ML20036A064

Forwards SSAR Markup & App 1C, Advanced BWR Station Blackout Considerations, Addressing Draft FSER Confirmatory Item 9.2.13-1

ML20036A064
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	04/30/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9305070355
Download: ML20036A064 (21)

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- April 30,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 j

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Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manage r Standardization Projxt Directorate

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and License Renewal.

Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation M

Subject:

. Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Confirmatory item 9.2.13-1

Dear Chet:

Enclosed is a SSAR markup and a new Appendix IC,"ABWR Station Blackout Considerations" addressing DFSER Confirmatory Item 9.2.131.

Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Butch Burton.

j Sincerely, Y

ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs

- cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE) _

Gail Miller (GE)

John Power (GE) i.

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April 30,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 1

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t Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate

~ Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal-r Office of the Nuclear Reac' or Regulation

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Subject:

. Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Confirmatory Item 9.2.13-1 3

Dear Chet:

Enclosed is a SSAR markup and a new Appendix IC, "ABWR Station Blackout Considerations"

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addressing DFSER Confirmatory Item 9.2.13-1,

_i Please provide a copy of this transmit'tal to Bu:ch Burton.

i Sincerely, s

bY ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs

' Norman Fletcher (DOE) cc:

. Gail Miller (GE) -

John Power (GE) -

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(3) The system shall be designed and constructed the reactor building as shown in Figure 1,212.

in accordance with Seismic CategoryI, ASME Equipment is listed in Table 9.2-8.

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code,Section III, Class 3 requirements.

cooling coil has a three way valve controlled by a room thermostat. Alternately, flow may be (4) The system shall be powered from Class IE controlled by a temperature control valve.

A buses.,

Condenser cooling is from the corresponding division of RCW.

(5) The HECW system shall be protected from missiles in accordance with Subsection Piping and valves for the HECW system, as 3.5.1.

well as the cooling water lines from the RCW system, designed entirely to ASME Code, Section (6) Design features to preclude the adverse III, Class 3 Quality Group C, Quality Assurance effects of water hammer are in accordance B requirements. The extent of this with the SRP section addressing the classification is up to and including drainage resolution of USI A-1 discussed in block valves. There are no primary or secondary N U R E G -0927.

containment penetrations within the system. The HECW system is not expected to contain L

These features shallinclude:

radioactivity.

(a) an elevated surge tank to keep the High temperature of the returned cooling system filled; water causes the standby refrigerator unit to start automatically. Makeup water is supplied

.i (b) vents provided at all high points in the from the MUWP system, at the surge tank. Each system; surge tank has the capacity to replace system water losses for more than 100 days during an (c) after any system drainage, venting is emergency. The only non-safety-related portions assured by personnel training and of the HECW divisions are the chemical addition

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procedures; and tank and the piping from the tank to the safety related valves which isolate the safety related (d) system valves are slow acting.

portions of the system.

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6 (7) The HECW system shall be protected from Also, see Subsection 9.2.17/for COL license failures of high and medium energy lines as information requirements.

discussed in Section 3.6.

9.2.13.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2.13.2 System Description The HECW system is a Seismic Category I

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The HVAC emergency cooling water system system, protected from flooding and tornado consists of subsystems in three divisions. missiles. All components of the system are Division A has one refrigerator and pump and designed to be operable during a loss of normal Division B and C have two refrigerator units, two power by connection to the ESF buses. See pumps, instrumentation and distribution piping Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3 2. Redundant components and valves to corresponding cooling coils. A are provided to ensure that any single component chemical addition tank is shared by all HECW failure does not preclude system operation in divisions. Each HECW division shares a surge Divisions B and C. The system is designed to tank with the corresponding division of the RCW meet the requirements of Criterion 19 of system. The refrigerator capacity is designed to 10CFR50. "_d di. :_

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D cool the diesel generator zone and electrical seene equipment room in its division.

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The system is shown in Figure 9.2-3. The I

refrigerators are located in the control building Initial testing of the system includes per-l as shown in Figures 1.2-20 and 1.2-21. This formance testing of the refrigerators, pumps and t

system shares the RCW surge tanks which are in coils for conformance with design capacity water Amendment 23 9.2-9 f

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Power shall be available from the Alternate AC (AAC)

A power source when required.

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The refrigerators of each division are in separate rooms.

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During a Station Blackout (SBO), the HECW chillers, pumps and instrumentation will be powered by the AAC which will become available in ten minutes.

Provisions will be made to ensure prompt restart.of the refrigera-i tors as discussed in Subsection 9.2.17.6.

The response to SBO is discussed in Chapter 1, Appendix IC.

During the SBO, little heat will be generated in the areas cooled by HECW because only battery powered equipment will be operating.

When AAC power becomes available, the fans will start supplying outside air and exhausting any hot air from these areas.

When chilled water becomes available, cooled air will be recirculated in these areas to restore normal tempera-ture.

