ML20035G049
| ML20035G049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1993 |
| From: | Albert R, Keimig R, King E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G042 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-93-08, 50-247-93-8, NUDOCS 9304260078 | |
| Download: ML20035G049 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000247/1993008
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-247/93-08
Docket No.
50-247
License No.
Licensee:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc.
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4 Irvine Place
Buchanan. New York 10003
Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generatine Station Unit 2
Inspection At:
Buchanan. New York
Inspection Conducted:
March 16-19.1993
Inspectors:
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E. B. King, Physigdjecurity Inspector
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R. J. Alber(PI'iysical Security Inspector
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Approved by:
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[ Division of Rad'i. d. Keimig, C e , Safeguards Section
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n Safety and
Safeguards
Areas Inspected: Management Support and Audits; Protected Area Physical Barriers,
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Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel,
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Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Security Training and
Qualifications; and Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Plan.
Results: The licensee was found to be in non-compliance in the area of controlling personnel
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and packages into the Protected Area. Additionally, one unresolved item concerning the
perimeter intrusion detection system was identified. Security program upgrades and
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enhancements continue to be made and management attention to the program was evident.
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DETAILS
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1.0
Key Persons Contacted
1.1
Licensee and Com:3ctor Personnel
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- S. Bram, Vice President, Nuclear Power
- J. McAvoy, Operations Manager
- G. Hayes, Central Security
J. M. Drexel, Site Protection Manager
- G. Cullen, Security Superintendent
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- T. S. Elsroth, Security Administrator
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- K. Price, Site Protection Supenisor
- J. Bahr, Acting Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- M. A. Whitney, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
'G. Lisewski, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Supervisor
J. L. Worrall, Site Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)
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'R. Meyer, Site Captain (TWC)
- F. Wiedeman, Administrative Coordinator (TWC)
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- T. Constantino, Training Coordinator (TWC)
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1.2
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. Scholl, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
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- Denotes those present at the exit interview
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The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor security
personnel during this inspection.
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2.0
Manacement Suonort and Audits
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2.1
Manacement Support
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Management support for the licensee's physical security program was
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determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was
based upon the inspectors' review of various aspects cf the licensee's program
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during this inspection as documented in this report.
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Security program enhancements made since the last routine physical security
inspection (50-247/92-11) were:
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the completion of the protected area (PA) pe-imeter fence upgrade;
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the implementation of a preventive maintenance program for security
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doors and locks.
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the procurement of backup batteries for security communication
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equipment;
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2.2
Audits
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's annual Quality Assurance Audit of the
fitness-for-duty (FFD) program, No. 92-04-D, which was conducted from
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January 28 - February 21,1992. The audit report documented five findings
and nine observations. The inspectors' review indicated that the audit was
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very comprehensive in scope, and the results were reported to the appropriate
levels of management. A review of the licensee's response to the audit
findings indicated that the corrective actions were adequate and that the
program was being properly administered.
3.0
Protected Area Physical Barrier. Detection and Assessment Aids
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3.1
Protected Area Barrier
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The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the PA barrier on March 16,
1993. The inspectors noted that a major barTier upgrade that had been
scheduled for completion by December 1992 was completed. The inspectors
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determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as
described in the NRC-approv:d Physical Security Plan (the Plan).
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3.2
Protected Area Detection Aids
The inspectors observed the perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS) on
March 18,1993, and determined that it was installed, maintained and operated
as committed to in the Plan. The inspectors requested testing of the detection
aids at a few locations in several zones that looked potentially vulnerable due
to weather related conditions. Three locations tested unsatisfactorily. The
inspectors verified that the zones tested satisfactorily during the previous
periodic functional test. The licensee implemented immediate corrective
actions, which included the establishment of compensatory measures in the
deficient areas and the repairs and testing of all zones that tested
unsatisfactorily. All repairs were completed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the time of
discovery.
