ML20035C765
| ML20035C765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1993 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035C761 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-93-05, 50-271-93-5, NUDOCS 9304090069 | |
| Download: ML20035C765 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1993005
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 1
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REPORT NO:
50-271/93-05
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DOCKET NO:
50-271
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LICENSE NO:
DRP-28
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LICENSEE:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation -
RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road
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Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
FACILITY:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
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LOCATION:
Vernon,- Vermont
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INSPECTION DATES:
February 17-25, 1993
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LEAD INSPECTOR:
A. Finkel, Senidr Reactor Engineer
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Performance Programs Section
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Operations Branch, DRS
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APPROVED BY:
Norman J./Blumberg, Chie[ tion -
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Performance Programs Sec
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Operations Branch, DRS
INSPECTION SUMMARY: Safety Inspection from February 17 - 25,1993 (Inspection .
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Report No. 50-271/93-05)
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AREAS INSPECTED: Announced safety inspection by one region-based inspector to
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review the licensee's program for correcting deficiencies identified by the licensee in their .
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fire barrier penetration seals that were originally installed in 1979/1980. A number of the
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original fire barrier penetration installations did not meet the licensee's design in the areas
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of: (1) penetration type and depth of fill material; (2) adequate grouting between the -
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penetration and wall; and (3) installing unqualified penetration designs.-
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9304090069 930401
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ADOCK 0500C271
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In addition to evaluating the program to correct the 1979/1980 penetration work, the
inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the NRC Information Notices 88-04 and
Supplement 1, " Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration
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Seals," and Information Notice 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals." The inspector also reviewed the status of NRC Unresolved Item
93-0241 associated with the Diesel Generator Room Fire Detection equipment and the
licensee's fire protection and prevention audit (VY-91-10) that was conducted from:
June 24 - 28,1991.
RESULTS: The inspector determined that the licensee's controls presently established for
the design, installation, inspection and testing during the present fire barrier penetration
modification work would correct and prevent the recurrence of the fire barrier penetration
deficiencies that occurred during the 1980 installation work. The inspector also verified that
the modifications performed to correct the fire barrier penetration seals were done with
qualified personnel using controlled drawings and approved materials. A qualhy control
program with at least two levels of independent quality control inspection has been
implemented by the licensee to verify that the as designed fire penetration configurathns
have been installed. The present penetration inspection program controls provide adequate
oversight to correct the licensee's identified fire barrier penetra6on deficiencies.
The licensee actions taken in reviewing NRC Information Notices 88-04 and 88-04,
Supplement 1, " Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration
Seals," and Information Notice 88-56, " Potential Problems With Silicone Foam Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals," were performed in an appropriate manner with respect to records, but did
not cause a change in fire barrier inspection methodology.
Three apparent violations were identified as a result of this inspection and are as follows:
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Inadequate fire barrier penetration seals were installed during the 1979/1980
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outage and have remained in place for 13 years.
Inadequate surveillance testing program and procedures for the fire barrier penetration
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seals allowed inadequate seals to exist for 13 years without being identified.
Sensitivity testing of smoke detectors was not conducted properly to determine their
operability.
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DETAILS
1.0
PERSONS CONTACTED
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Attachment 1 provides a listing of persons contacted during the inspection.
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2.0
INTRODUCTION (92720)'
A number of deficiencies related to fire barrier penetration seals were identified by the
licensee in 1992. Some details associated with these deficiencies are discussed in paragraph
3.0 below. As a result of the identification of these fire barrier penetration seal problems,
the licensee established an engineering task force to review the adequacy of all installed
penetration seals.
During this NRC inspection, in addition to evaluating licensee's the task force findings, the
inspector included verification of the as found penetration seals, identification of replacement
penetration designs and verification that testing of installed replacement configurations of fire
barrier penetration seals was acceptable and documented in the quality control program.
In addition to reviewing and evaluating the modification program associated with the fire
barrier penetration and penetration seal modification tasks, the inspector reviewed the
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licensee's program for performing fire program audits and NRC Information Notices. The
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licensee's action on an unresolved item reported in previous NRC inspection report was also
reviewed. The documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 2.