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[D RA1:T i

r APPENDIX IC STATION BLACKOUT CONSIDERATIONS i'

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ABWR ux6im^c~ -

-Standard Plant

-aav.c SECTION IC CONTENTS Section Title h

IC STATION BLACKOUT CONSIDERATION I C.1 INTRODt?CTION IC,1 1 I C.2 Sitif %f ARY C O N Ci t'S1 0 N S

~1C.2-1 l

'I IC.3 DISCI' SCION IC,3-1 i

1C.3.1 '

Background information 1C.3-1 IC.3.2 Plant Design Basis '

IC.3 2 l

t IC 3.3 Plant Safety Evaluation IC.3 3 i

iC.3.4 Plant SBO Conformance 1 C.3--t

-l IC.3.5 Other Considerations IC.3 5

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t IC.3.6 Alternate AC Power Source Operational Capabilities Plant NormalOperation 1C.3 7 IC.4 CONCLt'SIONS IC.4 1 l

1 C,5 St'\\l%f ARY - ST ATE %1FNTS IC.5-l' I C.6 REFERENCES IC.6-1

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ABWR u4eimic Standard Plant y yy c IC.1 INTRODUCTION This appendix briefly (a) identifies the design cl.

ements and requirements relauve to the prevention, mit.

igation, and accommodation aspects of a full spectrum of plant stauon blackout (SBO) events; (b) discusses the ability of the ABWR to successfully address and termi-nate these events; (c) ci'.es the results of evaluations 01 ABWR design relative to SBO Industry and Regulatory requirements; and (d) it examines the specific u.se of the Alternate AC Power Source (Combustion Turbine Generator) in SBO events.

This appendix serves as an integration compendium relative to the SBO scenarios and the ABWR systems and equipment descriptions and evaluation provided throughout the other SS AR secuons. This appendix will freely cite or reference more appropriate and detailed discussions else in the SSAR. These will include loss of power sequences and equipment capabiliucs to accom.

modate them.

In summary, the mission of the appendis is to )

describe how the ABWR design addresses plant SBO event, ii) summartze, clarify and support the ABWR design conformance with all SBO re-quirements, iii) indicate how the CTG integrates in the plant current SBO protection features. This new enhanced electrical power network in essence, will result in a significant reduction m the attended risk associated with this event category.

Amendment

ABM meimC

- Standaro Plant y yy c IC 2 SUM 51ARY CONCLUSIONS DG battenes) can alone ope with an eight hour outage.

How ever, the AAC can restore power within 10 minutes The descnbed and documented ABWR design in to I hour. This sigmficantly reduces the exposure of the the SS AR fully complies with:

pow er outage risk to prolonged SBO events and their ef-tects. Pow er restoranon within the 10 to 60 minute dme (1) all of the design regu!atory requirements relauve to domam is uewed as being a risk reduction sigmficant current determinisuc DB A safety evaluauons m.

element. Refer also to Subsecuon 19.3.15.

ciudmg special event consideranons (e g.. GDC regulauons, regulatory guides), SRP requirements (2) all of the standard design regulatory requirements relauve to current PRA evaluations (with only the use of Off-Site Power sources or On-Site DG Power sources after an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping penod).

(3) all of the new ABWR design requirements reladve to current NRC, EPRI and NUMARC guiJehnes (with additional use of the CTG as an A AC source).

9) all of the NRC-StatT DFSER SBO requirement 3 (

with On site /Otfsite Power sources. On-Site DGs sources,and On-Site AAC sources).

(5) the analyses assumptions cited in the ABWR-SSAR PRA evaluation (Chapter 19) (with both AAC power source use and without).

The incorporadon and u>e of the combustion tur-bine generator (CTG) as an alternate alternaung current

( AAC) power sources sufficiently reduces the risk from the full spectrum of SBO esents:

(1) In non-accident SBO events - the AAC is designed to provide immediate power to selective pcwcr generation equipment (PIP) busses, asviding any equipment damage. Within 10 minutes,its can be made really available to power safe shutdown equipment should mese be a reason to do so.

(2) Dunng DBA events - the AAC power source can provide timely (within 10 minutes) emergency pow er to emergency core and contamment cochng equipment with a minimum amount of operator ac-don or diversion.

(3) During Severe Accidents - extended SBO esents, the AAC has an enhanced capability to proude a wide variety of power service over long periods of time related to core and containment coolmg radiological aspects, etc.

The current ABWR design features - redundant.

diserse and independent power sources (off-site, on-site Amendment IC.2-1

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' Standard Plant -

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!j SECTION IC.3.

