ML20035G451
| ML20035G451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-93-04, 50-498-93-4, 50-499-93-04, 50-499-93-4, NUDOCS 9304270260 | |
| Download: ML20035G451 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1993004
Text
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ATTACHMENT 2
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HANDOUT ONE
OUTAGE ORGANIZATION
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9304270260 930422
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ADDCK 05000498
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AGENDA
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INTRODUCTION
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OUTAGE DISCUSSION
Organization
Duration
Scope
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Level 2 Schedule
SIILTfDOWN SAFETY
Organization
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Process
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CLOSING
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2RE03
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SHUTDOWNRISKASSESSMENT TEAM
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PLANT
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AfANAGER
CllAIRAfAN
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INDEPENDENT
INTEGRATED
SAFETYREVIEW
SHIFT TECIINICAL
PLANNING & SCHED
PLANTANAYLSIS
GROUP
ADVISOR
COORDINATOR &
REPRESENTATIVE
REPRESENTATIVE
SCHEDL1LER
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REFUELING OUTAGE IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATION
2RE03
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PLANT MANAGER
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IPS MANAGER
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DEPT MANAGER -
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DEPT MANAGER
DEPT MANAGER
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OUTAGE MANAGER
PLANT OPFRATIONS
MAINTENANCE
TECHNICAL SERVICES
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DEPT MANAGER
DEPT MANAGER
DEPT MANAGER
PLANT ENGINEERING
DESIGN ENGINEERING
NPMM
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REFUELING OUTAGE IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATION
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2RE03
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OUTAGE MANAGER
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OUTAGE SHIFT
MANAGER
ENERIMEM
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OUTAGE SCHEDULE
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SUPERv'ISOR
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COORDINATORS - I
BALANCE
OPERATIONS
OUTAGE
DISONNE
RCB/ MAS
OF PLANT
& TRAINS
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AREA COORDINATOR
COORDINATOR
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MM DISCPLINE
EM DISCIPLINE
IC DISCIPLINE
COORDINATOR
COORDINATOR '-
COORDINATOR
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OUTAGE DISCUSSION
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ORGANIZATION - See Handout
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DURATION
Breaker to Breaker = 78 days
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Breaker to Mode 4 = 68 days
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SCOPE
Statistics
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1596 Service Requests
1697 Preventative Maintenance Activities
948 Surveillance Tests
4241 Total
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includes:
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Steam Leaks
Control Room Instruments
Inoperable Automatic Functions
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Chemistry Monitors
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Major Components
53 Modifications
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Major Activities
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5 year insp, #21
18 month insp. #22 & 23
MOVATS - 98 valves
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Replace LP #21 rotor
Repair HP Gland
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Sludge Lancing
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Reactor Coolant Pump Motors - 18 month PM
Feedwater Pumps
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Main
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Auxiliary
Boosters
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Startup
Digital Rod Position Indication Inspection
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E!Ll/SRA
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LEVEL 2 SCIIEDULE
Critical Path
Polar Crane Repair
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Crud Burst
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MOVAT Testing Window
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No Mode Window
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RO Lineups & Surveillances
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Ramp-up from Mode 4
Train Outages
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Sequence of Mechanical Trains
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Sequence of Electrical Trains
Safety injection Work Windows
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ESF Loop Test
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No Mode Window
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Letdown and Charging
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RHR & SI Loop Isolation Valves
RCP Work Window
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Miscellaneous Work Windows
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Sludge Lance
Turbine
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Cire Water
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SJLISRA
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FLANDOUT TWO
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SHUTDOWN SAFETY
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SHUTDOWN SAFETY
Organization - see handout - make chart
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Pre Outage Review
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All Service Request for Scheduling Work Windows
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Work Windows Scheduled to Support Plant Condition
Review Station Problem Reports Associated with Shutdown Safety
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Special Review of any Off Normal Evolutions
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Shutdown Risk Assessment Report Development
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Review SRA Profile Chart
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Incorporate Lessons Learned from Previous Outages
Review High Risk Areas in Schedule and Make Recommendation for
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Schedule Change and or Contingency Plans
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Request Calculation for Vessel Time to Boil and Spent Fuel Pool
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Limitations
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Review and Complete Risk Assessment Addendums in Accordance with
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OPGP03-ZA-101
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Finalize and Prepare Report for Plant Review Committee
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Forward Report to IPS Manager for Approval
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Forward Report to Plant Manager for Approval
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During Outage
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Conduct Schedule Review Meetings Twice Weekly
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Review Activity Window Change Report
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Review Activity Scheduled Outside of Window Report
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SIL1/sRA
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Review of Outage Additions Which Require SRA Review
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Review any Major Schedule Changes
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Maintain Daily Plant Status Forms
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Present Plant Status at Daily Outage Meetings
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Provide Review and Recommendations for High Risk Evolutions During
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Outage as Required.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SHUTDOWN R1SK ASSESSMENT-PROF 1LE
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
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Page 7 of 21
ADDENDUM 1
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Midloop Operations
(Page i of 2)
NOTE
A 'NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies on
,
area that requires further evaluation or other
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compensatory measures may be warranted.
