ML20035G925
| ML20035G925 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1993 |
| From: | Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G916 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-93-03, 50-155-93-3, NUDOCS 9304300187 | |
| Download: ML20035G925 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000155/1993003
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 111
Report No.
50-155/93003(DRP)
Docket No.
50-155
License No. DPR-6
Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI 49201
Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant
inspection At: Charlevoix, Michigan
Inspection Conducted:
February 17 through April 6, 1993
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Inspector:
E. A. Plettner
R. J. Leemon
Approved By:
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Reactor Projects Section 2B
Date
Inspection Summary
inspection on February 17 throuch April 6.1993
(Report No. 50-155/93003(DRP))
Areas inspected:
A routine, unannounced, inspection by the resident
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inspectors of operational safety verification; engineered safety feature
system walkdown; maintenance and surveillance activities; engineering and
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technical support activities; and other safety assessment and quality
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verification activities.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, one violation was identified.
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violation was for failure to provide complete and accurate information in a
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timely manner to the NRC (paragraph 6).
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Operations:
The activities were carried out in an acceptable manner.
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strength was noted in the manner that departmental personnel exchanged
detailed information. A casual attitude toward caution tags was identified.
Maintenance / surveillance: Activities were mixed. Surveillances were still
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considered to be strong.
A weakness was identified in lack of an independent
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verification with peer evaluation on the main turbine hand trip solenoid work.
Radiation Protection: A good ALARA practice was recognized with two power
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reductions to repair a steam leak on the moisture separator.
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9304300187 930423
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ADOCK 05000155
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Emergency Preparedness: The licensee conducted a challenging drill and
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critique that resulted in noteworthy improvements for the subsequent NRC
evaluated emergency preparedness exercise.
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Engineering: As noted above, a problem with independent verification resulted
in an incorrect wiring modification to the main turbine hand trip solenoid.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification: A violation was issued for
failure to respond in a timely manner to an NRC violation.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company
- P. Donnelly, Plant Manager
- D. Hughes, Executive Engineer
D. Turner, Maintenance Superintendent
- W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
- G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent
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- R. Alexander, Technical Engineer
- E. Bogue, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent
D. Lacroix, Nuclear Training Administrator
- M. Bourassa, Senior Licensing Technologist
- R. Scheels, Planning and Scheduling Administrator
- K. Wooster, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- T. Petrosky, Public Affairs Director
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- D. Gaiser, Maintenance Engineer
- G. Boss, Reactor Engineer
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including members
of the technical and engineering staffs, and the reactor and auxiliary
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operators.
- Denotes those attending the resident inspectors' exit meeting on
April 6, 1993.
2.
Manaaement Meetina (30702)
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The Deputy Regional Administrator and members of the headquarters and
regional staffs' met on March 18 in Charlevoix, Michigan, with
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representatives of Consumers Power Company to review the Systematic
Assessment of Licensee Performance Report (SALP 11) for the Big Rock
Point Nuclear Power Plant.
On March 15 Mr. Patrick Donnelly assumed the duties of plant manager.
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Mr. William Beckman, the departing plant manager, has taken a position
in the corporate office to assist Consumers Power Company with future
projects.
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3.
Plant Operations
a.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in
conformance with the license and regulatory requirements and that
the licensee's management was effectively implementing its
responsibilities for safe operation of the facility.
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The inspectors verified proper control room staffing and-
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coordination of plant activities; verified operator adherence with
procedures and Technical Specifications; monitored the control
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room for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was
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available; observed that management personnel, including the plant
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manager, frequently toured the control room; and observed shift
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turnover.
The operations staff performed well in exchanging
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detailed information.
The inspectors also monitored various records, such as hold and
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secure card records, jumpers and bypasses, shift logs and
surveillances, daily orders, and maintenance items.
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All operations were considered acceptable except as noted
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elsewhere in this report.
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On February 28 the reactor was shut down to repair a leaking shaft
seal on the number two recirculation pump. During the shutdown,
the main turbine hand trip solenoid valve failed to function and-
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resulted in the operators manually tripping the turbine. No other
abnormalities occurred during the shutdown. The shutdown was
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performed correctly and in.a professional manner. Additional work _
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completed during the outage included the replacement of a steam
drum relief valve, change out of the gaskets on the "B"
and "D"
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trains of the reactor depressurization system, repair.of a main
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condenser tube leak, and change out of four solenoid valves that
actuate containment isolation valves. . Repairs were completed and
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reactor startup was accomplished on March 5.