1 CONTENTS j

Seetion lille Eggg

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IC.3.1 Itackcround inrormativm 1C.3-1

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IC.3.1.1 Determmistic SBO Evaluations IC.3-1 IC.3.1.2 Probabilistic SBO Evaluauons IC.3'-l

-j 1C.3.1.3 New Etolutionary Plant Requirements 1C.3 1 i

IC.3.2 Plant Desien Basis IC.32 fi IC.3.2.1 Off-Site AC Power Systems 1C.3-2

- I C.3.2.2 On-Site AC Power Systems IC.3-2 1C.3.2.3 On-Site DC Power Sources

~1C.3-2 IC.3.2.4 Alternate AC On Site Power S> stems 1C.3-2

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IC.3.2.5 Plant SBO Inherencies IC.3-2 j

IC.3.2.6 SBOlnherencies IC.2 2 IC.3.3 Plant Sa fet y F'valua tion

'lC.3 IC.3.3.1 Normal and Transient Operation IC.3 3.

1C.3.3.2 DBA Events 1C.3-3 IC.3.3.3 Special Events SBO(Non accident)

.1C.3-3 i

!C.3.3.4 Severe Accident - SBO (Extended Outages) 1C.3-3 IC.3.4 Plant SRO Conformance IC34 IC.3.4.1 Current and New NRC Requirements IC.3-4

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i IC.3.4.2 EPRI Utility Requirements Document IC.3,

IC.3.4.3 NRC DFSER Requirements.

IC.3-4

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1C.3.4.4 Regulatory Guide 1.155 Requirements 1C.3 ]

1C.3.4.5 NUMARC 87-00 Guidelines

!C.34 1C.3.4.6 Current SS AR Considerations IC.3 4 1C.3-ii l

Amendment

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a ABWR i

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Standard Plant:

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t SECTION IC.3

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a CONTENTS (Continued)

Section Titi.e Eage IC.3.5 Other Consideration IC.3-5 i

!C.3.5.1 Plant Technical Specificauons IC.3 1C.3.5.2 Design Interface requirements IC,3-5 IC.3.5.3 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)

IC.3-5 I

- i IC.3.5.4 ITAAC Aspects IC.3 1 IC 3.5.5 Equipment Qualificanon, Testing and Reliability IC.3-5 f

IC.3.5.6 Periodic Surveillance, Testing. Inspecuon and Maintenance IC.3-5 j

i IC.3.5.7 Power Feed Cable Routing IC.3-5 i

IC.3.5.8 CTG Capabilities -

IC3d IC.3.6 Alternate AC Power Source Onerationni Cnnahilities IC.3-6 1C.3.6.1-Plant Normal Operauons 1C3-6 1C.3.6.2 Non-Accident SBO Esents 1C.3-6 f

i IC.3.6.3 Other Capabilities IC.3-6 F

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ABWR meime Standard Plant uvc IC.3 DISCUSSION assumpoons were used. The coping study showed a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> upabihty without AC powcr.

IC.3.1 Background Information The second initiative was introduced m 1988 also A brief review of the esaluauon of the ABWR by EPRI in their Utility Requirements Document SBO esaluation is gne below.

4L RDL lt recommended the for ALWR design that an addinonal sue alternatne AC power source (AAC)

IC.3.1.1 Deterministic SBO Esaluations sh uld be an mtegral part of the plant design (Reference 6L That the una could be reviewed as a equipment Early traditional NRC requirements focused on protecuon mvestment to be used when ever power anomahes occur and to serve as a backup to existing deterministic safety evaluation principles which included compliance with GDCs. RGs. SRPs. Chapter sy stems. It would be a non. safety related component.

15 analyses address only short term SBO esents. The The NRC responded with a RG 1.155 revision to ABWR design is evaluated and included in Chapter 15' take mto account AAC aspects (Reference 4) of both the Recovery power sources includes only DGs. Other URD + NUMARC guidelines.

SS AR sections usually or primarily address DB A esents, effects, etc. The ABWR SS AR howescr. also addresses prolonged SBO plant condnions <c.g.. ECCS The third initiative was introduced by the NRC m 1990. < References 1 and 2). This initiatne required room heat-ups, etc.). and scenanos that an AAC be added to all esolutionary ALWRs and IC.3.1.2 Probabilistic SBO Esaluations sp ca apphca to ABWR deugn. A scries of requirements were also caed during the ABW,R carly reuew by the NRC Quesuon and answers relative to Later PR A evaluations (e.g.. guidehnes for PRA these requirements are an integral part of the SSAR.

evaluanons) regmred assessments of. he sequences or t

TA' ABWR design long had viewed the benefits of the scenarios involvmg prolonged loss of all of f-site and/or AAC. It was included in the design but in a more subtle on-site power sources). Early PRA cvaluation*

manner in Section 9. The ABWR was also cognizant of idenufied BWR vulnerabilities to extended SBO power its use for a variety of power loss-equipment plant outages. These were maml) due to early batte.y inherent protection (PIP) needs. Its adaptability and its degradation. Later analysis which more reabsucally current use is not accidental but a product of good exammed battery loads, their shedding, discharge desien perspective. The interaction between the AAC patterns, etc. focused on RCICS toom temperature andihe other part of the electrical power distribution concern.s These two areas were subjected to close design in Chapter S (e g., checks and balances at scrutiny and were adj.usted such that a 4 to 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> electrical breakers) have been' evaluated.

