ML20035A832
ML20035A832 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Sequoyah ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/22/1993 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20035A823 | List: |
References | |
50-327-93-05, 50-327-93-5, NUDOCS 9303300023 | |
Download: ML20035A832 (2) | |
Text
1 l
ENCLOSURE 1 l
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Docket No. 50-327 Sequoyah, Unit 1 License Nos. DPR-77 During an NRC inspection conducted January 31 through February 27, 1993, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance with the " General l
Statemer.t of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, i
Appendix C, the violation is listed below:
l 1
A.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires, in part, that primary containment integrity be maintained in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.c requires, in part, that containment leakage rates shall be limited to a combined bypass leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.25 L. (56.3 scfh) for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment bypass leakage paths to the auxiliary building when pressurized to P. (12 psig). This requirement is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 (prior to increasing reactor coolant system temperature above 200 degrees F).
Additionally, Technical Specification 3.6.1.3.b requires, in part, that each containment air lock shall be operable with an overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L. (11.25 scfh) at P (12 psig) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Contrary to the above, on February 22, 1993 the licensee identified that a leak existed on a blind flange (approximately 52.6 scfh) located on the Unit I upper containment outer airlock bulkhead. This leak resulted in a loss of primary containment integrity during the periods of time when the inner containment airlock door was opened. The inner air lock l
door was determined to have been opened eight times for personnel access to/from containment coincident with the leakage at the blind flange from February 16, 1993 through the identification of the problem on February 22, 1993.
Due to the as-found total containment bypass leakage being approximately 59.7 scfh, the required containment bypass leakage limit of 56.3 scfh was exceeded during the periods of time when the inner containment j
airlock door was opened. The inner air lock door was determined to have been opened eight times for personnel access to/from containment coincident with the leakage at the blank flange from February 16, 1993 through the identification of the problem on February 22, 1993.
Due to the as-found airlock leakage of approximately 55.6 scfh, the allowable airlock leakage rate was exceeded resulting in iroperability of the airlock for the period of February 16 through February 22, 1993.
This is a Severity Level IV problem (Supplement 1).
9303300023 930322 PDR ADOCK 05000327 l
O PDR
Tennessee Valley Authority 2
Docket No. 50-327 Sequoyah, Unit 1 License Nos. DPR-77 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Tennessee Valley Authority is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,- ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Sequoyah, within 30 days of the date of the _ letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).. This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not.
be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given.
to extending the response time.
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this22nd day of March 1993
.