YES / NO
1)
Is on-site electrical work which could perturb
mid-loop operation work minimized or avoided
during mid-loop conditions? (Including movement
of Cranes, etc., near transmission lines and
transformers)
/
2)
Is switchyard electrical work which could perturb
_f
mid-loop operations minimized or avoided during
mid-loop conditions?
/
3)
Are Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP) precursor
surveillances minimized or avoided during
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mid-loop conditions?
/
4)
Are LOOP precursor activities minimized or avoided
in the operation unit during mid-loop conditions?
/
(Verify daily during mid-loop)
5)
Does the schedule support the implementation or
mid-loop procedural prerequisites?
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6)
Are adequate controls in place to ensure RCB
containment integrity during mid-loop conditions?
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7)
Are heavy load lifts in the RCB avoided during
mid-loop operations?
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8)
Is the time in mid-loop configuration minimized?
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9)
Are potential fire inducing activities minimized
or avoided during mid-loop configuration?
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10) Are RHR modifications, work request, and tests,
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not covered by mid-loop procedure requirements,
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prohibited during mid-loop?
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
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Rev. 1
Page 8 of 21
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ADDENDUM 1
Midloop Operations
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(Page 2 of 2)
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YES / NO
11) Are RHR power supply modifications avoided during
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mid-loop?
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12) Is an adequate RCS vent path available when the
nozzle dams are installed?
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13) Are there adequate controls to ensure proper
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RCS level in place during mid-loop?
/
14) Are mid-loop conditions avoided for at least 7
days after shutdown?
/
15) If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the
action should be reviewed relative to the associated
risk, outage activities and schedules. The outage
schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or
recommendations provided for management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 9 of 21
ADDENDUM 2
Loss of Electrical Power
(Page 1 of 1)
NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
_I
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unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an-
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
,
YES / NO-
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1)
Will the emergency transformer (ET) be
available during mid-loop conditions?
/
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2)
Will the ET be available throughout the outage?
/
3)
Will two Standby Diesel Generators (SDG) be
available during all Mode 5 or 6 operations?
/
4)
Are two sources of offsite power continuously
maintained throughout the outage?
/
5)
Is SDG backfeed capability maintained
'throughout the outage?
/
6)
Are switchyard activities coordinated with
Outage Hanagement to minimize or avoid impact
on operable power supplies?
/
)
!
7)
Is the use of non-standard electrical line-ups
minimized or avoided to meet electrical
requirements?
/
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8)
If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the
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action should be reviewed relative to the associated
risk, outage activities and schedules. The outage
schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or
recommendations provided for management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 10 of 21
ADDENDUM 3
No Mode
(Page i of 2)
NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
YES / NO
1)
Are activities scheduled such that a minimum
of two FHB HVAC trains are available during
/
no mode?
2)
Will one or more-SDGs be available throughout
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the no-mode window?
(At least one operable
SDG must support a functional SFPCCS train)
/
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Will one or more SFPCCS trains be available
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prior to, during, and immediately following
no mode?
/
4)
Is the functioning train (s) of SFPCCS supported
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by an operable SDG?
