ML20034F372
| ML20034F372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034F364 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-92-35, 50-304-92-35, NUDOCS 9303030072 | |
| Download: ML20034F372 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1992035
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Report Nos. 50-295/92035(DRP); 50-304/92035(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 '
Downers Grove, IL 60515
Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Zion, IL
Inspection Conducted: December 22, 1992, through February 1, 1993
Inspectors:
J. D. Smith
R. J. Leemon
R. B. Landsman
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Approved By:
M. J.
arber, Chief
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pFReactorProjectsSectionIA
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Inspection Summary
Inspection from December 22. 1992. through Februar_y 1. 1993 Report Nos. 50-
295/920035(DRP): 50-304/920035(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee. action
on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; operational safety
verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; maintenance
and surveillance observation; engineering and technical support observations;
safety assessment and quality verification; licensee event reports (LERs);
management meetings; and qualification information concerns.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified in five areas, and one violation was identified in the remaining
area.
Plant Operations
Corrective actions (CAs) for configuration control personnel errors have been
implemented. The CAs include monitoring of non-licensed operator (NLO) field
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activities by the shift engineer and unit supervisor. The NLO coaching by
shift management and training program improvements have to-date effectively
stemmed the rash of personnel errors.
9303030072 930223
ADOCK 05000295
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Maiatenance and Surveillance
Excellent outage planning, scheduling and personnel accountability enabled the
plant to be ahead of an aggressive refueling outage schedule.
Engineering and Technical Support
The effectiveness of having the corporate engineering-group relocated to the
site was demonstrated during the Unit 2 refueling outage by the quick -
resolution of problems, effective installation of a large number of
modifications, and assistance to technical staff engineering as needed. The
presence of the corporate engineering group onsite has_ helped the station to
be ahead of the planned 105 day outage schedule.
In addition, the technical
staff reorganization and role changes have resulted in good support for the
outage schedule.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification
Due to two of six ECCS pumps being out of service, a temporary waiver of
compliance (TWOC) was requested by the licensee and granted by Region III.
However, the TWOC would not have been required if the shift engineer had
consulted other management prior to taking a safety injection (SI) pump out-
of-service for a check valve replacement during the same time that a charging
pump was experiencing high vibration readings.
On the positive side, station management's commitment to and involvement in
the Integrated Quality Effort (IQE) process has provided low threshold
trending information for quicker response.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
R. Tuetken, Vice President, Zion Station
- T. Joyce, Station Manager
- D. Wozniak, Superintendent, Technical
- W. Kurth, Superintendent, Production
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R. Budowle, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- A. Broccolo, Director, Services
W. Stone, Director, Performance Improvement
D. Redden, Assistant to Production Superintendent
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- P. LeBlond, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
R. Johnson, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
J. LaFontaine, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning
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- D. Bump, Nuclear Quality Program, Supervisor
C. Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor
- S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- R. Chrzanowski, Technical Staff Supervisor
K. Moser, Technical Staff
R. Milne, Security Administrator
- K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance
R. Cascarano, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
W. Demo, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
T. Printz, Unit 0 Operating Engineer
T. Boyce, Fire Marshall
- R. Ponce, Quality Control
- K. Depperschmidt, I.M.
- G. Kassner, RP
- 0. Fich, RP
- R. Mika, RP
- B. Gulley, SQV
- L. Simon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on February 5,1993.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members
of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineerirg staff.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701. 92702)
Inspection Follow-up Items (IFI)
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(Closed) IFI Item (295/91003-02; 304/91003-02):
Inspector concerns
about the adequacy of the verification process used by the licensee to
determine experience and qualifications of contract radiation protection
technicians hired to perform work during refueling outages. This item
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was discussed and closed in Report 295/92028; 304/9202E as Open Item
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295/92002-03(DRSS). This item is closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Summary of Operations
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Unit 1
The unit started the period at 100 percent power and load followed for
most of the inspection period. Due to two of six ECCS pumps being out
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of service on January 4, 1993, the unit ramped down from 100 to 36
percent power in response to the action statement of TS 3.8.1.D.
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Temporary Waiver of Compliance was granted by Region III which extended-
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the TS action statement by 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The unit returned to 100 percent
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power and load followed for the remainder of the period.
Unit 2
The Unit 2 core was unloaded on December 6, 1992, and the unit remained
defueled until January 6, 1993, when core reload was started. Core
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reload was completed on January 12, 1993.
Following reactor vessel head
tensioning on January 22, 1993, the unit entered Mode 5 where it
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remained for the rest of the period.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System
Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in
conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the
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licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its
responsibilities for safe operation. During tours of accessible areas
of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant and equipment
conditions, including control of activities in progress.
