ML20035D920
| ML20035D920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1993 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Donnelly P CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035D921 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304140113 | |
| Download: ML20035D920 (2) | |
Text
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,s APR 0 51593
[, y Docket No. 50-155
'd Oi Consumers Power Company ATTN:
P.M. Donnelly Plant Manager Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant 10269 US 31 North Charlevoix, MI 49720
Dear Mr. Donnelly:
This refers to the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) 11 Report for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, and our meeting of March 18, 1993, which discussed in detail the contents of the report and your written comments dated April 2,1993, relative to the report.
Based on our in-depth discussions during the meeting and our thorough review and evaluation of your letter of response, we have reached the conclusions presented in the enclosed meeting summary. With the incorporation of the revised pages from Enclosure 3, the Initial SALP Report should be considered to be the Final SALP Report.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter with the referenced enclosures, will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
No reply to this letter is required; however, should you have questions regarding the Final SALP Report, please let us know and we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Final SALP 11 Report No. 50-155/93001 (Meeting Summary) 2.
Revision sheets 3.
Revised Pages to SALP Report 4.
Licensee Response Ltr.
dtd April 2, 1993 See Attached Distribution RIII RII #
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<3 Docket No. 50-155 Consumers Power Company ATTN:
P.M. Donnelly P' ant Manager Big Rocir <oint Nuclear Plant l
10269 UL 31 North Charlevoix, MI 49720 l
Dear Mr. Donnelly:
This refers to the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) 11 Report for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, and our meeting of March 18, 1993, which discussed in detail the contents of the report and your written comments dated April 2,1993, relative to the report.
Based on our in-depth discussions during the meeting and our thorough review and evaluation of your letter of response, we have reached the conclusions presented in the enclosed meeting summary.
With the incorporation of the revised pages from Enclosure 3, the Initial SALP Report should be considered to be the Final SALP Report.
In accordance with Sectitn 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter with the referenced enclosures, will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
No reply to this letter is required; however, should you have questions regarding the Final SALP Report, please let us know and we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,.
(([crtDavis If L
A.
Regional Administrat
Enclosures:
1.
Final SALP 11 Report No. 50-155/93001 (Meeting Summary) 2.
Revision sheets 3.
Revised Pages to SALP Report 4.
Licensee Response Ltr.
)
dtd April 2, 1993 See At tached Distribution i
i APR 0 S 2 93 Consumers Power Company 2
Distribution:
cc w/ enclosure:
David P. Hoffman, Vice President Nuclear Operations OC/LFDCB Resident Inspector, RIII l
James R. Padgett, Michigan Public Service Commission Michigan Department of Public Health Big Rock Point, LPM, NRR SRI, Palisades i
INPO i
The Chairman K. C. Rogers, Commissioner J. R. Curtiss, Commissioner F. J. Remick, Commissioner E. G. de Planque, Commissioner J. H. Sniezek, DEDR T. E. Murley, Director, NRR Chief, RPEB, NRR (2 copies)
L. B. Marsh, Director, Project Directorate III-I, NRR J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement C. D. Pederson, RIII L. L. Cox, RIII (2 copies)
TSS, RIII RIII Files i
RIII PRR i: C C o l-
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i SALP 11 1
FINAL SALP REPORT l
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Inspection Report No. 50-155/93001 Consumers Power Company Bia Rock Point Nuclear Plant October 1. 1991. throuah December 31. 1992
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Bio Rock Point Nuclear Plant
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A.
Summary of Meetino with Consumers Power Company on March 18. 1993 I
The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in Report No. 50-155/93001 and were discussed with the licensee on March 18, 1993, at the Points North Inn, Charlevoix, Michigan.
While the meeting was priwily a discussion between the licensee and the NRC, it was open to niembers of the public as observers.
The following licensee and NRC personnel were in attendance, as well as the noted observers.
