ML20036A089
| ML20036A089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9305100032 | |
| Download: ML20036A089 (9) | |
Text
_.
(
GE Nuclear Energy l
i 4
gg,te-g,ec" f.~; n
[ ;n-(?
.~ L
.l b
f
-E April 28,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 l
l i
l I
l Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager
. Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors 3
and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation -
Subject:
Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Confirmatory item 83.2.8-1 and Open Item 83.3.5-1
Dear Chet:
Enclosed are replacement pages for Attachment 1 to my letter dated March 31,1993 for DFSER Confirmatory Item 83.2.8-1 and Open Item 833.5-1. Also enclosed are the corresponding SSAR markups.
Please provide a copy of this transmittal to John Knox.
1 Sincerely,
,)
Jack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs' 1
cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE).
Bob Strong (GE)-
t n
g6D
'g 060043 1
JIW115 9305100032 930428
. DR ADOCK.05200001-PDR
____-v---__-.
Page No.
{Q 04/26/93 DFSER CHAPTER 8 ISSUES & GE RESPONSES
.00 FSERSTAT
. REPORT FORM FSERMEMO IVEM NUMBER TYPE REF NRC
SUMMARY
REPORT GE RESPONSE Q.3.2.8-1 CONF 62 8.3.2.8-1 Physical separation of equipment 2nd Paragraph:
The staff indicated the need for a committment for a 3-hour fire the second-to-last sentence in 8.1.3.1.1.1 (page 8.1-3) has been barrier and missile barrier for everything up to the power modified, per the February meeting agreements, as follows:
distribution penets. The staff has reviewed the writeup in Appendix 9A and found the following inconsistencies.
"This equipment is housed in Seismic Category I structures except for some control sensors associated with the Reactor Protection Section 9A.5 conflicts Chapter 8 statement that att Class 1E System (see 9A.S.S.1), and the Leak Detection System (see busses, distribution systems and power and control systems are 9A.5.5.7)."
located in seismic Category I buildings. GE agreed to list the exceptions listed in 9A.5.5 in Chapter in Section 8.1.3.1.1.1. GE Cross references to these sections were also added to comitted to verifying if additional cross references to 7.2.2.2.4(4) and 7.3.2.2.2(1), respectively, as shown in attached exceptions are needed in Chapter 7 and adding additional markups.
information to the SSAR, if required. This was acceptable to the staff.
3rd Paragraph:
Section 9A.S.5.1 indicates that there are multiple divisions of scram solenoid fuse penets in the same fire areas. GE comitted The following sentence was awed in the second paragraph of to clarifying the discussion in the section to add a statement 9A.5.5.1, page 9A.5-1, per attached markup:
that the panels are in separate fire areas. GE agreed to provide a statement in section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 indicating that the 3-hour "The Div. I rooms are located in separate fire zones from the fire barrier will be maintained from the power source up through Div. II rooms, which zones are separated by 3-hour fire the distribution panels. Exceptions for the loads are provided barriers."
in 9A.5 This was acceptable to the staff.
The following clarification was added in the end of the first the staff provided a markup of 9A.5 to GE indicating sections paragraph of 8.3.3.6.2.2.2 (formerly 8.3.1.4.2.2.2, page 8.3-17):
which are inconsistent with other sections of the SSAR.
"The electrical equipnent f rom the Class 1E power suppies to the distribution centers are separated by 3-hour fire barriers.
Beyond the distribution centers, the exceptional cases where it is not possible to instatt such barriers have been analyzed and justified in Appendix 94.5."
4th Paragraph:
Page No.
l4 04/26/93 DFSER CHAPTER 8 ISSUES & GE RESPONSES
.00 FSERSTAT
. REPORT FORM FSERMEMO IVEQ NUMBER TYPE REF NRC
SUMMARY
REPORT GE RESPONSE
- (The response for consistency check is included with the response for Open Item 8.3.3.5-1.)***
Q.3.3.5-1 OPEN 68 8.3.3.5-1 Redundant class 1E systems (environments) 1st Paragraph:
The stsff indicated that in Table 9A.S.2 there is a list of The statement in 7.4.1.4.4 (page 7.4-7.1 attached) has been reactor building special cases with redundant equipnent or marked up as follows:
circuits in the same fire area. Electrical codes are listed to provide separation guidance. Some circuits list N/A under
" Control of all necessary power supply circuits is also a plicable codes which do not indicate the basis for protection transferred to the remote shutdown system."
of the equipment or circuits. GE indicated that the scram solonoids are addressed in 9A.5.