On a sampling basis the inspectors observed control room staffing and
coordination of plant activities; observed operator adherence with
procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room
indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was
available and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by
station managers.
The inspectors also monitored various administrative
and operating records.
The specific areas observed were:
Engineered Safety features (ESF) Systems
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Accessible portions of ESF systems and their support systems
components were inspected to verify operability through
observation of instrumentation and proper valve and electrical
power alignment.
The inspectors also visually inspected
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components for material conditions.
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Radiation Protection Controls
The inspectors verified that workers were following health
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physic's procedures and randomly examined radiation protection
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instrumentation for operability and calibration.
The station's exposure total for 1992 was 1,042 man-rem.
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Personnel contamination events'(PCEs) for 1992 totaled 463. Dose:
recorded for the current Unit 2 outage at'the end of the
inspection period was 260 man-rem. . Exposure projections.through
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the end of the outage indicate that the outage should be completed
for less than 300 man-rem.
PCEs occurred at a lower rate with 37
recorded for January 1993. The outage man-rem exposure and PCEs
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were less than half of-the values projected.
The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the corrective
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actions implemented to address many problems encountered during
the spring 1992 Unit.1 outage. The changes included planning and.
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scheduling activities, containment access control, and many
changes to dose tracking for specific outage jobs.
Based on these-
reviews it appears that the corrective actions have been effective
during the current Unit 2 outage, and the overall station
radiation protection program continues to improve.
Security
During the inspection period, the inspectors-monitored the-
licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were
being implemented according to their approved security plan.
Housekeepina and Plant Cleanliness
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The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant
cleanliness.for fire protection and protection of safety-related
equipment from intrusion of foreign matter.
Examples of-
housekeeping improvements that have continued during the outage
include removal of the 12 percent boric acid equipment and
decontamination of a significant number of auxiliary equipment
rooms allowing street clothes entry.
a.
Operational Events
Enforcement Conference
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On January 27, 1993, an Enforcement' Conference on the misalignment
of an auxiliary feedwater.~(AFW) system valve and other operational
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personnel errors was held at the NRC Region III office.
A Level
IV violation was~ issued for the misaligned AFW valve.
(See
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Reports 50-295/93004; 50-304/93004.)
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b.
Assessment of Plant Operations
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Good corrective actions (CA) for configuration control personnel
errors have been implemented. The CAs include monitoring of non-
license operator (NLO) field activities by the shift engineer and
unit supervisor. The NLO coaching by shift management and
training program improvements have to date effectively stemmed the
rash of personnel error.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726)
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Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed
and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards,
and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were also considered during this review:
approval s
were obtained prior to initiating the work and testing and that
operability requirements were met during such activities; functional
testing and calibrations were performed prior to declaring the component
operable; discrepancies identified during the activities were resolved
prior to returning the component to service; quality control records
were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified
personnel.
a.
Maintenance / Surveillance Related Activities
Safety In_iection Timers
On December 30, 1992, while performing PT-10-3 for Bus 148 train
B, the IB RHR pump auto-started. During the investigation, the
tech staff engineer identified that the Bus 148 train B SI timer
did not fully reset as required. Upon resetting the timer
tranually and inspection of the other timers, the tech staff
engineer found that Bus 149 train A and train B SI timers were not
fully reset as required and manually reset them. Also during the
inspection, the following timers were identified as having binding
of their reset mechanism; bus 147 train A SI timer, bus 147 train
B SD timer, bus 148 train A SD timer, Bus 148. train B SD timer,
and bus 149 train A SD timer.
Following adjustment of the reset
mechanisms,
each of the 8 timers are resetting as required. The
root cause investigation is still in progress at this time.
0A Fire Pump
On January 6,1993, the OA fire pump exceeded the seven day TS out
of service limit due to a bad sensing line. Delays in procuring
and evaluating the material for this line prevented the repair of
the pump within the LCO.
The licensee is required to write a
report to the NRC within the next 30 days explaining this
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situation. The resident staff will review the report and monitor
the pump repairs.
This situation has minor safety significance.
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Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance
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Excellent outage planning, scheduling, and personnel
accountability enabled the plant to be ahead of an aggressive
refueling outage schedule.
Needed improvements in the foreign
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material exclusion (FME) program have been noted, as illustrated-
by coverage of open piping and equipment, including the reactor
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cavity, with debris nets following defueling.
No violations of deviations were identified.
6.