The coping internal was possible and probable. These incorporation of the AAC into the SBO network is, matters are addressed in the ABWR design. Eight hour therefore, m acrecment with all of the previous Section battery service availability and continued RCIS use were M design consiilerations.

specifically evaluated. Evaluations are included in the appropriate SSAR Sections. Refere to Subsection 8.3.2. L3.1.

IC.3.1.3 New Evolutionary Plant Requirements Three sets of new SBO requirements esolved over the last 10 years. Early in 1984, concern over olf-sne power availability due to weather conditions and the reliability of DG units triggered the first NRC/ Industry Initiative - SBO Quantitative Evaluations and Coping Studies. A new set of NUMARC related guidelines were developed in 1988 to establish a standard plant SBO vulnerability / avoidance (Reference 5) profile. also in 1988. the NRC established and issued specific SBO requirements in 10CFR50.63 (Reference 3)

An evaluation of ABWR was conducted. Worst case Amendment

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ABWR 3xeioo4c i

Standard Plant uve IC.3.2 Plant Design Basis SBO copmg mterval out to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (e.g., MCR 11C temperature nse will be hmited to -30*F due to liC A bnef lisung of the plant power sources are gnen heat load hmits). The MCR is supplemented by the below:

more open remote shutdown panel rooms during SBO es ents. The RCIS room is isolated from HPCS and IC.3.2.1 Off-Site AC Power Systerns RHR equipment and subject only to its own requirement heatup. External fire pump water makeup sources are Of f-site transmission sources connect to on >ae also as aildle.

loads are through a set of four transformers. The power unit-auuliary, start-up and re3erve transformers provide IC.3.2.6 CTG Silo Inherencies

>utficient power connections to satisfy GDC 17. Refer to Section 8.2.1 and 8.3.1 for design details.

The CTG can restore HVAC and other support /auuhary services within ten minutes. GTC is IC.3.2.2 On-Site AC Pouer Systems self contamed and not influenced by turbine building environmental conditions. CTG is not complicated by Three load groups each with a Class IE safety plant ESF type equipment turn-off devices. The CTG is related loads and separate mdependent non-sately loads not dependent on any house auxiliary service system.

and voltage groups - - under 6.9 Kv. 480 V.120 V AC The CTG can be connected to three different non->afety loads are prosided. A three load DC bus load buses tfeedwater, circulaung water) and three different arrangement matches the above normal AC feed busses.

safety related buses (three DG load buses).

A set of inverter / charger arrangements enterconnect AC and DC sources. Refer to Subsection 8.3.1 for detailed design aspects and their esaluations.

IC.3.2.3 On-Site DC Power Sources A DC power system is provided for safety and non-safety switch gear control, control power.

mstrumentation, critical motors, and emergency lighting.

Four independent Class IE 125 VDC divisions, three independent non-safety related 125 VDC load groups and one 250 VDC non safety related computer system are provided. Refer to SS AR Subsection 8.3.2 for detailed design and evaluations.

IC.3.2.4 Alternatise AC On-Site Power Systems A single combustion turbine generator (CTG) acts as a standby alternauve on-site AC power source. It is primarily configured to non-safety loads for LOOP situations. It can be re configured to selective Class IE loads upon need. The unit is identified as an AAC pow er source.

Refer to Subsection 9.5.11, 8.3.1, 8.3.1.1.1.

8.3.1.1.7. and 8.3.1.4 The plant electrical design is enhanced by a number of other considerations.

IC.3.2.5 Plant S110 Inherencies The ABWR design provides a number of umque features. The use of low heat-up 1&C components reduces the need for HV AC durmg SBO and extends the Amendment

ABMR 23A6100AC Standard Plant yry c IC.3.3 Plant Safety Evaluation There does not appear to be any impediment to its use before. during or after a prolonged SBO event. An A brief resiew of the ABWR design relatne to extended SBO alone, the failure of coping equipment, vanous LOOP and SBO situations is gne below.

etc. and the need for immediate use of CTG are far beyond the design basis requirements. However, the

.lC.3.3.1 Normal and Transient Operation CTG is asailable throughout the event to use to service salet) and non-safety loads.

The ABWR design operates and reacts similar to any other BWR design on power source perturbations (e.g.

LOOP). The plant will utilize tradinonal protective and recovery acuons. On loss of power sources, the plant will search for conventional alternauve sources while sequencing emergency sources (e.g., DG). Load shedding and normal reconfigurations will occur. However, a special extensive analysis of the interacuan between alternate GTG will be u ed iniually to supply non-safety loads and subsequently to supply safety loade : hen re-configured to this scruce by manual oper. r action. Also refer to Subsectior.s 8.31.