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3.0
3.1
Recent Fire Penetration Program History
On March 19,1992, the licensee was performing a fire penetration seal inspection of
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penetration number IS-0109, located at the intake structure, and determined it to be sealed
with an unacceptable sealing material. The pipe sleeve was found with metal jacketed
insulation in the wall penetration sleeve. Licensee engineering issued a corrective action
request (CAR) 92-10 to document the finding and initiate additional inspections. The CAR
that was issued also included a penetration problem that the licensee identified in the "A"
Diesel Generating Room (DGR) at about the same time that the intake structure penetration
problem was identified. The nonconformance on the "A" DGR was identified as spalling and
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shrinkage of the grout in penetration RA-519-SF. The licensee's investigation, resulting
from their CAR, consisted of reviewing the fire barrier penetration seal designs, installation
documentation, and quality control records of the 1979/1980 fire barrier penetration seal
installation work. Plant modifications that were installed from 1980 to the present were also-
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'The parenthetical notation following the paragraph title denotes the NRC inspection
procedure that was used by the inspector in conducting this inspection. The procedure title is
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" Corrective Action."
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reviewed. The licensee's record search did not identify any other penetration seat problems
similar to those identified in CAR 92-10. One result of the CAR 92-10 investigation was an
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engincedng recommendation to provide a removable piping insulation to allow for future
inspections of the fire barrier penetrations.
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The licensee planned the replacement of the present piping insulation covering the fim barrier
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penetrations during their August 1993 refueling outage; however, work was begun in
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December 1992 to replace the existing piping insulation with a new qualified design.' On
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December 7,1992, a section of piping insulation was removed from penetration RA-512-SF
and no abnormal conditions were identified with the existing fire barder penetration seal
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installation. On December 17,1992, when remaining insulation material was removed from ~
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penetration RA-512-SF, visual inspection of the penetration determined that it was only
partially filled with fire barder scaling material. The penetration was repaired to the original
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design criteria using qualified material.
During the removal of piping insulation from another penetration RA-519-CA, on
December 22,1992, a second nonconforming fire barrier penetration installation was
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identified. The fire grouting material had developed cracks between the wall and the
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penetration's pipe sleeve. That day, a licensee engineering team was established to review
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the inspection findings and the plant history records for this penetration. Discussions with
individuals indicated that a decision was made, but not documented, during the 1979/1980
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installation not to remove the pipe insulation inside the penetration seal cavity but to seal
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between the insulation and the pipe sleeve / wall interface. The decision not to remove the
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piping insulation and to insert the grout material is believed to be the cause for the poor
penetration installation. The decision not to remove the piping insulation was also identified
as the reason the fire barrier penetration configuration was not identified as a nonconforming
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condition at the time the grouting work was performed. Based on the licensee's current
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inspection findings and, as required by Technical Spe ifications, the licensee established
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compensatory fire watches in those portions of the plant where these penetrations were
located.
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On December 29,1992, the licensee instituted a task force to review and identify the status
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of all their fire penetration seals, which is still an on-going task. Where piping insulation
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was installed, it was removed so that the fire barrier penetrations could be inspected.
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Nonconforming conditions were documented in the nonconformance reporting system. The
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status of the fire barrier penetrations are documented in the licensee'sfPenetration Repair
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Task Force Summary" document. This document defines the number and types of fire
barriers that have been determined by the licensee as nonconforming. The four categories of
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penetrations are: (1) insulated penetrations, (2) uninsulated penetrations, (3) electrical
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penetrations,' and (4) cable trays. Of the estimated one hundred penetrations identified by the
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licensee to be repaired, over 50% have been repaired and inspected as of the time of this '
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NRC inspection. The inspector determined that the licensee's present fire barrier penetration
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task is well managed and documented as required by their program.