That was acceptable to the staff. For other exarrples, CE provided an explanation for 2nd Paragraph:
clarification and no revision to the SSAR was required. The staff questioned the protection of the power supply to the remote Discussions for the protection of Class 1E electrical systems shutdown penet from a fire in the main control room. CE upstream of postulated faults in these systems are provided in indicated that in SSAR section 7.4.1.4.4, it states that all Table 9A.5.2, Amerdnent 23. For the SLCS, see Items 9-12 (C41),
necessary power sumty circuits are manually transferred to other electrical codes "18" and "1C", which are explained in Section sources after a control room short circuit.
9A.5.7.
A similar process may be followed for att other systems identified in the table, which includes FCS (T49) and the SGTS The discussion of the SLCS in 9A.5 indicates that the SLCS will (T22).
be lost in one fire. There is not discussion on the protection of the Class 1E electrical systems. GE agreed to modify the For consistency and clarification, the following modifications writetp to address this issue and do similar for the flanrnability were performed as marked in the attached:
control system, SGTS, among others to discuss the required protection of Class 1E power supplies. This was acceptable to 9A.5.5.9 Flanrnability Control System - Section 9A.5.5.18 was the staff. The staff indicated that SPLB and SICB should also deleted and its contents were moved to the end of 9A.5.5.9.
The review the section. This becomes an interim confirmatory item reference to 9A.S.S.18 in Teole 9A.5.2 was changed to 9A.S.S.9.
based on the above items.
9A.5.5.10 Fuel Pool Cooling Cleanuo System - This section was deleted because the system is not Class 1E and does not receive power from Class 1E sources.
94.5.5.11 Standby Gas Treatment System - This section was corptetely revised as follows: "The standby gas treatment system
3 Page No.
[
05/26/93 DFSER CHAPTER 8 ISSUES & GE RESPONSES
.00 FSERSTAT
. REPORT FORM FSERMEMO ITEM NUMBER TYPE REF NRC
SUMMARY
REPORT GE RESPONSE equipment is contained in two separate adjoining rooms located between 270 and 330 degrees azimuth near the standby liquid control system area at the 38-foot level. The system consists of two totally independent and redundant divisional trains (Div. II and Div. 111). Each divisional train has a filter train (consisting of the demister, an electric process heater, prefitter, pre-HEPA filter, charcoat absorber, a post-HEPA filter and space heaters), an exhaust fan and a cooling fan. The two divisional trains occupy two separate rooms separated by a 3-hour fire barrier. Each divisional train exhaust is connected to the R/A exhaust duct and they are isolated by fire dacpers."***
4 l
i 234uoom ABWR a, n Standard Plant
(
The transmitters are located in separate enclosures The cabling is routed in separate conduit or trays and their connecting cables are housed in separate for each division, separated from each other, to meet metal conduit. Shorting and/or grounding of these IEEE 384. Conduit will be embedded in concrete cables due to postulated fire would not jeopardize where feasible.
i i
the emergency power busses because the low-voltage Tbc electric drive motor and cabling for the redun-power supplies which feed the transmitters are dant pumps are located more than 5 ft apart. The current-timiting devices.
injection valves and cabling are located more than 3 ft In event of fire in the spaces protected by tem-apart centerline to centerline.
perature detection, it is expected that a signal will be The control cables for Division 1 and 2 equipment generated by the ambient sensors at compartment are in separate conduit and separate from the power temperatures well below the threshold of darnage to cables. The Division 1 power and control cabling is equipment of either division. TIis signal would routed out of the Division 2 area to the Division 1 appear to the leak detection temperature sensor as a area by conduit embedded in the floor and walls.
leak in the process piping or equipment within the compartment.
