ML20035C273
| ML20035C273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304060427 | |
| Download: ML20035C273 (10) | |
Text
,
GENuclearEnergy s.
sevwor a cem
, ?b ru.*i'i?" Aemie W J?se. CA 95 !]5 April 2,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 i
?
Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Subject:
Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - Chapter 7 I
~
DFSER Items
Dear Chet:
Enclosed are SSAR markups that address Open Item 7.13.1-1, Confirmatog Item 7.5.2. and COL Action Items 73.1.11-1,7.7.1.15-1 and 7.8-1.
Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Jim Stewart.
f Sincerely, j
- f ck Fox Advanced Reactor Programs j
cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE) i Bob Strong (GE) i r
r 060046 i
JI n 77 h'
^
9304060427.930402 r
'PDR ADOCK 05200001
//
l!
A PDR-
Page No. -
1 0'4/02/93 ABWR CHAPTER 7 DFSER !$ SUES l
.D0 ROADMAP7
. REPORT FORM ROADMAP7 TO PRINT l
DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE CE RESPONSE j
1.
t l
7.1.3.1-1 OPEN SSAR section 3.1 discusses each CDC Pages 3.1-3,-10,-30 The ABWR meets all of the general generally rand lists references to design criteria. However, it was l
l-other SSAR sections for specific agreed hith the staff (see the system application of the CDC. GDC Licensing Review Basis (LRB) document 3, 26, 27, 30, 37, 42, 43, 55, and 56 for the ABWR), that criteria to be j
are listed in the SSAR Chapter 3 as addressed specifically in Chapter 7 being included in Chapter 7.
In the of the SSAR would be consistent with Chapter 7 GDC listings, however, those identified in Chapter 7 of the these CDCs do not appear but should.
SRP, plus any identified in the LRB.
In addition, GDC 2, 15, 38, are Accordingly, it was understood that listed in SSAR Chapter 7, but there GDC's not identified in Chapter 7 of is no corresponding reference to the SRP would be addressed in other Chapter 7 in the Chapter 3 sections of the SSAR (i.e., Section discussions. These discrepancies 3.1 or other).
need to be corrected in an amendaent to the SSAR. This is Open Item The cross references from the various 7.1.3.1-1 CDCs in Section 3.1 to other chapters were not intended to inpty the existence of a redundant assessment i,
I of each GDC, but rather a reference to additional technical information which supported the CDC ccanitment in Chapter 3.
With this inderstanding, l
no $$AR change is required for GDCs 3, 26, 27, 30, 37, 42, 43, 55, and
- 56. However, specific references to I
Chapter 7 have been added in Section 3.1 f or GDC's 2,15,' and 38 per the j
attached mark-up.
7.3.1.11-1 COL As described in the SSAR, the HVAC 7.3.3.1(Page 7.3 51) The following information has been systems represent the traditional added to Section 7.3:
cooling designs provided for earlier BWR designs evaluated by the staf f.
a7.3.3 COL License Information These designs meet the requirerrents of GDC 3 and 21 (concerning system 7.3.3.1 Cooling Tenperature Profiles reliability and testability) for for Class 1E Digital Equipnent i
- analog systems. However, some additional analysis may be required The COL applicant shall include, as to determine whether the application part of its pre-operational test of the ABWR conputer-based technology procedure, cooling temperature' requires additional cooling to limit profiles for racks containing Class hot spots resulting from higher 1E microprocessor-designed equipment.
current densities within the digital The profiles shalt include data for chip designs than those present in HVAC configurations consistent with l
the previous transistor designs.
the various accident events which require Engineered Safety Features Additional controts and direct (EST) systems."
cooling ney be required, and a design timit for the equipment designs j
l
)
i H'
. Page No.
-2 d4/02/93 ABWR CHAPTER 7 DFSER ISSUES i
.D0 ROADKAPT.
. REPORT FORM ROADMAP7 70 PRINT t
DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE GE RESPONSE J
consistent with the life expectancies is required to conplete the design i
docunentation. As discussed in Chapter 9 of this report, the 11AAC will verify that the chitters are appropriately sized for the heat loads of the room. In addition, the 1&C equipment will be qualified for its particular environment, as described in Section 7.2 of this a
report. The environmental qualification of the equipment is also described in the generic l
equipment qualification ITAAC in Chapter 3.1 of the DCM. The staff expects that the COL applicant will include as part of its test procedure, cooling temperature profiles for the racks with the HVAC configurations possible for various I
accident events requiring ESF. This l
ts COL Action 1 tem 7.3.1.11-1.
r 7.5.2-1 CONF Among the manual action variables Tab.7.5-7, Amend.23 The Amendment 23 version of Table required for reactor shutdown from 7.5-7 has deleted the drywell I
outside the control room, SSAR Table pressure variable.