Consumers Power Comnany M. Morris, Chief Operating Officer t
4 D. Hoffman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations i
W. Beckman, Plant Manager P. Donnelly, Plant Manager D. Hughs, Executive Engineer G. Withrow, Engineering Superintendent i
i W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent, CPCo E. Bogue, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent T. Petrosky, Public Affairs Director i
R. Rice, Director Nuclear Performance Assessment M. Van Alst, Property Protection Supervisor L. Darrah, Operations Supervisor i
E. Evans, Electrical / Instrumentation and Control Engineering Supervisor D. Moeggenberg, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor j
D. LaCroix, Nuclear Training Administrator I
A. Katarsky, Big Rock Point Emergency Preparedness Coordinator T. Hagan, Directe Nuclear Training l
C. Barsy, Chemistry Supervisor R. Alexander, Technical Engineer D. Turner, Maintenance Superintendent R. Sinderman, Rate Case Technical Analyst W. Merwin, Operating Experience Analyst T. Mosley, Sr. Engineer, Chemistry / Health Physics K. Wooster, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. Fremeau, Director, Nuclear Services l
T. Popa, Chemistry / Health Physics-ALARA Coordinator j
E. Zienert, Director, Human Resources W. Beckus, NPAD Performance Specialist i
D. Gaiser, Senior Engineer, Maintenance R. Sarki, Supervisor, Maintenance R. Joba, Supervisor, Performance Engineering S. LaJoice, Site Manager, Burr >s Security
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_ _ _ - _ -, _.,, - _,.. l
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R. McCalik, NPAD Specialist R. Hill, NPAD Specialist J. Tilton, Senior Engineer Electrical L. Potter, I and C Supervisor S. Beachum, Special Projects Supervisor P. Loomis, NPAD Specialist J. Horon, Shift Supervisor G. Hausler, Shift Supervisor M. Bourassa, Senior Licensing Technician J. Lampman, Licensing Specialist S. Amstutz, Staff Secretary to Plant Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission H. Miller, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III E. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
L. Marsh, Project Director, PD 3-1, NRR M. Phillips, Section Chief, DRP E. Plettner, Senior Resident Inspector L. 01shan, Project Manager, NRR R. Leemon, Senior Resident Inspector Other E. Muma, Emergency Services Director Charlevoix County D. Hahn, Michigan Department of Public Health R. Whale, Michigan Public Service Commission J. Padgett, Michigan Public Service Commission B.
Comments Received from Licensee Consumer's Power's response to the Big Rock Point Initial SALP 11 Report dated March 3,1993, included several comments that have resulted in a minor revision to the Initial SALP Report. These changes are listed in and the revised pages are included as Enclosure 3.
The affected pages of the Initial SALP Report should be replaced with the corrected pages included in Enclosure 3.
C.
Regional Administrator's Comments Based on Consideration of the Licensee Comments I have considered your written response to the SALP 11 initial report and the comments during the public meeting held on March 18, 1993.
Enclosure I We acknowledge your plans to implement E0Ps for plant operations and to improve the MOV program in ETS prior to the startup following the 1993 refueling outage. We will review these during future inspections.
In Emergency Preparedness, we acknowledge the corrective actions on the exercise performance weakness were well underway late in the SALP 11 period. However, completion of a second training session and demonstration of the corrective actions' effectiveness, based on March 1993 exercise performance, were essential to resolving our concerns.
In ETS you commented that the EDSFI results were positive. We believe the SALP report accurately portrays the results of the EDSFI.
Selected important strengths and weaknesses were discussed in appropriate functional areas.
In Safety Assessment and Quality Verification, we acknowledge your clarification of the reasons why the 1992 exercise performance weakness was categorized as only a recommendation for improvement rather than a traceable finding by the NPAD staff.
In addition, we acknowledge that only one of our four exercise concerns was categorized as a performance weakness.