Postulated fire damage to the electrical equipment in the SLC area could not inadvertently result in 9A.S.S.8 Standby IJquid Control injection of boron because this can only be done by The following SLC equipment is located in the activation of a switch on the control room panet Fire same general area of the reactor building at the 38-ft could damage the power cabling to the pump suction level, azimuth (approximately) 2508 (Division 2 valves or to the pump motors preventing opening of valves or start of pump motors on command from the l
general area) on a concrete slab outside the drywell:
control room. However, the SLC equipment is not Divisional Designated required for safe shutdown of the reactor, since it is i
Eouiement Division redundant to the RPS.
l 9A.5.5.9 Flammability Control System 1
Pump C41-C001A 1
1 The flammability control system equipment is lo-f Pump C41 C001B cated in a large enclosed area at grade level at 2
i approximately 180 degrees azimuth. The roomthaCa
+~
l Injection Valve (MO) C41 FD06A 1
fire barner floor and is completely surrounded liy fire barrier walls and doors. There are large access doors y
(1.l Injection Valve (MO) C41-F006B 2
to the om.u, nr the eaa.,rtine of the room.
,,,,J", Qm*.n'f'y,"l'f"'; '
y h
j Suction Valve (MO) C41-F001A 1
[
y s.c d ca
.sns _... ra f
O dI'.7." "." 1."U7.m,dT i
Suction Valve (MO) C41-F001B 2
sboa,d). Th. i.ho.rd la.4.uok esto
.r. seeo, s.
I
.p st.d (MD) talves. d th.
sho.,d anot.tio.
[o" g
, r, c, g
)
O',',",*'j"g,,,",.,,g"Q, ~.a,.i..,
Control and Power Cabling to *A
1
-y,
-.dn.
Equipment
- = i h.,d ur :
n.c i
- 6. m
.,4 i i
.a..
- r.
ZZ,j'@'",,7,,,gl"f",0%
.' (
y.'#
Control and Power Cabling to *B*
2 g
V, o
l
"".'."6". *=" '_es i...d....... _ %
d 6..
Equipment i.
n,.
.519~ Fuel n.s.; E
.t
=,, as x
Nondivisional Eauinment ment is Boron Storage Tank l
The fuel pool cooling cleanup syste
'/ located 20-foot above grade and ately 310 g
degrees azimuth.
d' Storage Tank Heating elements (a:
The Divis' quipment is spatially separate Power Cabling for Storage Tank Heaters fro avision 11 equipment, though there is no 9AS4 Amendment 22
)
i
nA6tmani ABWR Rev B Standard Plant
~'
fire barrier betw msions. The main Subsection 7.4.2.1.2(3) of the SAR, the breaker time-overcurrent trip characteristic for all circuit cared slightly more than 5 feet apart.
faults shall cause the breaker to interrupt the fault
". (
n e,. m current prior to initiation of any upstream breaker.
9A.5.5.11 Standby Gas Treatment System The power source shall supply the necessary fault 5 efnait The standby gas) treatment system equipment is current for sufficient time to ensure the proper coor-dination without loss of function of Class IE loads. In contained in two{ adjoining rooms located between addition, each FMCRD inverter has current limiting 270 and 330 degrees azimuth near the standby liquid features to limit the FMCRD moter fault current.
control system area at the 38 foot level.
Continuouh operation of all the FMCRD motors at The system eonsiats of two the limiting fault current of the inverter shall not tetatty independent and degrade operation of any Class 1E loads (i.e., the redundant-vieionei trains diesel generators shall be o.f appropriate design gi)v.It di ttt).
Each Iision (Y rain has a filter capacity).
train tc sisting of the f
Each of the FMCRD panei rooms are enclosed by demister, an etectric process fire barrier walls and are on opposite sides of the (b}
heater, prefitter, pre NEPA reactor building. Shorts and/or grounds on the fitter, charcoat adsorber, a Class-1E divisional FMCRD power source cables post-HEPA filter and space caused by postulated fires in either of these areas heaters), en exhaust fan and would therefore not cause an unsafe condition nor a eoo1Ing fan.
The two ardize the integrity of the Class 1E power busses.
dipiora1 trains oeeupy tw 3-W" s grdte rooms separted by a A.5.5.13 Reactor Building Operating Deck fire barrier.
Eaeh Radiation Monitors divisional train exhaust is connected to the R/A exhaust Radiation monitoring within this area is facilitated
- * 'a
-- fd E D and they are isoIated by; by two independent systems. The area radiation fire dampers.
monitoring system and the process radiation 9A.5.5.12 Fine Motion Control Rod Drive monitoring system.