R3.2 and 9.5.I 1.

IC.3.3.2 DB A Esents The ABWR design functions hke other BWR previous designs under DBA-LOCA conditions.

However, a special comprehensive discu3sion is gnen in Subsection 8.3.1.1.7. Again, the u.se of the CTG is available but generally considered unnecessary due to the redundant diversity, and independence of the other power sources (e.g., DGs). Current analysis do not expect DBA + LOOPS although the current design basis assumes no credit for off site AC. Howeser, if this scenario includes an SBO sequence, the CTG is available for use in 10 to 60 minute interval. Also refer to Subsecuon 8.3.1. 8.3.2 and 9.5.11.

IC.3.3.3. Special Es ents - SBO (Non-accident)

The use of the CTG for an extented non-accident 580 events was envisioned by the NUMARC guidelines as a creditable SBO consideration. With isolation like conditions prevailing, reconfiguration of the CTG to safety load service within 10 minutes to (o minutes is expected to be a fairly normal operator acuen. Use of MCR for the entire refiguration is expected although front panel control and load breaker control are possible.

i IC.3.3.4 Sesere Accident -SBO (Estended Outages) i i

The use of the CTG for extended SBO conditions

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is not expected since the immediate use of CTG will negate a potential prolonged 580 before it can occur.

The CTG is available whenever its use is desirable.

i Amendment IC3-3

1 ABWR DA6WOAC Standard Plant mc i

IC.3.4 Plant SBO Conformance A thorough resiew of the NRC DFSER comments concluded that ABWR design reDected in the SSAR A bnef review of the ABWR design conformance n agreement with the staff findings.

was to vanous SBO requirements is given below.

IC.3.4.1 Current and New NRC Requirements A review was conducted of the ABWR design The ABWR fully complies with 10CFR$0.63 relatne to the RG 1.155 requirements in regards to the requirements. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> SBO duranon was chosen to normal emergency power systems (off-site, on site. DG, be conservauve. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping study was performed battenes) refer to Subsecuon 8.3.2.2.2. The ABWR is and the results were acceptable. The subject equipment in full agreement with the intent of the SBO guidelines.

was demonstrated to have sufficient margin to function as required dunng or after the event. The ABWR fully A separate, special review was conducted of the comphes with ALWR requirements. An alternative ABWR-CTG design relauve to RG 1.155. (Specifically source was proposed. Procedures to cope with SBO will to RG Section 3.3.5.) The ABWR-CTG design was m be developed. Traming will be conducted. Rehability compliance with the five cited requirements. The use of and environmental data will be mamtained. Equipmnet the CTG in the ABWR design (less than Ihr SBO) quahficauons will be conducted.

reducesthe RG compliance consideranons for the nonnal emergency sorces by reducing the coping study A review of the new SBO SECY 90-016 requirements.

requirements concludes that ABWR is m comphance with the intent of the ALWR initiative.

IC.3.4.5 NUMARC 87-00 Guidelines IC.3.4.2 EPRI Utility Requirements Document A resiew was conducted of the ABWR design relatne to the NUMARC SBO guideline / requirement The ABWR fully complies with the URD Secuan report. Special attention was gisen to Appendices A, B

11. The independent off-site power source connecuans and C relauve to the AAC design and its capabihues.

are provided. Sufficient on-site power sources, configurations and battery capabilities are included m The review concluded that the ABWR design and the ABWR design to meet specified requirement.s.

its esaluation comply with the NUMARC guidelines.

An alternate AC power source is provided with Ses cral requirements are COL applicant sufficient capacity to sustam safe shutdown loads. The responsibility items (e g., EOPs, testmg, mamtenance, CTG rehabihty shall be 0.90.

e tc. ).

The CTG will be periodically tested and IC.3.4.6 Current SSAR Considerations maintained to vendor standards.

The actise use of CTG was not initially part of the A review of the individual requirement concludes SS AR. Most of the current SBO evaluations are based that the ABWR design is in compliance with the subject on non.ACC availability (e.g.,8hr coping study). The URD objectives.

use of CTG will obvious relax some of the stringent equipment aspects.

IC.3.4.3 NRC DFSER Requirements in summary, the ABWR is in full compliance with A very comprehensive evaluation of the SSAR all industry and NRC SBO requirements.

mformation related to plant LOOPS and SBOs was conducted by the staff and reponed in Subsecuon M.3.9.

The SBO requirements compliance is reflected Clear and concise requirements of the ABWR design throughout the SS AR in individual sections.

were hsted. The staff evaluation concluded that the current design complies with the SECY ALWR requirements, with the SBO Rule and with the tradinonal DB A, design basis.

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l Amendment 1C 3-4 i

ABWR 23A6100AC Standard Plant yry c IC.3.5 Other Considerations I C.3.5.5 Equipment Qualification, Testing and Reliability Several other considerations are singled out for special comphance or requirements attendon. These are The subject CTB must be qualified for its intended hated below.

service and reliability by the vendor / supplier.