It is my conclusion that the SALP 11 initial report ratings have not changed.
i
REVISION SHEET PAGE LINE READS NOW SHOULD READ 6
31-35 Examples include the Examples include the improper installation of improper installation of compression fittings on compression fittings on a a primary pressure primary pressure boundary, improper boundary, improper coupling of the seventh coupling of the seventh turbine admission valve, turbine admission valve, improper repair of the and, most recently, turbine handtrip inadequate repair of the solenoid, and most "B"
reactor recently, inadequate depressurization valve repair of the "B" flange leaks.
reactor depressurization valve flange leaks.
Basis:
Repair of the main turbine handtrip solenoid was unsuccessful vice inadequate, therefore, it does not constitute an example of a lack of quality.
PAGE LINE READS NOW SHOULD READ 11 13-15 Following the discovery Following the discovery i
of a failed core flow of a failed core flow l
baffle plate hold-down baffle plate hold-down i
bolt, the initial bolt, the initial l
engineering analysis and engineering analysis was proposed acoustic inadequate and the monitoring system were proposed acoustic inadequate.
monitoring system could I
not be calibrated at that l
time.
Basis:
Subsequent information provided by the licensee identified a i
previously unknown loose part in the reactor vessel where upon correction, the acoustic ronitoring system could have been calibrated.
c Fa
/M [t? Roll ecause management was not effective in resolving procedural adherence p blems.
Trai ing, qualifications and the number of staff in chemistry and radiation protec ion (RP) remained good. The chemistry and RP technician staffs experie ed low turnover. Contract RP technicians hired to support outage activiti were effective in their assignments.
The RP and chemistry superinten ent and RP supervisor were replaced after the previous individuals transferred ithin the company.
The ALARA program was improved by the addition of a Senior RP technician to assist the ALARA coordinator in identifying ra 'ological concerns during maintenance job planning.
In addition the pre ious RP supervisor transferred to the outage management section, thus pro ' ding a stronger RP presence in the outage management section.
2.
Performance Rati i
Performance is rated Cat ory 2.
Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment perio 1
[P 3.
Recommendations f
None.
C.
Maintenance / Surveillance 1.
Analysis Management effectiveness in ensuring qua ty g mixed. Weaknesses in post-maintenance testing and procedural complia (e wer6 noted. A lack of quality was observed resulting in several rework is Examples included the improper installation of compression fittings Q primary pressure boundary, improper coupling of the seventh turbine admis qnNalve, improper repair of the turbine hand trip solenoid, and, most recent A adequate repair of the I
"B" reactor depressurization valve flange leaks.
ecause root-cause analysis and failure modes were occasionally not documented, equipment problems could not be adequately addressed; this was also a concern 'n the previous assessment period.
At the end of the assessment perio, a root-cause analysis training program was instituted.
On the positive side, maintenance-related turnovers and br' fings ensured minimal delay of the work activities, and supervisors provi d oversight to maintenance workers at job sites. The plant staff continued o manage the number of control room equipment deficiencies with a " black bo d" condition being maintained throughout most of the period when the plant wa operating.
In addition, plant management instituted a preventive maintenance PM) self-assessment that identified several concerns.
Midway thr' ugh the as essment period, a number of specific programs were developed to address thes concerns. These included upgrading and computerizing the maintenance ork request process, which allowed managers to track the status of maintena e activities and to improve scheduling. Maintenance planning was improved 'ith the assignment of three dedicated planners and the development of a " job 6
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l
[nclosure 3 because management was not effective in resolving procedural adherence problems.
Training, qualifications and the number of staff in chemistry and radiation protection (RP) remained good. The chemistry and RP technician staffs experienced low turnover.
Contract RP technicians hired to support outage activities were effective in their assignments. The RP and chemistry superintendent and RP supervisor were replaced after the previous individuals transferred within the company. The ALARA program was improved by the addition of a Senior RP technician to assist the ALARA coordinator in identifying radiological concerns during maintenance job planning.
In addition the previous RP supervisor transferred to the outage management section, thus providing a stronger RP presence in the outage management section.
2.
Performance Ratina Performance is rated Category 2.
Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations None.
C.
Maintenance / Surveillance 1.