Components The area radiation monitoring (ARM) system is The fine motion control rod drive components non safety related and uses two radiation channels in which require multi divisional power interfaces are the fuel storage and handling areas. It has no system contained in two large enclosed areas approximately actuation function, but is used for monitoring of background radiation and radiation resulting from 50 feet above grade level.
accidental fuel drops. The sensors are mounted on the walls within the fire zone area. These detectors One of these areas is centered at 90 degrees azimuth, just inside of the reactor building wall, and are designed to annunciate local and control room alarms for both high and low radiation conditions.
contains Divisions I and III power interfaces for The low condition is an indication of an inoperative FMCRD driver cabinets. The room also contains non-1E equipment associated with the rod control radiation monitor. Loss of these detectors, due to fire, does not impact plant safety.
and information system.
The process radiation monitoring (PRM) channels l The other area is a ' mirror image" centered at 270 that are utiHud in this area are safety related, and are degrees azimuth and contains Division II and III used to perform isolation functions. The Gieger power interfaces for FMCRD driver cabinets. The Mueller detectors are mountedin he rehetor building room also contains non 1E equipment associated with ventilation system exhaust du
( m 643). They are the rod control and information system.
safety related, and receive their power from a dual auctioneered class 1E divisional high voltage power Exception is taken to the LOCA-trip requirements of isolation circuit breakers for the FMCRDs because supplies of the digital ARM (D11-Z602A-D Div,1-4).
of ATWS considcrations. As explained in Each divisional digital ARM output voltage is hard wired to its associated detector and it 9A.5-7 Amendment 23
ABWR 2mtoun Standard Plant w.
9A.5.5.16 Containment Isolation Valves ivisions (div.1 & 4). Loss of a complete di ~
acceptabic because FCS is p of two f The primary function of each isolation valve isI independent redundan sions moun.ted.in tp to close to isolate primary containment when isolation hate fire ar is required. In general, outboard isolation valves are assigned to division 1 and inboard isolation valves to 9A.S.6 (Deleted) division 2. In some cases this results in division 1 outboard isolation valves being located in division 2 or 9A.5.7 Typical Circuits Analysis Of Special 3 areas. This is acceptable from a functional Cases standpoint because a fire in an area outside of containment and involving the penetration must be This analysis is for those cases where a device assumed to disable the system anyway, without regard from one division is located in an area of another l
to whether or not the outboard isolation valve is. division. Only typical cases are analyzed here. Each i
disabled. If the valve is open at the time of the fire it case type is assigned an electrical separation type could fail in the open position and remain open but code for unique identification. An analysis and a the inboard valve would not be involved in the fire typical electrical connection block diagram (Figure and would close on demand. It is a requirement that 9A.5-2) are presented for each typical case. Table cables for outboard valves located in fire areas of a 9A.5-2 provides a summary of the special cases of the division different than the division of the valve not be equipment in the reactor building discussed in routed through fire areas containing any circuitry Appendix 9A.5 of the SSAR special cases. It provides associated with the inboard valve of the isolation pair.
the justification and their acceptability from the See Table 9A.5-2 for identification of specific valves standpoint of the consequences on the electrical which fallin this category.
circuits only. The table also references analyses to confirm the acceptability of the loss of function.
9A.5.5.17 Division 4 Sensors In all cases Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE There are a few cases of division 4 instruments Standard 384 are met. The justification is for the being mounted in division 2 fire and HVAC area. It acceptability of complete burnout of the fire area in is possible that both the division 2 and 4 sensors could which the device is located.
be lost due to a single fire. This would either cause the two channels to trip high or alarm down scale. A Cases with special situations which do not lend high trip would cause the protective action to be taken themselves to a typical analysis are discussed as a result of the two out of four logic. For a down individually in Appendix 9A, Section 9A.5, of the l
scale trip, the operator would know that a failure had SSAR.
occurred and automatic action would still be initiated by divisions 1 or 3. For these reasons, simultaneous Type 1A, Large 460V Motor-loss of both the divisions 2 and 4 instruments is acceptable.