7.5-7 tists drywell pressure.
[
However, the parameters listed in SSAR Section 7.4 for display of the remote shutdown panet do not include this parameter. GE has stated that f
this parameter is not required for r
shutdown using the RSS without a h
design-basis event, and it should, I
therefore, not be listed in the table. This is Confirmatory item r
7.5.2-1.
7.7.1.15+1 COL There is a provision in the SSAR for 9.5.13.17, 9.5.2.2.2 The following COL Action Item has a separate telephone communication been added system using portable, sound powered telephones to be designed also will "9.5.13.17 Sound-Powered Telephone be provided. This is the tJnits responsibility of the COL Applicant f
and is COL Action item 7.7.1.15-1.
The COL Applicant shall provide the
.f This system provides communication sound powered telephone units to be
.f between boards in the main controt used in conjunction with the system room, between the main control room described in 9.5.2.2.2."
and field stations, and between field f
stations during fuel transfer, f
testing, inspections, calibrations,
I i
Page No.-
3 04/02/93
' ABWR CHAPTER 7 DFSER ISSUES
.00 ROADMAP7
. REPORT FORM ROADMAP7 TO PRINT DFSER ITEM NUMBER OFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE GE RESPONSE and maintenance.
i 7.8-1 COL In RAI 0420.014, the staff requested APPENDIX 1C The SSAR has indicated that the ABWR that GE address the effects of can cope with station blackout station blackout on the HVAC system without the need for the Cornbustion :
required to maintain functional Turbine Generator (CTG). However, electronics. GE responded that this due to recent developments involving-will be addressed as an interface SECY 90-016, GE now takes credit for requirement for the performance of a the CTC as an alternate ac (AAC) heat-rise analysis for the stations power source, as defined in Section blackout (assuming no HVAC) scenario 3.3.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.155.
using the environmentai terroeratures Furthermore, the CTG and its for the specific plant location. The associated. distribution system are staff has determined that this will designed such that the CTG can be be the responsibility of the COL available to power a Class 1E bus-applicant and is now COL Action Item within 10 minutes. With these 7.8-1.
This will be acceptable capabilities, a coping study is not subject to the resolution of the required per Regulatory Guide 1.155.
sbove COL Action item 7.8.1.
However, the 4-8 hour coping stu:fy previously submitted in 19E.2.1.2.2 confirms there should be no heat-up concerns within the 10-minute startup time for the CTG.
A detailed assessment of Regulatory Guide 1.155, with the CTG used as an l
AAC, will be provided in Appendix 1C.
f I
I i
l
AMVR 2mmt arv,A Standard Plant (5) 3.5 Missile Protecion of protective cabling if a fire occurs. The
(
arrangement of equipment in reactor protection (6) 3.7 Seismic Design channels provides physical separation to limit the effects of a fire.
(7) 3.8 Design of Seismic CategoryI Structures Combustibic supplies, such as logs, records, manuals, etc, are limited in such areas as the (8) 3.9 MechanicalSystems and control room to amounts required for current Components operation thus limiting the effect of a fire or explosion.
(9) 3.10 Seismic Quali5 cations of Seismic Category llnstrumen-The plant fire protection system includes the tation and Electrical Equipment following provisions:
(10) 331 Environmental Oualification of (1) automatic fire detection equipment in those Sifety Relate 4Meshanical and areas where fire danger is greatest, and Electrical Equipmen (2) extinguishing services which include auto-(d/ '
- i> (lh
'7 d Ta hft 7.(-1 j
3.1.2.1.3 Cdtedon 3 - Fin Protection,
matic actuation with manual override as well as manually-operated fire extinguiabers.
k 3.1.2.1.3.1 Cdtedon 3 Statement The design of the fire protection system Structures, systems, and components important meets the requirements of Criterion 3. For to safety shall be designed and located to mini-further discussion, see the following sections:
mire, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explo-Chapter /
sions. Noncombustible and heat-resistant mate-Section Iith rials shall be used whenever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the (1) 3.8.2.6 Materials, Quality Control and containment and control room. Fire detection and SpecialConstruction Techniques fighting systems of appropriate capacity and cap-ability shall be provided and designed to mini- (2) 7 Instrumentation and Control mire the adverse effects of fires on structures, Systems systems, and components important to safety.
Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure (3) 8 Electric Power i
that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly inspair the safety capability of (4) 9.5 Fire Protection System these structures, systems, and components.
(5) Appendix Fire Hazard Analysis 33.2.1.3.2 Evaluation Against Cdterion 3 9A Fires in the plant are prevented or mitigated (6) 13 Conduct of Operations by the use of non-combustible and heat-resistant materials such as metal cabinets, metal wireways, 31.2.1.4 Cdtedon 4 Eartroemental and high melting point insulation, and flame-Missiles Design Bases resistant markers for identification wherever 3J.2.1.4.1 Cdterion 4 Statement practicable.
Cabling is suitably rated and cable tray Structures, systems, and components important loading is designed to avoid objectionable to safety shall be designed to accommodate the internal heat buildup. Cable trays are suitably effects of and to be compatible with the separated to avoid the loss of redundant channels environmental conditions associated with normal t
31-3 Amendment t
ABM 2WIME REV.A Standard Plant Chapter /
(3) Associated containment penetrations and Section Tf;k isolation devices.
}
(1) 1.2.1 Principal Design Criteria The drywell and wetwell zones condense the steam and contain fission product releases from (2) 3 Design of Structure, Components, the postulated design bases accident (i.e., the Equipment, and Sptems double ended rupture of the largest pipe in the primary coolant system). The !caktight primary (3) 5.2.2 Overpressurization Protection containment vessel prevents the release of fission products to the environment.
(4) 5.2.5 Reactor Coolant Pressure Bounduy and Core Cooling The secondary containment boundary of the Systems 1.cakage Deteaion reactor building, which completely encloses and integrates structurally the PCV, provides addi-(5) 5.3 Reactor Vessel tional radiation shielding to protect operating
~~ ~~~~~
personnel and the public and also protects the p
C (6)' 5.4.1 Reador Recrculatio em
'PCV from weather and external missiles.
,/
yb, rj.3 Lnousce mi safe le afa e( 1 +,.h r
9 ca tu Acaru we.tattw o.,
Tem'perature and pressure in the PCV are cident Analyses 15 1
S limited following an accident by using the RHR 3.1.2.2.7 Criterion 16 - Contatament Design
, system to condense steam in the containment at-mosphere and to cool the suppression pool water.
'N-3.1.2.2.7.1 Criterion 16 Statement The design of the containment systems meets Reactor containment and associated systems the requirements of Criterion 16.
shall be provided to establish an essentially leaktight barrier against the uncontrolled For further discussion, see the fo!!owing release of radioactivity to the environment and sections.
to assure that the containment design conditions important to safety are not exceeded for as Icng Chapter /
as postulated accident conditions require.
Section Tith 3.1.2.2.7.2 Evaluation Against Cdtedon 16 (1) 1.2 General Plant Description The primary containment system consists of the (2) 3.8.2 Steel Containment following major structures and components-(3) 6.2 Containment Systems (1) A leaktight primary containment vessel (PCV) enclosing the reactor pressure vessel, the (4) 15 Accident Analyses reactor coolant pressure boundary, and other branch connections of the reactor primary 3.1.2.2.8 Cdtedon 17 - Dectdc Power coolant system. The PCV is a cylindrical Systems steel lined reinforced concrete structure with a removable steel head and has upper and 3.1.2.2.L1 Criterion 17 Statement lower drywell zones, diaphragm floor (D/F) and annular suppression chamber (or wetwell An onsite electric power system and an off-rone) under upper drywell separated by the site electric power system shall be provided to 1
D/F.
permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety (2) A suppression pool containing a large amount function for each system (assuming the other,
of water used to rapidly condense steam from system is not functioning) shall be to provide l
a reactor vest,el blowdown or from a break in sufficient capacity and capability to assure a major pipe.
that:
l l
I 3.1-10 Amendment 1 l
i
N
- ABM nuaoaxe Standard Plant nrv A 3.1.2.4.9.1 Critedon 38 Statement For further discussion, see the following A system to remose heat from the reactor I
containment shall be provided. The system safety Chapter /
function shall be to reduce rapidly, consistent Section Iih with th.anctioning of other associated sys-tems, the containment pressure and temperature (1) 5.4.7 Residual Heat Removal System following any LOCA and maintain them at N
acceptable low levels.