Quahfication testing. inspecuons and reliability shall be IC.3.5.1 Plant Technical Specifications a COL apphcant responsibility item.

The current DB A design basis oriented Tech Specs I C.3.5.6 Periodic Surseillance, Testing, inspection will contmue to be all that's required to assure safe and and Niaintenance ordern plant operation, transient accommodation and accident mitiganon. There is little need to require A scry strict and comprehensive reliabihty surveillance or operational requirements for the CTG assurance program exist for the normal plant emergency other than those required to assure a reliable and power system (DGs). This is considered a COL mamtainable plant equipment status for the alternatise apphcant irresponsibility ITEM.

Likewise, a power source. Manufacturers maintenance, testing and c om pre h e n si verc hability/a vailabili ty/surve n aalnc e/in s pe inspection requirements will be part of the plant PM ction and tesung program for the CTG is a COL program. Refer to SS AR Section 16 for Tech Spec appheant item.

Requirements on other powcr sources.

IC.3.5.7 Power Feed Cable Routing IC.3.5.2 Design Interface Requirements The power feed cable routing shall be physically Few plant auxihary senice or support sptem separated from other alternate sources to the extent interfaces exist between the self-contained, skid pracucal. A suggested routing is shown in SS/.R.

mounted CTG unit and the plant system serviced by the CTG. Electrical power cable connections to the plant IC.3.5.8 CTG Capabilities electncal distnbution system represents one of the few interface connections. These power cable raceways are The CTG will be capable of recharge the plant independent and separate from other plant electncal batteries during an clongated SBO scenano. The CTG power distnbution cabling. Most operauonal 1&C is on should be sized to carry the necessary safe and orderly front panel mounted.

Operating performance shutdow n loads with margin.

considerations are m the MCR. Connecuon breakers are at the load centers.

Diesel oil support sampling requirements equally apply to the CTG They are already cited for the DB m Subsection 9.5.13.13.

IC.3.5.3 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)

Plant EOPs will include considerations relauve to the use of the CTG under a variety of plant power perturbutions conditions. These are considered COL applicant responsibility items. The EOP should consider specific instructions, timing and related matters during SBO events or their symptoms. They shall specifiy specific operator actions relative to emergency power distnbuuon alignments.

I C.3.5.4 ITAAC Aspects i

The CTG is addressed in the Tier i documentauon (ITAAC).

l Amendment IC M i

ABWR meioac Standard Plant arv c IC.3.6 Alternate AC Power Source spectrum of LOOP (and LOOP related) events in SSAR Operational Capabilities Subsection (3.1.1.7.

IC.3.6.1 Plant Normal Operation The use of the CTG is fairly simple and straighuorward. Review of Figure 8.3-1 shows that the The normal operation and configurauon of the on.

CTG ean leed safe and orderly shutdown buses through site AC power network and its mdnidual power sources the reahgnment of two or three pre selected breakers, are descnbed in SS AR Subacctions 8.2.1 and 8.3.1. The CTG (AAC) system operauonal attnbutes and its The CTG will be up to operational sped in 2 mterconnections are desenbed in Subsection 9.5.12 and minutes and is available for bus connecuon in 10 are shown on SS AR Figure 8.3-1.

nunutes. The difference in time is to allow the normal primary emergency sources to be used to energize The CTG is designed normally to supply standtsy required buses and loads.

power to one of the two turbine buildings located (non-Class lE0 6.9 Kv buses which carry the plant EOPs to re configure the emergency sources to insestment protecuon (PIP) loads. (The other PIP hnes required bus / loads will be prosided to assure safe and receives back-up power from the auxihary transformer orderly energizadon of the necessary buses / loads.

fed from an alternate off-site power source.) The CTG automadcally starts on detecuon of voltage drop of less IC.3.6.3 Other Capabilities than 70 4 or its downstream bus. When the CTG is ready to synchromze, if the voltate is sull dehtient.

The CTG can be easily used for other SBO events power automatically transferred fro'm the unit auultars mcludmg potentially prolonged SBO scenanos. The transformer to the CTG. Refer to Figure 8.3-1) carl) use of the CTG will normally termmate the SBO m the 10 mmute to I hour mterval. Events hke DB A-The CTG can also feed non-Class I buses LOC As. site weather conditions, prolonged degradation powering feedwater and recirculating water pumps, of normal emergency sources (e.g., DGs) can be These buses normally receive power from the unit effectacly mitigated by the use of the CTG opdon.

auxiliary transformer and supply power to the third bus The CTG can be connected to one or more of the (plant mvestment protection (PIP) in the load group through a cross-ue. The cross-tic automatically opens three Safety related bus divisions; to one or more of the on loss of power but may be manually reclosed if it is three non-safety related bus divisions; to one of the desired to operate a condensate or feedwater pump from feedw ater and circuladng water buses; to one or more of the combustion turbine or the reserve auxtbarv the MCR or paint HVAC chiller systrems; or to one or transformer which are connectable to the PIP buses.

more of the DC battery charger divisions.