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3.2
Fire Penetration Modification Program
As part of the efforts to improve deficient fire barrier penetrations that were identified in'
1992 and by ongoing inspections in 1993, the licensee is installing two types of fire barrier
materials manufactured by the Brand Company. The first material is the Brand Company
flexible boot seal design that is replacing the present fire barrier penetration seals for piping
subject to thermal growth. The Brand design is a flexible boot penetration seal that is
custom fit to the specific penetration that it is protecting. The seal is fabricated from fabrics
of fire retardant, radiation-resistant, silicone rubber with woven glass fiber reinforcing the
silicone. The ends and side seams are adhesive bonded, and the end joints reinforced with
stainless steel bands. The Brand Company design has been qualified to ASTM E-119 for
three hour fire exposure, and qualification tested for both radiation > 10' RADS and a
maximum seal leakage rate of 15 PSI. The second fire barrier material that the Brand
Company technicians are using to seal penetrations is a foam. They are using SE-FOAM
which is a medium density silicone foam based on Dow Corning Corporation RTV foam.
SE-FOAM is a liquid silicone that is applied using automatic dispensing equipment designed
by the Brand Company and installed by their technicians. SE-FOAM seals have been
qualified 'o the ASTM E-119 three hour fire barrier test, radiation levels > 10' RADS and a
seal leakage rate of zero for rooms pressurized to % PSI. with CO . The Brand Company
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qualification data on this series of fire barrier penetration seals has been approved by the
licensee's engineering organization and the qualification reports are stored in the engineering
data bank information files. During this inspection, the inspector did riot review the Brand
Company qualification data which is maintained in the licensee's offsite engineering facility.
The design and installation methods for each series of fire barrier penetration seals are
controlled and documented in a modification package that contains the engineering drawings,
installation, inspection and acceptance test criteria. The inspector verified this by reviewing
ten modification packages that contained design instructions, installation instructions, quality
inspection hold points and supervisor signature for final installation approval. Each
penetration modification installation package reviewed was detailed such that the lack of
penetration installation data that occurred in the installation work performed in early 1980
should not be repeated during this installation process.
To verify that the present fire barrier penetration modification program was being
implemented as described in the licensee's modification work packages, the inspector
witnessed fire barrier seal installation work that was in progress. For work that had been
completed, the inspector reviewed the work packages to assure that tne work was complete
and that the work package data sheets were reviewed and approved by the specified licensee
supervision. The following fire barrier piping flexible boot seals and Brand SE-FOAM
penetrations were inspected. (The * by the building locations identifies installation work that
was in progress and was witnessed by the inspector.)
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TG-0331-SF
TG-0357
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TG-0419
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RA-0933-SF
- - RX BLDG.EL. 252 W. WALL
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RA-0520-SF
- - RX BLDG.EL. 232 SW. WALL
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RA-0721-SF
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RA-1002-SF
- - RX BLDG.EL. 239 T CATWALK
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RX BLDG.EL. 239 T CATWALK
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TG-0304-SF
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TG-0310-CA
The above penetrations were installed per the engineering documents listed in the
" Penetration Repair Task Force Summary" document. The installation work was verified by
quality control inspectors and documented in the specific penetration work package. The .
inspector verified that the acceptance criteria used by the quality control inspectors was well
defined and documented in each penetration installation modification work package. The
" Penetration Repair Program" is documented and verified by at least two levels of quality
inspection. The present fire penetration modification pmgram that the licensee is
implementing is well engineered, installed by qualified personnel, inspected by a trained
quality inspection function and documented in controlled modification packages.
3.3
Inadequate Fire Barrier Penetrations
The licensee's inspection of their fire barrier penetration seals identified over 100
nonconforming penetrations. Examples of nonconforming penetration types included: lack
of adequate fire barrier fill material, cracks in the grouting seals, and installed unqualified
penetration designs. Some examples of these non-conforming installations are as follows:
Inadequate Foam Depth - The following fire barrier penetrations in the "A" Diesel'
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Generator Room had inadequate foam depth; Nos. TG-0323-SF, TG-0324-SF and
TG-0325-SF.
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Fire Penetration Grout Cracks - The following fire barrier penetrations in the wall of
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the Turbine Building Hallway, outside the Diesel Rooms, had grout cracks; Nos. TG-
0404-SF, TG-0406-SF and TG-0407-SF.
Unqualified Fire Barrier Penetration Installations - Foam on Diesel Generator side of
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wall not approved for application, through-block voids not filled in Turbine Building
Hallway, and fire barrier penetration No. TG-0302-SF sealed with an unidentified
foam product.