5)
Do Rad monitor maintenance activities support
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no mode and fuel movement activities?
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6)
Are contingencies to provide SFP make up
readily available in case of loss of SFP
cooling? (Ref. OPOPO4-FC-0001)
/
7)
Is an operable LHSI pump available in case
of loss of SFP cooling?
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8)
Is the available LHSI pump supported by an
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operable SDG?
9)
Will the use of the in-containment storage
f
area for fuel storage be avoided during
no-mode?
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10) Are activities avoided or minimized that could
perturb the functioning of the SFPCCS?
/
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
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Rev. 1
Page 11 of 21
ADDENDUM 3
No Mode
(Page 2 of 2)
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11) Are there two ESF electrical buses available
during no mode?
(one bus backed by a SDG)
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12) If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the action
should be reviewed in the relative to the associated
risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage
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schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or
recommendations provided for managagement resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 12 of 21
ADDENDUM 4
Pressurization
(Page 1 of 1)
NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
YES / NO
1)
Is Cold Overpressure Mitigating System (COMS)
available as required?
/
2)
Is a vent path established as required?
(Minimum of 2 sq. in.)
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3)
Are high pressure injection systems rendered
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inoperable at cold shutdown conditions?
(i.e. HHSI)
/
4)
If one or both pressurizer PORVs are inoperable
are the required RHR pumps and discharge relief
valves available?
/
5)
If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the action should be reviewed relative to the
associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The- outage schedule should then be adjusted
as necessary or recommendations provided for
management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGt03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 13 of 21
ADDENDUM 5
Loss of Coolant Inventory
(Page 1 of 1)
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NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
YES / NO
1)
Is a source of borated RCS makeup maintained
throughout the outage? (e.g., RWST, BATS)
/
2)
Is work on valves or other components that
could lead to an RCS draindown minimized or
avoided while fuel is in the vessel?
/
3)
Is the use of freeze plugs in conditions where
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a f ailure could cause a loss of inventory
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avoided?
/
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4)
Is the Reactor Vessel Level Indication
System (RVLIS) calibrated and operable prior
to shutdown and during the outage?
/
5)
Is an alternate source of water available for
RCS make-up?
(e.g., Firewater, RMWST)
___
/
6)
Are there adequate controls to ensure instrument
air is available to the spent fuel pool gates?
/
7)
If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the acticn should be reviewed relative to the
associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted as
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necessary or recommendations provided for
management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 14 of 21
ADDENDUM 6
Loss of Cooling
(Page 1 of 1)
,
NOTE
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A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
-area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
TES / NO
1)
Are the required number of RHR trains available
for the plant shutdown conditions?
/
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2)
Are the required RHR trains supported by
operable SDGs?
/
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3)
Are LHSI pumps available to mitigate loss of
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cooling conditions?
/
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4)
Although not required by Technical Specifications,
are HHSI pumps available to mitigate loss of
cooling conditions?
/
5)
Does the schedule support system / equipment
releases to minimize potential for
interrelated system LOCA's? (ie. RCS via RHR
release)
(Ref. OPOPO4-RC-0006, OPOPO4-RC-0007)
/
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6)
Are electrical activities avoided that could
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perturb the operable RHR trains?
/
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7)
Are RCS related activities minimized or avoided
that could perturb the operable RHR trains?
/
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8)
If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the action should be reviewed relative to the
i
associated risk and the associated outage
)
activities and schedules. The outage schedule
should then be adjusted as necessary or
recommendations provided for management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
.
Rev. I
j
Page 15 of 21
ADDENDUM 7
Reactivity Management
(Page 1 of 1)
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NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
'
YES / NO
1)
Is one CCP available during modes 4,
5, and 67
/
2)
Is the required boron injection path available?
/
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3)
Are the source range monitors supported by an
i
operable SDG (SDG #11/#21) during critical
evolutions?
/
4)
When fuel is in the vessel, are there two
!
source range or extended range neutron
detectors available and supported by an
operable SDG7
/
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5)
Is work on Boron Dilution Paths avoided?
(Ref. IPSP03-CV-0014)
/
6)
Are hydrostatic testing activities scheduled
to prevent an inadvertent RCS Boron dilution?