This cross-tic arrangement allows advantage to be taken of the fact that the feedwater pumps are motor driven The operation of the CTG from the MCR and the through an adjustable speed drive so that they have low umt front panel in concert with a variety of plant system situation has been evaluated. Comunicanon between starting currents and can be started and run at low power. The combustion turbme and reserve auxiliary CTG and other plant locanons has been assured even transformer have sufficient capacity to start either or dunng SBOs.

both of the reactor feedwater and condensate pumps in a load group. This provides three load groups of non.

In summary, the CTG is mdeed amulti purpose safety grade equipment in addition to the divisional IE plant mvestment protection system even under most load groups which may be used to supply water to the severe plant conditions of LOOP. SBO and DB As.

reactor vessel in emergencies. (Refere to Figure 8 3-1 L IC.3.6.2 Non-Accident SBO Esents The CTG is readily available to provide backup emergency power service during LOOP or SBO Inon accident) events. The current pnmary emergency pow er sources -- diesel generator umts - - for complete LOOP events are discussed in SS AR Subsecuon 8.3.1.1.8 and the electncal network response is given for a wide i

Amendmeni C36 i

i

ABWR

3WWAC Standard Plant nev c t

SECTION IC.4 CONTENTS Section Title Eare IC.4.1 General Co n clu s io n s.

]C.4 1 IC.4.2 S ne rific Obsers ations IC.4 1 1 C.4.3 Snecial Considerations IC.4 1 v

a j

Amendment

ABWR s

uwmc Standard Plant q

IC.4 CONCLUSIONS solenoids such that each can be started manually without DC power o.e assuming the DC batteries are dis-IC.4.1 General Obsersations charged followmg 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of coping),(4) the combus-tion turbine generator aill be able to be started by a The follow mg general obsers ations can be con.

smalkr self contamed diesel with its own battery, (5) cluded from the SS AR deogn desenpuonand esalua.

AC power f rom any one of the three diesel generators tions.

will be capable of being manually connected to required.

loads withm its associated division without DC control (l; The ABWR design fully comphes with a wide power, and (6) AC power from the off-site preferred spectrum of SBO NRC requirements, regulauens, splem or from the combusuon turbme generator will be regulatory guides and staff posinons and with ex-capable of bemg manually connected to required loads tensive Industry guidelmes and requirements.

4ithm eash of the three Class IE AC disistons without DC c ontrol pow er.

(2) The ABWR design proudes a full spectrum el prevenuon. rmuganon or accommodauon seruces Based on the above considerauons, its concluded for a wide sanety of SBO esents, that the ABWR design for reestablishmg of AC power meets the SBO rule.

G) The ABWR design SBO ESFs are made up at wide assortment or network of diver 3c, redundant Cm Cabihty Durirz SBO Esents and mdependent scruces, systems, funcuons and equipment.

The ABWR design assures that (1) the plant de-sign is to be such that specified ternperature limits will (4 The ABWR design pros ides a substanual time m-not be escceded in the RCIC or required control rooms tervenuon penod for remedial or recoscry acuons.

for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following station blackout, (2) equipment required for the SBO event located in the (5) The ABWR design has factored in a substanual RCIC room will be designed and qualified to a tempern-amount of plant operaung expenence feedback, ture esent m excess of 66*C (i.e., the specified tempera.

equipment reliability and availability considera-ture hmit),(3) equipment required for the SBO esent lo-uons. human man-machme aspects. ennronmental cated m the main control room will be designed and considerauons and unh/c basically time proven quahfied to a temperature m excess of 122"F ti.e., the equipment and technologies mto tts SBO protec-specified temperature limit), (4) the minal temperature uon scruces, in the heat-up calculations of 40 C for the RCIC room will present the equipment from reachmg the design (6) The CTG prosides a significant enhancement to temperature of 66;C for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, (5) the iniual the exisung SBO mit gation protecuon network.

temperature in the heat-up calculations of 26 C for the mam control room will prevent the equipment from IC.4.2 Specific Observations reachmg the design temperature of 50'C for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />,16) environments expected dunng and following Three key areas support the ABWR design capa-the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping time through out the plant for the sta-t bilities and their comphance with SBO requirements.

tion blackout event will not exceed the enuronment for The entically important elements of the ABWR design which the required safe and orderly shutdown equip-are cited below for each of the key areas.

ment is designed and quahfied,(7) the disision I battery will be sized with sufficient capacity to supply all re-Re-establishment of AC Dower to the Class 1E quired SBO loads without load shedding, and (8) the Distnbution Svstem Dunne SBO Events RCIC sptems will base sufficient capacity and capabil-ity to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condiuon for 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 3.