Analysis Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was mixed. Weaknesses in post-maintenance testing and procedural compliance were noted. A lack of quality was observed resulting in several rework issues.
Examples included tha improper installation of compression fittings on a primary pressure boundary, improper coupling of the seventh turbine admission valve, and, most recently, inadequate repair of the "B" reactor depressurization valve flange leaks.
Because root-cause analysis and failure modes were occasionally not documented, equipment problems could not be adequately addressed; this was also a concern in the previous assessment period. At the end of the assessment period, a root-cause analysis training program was instituted.
On the positive side, maintenance-related turnovers and briefings ensured minimal delay of the work activities, and supervisors provided oversight to maintenance workers at job sites. The plant staff continued to manage the number of control room equipment deficiencies with a " black board" condition being maintained throughout most of the period when the plant was operating.
In addition, plant management instituted a preventive maintenance (PM) self-assessment that identified several concerns. Midway through the assessment period, a number of specific programs were developed to address these concerns.
These included upgrading and computerizing the maintenance work request process, which allowed managers to track the status of maintenance activities and to improve scheduling. Maintenance planning was improved with the assignment of three dedicated planners and the development of a " job 6
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.f O k f procurement of parts and materials, assisting maintenance in determining i
w ich vendor recommendations should be followed for the preventive maintenance I
ram, and in resolving issues of component aging.
Technical support was pr j
also weak for the core spray system piping replacement modification.
Weakn ses identified included failure to obtain design basis information, i
9 inadequ te inservice testing of the core spray pumps, and inadequate post-j modifica 'on testing. Also, the uncertainties associated with the results obtained om a computer program, which is used to predict flow to the core spray syste based upon pump performance data, had not been quantified.
I Weaknesses in engineering support were also noted in the lack of analysis of adverse trend ta. As a result, there were unidentified trends regarding j
repetitive relie valve failures and low EDG cooling water suction pressures that indicated po ti gradation.
Following the discovery of a failed i
core flow baffle
.te ho d-down bolt, the initial engineering analysis and the proposed acousti
. l'toring system were inadequate.
The net result of this effort was to ca additional off load of the core to replace the j'
core flow baffle plate d
wn bolts.
Engineering actions in implementing the repair were good. A mple of good resolution of technical issues was 1
the special test to resolv station black-out issues.
Enforcement history was good; oweva, it had declined.
None of the violations issued indicated pr r,
ic problems.
Engineering resources were often rpped. The staff was experienced.
However, many of the weaknesses not di ahve could be attributed to the level of engineering support provided.
En 'rf(6 ring and technical support to the operations and maintenance departments wac dequate during normal operations but was strained during outages, when d with reactive work, and when
' making plant improvements. Also, the pla t t ff received insufficient support from corporate engineering organiz io For example, staffing to support MOV work was insufficient to execute a ffective MOV program. This was evidenced by poor progress in the MOV pro am, numerous errors in l
I engineering calculations, and inappropriate ass mptio..s.
1 2.
Performance Ratinq p
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j Performance is rated Category 3.
Performance was ra d egory 2 during the l
previous assessment period.
]
3.
Recommendations The licensee should improve engineering capabilities and inv lvement in support of the Big Rock Point plant.
This is particularly im rtant in view l
of the demands imposed by plant aging.
G.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification 1.
Analysis Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was mixed.
Management involvement was apparent in attempts to resolve long-standing plant probl s,
i such as the steam flow oscillations experienced on the main turbine.
Howev r, 11
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of procurement of parts and materials, assisting maintenance in determining which vendor recommendations should be followed for the preventive maintenance program, and in resolving issues of component aging. Technical support was also weak for the core spray system piping replacement modification.
Weaknesses identified included failure to obtain design basis information, inadequate inservice testing of the core spray pumps, and inadequate post-modification testing. Also, the uncertainties associated with the results obtained from a computer program, which is used to predict flow to the core spray system based upon pump performance data, had not been quantified.