The above are some examples of licensee identified fire barrier penetration seal
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nonconformances which have existed for over 13 years. These examples of fire barrier
penetration seal nonconformances are an apparent Violation of Technical Specification
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Section 3.13.E.1, " Vital Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seals," that states, in part, "... vital
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fire barrier penetration seals protecting the Reactor Building, Control Room Building, and
Diesel Generator Rooms shall be intact." The fact that the installed fire barrier penetration
seals were not intact and therefore did not meet Technical Specification Section 3.13.E.1 for
13 years is an apparent Violation (50-271/03-05-01).
3.4
Surveillance Inspections
Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.13.E.1, Vital Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seals states
in part, " Vital fire barrier seals shall be verified to be functional by visual inspection at least
once per operating cycle and following any repair." Operating Procedure (OP) 4019,-
Revision 3, " Surveillance of Vital Fire Barriers," was written to implement this requirement.
The inspector determined OP 4019 was inadequate in its inspection direction to verify the
vi al fire barrier penetration inspection requirement of TS Section 4.13.E.1. for
insulated /uninsulated penetrations, electrical penetrations and cable tray penetrations. As an
example, OP 4019 did not adequately define, for the inspector, an acceptance criteria for the
following types of fire barrier penetrations:
Cable tray penetration fill requirements for depth and 13pe of material
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Grouting cracks acceptance criterion
Penetration configuration criterion
In addition to the above, OP 4019 did not require personnel to remove the thermal protective
piping seal material to perform a visual penetration surveillance inspection. The lack of
inspection criteria in the surveillance procedure is considered to be the main reason that the
nonconforming penetration installations were not identified by the licensee. A fire barrier
penetration problem was noted by tt'e licensee on December 17,1992, when piping
penetration No. RA-512-SF was ideatified with partially filled fire barrier sealant material
after removal of the thermal insulation. The failure to verify the functionality, as exhibited
by existence of deficiencies in fire barrier penetration seals for the types of installed
penetration for 13 years, is an apparent Violation of Technical Specification Section 4.13.E.1
(50-271/93-05-02).
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During the identification of the penetration nonconformances in December 1992, the licensee
became aware of the deficiencies in their present surveillance procedure OP 4019. As part
of the penetration modification task, a revised surveillance procedure is being written to
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correct the present surveillance procedure deficiencies. In revising the fire barrier
penetration surveillance procedure, specific direction for quality control inspection, type and
depth of fill material and grouting configuration are to be defined.
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4.0
LICENSEE'S REVIEW OF NRC INFORMATION NOTICES REGARDING
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FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS
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The actions taken by the licensee in response to two NRC Information Notices (IN) issued in
1988 were reviewed. In 1988, following the receipt of NRC Information Notices No's 88-04
and 88-04 Supplement 1, " Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Seals"
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and IN 88-56, " Potential Problems With Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," the
licensee performed an evaluation of their fire barrier seal installation documentation. In
addition to reviewing their quality control installation records from 1980 when most of the
seals were installed, a review of their modification program data from 1980 to 1988 was also
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performed. In conjunction with this effort and to support their in-house historical data
records, a search of industry history records was also performed. The licensee's initial
investigation did not identify any deficiencies from their fire barrier penetration seal
documentation history files. In addition to the records search, the licensee had discussions
with cognizant plant personnel associated with the 1979/1980 fire barrier penetration seal
program. None of the people interviewed were aware of any quality concerns with the fire
penetration installation program at that time. The lack of any negative information associated
with the installation of fire barrier penetration seals was the basis for the licensee decisions
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that their fire barrier penetration seals were installed as designed and that they did not have
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the type of problems as outlined in the 1988 Information Notices.
However, Information Notice (IN) 88-56 indicated that if generic penetration problems exist,
they may be limited to only silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals but not to any
particular vendor or installer. The IN also suggested that a penetration seal inspection
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methodology should include the removal the fire barrier penetration seal dams' to verify if
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there are voids, gaps or cracking of the. solidified foam material. The licensee's fire barrier
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penetration inspection program, conducted in November 1988, did not require the removal of
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fire barrier penetration seal dams during their penetration inspections. This was a missed
opportunity by the licensee to identify their nonconformances in November 1088.