This type is for a 460V Class 1E motor which is fed from a 480V Class 1E power center and is y
located in a divisional area different than the
[9'A.5.5.18 Flammability Control Systeam (FCS) s division of the motor. A current '
fuse is f
The FCS is made up of two in endent added downstream of the bc # y.~
the power redundant divisions (div. 2 & 3), and ch divisionis center to provide Class 1E t protection located in fire area division 2 & 3 ctively. Each for the motor feed circuit to assure that a motor (p
division has two suction isola ' valves (inboard and or cable fault does not propagate back to the
~
.e cause the bus supply breaker to open.
outboard) and two return
'on valves (inboard &
'4]
outboard). The in
. isolation valves are motor fault in hpm tor circuit will cause a operated (MO) s, and the outboard isolation cMJt 161gk drop on the bus but the quired to be designed to valves are f
- ose (FC) air operated (AO) solenoid oads r
ulves solenoids per valve). They are powered accomodate m voltage dips while a load fro ivisions 1 & 4. Fire in either divisions may breaker is cle 'ng a downstream fault. Tables referencing this typical circuit analysis should the inboard valve (div. 2 or 3) to fail to operate, j have a column which gives the justification for s
but the outboard isolation valves are still capable to,
_ Qsolate because they are powered from differeng 9A5 7.2 (J
(
Amendment 23 (h mta=$ k N I
ABWR 23A6:00AH Rm B P
Standard Plant Table 9A.5-2
SUMMARY
OF THE REACTOR BUILDING SPECIAL CASES (Continued) i FIRE ELEC JUSTIFICA* DON FOR HEM MPL DIV. ELEV HORIZ VERT DESCRII' DON ROOM AREA SEP. TYPE ACCEITAB11JIY OF 4
NO.
NO.
DIM.
DIM.
NO.
DIV.
CODE IDSS OF FUNCDON j
91 T31-F006 1
19000 2.6 E6 AO VALVE
$21 2
3C Normally closed, fait closed viv. Ims of path A
to SGIS is accept.
92 T31-F009 1
19000 2.6 E.6 AO VALVE 521 2
3C Normally closed, fait viv. Imns of contmt atmos.
control is accept.
l 93 T31-ID40 2
3C Normany open, fait cisd viv. loss of nitro.
I supply is accept.
94
'D1-PD41 2
13700 5.8 C2 AO VALVE 411 1
3C Normally open, fsit cisd viv. Imss of nitro.
supply is accept.
95 T31-F731 1
23500 5.8 CB SO VALVE 616 3
3C Normally open, fail open instru viv. Backed by manualiso vivis accept.
T31-F737B 1
6500 2.1 D3 SO VALVE 323 2
3C Normally open, fall open instru vtv. Backed by I
manualiso viv is accept.
97 T31-FT39D 4 2800 2.2 C1 SO VALVE 241 2
3C Normally open, fail open J
instru vtv. Backed by manual iso viv is accept.
98 T31-1741D 4
-1700 2.2 C1 SO VALVE 241 2
3C Normally open, fail open instru viv. Becked by a
manualiso vtv is accept.
99 T31-F801A 1
18100 2.0 D.5 SO VALVE 528 2
3C Normally open, fail open instru viv. Backed by a
manualiso vtv is accept.
a 100
- DI-F801B 2
18100 5.7 B.8 50 VALVE 510 1
3C Normally open. fail open instru viv. Backed by manualiso vtv is accept.
101 T31-F805A 1
6600 5.9 DJ SO VALVE 332 3
3C Normally open, fail open instru vtv. Backed by manual iso vtv is accept.
102 T31-LTD5ED 4 8200 2.2 C1 LEVELTRANSMTTIER 140 2
2B See Secuan 9A.5.5.17 103 T4%f002B 1 1 20100 2.7 E.4 SOLENOID VALVE 521 2
3C See Secuon 9A33 104 T49-P00282 4 20100 2.7 E4 SOLENOID VALVE 521 2
3C See Section 9A33 %
105 T49-P002C-1 1 20100 5.7 DE SO1ENO1D VALVE
$30 3
3C See Secuan 9A35g 106 T49-P002C-2 4 20100 5.7 DE SOIENOID VALVE 530 3
3C See Section 9A.53 K g '!
107 T49-P007A-1 1 000 SE DJ SOLENOID VALVE 230 3
3C See Secuan 9A3.5 r 108 T49-P007A-2 4 800 SE D.5 SO1ENOID VALVE 230 3
3C See Section 9AJS Ef 109 T49-P007B-1 1 000 la E3 SOIENOIDVALVE 221 2
3C See Sectum 9A.53 6 110 T49-P0078-2 4 300 22 E3 SOLENOID VALVE 221 2
3C See Section 9A33 $
Ill U41-D109 1
18100 1A A.7 FPC FUMP(A) RM HVH
$47 2
IB Cooling for TPC pump.
redundancy prtmded by RHR 9A3-8 4 Amendment 23
ABWR 22A6100AH P
Standard Plant Rev.B Table 9A.5-2
SUMMARY
OF THE REACTOR BUILDING SPECIAL CASES (Continued) l FIRE ELEC.