Weaknesses in engineering support were also noted in the lack of analysis of adverse trend data. As a result, there were unidentified trends regarding repetitive relief valve failures and low EDG cooling water suction pressures that indicated potential degradation.
Following the discovery of a failed core flow baffle plate hold-down bolt, the initial engineering analysis was inadequate and the proposed acoustic monitoring system could not be calibrated at that time. The net result of this effort was to cause an additional off load of the core to replace the core flow baffle plate hold-down bolts.
Engineering actions in implementing the repair were good. An example of good resolution of technical issues was the special test to resolve station black-out issues.
Enforcement history was good; however, it had declined.
None of the violations issued indicated programmatic problems.
Engineering resources were often strained.
The staff was experienced.
However, many of the weaknesses noted above could be attributed to the level of engineering support provided.
Engineering and technical support to the operations and maintenance departments was adequate during normal operations but was strained during outages, when dealing with reactive work, and when making plant improvements. Also, the plant staff received insufficient support from corporate engineering organizations.
For example, staffing to support MOV work was insufficient to execute an effective MOV program.
This was evidenced by poor progress in the MOV program, numerous errors in i
engineering calculations, and inappropriate assumptions.
2.
Performance Ratina Performance is rated Category 3.
Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment period.
3.
Recommendations The licensee should improve engineering capabilities and involvement in support of the Big Rock Point plant. This is particularly important in view of the demands imposed by plant aging.
G.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification 1.
Analysis Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was mixed. Management involvement was apparent in attempts to resolve long-standing plant problems, such as the steam flow oscillations experienced on the main turbine.
- However, 11
ENCIDSUPE 4 OPOWBi Consumers n"r uawter%
POWERING MIENIGAN'S PROGRESS si n o po.m u.,e m. ic:en un si s w.c + m = 4 m o April 2, 1993 Nuclear Regulatory Commissien Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-155 - LICENSE DPR BIG ROCK POINT PLANT -
RESPONSE TO THE INITIAL SALP 11 REPORT (INSPECTION REFORT 50-155/93-001)
We have reviewed the initial SALP 11 report for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant covering the period from October 1,1991 through Cecember 31, 1992.
We would like to take this opportur.ity to respond to :ne report.
As we discussed at the SALP meeting,1992 was a difficult period for Big Rcck Point, and the SALP Report covering this period was a disappointment to Consumers Pcwer Company and especially the Big Rock Pcint Staff. However, as we have already communicated to the Big Rcck Point Staff, we intend to look forward and accept our challenges fcr 1993 and beycnd in improving plant performance. The weaknesses and reccerendatiens contained in this SALP Report are part of these challenges.
We agree with the Staff's recc mendatien that ccomunicatien, both inter-departmer.tal, external, and between regulator / licensee needs continued improve.ent.
The following paragraphs provide our comments and active plans to the report arranged by SALP Category.
Plant Ooerations We recognize that with the difficulties of e:ergent work in 1992, resources to support E0P improvement were insufficient during the 52LP period to close all the open issues. To improve, a meeting was held in the Region (4th quarter 1992) and a follow-up letter was submitted to describe our corrective actions in addressing the remaining issues. The agreed upon cr.arges to the E0P's will be in plact by startup from the 1993 Refueling Outage.
Eadioleci al Controls t
Dose control and ALAPA plannir;g effcrts have hac hign :ricrity over the last three to five years at Big Rock Poir.: and -e u;reciate the recognition from the Staff in the SALP Report. Dose contrcl -ili contimue to remain a hich priority as evidenced by our early implerentaticn of t e revised 10 CFRl*0.
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ENCLOSURE 4 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BIG ROCK POINT PLANT RESPONSE TO SALP 11 REPORT April 2,1993 Maintenance / Surveillance This section refers to our difficulties with the turbine as: " improper repair of the turbine hand trip solenoid" (HTS). Although CPCo acknowledges that the hand trip solenoid failed to cperate on three (3) occasions during this following the failure of period, none of the repair efforts were improper,the HTS on October 5,1992, Regi to review our troubleshooting and repair efforts, and as documented in Inspection Report 92-021, no concerns or additional actions were identified.