2 6.2.2 Containment Heat Removal S ems
/
3 7$
p 'wcred 3e kfu ra or wu cu rro -
Suitable redundancy in components and features 83.1 A
ower ystems and suitable interconnections, leak detecti n, (p9.2 [. Water Systems isolation, and containment capabilities shall e provided to assure that, for onsite elect [ic
/
power system operation (assuming offsite power is 15 Accident Analyses not available) and for offsite electric pow (e,r system operation (assuming onsite power is not 3.1.2,4 10 Cdtedon 39 -Inspection of s
available), the sy*Mm safety function can be 'Coitainment Heat Removal System accomplished, assuming a single failure.
3.1.2.4.10.1 Cdtedon 39 56 ment 3.1.2.4.9.2 Evaluation Against Cdterion 38 The containment heat removal system shall be The containment heat removal function is designed to permit appropriate periodic inspec-accomplished by the suppression pool cooling mode tion of important components, such as the torus, of the RHR. Following a LOCA, suppression pool sumps, spray nozzles, and piping, to assure the cooling mode limits the temperature within the integrity and capability of the system.
wetwell by recirculating the suppression pool water and removing heat via the RHR system heat 3.1.2.4.10.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 39 g
ex
,ngers. Any or all redundant RHR system heat exchangers can be manually activated. This Provisions are made to facilitate periodic subsystem is initiated manually following inspections of active cornponents and other indiction of high suppression pool temperature. important equipment of the containment heat If a LOCA signal is present, the RHR will removal systems. During plant operations, the function in the core cooling (LPFL) mode.
pumps, valves, piping, instrumentation, wiring, and other components outside the containment can Following a LOCA, wetwell and drywell spray be visually inspected at any time and will be mode of the RHR condenses steam within the inspected periodically. Such components inside drywell and wetwell zones of the containment 'oy the containment will be tested and inspected spraying suppression pool water cooled through during periodic outages. The testing the heat exchangers. Wetwell/drywell spray is frequencies of most components will be started manually. The drywell spray mode is correlated with the component inspection.
initiated by operator action post-LOCA in the presence of high drywell pressure. The wetwell The suppression pool is designed to permit spray mode can be manually initiated in the appropriate periodic inspection. Space is control room, unless an overriding LOCA signal provided outside the containment for inspection for the LPFL is present. The wetwell spray mode and maintenance.
does not depend on the operation of the suppres-sion pool cooling mode.
The containment heat removal system is designed to permit periodic inspection of major The redundancy and capability of the offsite components. This design meets the requirements and onsite electrical power systems for the RHR of Criterion 39.
system is presented in the evaluation against Criterion 34.
For further discussion, see the following sections:
);
Amendment 1 3.1-33 1
nistm^r ABWR REV A San'dard Plant
{
(a) BTP ICSB 21 - Guidance for Application f..a for Regulatory Guide 1.47: The ABWR 3 3 C" " ' " '
3"***i design is a single unit. The r e for e, item B-2 of the BTP is not applicable.
7.3.3.1 cooling Tenperature Profiles for class 1E
- 8'*** '9"i "*"*
P Otherwise, the HPIN are in full compliance with this BTP.
The col applicant shall include, as part of its pre-operational test procedure, cooling (b) BTP ICSB 22 - Guidance for Application tenperature profites for racks containing class 1E of Regulatory Guide 1.22: All actuated microprocessor-desigred equipnent. The profiles equipment within the HPIN can be fully
,n,ig gnet,,3,o,,,,,, gy,c,,n,,,,,,1,,n, tested during reactor operation.
consistent with the various accident ever.ts wnich
- "' ' "** '*d * * ' '* # "' * " ' E S " ' Y' * **' *%
(5) TMI Action Plan Requirements (TMI):
In accordance with the Standard Review Plan for Section 7.3, and with Table 7.1-2, there are no TMI action plan requirements applicable to the HPIN.
t 73.2.11 Additional Design Considerations l
1 Analyses 73.2.11.1 General Plant Safcty Analysis The examination of the ESF systems at the
(
plant safety analyses level is presented in Chapter 15.
73.2.11.2 Loss of Plant InstrumentAir System Loss of plant instrument air will not negate the ESF systems safety functions (Chapter 15).