Identification of their nonconformances in November 1988, when the fire banler penetration
seal inspections were performed, would have started corrective action on their present
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identified nonconformances four years earlier.
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'In many silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals, a permanent dam constructed from a
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fire-resistant material is used. Normally, a permanent dam is located on the bottom of floor and
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ceiling penetrations and on both sides (although sometimes only on one side) of wall
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5.0
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED NRC INSPECTION ITEM
(Closed) Unresolved Item 93-02-01 Diesel Generator Room Fire Detection
This item resulted from the resident inspector's observation of a monthly surveillance test.
On January 19,1993, while observ'mg the monthly testing of the "B" emergency diesel
generator (EDG), the resident inspector observed a bluish - white haze that began to
accumulate in the ceiling area of the diesel room after approximately five minutes. The
Auxiliary Operator (AO) who was monitoring the diesel test and the fire watch and who was
stationed in the diesel room as part of the firewatch pmgram, also observed the haze and
inspected the diesel to determine its source. It appeared that the haze was generated from
heated lube oil on hot surfaces of the turbocharger and possibly the exhaust manifold. The
potential for fire was not a concern since good housekeeping conditions were observed in the
general vicinity of the exhaust manifold and there was no fuel or other combustibles in the
area. Approximately ten minutes into the diesel run, the diesel room exhaust fan
automatically started on high ambient room temperature and the haze was evacuated. After
approximately 15 minutes, the haze being generated was significantly less and did not
accumulate to the previous levels even when the room fan was secured. The resident
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inspector's concern was that none of the three ceiling-mounted ionization type smoke
detectors alarmed in the control room prior to the start of the EDG room fan despite the
noticeable haze. The inspector noted that the operation of the EDG was conducted in a safe
manner and that the operability of the diesel was not a concern. However, the failure of the
three ionization defectors to alarm when exposed to the oil haze was a concern.
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In his review of the fire detection equipment surveillance procedures and licensing
documentation, the resident inspector identified the following:
The Safety Evaluation for license Amendment No. 43 issued January 13, 1978, specifies that
testing will verify that the smoke detectors have adequate sensitivity to detect the products of
combustion. Vermont Yankee procedures OP 4002, Revision 3, " Integrity Surveillance of
Fire Detectors and Suppression Systems," and OP 4339, Revision 2, " Surveillance of Fire
Protection Detectors Instruments," only provides for visual inspection, detector actuation and
circuit continuity checks to verify smoke detector operability.
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During this inspection (93-05), the inspector's review of surveillance procedure OP 4339,
Revision 2, November 1992, verified that a go/no-go type of test (unmeasured concentration
of an aerosol over the detector) is performed to activate the detector. This type of test, if the
detector is working, will activate an alarm and cause a lamp on a fire control panel to
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activate. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code 72E,1990, " Standard on
Automatic Fire Detectors," states in Paragraph 8-3.4.2, " Detector sensitivity shall be
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checked within one year after installation and every alternate year thereafter...and that
detector sensitivity shall not be tested or measured using any device that administers an
unmeasured concentration of smoke or other aerosol into the detector."
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Since 1978, the licensee has not changed their procedures OP 4002, Revision 3, and OP
4339, Revision 2, to incorpomte the detector sensitivity test that demonstrate the operability
of this fire system. The licensee has a Pyrotronics Model SCU-9 Sensitivity Test Set that is
designed for testing fire detectors; however, it has not been used because surveillance
procedure OP 4339 does not specify that a fire detector sensitivity test be conducted.
This unresolved item (50-271/93-02-01)is closed. It has been changed to an apparent
violation for failure to comply with Technical Specification Section 4.13.A.1, " Fire
Protection System," which states, in part that, "Each of the sensors specified in 3.13.A.1...
shall be demonstrated operable at least once per six months." License Amendment No. 43
issued January 13,1978, added the requirement for sensitivity testing of smoke detectors to
verify detection performance. Failure to demonstrate the operability of the smoke detector
system is an apparent Violation of Technical Specification Section 4.13.A.1
(50-271/93-05-03).
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FIRE AUDIT PROGRAM
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Licensee's Fire Audit No. VY-91-10 was selected for review by the inspector since this was
the latest yearly audit that was performed on the same fire barrier penetration seals and fire
detector systems that inspector was inspecting at this time. In each of these two areas, the
audit identified that these, "were noted to be in good condition."