One would conclude that our extensive troubleshooting and repair efforts were Since the SALP unsuccessful, but they should not be referred to as improper.
period, in response to an additional HTS failure, a system design change has been installed (direct acting valve).
Egercency Prenaredness CPCo was disappointed in the decline in this functional area. While there were no significant problems identified in the 1991 exercise, we did have one performance weakness in the 1992 exercise. The initial SALP Report discusses this weakness concerning co munications with State officialt and states that not all corrective actions were completed by the end of the assessment period.
In fact, all corrective atticns were completed before the end of the assessment period; however, performance in this area was not scheduled to be evaluated until the 1993 exercise.
The corrective actions were effective as evidenced by the recent successful 1993 Exercise in which preliminary results showed no performance weaknesses, folicw-up ite.s or significant concerns.
Security Consumers Power Company continues to increase security awareness at Big Rock Point and will reinforce our efforts to reduce the number of personnel errors committed by the plant staff.
Enoineerino/ Technical succort CPCo has reviewed this section and offers additional information in two areas:
Core flow baffle plate f ailure MOV Program support a
With respect to the flow baffle plate hold-down bolt activities, our decision to terminate our efforts in resolving the NRC's contractor's comments on the engineering analyses to support continued operation, was rooted in our feeling that an impasse had been reached. Professional experts had a different opinion in the correct analytical approach. While it is true that the installed acoustic monitoring system could not be calibrated because of a large background signature, it was later noted upon disassembly of the reactor internals. that a loose thermal shield wedge was discovered under the core l
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ENCIOSURE 4
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0F. HISS 10N 3
BIG ROCK POINT PLANT RESPONSE TO SALP 11 REPORT April 2, 1992 support plate. This wedge was approximately the same size and weight as the nut which the acoustic monitor was designed to detect. Had this part not been in the vessel it is highly likely that background noise would have been acceptable allowing system calibration and operability. We concluded that additional work, with the associated review and comment cycle, would only extend the outage further with no guarantee of a satisfactory resolution.
After discussicns between CPCo and NRC management, this concern was mutually supported by both sides that the repair option was the appropriate choice.
Describing the acoustic monitoring system as inadequate is not apprcpriate, in light of the abcVe discussion.
Regarding the POV effort, CPCo does recognize that some errors were identified in our calculations. To support onsite efforts, CPCo elected to erploy an offsite contractor to support our effort. Since the last outege, Censurers Power has assigned additional individuals to the MOV effort to develop inplace and dP testing procedures which are scheduled for the 1993 Refueling Outage.
One additional item mentioned by CPCo at the SALP meeting relates to the n
Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSF1). Consumers Pcwer, especially BRP personnel expended significant engineering resources in preparation for, during, and after the ED5F1. We believe that based upon your Inspection Report and discussions at the Exit Meetings that the results were very positive.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification The Initial SALP Report refers to Audits associated with the 1992 Emergency Exercise and concludes that no findings were identified. Our Audit organization (NPAD) did perform a surveillance un the 1992 exercise. While the surveillance did not identify any findings, it did make recommendations for improvement, which we believe address weaknesses identified by the NRC.
Also the Ecergency Planning organization had already identified a centern in this area and corrective actions were in progress, so NPAD classified it as a recommendation only (it was self identified). We also believe that Inspection Reports92-012, 92-013 and 91-019 doct. ment positive conclusions on licensee assessment activity and follow-up in the Emergency Preparedness area.
Big Rock Point is committed to continuously improving plant operatiens to ensure that we are meeting industry standards, NRC expectations and to accomplish our goal of operating to the end of licensed life, May 31, 2000.
Patrick M Donnelly (Signed)
Patrick M Donnelly Plant Manager CC: Administrator, Region III, U$NRC NRC Resident inspector - Big Rock Point M
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