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Additionally, based on a review of the licensee's training lesson plans and
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critical tasks relevant to patrol officer responsibilities, the inspectors
determined that the patrol officers were not trained to a level that would enable
them to detect the deficiency. The licensee committed to roir.e the post
responsibilities for all patrol officers to increase their awareness of potential
vulnerabilities and to incorporate lessons learned into the training lesson plans
and critical tasks to enhance training effectiveness. This is an unresolved item
(URI 50-247/934)8) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspxtion.
3.3
Assessment Aids
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The inspectors observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during daylight
periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as
committed to in the Plan.
Because of previously identified assessment problems, the licensee initiated a
long term assessment upgrade. The assessment upgrade is progressing on
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schedule. It will include the repositioning and, if needed, the addition of
cameras to enhance assessment capabilities. All assessment upgrades are
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scheduled for completion in 1995. This item will be reviewed during
subsequent inspections.
4.0
Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel. Packages and Vehicles
4.1
Personnel Access Control
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4.1.1 The inspectors verified that personnel were properly identified and
authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards.
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4.1.2 The inspectors determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA
and vital areas (VAs) displayed their badges as required,
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4.1.3 The inspectors verified that the licensee had escort procedures for
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4.1.4 The inspectors verified that the licensee had a mechanism for
expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that the
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mechanism was adequate for its purpose.
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4.1.5 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's search program for firearms,
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explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials against
commitments in the Plan. The inspectors observed both plant and
visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic
periods on March 17 and 18,1993.
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The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to properly
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perform personnel and package searches at the main personnel access
control point prior to granting access to the PA, as committed to in the
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Plan, represents an apparent violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-
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247/93-08-02).
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4.1.6 On March 18, 1993, the inspectors observed access control processing
for containment entry. The inspectors determined that only authorized
personnel were granted access to the area and that a mechanism was in
place to positively control materials and personnel into the area. No
deficiencies were noted.
4.2
Packace and Material Access Control
The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control
over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main
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access portal (except as noted in Section 4.1.5). The inspectors also observed
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package and material processing and interviewed members of the security
force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control
procedures. No deficiencies were noted.
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4.3
Vehicle Access Control
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The inspectors determined that the licensee properly controlled vehicle access
into and withir he PA. The inspectors verified that vehicles were properly
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authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified
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by a SFM at the main access portal. This procedure was consistent with the
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commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search
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procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the
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Plan. The inspectors determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access
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at the main vehicle access portal. On March 17 and '.8,1993, for a combined
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period of about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, the inspectors also observed vehicle searches and
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interviewed SFM's and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search
procedures. On March 17, 1993, while observing vehicle searches, the
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inspectors observed that a SFM failed to search packages located in the bed of
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a truck. When the inspectors questioned the SFM, he indicated that he had
forgotten about the packages. A licensee representative, who was in
attendance at the time, implemented immediate corrective actions. The vehicle
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was researched and the responsible SFM was relieved of duties and retrained
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by a training instructor prior to reassignment to duties. Based on the
inspectors' observations, the inspectors determined that the incident was an
isolated oversight, and the manner in which vehicles were being searched prior
to and after the incident was effective and correct.
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5.0
Alarm Stations and Communications
The inspectors observed the operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and
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Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined they were operated as committed to m
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the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspectors and found to be
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knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors verified that the
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CAS and SAS did not require any operational activities that would interfere with the
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assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.
6.0
Security Training and Oualification
The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed training, physical and firearms
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qualification records for eight SFMs. The inspectors determined that the training had
been conducted in accordance with the security training and qualification (T&Q) plan
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and that it was properly documented.
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Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite
knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The results of the interviews
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indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of the job requirements. Nc,
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deficiencies were noted.
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7.0
Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure Verification -
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The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency
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Procedure. The licensee's procedure details short-term actions that would be taken to
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protect against attempted radiological sabotage involving a land vehicle bomb if such
a threat were to materialize. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the necessary
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equipment was available and strategically positioned to enable the licensee to
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expeditiously implement the contingency procedure.
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8.0
Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at
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the conclusion of the inspection of March 19, 1993. At that time, the purpose and
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scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented. The items as
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documented in this report were reviewed with the licensee. The licensee agreed with
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the inspection findings.
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