively designed and analyzed using the ASME Section III stress indicies and (c) For transients having total cycle times of 10 seconds or less and no tensile hold time, provided that the oxygen content of the water does not exceed 0.3 ppm.

Environmental effects are considered by increasing the local peak stress through four factors used as multipliers to the stress indicies. The four factors are:(1) the notch factor, (2) the mean stress factor, (3) the environmental correction factor, and (4) the butt weld strength reduction factor.

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.d M sAsimre Standard Plant nry n conditions. The operability assurance program particular ASME Class of valve analyzed.

ensures that these valves will operate during a fkg Syyess Liis for opera 6U[

dynamic seismic and other RBV event.

are you;ded k facirde 7 of i

3.93.2.5.1 Procedures To()g 3,9-2..

Dynamic load qTalification is accomplished Qualification tests accompanied by analyses in the following way:

are conducted for all active valves. Procedures hcok for qualifying electrical and instrumentation (I) All the active valves arefdesigned to have components which are depiinded upon to cause the a fundamental frequency which is greater valve to accomplish its intended function are than the high frequency asymptote (ZPA) of described in Subsection 3.9.3.2.5.1.3.

the dynamic event. This is shown by suitable test or analysis' r

3.93.2.5.1.1 Tests fc+

(2) The actuator and yoke of the val system Prior to installation of the safety.related is statically loaded to an amou t greater than that due to a dynamic event valves, the following tests are performed: (1) load is applied at the centerb. The shell hydrostatic test to ASME Code Section III gravity requirements; (2) back seat and main seat leakage of the actuator alone in the direction of tests; (3) disc hydrostatic test; (4) functional the weakest axis of the yoke. The tests to verify that the valve will open and simulated operational differential close within the specified time limits when pressure is simultaneously applied to the subject to the design differential pressure; and valve during the static deflection tests.

(5) operability qualification of valve actuators for the environmental conditions over the (3) The valve is then operated while in the installed life. Environmental qualification deflected position (i.e., from the normal procedures for operation follow those specified operating position to the safe position).

in Section 3.11. The results of all required The talve is verified to perform its

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tests are properly documented and included as a safety-related function within the part of the operability acceptance documentation specified operating time limits.

package.

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(4) Motor operators and other electrical 3.93.2.5.1.2 Dynamic d Qualificdlon appurtenances necessary for operation are qualified as operable during a dynamic The functionalit of an activ valve d, ring event by appropriate qualification tests and after a seism' and other RB eventg 15 prior to installation on the valve [hese demonstrate (by an analysisjb combination rmotor operators tnen nave individual of analysis and test. The qualification of Seismic Category I supports attached te electrical and instrumentation components deco.i

, lynamic loads between the controllig valve actuation is discussed in Q

. valves themselves.

S ubs e ctic n S.9.3.2.5.1.3.

The valves are designed using either stress analyses or the The piping, stress analysis, and pipe pressure temperature rating reggirepents based support design maintain the motor operator upon desi n conditions. Aggarfalyiis of the accelerations below the qualification levels 6

extende s{rgeture is performed for 64e+4e with adequate margin of safety.

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q=kr ynat.D 7oads:pp?id a i a m d gm :" d the extended structure. See If the fundamental frequency of the valve, Subsectioh 3.9.2.2 for further details.

by test or analysis, is less than that for the Loebym ZPA, a dynamic analysis of the valveherformed The maximum stress limits allowed in these to determine the equivalent accAWien to be analyses confirm structural integrity and are the applied during the static test. 1,c. analysis limits developed and accepted by the ASME for the provides the amplification of the input s

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l Table 3.9 2 LOAD COMBINATIONS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SAFETY-RELATED, ASME CODE CLASS 1,2 AND 3 COMPONENTS, COMPONENT SUPPORTS, AND CIASS CS STRUCTURES (Continued)

NOTES is s PWf MM MO f f

(6) DMeted' "G$Yaf mY N 7&)E

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lStL Q cfige. (lass I,2.ard 1 V aNe*Q (or 03S Sy)

Y (7) For active Class 2 and 3 pumpsf the stresses are limited by criteria: Om 11.2SI and (om ggI3 1

or OL) + ob 11.8E. where the notations are as defined in the ASME Code,Section III, subsections NC or KD, respectively N(or gl gy J

4 NBad (8) The most limiting load combination case among SRV(1), SRV(2) and SRV (ALL). For main steam and branch piping evaluation, additional loads associated with relief line clearing and blowdown into the suppression pool are included.

(9) The mest limiti'2g load combination case among SRV(1), SRV(2) and SRV (ADS). See Note (8) for main steam and brandt piping.

(10) The reactor coolant pressure boundary is evaluated using in the load combination the maximum pressure expected 10 occur during ATWS.

(11) The piping systems that are qualified to the leak-before-break criteria of Subsection 3.6.3 are excluded from the pipe break events to be postulated for design against LOCA dynamic h

effects, viz., SBL, IBL and LBL.

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\\v LOAD DEFTNTTION LEGEND:

Normal (N)- Normal and/or abnormal loads associated with the system operating conditions, including thermal loads, depending on acceptance criteria.

SOT System Operational Transient (see Subsection 3.9.3.1).

IOT Infrequent Operational Transient (see Subsection 3.9.3.1).

ATWS -

Anticipated Transient without Scram.

TSVC -

Turbine stop valve closure induced loads in the main steam piping and components integral to or mounted thercor.

RBV Loads - Dynamic loads in structures, systems and components because of reactor building vibration (RBV) induced by a dynamic event.

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Amencment 23 3

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' Nl NOTES 6 & 12 FOR TABLE 3.9.2 (6) All ASME Code Class 1,2 and 3 Piping systems which are essential for safe shutdown under the postulated events are designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-1367 (Reference 7). Piping system dynamic moments can be calculated using an elastic response spectrum or time history analysis.

6 (12) For ASME Code 1,2 and 3 piping the following changes and additions to ASME Code Section III Subsections NB-3600, NC-3600 and ND-3600 are necessary and shall be evaluated to meet tte following stress limits:

J/a-J (a) ASME Code Class 1 Piping:

ct [*r Mc. u,.os,,,

Et (tz O sse vw where: S is the nominal value of seismic anchor motion stress m

t M

is the' combined moment range equal to the greater of c

(1) the resultant range of thermal and thermal anchor movements plus one-half the range of the SSE anchor motion, or (2) the resultant range of moment due to the full range of the SSE anchor motions alone.

C,D and I are defined in ASME Code Subsection NB-3600 z

o SSE inertia and seismic anchor motion loads shall be included in the calculation of ASME Code Subsection NB-3600 equations (10) and (11).

/adECE (b) ASME Code Class 2 and 3 Piping:

5

= i $' s s.osh.os )st. 6M S

y where S,and M are as defined in (a)_above, and c

i and Z are defined in ASME Code Subsections NC/ND-3600 SSE inertia and seimic anchor motion loads shall not be included in the calculation of ASME Code Subsections NC/ND-3600 Equations (9,.an&'(10) d.n/ O/),

. _smW-Sev-vs c.c. La.vd s A ed B l L. _

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