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On April 3 the number seven main turbine admission valve failed in
the closed position. Operators took the appropriate actions-to
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maintain the plant in a safe condition.
Repairs will be completed
during the scheduled 1993 refueling and maintenance outage to
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commence in June 1993.
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Caution Taas
During tours of the control room, the inspectors noted a number of.
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large size caution tags on control panels, as well as a number of
smaller caution tags in use. As a result of the Three Mile Island
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accident, most licensees have gone to exclusive use of the smaller
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tags on control panels in order to prevent blocking the view of
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equipment indicators and controls. A review of the Big Rock Point
procedure for caution tags revealed that either size tag is -
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authorized in the control room. Although several'of the larger
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tags were rolled or folded in order to prevent obscuring the view,
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this is considered to be a weakness.
In response, the licensee
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submitted a procedure change request to strengthen the caution tag--
procedure.
In a previous self. identified. finding discussed in
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Deviation Report D-BRP-92-040,. the recirculation systems were
declared operable with caution tags left on the pump suction valve
handwheels in the recirculation system pump rooms. No apparent
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reason was listed for the error. These findings indicate a casual
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attitude toward the caution tag system.
Emeroency Preparedness Drill
On February 23 th' licensee staff participated in an emergency
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preparedness training drill to identify areas where improvements
should be made in preparation for the graded exercise to take
place on March 23, 1993.
The inspectors observed the drill in the
control room and Technical Support Center (TSC). The licensee
conducted a challenging drill followed by good critiques.
Items
identified for improvement were: more attention by reactor
operators to the control board indications, more timely
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communication to the staff when upgrading the emergency
classification level, and tracking of the protective action
recommendations on the TSC status board. Other issues for
consideration included more formal feedback communications during
changes of command and control and the relaying of information
between the operations support center and the control room as
related to work activities. Orderly, formal, and structured
status update briefings were needed to improve overall
communications and focus the staff's actions on priority items.
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The NRC evaluated the emergency preparedness exercise held on
March 23. The results of that evaluation are documented in
Inspection Report 50-155/93005(DRSS), and indicated that the above
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areas for improvement had been corrected.
Procedure Adeauacy
During the inspection period the licensee completed its
investigation into the reactor depressurization system valve,
VRDS-101-A, being closed when it should have been open. The
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investigation identified that the operators involved had little or
no experience in operating such unique valves.
Further
investigation revealed that the same problem occurred some time in
1982 for which the licensee issued a memo to correct the problem.
These instructions, however, were not included in plant operating
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procedures or training lesson plans resulting in the incident
occurring again on January 4, 1993.
This incident is not being
cited as a violation in that it is similar to another violation
for procedure adequacy where the corrective actions are still
being implemented by the licensee. This is discussed in
Inspection Report 50-155/91005(DRP).
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Radiation Protection /ALARA
A good ALARA practice was noted on March 9 when reactor power was
decreased to reduce radiation exposure to the workers from 0.30
REM per hour to 0.08 REM per hour while repairing the moisture
separator. This practice was again employed when power was
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decreased a second time on March 11 to complete the repair.
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b.
Enoineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the batteries, diesels,
service water, core spray, and fire system. During the
inspection, the material condition of the valves, pumps, hangers,
supports, labeling, housekeeping, and major system components were
assessed. The housekeeping throughout the station was adequate in
the major traffic areas.
Some minor fretting was noted on some
copper lines on the emergency diesel generator. The licensee
issued a maintenance order to correct the problem.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance / Surveillance (61726 & 62703)
a.
Work Observations
Station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed
and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry
codes and standards, and in conformance with Technical
Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: Approvals
were obtained prior to initiating work; test instrumentation was
calibrated; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed
prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
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qualified personnel; results were within specification and
properly reviewed; and any deficiencies identified were properly
resolved.
The following maintenance and surveillance activities
were observed.
Maintenance
M/0 92-RDS-0054 Reactor Depressurization Valve "D" for Removal
and Reinstallation cf Gasket.
M/0 93-TGS-0037 and 0038 Turbine Hand Trip Solenoid Replacement.