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The purpose of the audit was defined as, "... to assess the plant's fire protection
equipment and program implementation in depth to verify continued compliance with
regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis Report, and licensing conditions."
The audit did not identify that the fire barrier penetration seals were nonconforming and the
smoke detectors were not verified to be operable. This was a missed opportunity by the
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quality assurance audit program. Identification of these nonconformances in June 1991,
when the audit was performed, would have started corrective action on these
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nonconformances one and half years earlier.
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EXIT MEETING
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The inspector met with licensee personnel (denoted in . Attachment 1) at the conclusion of the
inspection, on February 25,1993, at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The
inspector summarized the scope of the inspection and the inspection findings at that time.
Subsequent to the exit meeting held at the Vermont. Yankee site on February 25,1993, a
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review of additional data was performed by the inspector in the NRC Regional Office in
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, from March 4 - 8, 1993.
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Attachments:
1. Persons Contacted
2..
Documentation Review
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ATTACIIMENT 1
Persons Contacted
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
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- B Buteau, Engineering Director
- J DeVincentis, Technical Programs Supervisor
- B. Gippardi, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- D. Girroir, Senior Mechanical and Construction Engineer
- S. Jefferson, Assistant to Plant Manager
- J. Meyer, Operations Support Engineer
- S. Lucis, Fire Protection Coordinator
- D. Reid, Plant Manager
- E. Sawyer, Fire Protection Consultant
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- R. Tucker, Senior Engineer
State of Vermont Representative
- W. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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- H. Eichenholz, Senior Reactor Inspector
- Denotes those personnel present at the exit meeting held on February 25,1993.
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During the course of this inspection,the inspector contacted other members of the licensee's
Technical, Quality Assurance, Fire Protection and Engineering Staffs.
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ATTACIIMENT 2
Documentation Reviewed
Operating Procedures (OP)
OP 3020, Revision 17, April 1992, " Fire Brigade and Fire fighting Procedure"
OP 4002, Revision 3, August 1992, " Integrity Surveillance of Fire Detectors / Fire
Suppression Systems"
OP 4019, Revision 3, July 1991, " Surveillance of Vital Fire Barriers"
OP 4339, Revision 2, November 1992, " Surveillance of Fire Protection-
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Detectors / Instruments"
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Fire Program Plans, Procedures and Audit Reports
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Vermont Yankee Fire Protection Plan, Revision 11, May 5,1991
Fire Penetration Repair Tracking Lists, February 22,1993
Fire Barrier Identified Deficiency List, February 20,1993
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OQA-XVIII-2, Revision 24, January 23,1993, " Quality Assurance Audit Plan"
VY-91-10 Fire Audit Report, June 24 - 28,1991, " Fire Protection / Housekeeping"
Yankee Atomic GEN-9, " Fire Protection System Design
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General Documentation
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Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.13.E.1, " Vital Fire Barrier Penetration Seals"
Safety Evaluation for license Amendment No. 43 issued January 13, 1978
NRC Information Notice No. 88-04, and Supplement 1, " Inadequate Qualification and
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Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals" and 88-56, " Potential Problems With
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Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration SeJs"
Corrective Action Request (CAR) 92-10 " Unapproved Penetration Sealing Material"
Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-15, Revision 1, " Unidentified / Unqualified Reactor Building
Vital Fire Byrier"
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code 72E, " Standard on Automatic Fire
Detedors" 1990
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Document Reviewed In NRC Office Subsequent To The Plant Inspection
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Operating Procedure (OP) 4019, Revision 5, February 25,1993, " Surveillance of Vital Fire
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Barriers"
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Attachment 2
Fire Penetrations Inspected
TG- 0333-SF
TG- 0357
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TG- 0419
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RA- 0933-SF
RX BLDG.EL. 252 W. WALL
RA- 0520-SF
RX BLDG.EL. 232 SW. WALL
RA- 0721-SF
RA- 1002-SF
RX BLDG.EL.239 T CATWALK
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RA- 1008
RX BLDG.EL.239 T CATWALK
TG- 0304-SF
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TG- 0310-CA
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