JUS'1TITCAT10N FOR TIEM MPL DIV. ELEV HORIZ VERT DESCRIFI1ON ROOM AREA SEP."IYPE ACCEPTABILT1Y OF l
NO.
NO.
DIM.
DIM.
NO.
DIV.
CODE LOSS OF FUNCTION 66 E51-FIU14B 2
-1700 6.2 B.9 PRESS XMTR(TURB EXH) 210 1
2B See Section 9A3.5.15 67 E51 FIU14F 2
-1700 6.2 B.9 PRESS XMTR (TURB EXH) 210 1
2B See Section 9A.5.5.15 68 G31-IE3 1
14480 2.4 B.6 MO GATEVALVE(ISOL) 443 2
1C Sec Tabic 9AJ-1 69 G31-F072 1
13500 23 B.6 AO VALVE 443 2
3C See Section (a.53.16 70 H22-PO44A' 1 23500 63 F.1 CAMS GAS CYL RACK A 633 3
N/A Redundant rack in diff i<c 3*'k?
fire ares.3 71 H22-P055A* 23
-1700 5.2 A3 SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL A 210 1
N/A See Section 9A.5.5.1 72 H22-PQ55B* 23
-1700 4.6 E.8 SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL B 231 3
N/A See Section 9A.5.5.1 73 H22-P055C* 23
-1700 4.9 E7 SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL C 231 3
N/A See Section 9A.53.1 74 H22-P055D* 23
-1700 5.0 A3 SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL D 210 1
N/A See Section 9A3.5.1 75 H22-P055E' 23
-1700 5.1 AJ SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL E 210 1
N/A See Section 9A33.1 SCPv LM SOL PUSE PNL F 231 3
N/A See Section 9A.5.5.1 76 H22-PJ55F* 23
-1700 43 E7 8
77 H22-PQ55G* 23
-1700 5.0 E.6 SCRAM SOL FUSE PNL G 231 3
N/A See Section 9A.53.1 78 H22-POS$H* 23
-1700 4.8 A3 SCRAM SOLFUSE PNL H 210 1
N/A See Section 9A3.5.1 79 P21-P075B 1
13550 23 E3 MO GATE VALVE (ISO) 420 2
1C Outbd iso vtv, see Section 9A.5.5.16 80 P21-FOBIB 1
13550 2.6 E4 MO GATE VALVE (150) 420 2
1C Outbd iso vtv, see Section 9A3.5.16 81 P24-PQ53 1
13550 2.7 E.5 MO GATEVALVE(DW150) 420 2
1C Outbd iso viv, see Section 9A.53.16 82 P2AF142 1
13550 23 E6 MO GATEVALVE(DW150) 420 2
1C Outbd iso viv, r,ee Section 9A 53.16 83 P54-F007B 2
19000 2.2 B.9 MO GLOBE VALVE
$43 4
1C Outbd iso vtv, see Section 9A.53.16 84 P54-F200 1
19000 2.4 B.9 MO GLOBE VALVE 543 4
1C O.itbd iso vty, see Section 9A.5.5.16 85 P54-PT002B 2 19000 23 B9 PRESSTRANSMITIER 543 4
2B Redundant *A* Xmtr located in diff C#82C 23 goc 2 2
- 6. G c f 4%
fire area 86
'IT2-O!ewt** 2 mm Ge* M COOllNG FAN A 68?
3 IB Redundant "B" pump 3
loosted in diff h7e C 081 B 21 C.*1 64%
fire ares 87 W3 23500 W es' COOLING FAN B 6C" 2
1B Redundant *A* pump located in diff fire area 88 T22.PD19 3
23500 la C3 AO VALVE 640 2
3C Redundant viv located in diff fire area 89 T31-P002 2
13700 53 C.2 AO VALVE 411 1
3C Normany closed, fail closed viv. Loss of contmt atmos control is accept.
90 T31-F003 2
8500 53 B.6 AO VALVE 318 1
3C Nor naDy closed, fait closed viv. lass of contmt atmos control is accept.
9AJ-83 Amendment 23
-