/
7)
Is the time minimized that the control rods
are not able to be inserted?
/
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8)
Is Control Rod Lockout avoided in stodes 3 or 47
/
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9)
Are RCS dilution paths isolated when control rods
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are locked out in Mode 57
/
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10) With the Reactor Vessel Heac in place and the control
rods in the Locked-Out Condition can the control
rods be inserted in a timely mann.r?
/
11) If the answer to any of the above is "NO",
the
action should be reviewed relative to the
associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The outage schedule should then be adjusted
'
as necessary or recommendations provided for
management resolution
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 16 of 21
ADDERDUM 8
.
Containment Integrity
(Page 1 of 1)
NOTE
A "NO" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
YES / NO
1)
Are the openings and closings of the RCB
scheduled appropriately relative to fuel
movements and mid-loop conditions?
/
2)
Do the openings and closings of the RCB conform
with Technical Specification?
/
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3)
Do Rad monitor maintenance activities support
containment integrity requirements?
/
4)
Can RCB integrity be rapidly restored during
mode 5 conditions?
/
5)
Is there an alternate / temporary source of
electrical power available to power the
equipment match hoists to close the hatch?
(i.e. In the event of a loss of power incident)
/
6)
If the answer to any of the above is "NO",the
action should be reviewed relative to the associated
risk, outage activities and schedules. The outage
schedule should then be adjusted as necessary or
recommendations provided for management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
I
Rev. 1
3
Page 17 of 21
ADDENDUM 9
Personnel Safety
(Page 1 of 1)
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NOTE
A "YES" answer does not necessarily represent an
unacceptable risk situation, but identifies an
area that requires further evaluation or other
compensatory measures may be warranted.
i
YES / NO
1)
Are there areas in the schedule that have an
increased potential for caustic releases?
/
2)
Are there areas in the schedule that may require
special protective equipment?
/
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3)
Are there areas in the schedule that will
require a confined space entry?
/
4)
Are there areas in the schedule that may
require special work preparations?
/
,
5)
Are there areas in the schedule where plant
personnel could be exposed to pressurized
system?
/
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6)
Are there areas in the schedule where plant
personnel could be exposed to high levels
of radiation?
/
7)
Are there areas in the schedule where work
'
activities will require plant personnel to
be in areas where heavy load movements are
taking place?
/
8)
If the answer to any of the above is "TES",
the action should be reviewed relative to the
associated risk, outage activities and schedules.
The' outage schedule should then be adjusted as
necessary or recommendations provided for
management resolution.
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Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
1
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Rev. 1
Page 21 of 21
ADDENDUM 13
(Page 1 of 1)
DAILY PLANT STATUS FORM (TTPICAL)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
MODES 5 AND 6
DATE:
/
/
TIME
Diesel Generators
B or C
RHR System
0
ESF Elec System
2
ECV System
1
CCW System
1
SFPCCS*
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Standby Xfar 2
Main and Aux Xfmr
2 out of 3
Standby Xfar 1
Emergency Xfmr
FHB HVAC
2
FHB Rad Monitors .
1
EAB HVAC
1
SFPCCS must be backed by its associated SDG.
(SFPCC Pump
"A" with SDG
"B",
SFPCC Pump "B" with SDG "C".)
.
I
a
!
,
,
.
A
Shutdown Risk Assessment
OPGP03-ZA-0101
Rev. 1
Page 20 of 21
ADDENDUM 12
(Page 1 of 1)
DAILY ?LANT STATUS FORM (TTPICAL)
'
SHUTDOVN SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
MODES 5 AND 6
DATE:
/
/
TIME
,
_
System
No. Required
No. Available
Diesel Generators
2
RHR Systems
2
EST Elec Buses
2
ECW System
2
CCV System
2
SFPCCS
1
LHSr
0
1
Standby Xfer 2
Main and Aux Xfmr
2 out of 3
,
Standby Xfar 1
.
Emergency Xfmr
EAB HVAC
2
FHB HVAC
2
Rad Monitoring:
1
.
EAB
FHB
1
RCB
1
,
a