73.2.113 Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment Loss of cooling water to ECCS, containment and reactor vessel isolation systems and other systems described in this section, when subject to single active component failure (SACF) or single operator error (SOE) will not result in the loss of sufficient ESF systems to negate their safety function (Chapter 15).
73.2.12 Periodic Testing of ESF j
Instnamentation Protection system in. service testability is discussed in Subsection 7.1.2.1.6.
(,
7 3-51 Amendment 2
ABM
- m to w t Standard Plant nrv n Due to its importance to plant operation and Junction boxes installed outdoors are made safety the paging equipment will have an exclu-of stainless plate in accordance with the sive DC power supply with a dedicated battery.
outdoor specifications. Junction boxes in-The battery has capacity for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of op-stalled within building are constructed to cration following the loss of AC power. The prevent water damage from above.
charger is sized to recharge the battery form a fully discharged condition in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> while sup-The interconnecting cables consist of a stan-plying the normal DC loads.
dard pair of conductors with cross-linked poly-ethylene insulation, a static electricity shield and an overall sheath of flame and heat A handset is located at the same relative posi-resistant PVC (colored yellow).
tion on each floor, at a conspicuous location in the patrol route, at uniform intervals in corri-The circuits from the main paging equipment dors and large rooms, close to panels where pos-to each junction box are wired by separate sible and at a location least affected by radioac-routes. Wiring is routed in existing cable tivity within one area.
trays for control cables. Containment penetrations X-102 A and B are used for Paging equipment for outdoor facilities is de-communication cables which are routed to the signed to automatically limit the sound volume at communication circuits within containment.
night to a level manually set from the operator's desk. The rnanual volume settings can be 10,20, 9.5.2.2.2 Sound. Powered Telephone System for 30 or 40 dB.
Plant Maintenance and Repair The paging equipment produces an emergency sig-A separate telephone communication system us-nal (siren sound) upon actuation of an emergency ing portable sound-powered telephone units will signal pushbutton.
be provided.
Box-type speakers are installed in small rooms The communication facilities for use during where reverberations make hearing difficult, plant maintenance consists of local termina jacks and boxes and a systeni main communicationm Speakers and handsets are installed at the board with storage for patch cof'd's. The best practical distance from noise sources. How-portable sound-powered telephones themselves are ever, in rooms where noise level increases during out of the ABWR Standard Plant 4 cope ($ec 9 5,f 3.17),
y The system provides commu[pication c
/
equipment operation, (such as feed water pump room, diesel generator room etc.), handsets are enclosed within a sound-proof booth.
between boards in the main corrtrol room, between
/
the main control room and fieldwations, oV The speakers are of two different types as de-from field stations, or from field station to scribed below. Their sound to noise (S/N) ratio field station during testing and periodic is approximately 3 to 6 dB.
inspection of the plant.
S:
Output sound pressure of speaker.
An outline of the system is shown in Figure 9.5-2.
N: Noise level at a place where the speaker is installed.
The communication between stations of the maintenance communication facility is by means (1) Horn shaped (Trumpet shaped): Output of 5 to of portable telephone units and patch cords at 15W the maintenance communication system board.
(2) Cone shaped (box Type):
Output of 3W Terminal jacks are attached to the central control boards and to local panels and racks (3) Junction Box where communication links are frequently required.
9.5-2a Amendment 22
~.
ABWR 23461o w i Standard Plant nrv n 9.5.13.16 NUREG/CR-0660 Diesel Generator Reliability Recommendations Programs shall be developed to address NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations regarding training, preventive maintenance, and root-cause analysis of component and system failures.
A 9.5.14 References q
1 5.i3.17
.Sco d - fw crel 1.
Stello, Victor, Jr., Design Requirements f
g fp*
Related To The Evolutionary Advanced Light Wa:er Reactors (ALWRS), Policy Issue,
'fl,c. Col /) pj,(ic4"T Siwil SECY-89-013, The Commissioners, United p rp /tdc the.soon/-foacer/ l January 19, 1989.
y e /cp4cee u rtiff to be v. e/ I States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, cog'gwcrid y$ed t ry (f,5.g.y.g W e'f l1 Th e fg clescH sy s1Gm 2.
Cote, Authur E., NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, National Fire Protection C
Association, Sixteenth Edition.
3.
Design of Smoke Control Systems for Buildings, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc., September 1983.
4 Recommended Practice for Smoke Control i
Systems, NFPA 92A, National Fire Protection Association,1988.
5.
Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, National Fire Protection Association.
Amendment 24 9.51011
,