During the post modification testing, a wiring error was
discovered which had occurred during the installation process. An
indepth root cause analysis was conducted to determine where the
breakdown occurred as it could have an impact in future
applications on safety related systems. The problems identified
were as follows:
no pre-job walkdown of the system to verify that
terminal configuration matched the plant drawings (this was a
concern identified with configuration control during the
Electrical Distribution Safety Function Inspection conducted in
the Fall of 1992), lack of detail in the written work
instructions, and lack of an independent peer inspection
verification. This was a non-safety related system and the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B did not apply. However,
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the licensee agreed to provide guidance for quality verifiers on
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the importance of independent verification and to improve the
modification process with additional procedural guidance to assure
that similar problems do not occur in the future.
Moisture Separator Steam Leak Repair
On March 9 reactor power was reduced to 35 percent to repair the
steam leak located on the top portion of the moisture separator
(MS). The contractor, in preparing to perform the sealant
injection operation, noted that the bolts on top of the MS were a
different size than expected. Because of delays in determining
and obtaining the proper sized bolts, the reactor was returned to
full power without making any repairs. _ The correct size bolts
were determined and procured, and on March 11 reactor power was
reduced to 70 percent to perform the sealant injection operation.
The operation was successfully completed and the reactor returned
to full power later in the day.
Because the licensee lacked
detailed engineering prints on non-safety related equipment,
additional time and radiation exposure to workers was necessary in
order to complete the repairs.
Surveillance
T7-28 The Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance. This was
performed by an engineer and an operator using state-of-the-art
vibration computer data logging equipment.
The inspector observed
that the operator was knowledgeable of the equipment and
electrical system and operated and took readings on the emergency
diesel generator and electric fire pump. The engineer ensured
that the vibration probe was properly attached to the equipment
and that the reading had stabilized before logging the readings.
No problems were identified.
b.
Outaae Plannina and Control
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The Operations Department formed a new committee which had one
working meeting during the inspection period to discuss the scope
and establish better ways to schedule and prioritize work
activities during outages. This was the first step in a process
to improve interdepartmental communications and planning.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Enoineerina and Technical Support (38280)
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The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities. This was
accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
events, outage related activities, and assigned TS surveillances;
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observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing
deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
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Problems were noted in the main turbine hand trip solenoid modification
process. This is discussed in detail in section 4.a of this report.
The licensee is taking actions to address the findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification (40500)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of management control,
verification, and oversight in the jobs observed during this inspection.
The inspectors also attended management and supervisory meetings
involving plant status to observe the coordination between departments.
Additionally, the inspectors routinely monitored the results of the
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licensee corrective action programs by attending routine meetings,
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through discussions with the plant staff, and review of deviation and
root cause evaluation reports.
The licensee held two Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meetings on
a wiring error on a battery charger. This was for a root cause
investigation which was still in progress at the end of the inspection.
However, it was determined that the battery charger was operable during
the time in question. The CARB was considered pro-active since the
battery charger is not classified as safety related equipment. The
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resident inspectors will evaluate and document the results of the root
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cause analysis and lessons learned in a future inspection report.
Inspection Report 50-155/93002(DRP) contained an unresolved item, 93002-
01, involving the licensee's failure to inform the appropriate groups
within the organization and the NRC of commitment date extensions. 0n
February 17, 1993, the licensee informed the NRC that Notice of
Violation 50-155/92017-03(DRP) had exceeded the response date of
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December 31, 1992 (a period of over six weeks).
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requires licensees to respond in writing within twenty days or other
specified time of the date of a Notice of Violation, describing the
corrective actions that have been taken, corrective actions to be taken,
and the date when full compliance will be achieved. The licensee failed
to provide the required information to the Commission prior to exceeding
the response date and failed to request an extension for Violation 50-
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155/92017-03(DRP).
This is considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 2.201(a) (50-155/93003-01(DRP)).
One violation and no deviations were identified.
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Followup of Previous Identified Items (92701)
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(Closed) Unresolved item 93002-Ol(DRP): " Failure to Update Missed LER
Commitment Dates." This unresolved item dealt with failure to update
the NRC prior to exceeding corrective action completion dates for
licensee event reports.
Violation 50-155/93003-01(DRP) dealing with the
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same subject matter is being issued; therefore, this item is closed.
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8.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
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1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6.
The inspectors
summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the
inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any
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such documents or processes as proprietary.
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