The ABWR design assures that (1) any one of the three divisions of RHR will be sufficient to safely shut.

Based on the atee considerations, it is concluded down the plant (2) restoration of AC power to any one that the ABWR design will be capable of coping with l

division at the end of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping period will w tth the SBO esent and meet the SBO rule.

margin be capable of maintaining the plan within re-quired design hmits and to permit completion of plant combuqion Turbine Generator CTG) use Dunne SBO shutdown, (3) the three mdependent diesel generators b'"b will be designed with bypass valses for their DC Amendment i C 4.- 1 i

J

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~

23A6100AC Standard Plant gry e been ugnincantly reduced. Refer ako to NRC ALWR The ABWR design will mclude a fully qualified requirements.

alterr' ate AC power source. The staff understands that this alternate AC power source t 1) will be a combusuon turbme generator,(2) w all be prouded with an immedi-ate fuel supply that is separate from the fuel supply for the onsite emergency AC power sy stem (i.e., a 3eparate day tank supplied from a common storage tank L G) tuel will be sampled and analyzed consistent with apphcable standards,(4) will be capable of operatmg dunng and af-ter a stauon blackout uthout any AC support systems powered from the preferred power supply or the blacked out units Class IE power sources affected by the esent,(5) will be designed to power all the normal and/or Class lE shutdown loads necessary wittun I hour or less of the onset of the station blackout, such that the plant is capable of mamtaming core coolmg and con-tainment mtegnty,(6) wall be protected from deugn ba-sis weather events (except scismic and tornado missdess to the extent that there will be no common mode failures between offsite preferred sources and the combustion turbine generator power source, (7) will be subject to quality assurance guidelines commensurate with its im-portance to safety,(8) will have sufficient capacity and capability to supply one division of Class 1E loads,19) will have sufficient capacity and capability to supply the normal non-Class IE loads used for a safe shutdown, (10) will undergo factory testmg similar to those re-qmred for the Class IE diesel generator,(11) will not supply power to nuclear safety related equipment except on condinon of complete fadure of the emergency diesel generators and all offsite power, (12) will be no smgle pomt vulnerability with onsite emergency AC power sources, and (13) will be subject to site acceptance test-ing, penodic preventati,e mamtenance,inspecuan, etc.

Based on tre above,its concluded that the ABWR design for the Alternate AC power supply will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.155 and meets the SBO rule.

IC.4.3 Special Observations The response of the ABWR to a wide spectrum of SBO events (non-accident LOOP, DBA with LOOP, external SBO with severe accident consequencesi has been evaluated both qualitatively (determinisuc analy-sis);ad quantitatively (probabilistic analysis). The use of CTG significantly enhances the already sigmficantly inherent ABWR prevention, mingation and accommoda-tion capabilities. The stnct compliance with several de-verse sets of very restrictive requirements (e.g.. Industry and NRC ALWR requirements) further assures the po-tentially and sesere dominate risk contnbutor SBO has Amendmem 1C 4-2

ABWR.

) A6100AC j

Standard Plant y ry c IC.5

SUMMARY

STATEMENTS The ABWR design is capable of prevenung, mit.

igating and accommodating a wide spectrum of SBO scenanos with a network of redundant, diserse and m-dependent emergency power sources.

The ABWR design utilizing the traditional off site and on-site power sources fully complies with all stan-dard plant SBO requirements (reliable power sources. S hour copmg study, recovery procedures, etc.).

The addiuon of the CTG to the plant power network significantly reduces plant and public nsk from SBO esents. However,its primary purpose is to service a s a back-up power source for normal LOOP esents. It can howeser, prevent and mitigate more sesere. potentially prolonged SBO scenanos w hen necessary.

Amendment IC 5-1

p

.y.

AB.WR uxsimic Standard Plant y rv e IC.6 REFERENCES (1) SECY-90-016. Evolutionary LWR Certilication issues and Their Relationship To Current Regulatory Requirements. January 12. l%).

e (2) Letter J. Taylor to S. Chilk, Etolutionary LIL R Cerufication issues and Their Relationsiup To Current Regulatory Requirements, Junc 26.19%).

(3) 10CFR50.63. Loss of All Ahernating Current Pcw er iStation Blackout-SBO). J uly 21,1988.

(4) RG-1.155, Station Blackout, July 1988.

(5) NutARC 8MO. Guidehnes and Tec hnical Bases For NUMARC Initiatise AJdressing Staiwn Blackout at LWRs Plus Supplemental Q:-\\s January 4.1990.

(6) EPRI-URD, EPRI Utilitx Requirements Dt.c u".ent For Evoluuonary ALWR.Juty1990.

(2) NUREG-la69, Draft Safety Evaluation Repor: -

Design Cerufication of GE-ABWR iDFSER>.

Octoter.1992.

m t

Amendment 1C NI

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