Engineering and Technical Support (37828)
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This was
accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
events, outage-related activities, and assigned TS surveillances;
observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing
deviation investigations and root cause determinations,
a.
Engineering and Technical Support Events
Trip of Inverter 212
Zion has made significant progress towards identifying and
resolving sporadic instrument inverter failures, which have
plagued the station for years, by the use of a high tech Nicolet
data recorder which samples 16 circuit points and auto-triggers on
a fault.
Fcllowing a trip of inverter 212 on December 12, 1992,
the data recorder was used to monitor the inverter, which tripped
again on January 7, 1993. Data from the recorder clearly
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identified a sporadic failure of a control and synchronization
board. After this board was replaced and the inverter reentrgized
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to a load cart, new anomalies were observed in a gate drive
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control board that led to a subsequent trip on January 18. This
board was replaced and inverter 212 was returned to service
January 27.
Trip of Inverter 214
Inverter 214 tripped on December 16, 1992, with the Unit in cold
shutdown.
Investigation revealed a failed capacitor and diode
which were replaced.
The control and synchronization board was
replaced as a preventive measure.
Inverter 214 was run on a load
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cart and then returned to service on January 26, 1993.
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The licensee did an excellent job in investigating and determining
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the root cause of thest inverter failures using the latest test
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equipment technology. As a preventive measure, they also replaced
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the control and synchronization boards in other inverters.
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During outage Z2R12, the licensee will also replace control boards
on Inverter 213 (since it is still undergoing its normal PM
program) - even though it has no indications of any problems.
Part Replacements
Periodic replacement of circuit boards has been incorporated into
the inverter PM prograin.
Long range plans call for inverter parts
replacements to begin during the dual unit service water outage
(1993-1994).
Trending
Recording high-resolution baseline data will be part of the
PM/ Tech Staff trending process in the future for inverters.
b.
Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support
The effectiveness of having the corporate engineering group
relocated to the site was demonstrated during the Unit 2 refueling
outage by the quick resolution of problems, effective installation
of a large number of modifications, and assistance to technical
staff engineering as needed. The presence of the corporate
engineering group onsite has helped the station to be ahead of the
planned 105 day outage schedule.
In addition, the technical staff
reorganization and role changes have resulted in good support for
the outage schedule.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification '(40500)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight
activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were
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evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status
were attended to observe the coordination between departments.
The
results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored
by attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staff, review of
deviation reports, and root cause evaluation reports.
a.
SAQV Related Events
Unit 2 Outage Meetings
A timely 30-minute outage meeting is held daily. The meeting
agenda includes outage status, protected electrical paths for
vital equipment, schedule highlights, outage action items list,
departmental concerns, and topic of the' day (ALAPA/ Dose; Financial
Report; work request status, testing status, and modification
status). These meetings have been efficient and are a great
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contributor to keeping the outage on time, keeping plant personnel
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accountable, tracking setbacks, and resolving problems. Good
outage planning and scheduling has enabled the plant to be ahead-
of schedule.
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Recional Temporarv Waiver of Compliance (RTWOC)
On January 5, 1993, with the IB safety injection (SI) pump out of
service for replacement of the recirculation line check valve,
the 1A charging pump was declared inoperable due to vibration
readings on the speed changer. Unit I started a ramp down from
full power in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.2.D
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action statement for having two of six emergency core cooling
pumps inoperable.
Zion Station requested a Temporary Waiver of Compliance (TWOC)
from Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.0 to avoid placing the
unit in an unnecessary shutdown and thermal transient. On
January 5,1993, Region III verbally grantcd the lWOC to TS 3.8.2.D which allowed Unit I to remain in Mode 1 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to
complete repairs on the IB safety injection pump recirculation
line check valve and return the pump to service. The Unit I ramp
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down was stopped with the Unit at 36% power.
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On January 6, 1993, the IB SI pump was returned to service.
Unit
I exited the requirements of TS 3.8.2.D and the TWOC approximately
four hours before it expired.
Integrated Quality Effort (10E) Process
The IQE process continues to evolve and mature into a very
effective trending system that quickly analyzes low threshold
indicators for management attention.
Senior station management is
committed to the IQE process which provides an early indicator of
negative trends.
The IQE process is administered by the performance supervisor who
uses senior management observations, onsite and corporate audits,
Zion's Problem Identification Form (PIF) program, and other
identified deficiencies as inputs.
Presently senior management
analyzes the IQE for action, however the ownership of the program
including analysis of the data is being pushed down to department
head levels. The effectiveness of this results oriented process
to quickly identify tnd correct negative trends has been
recognized by corporate management by the use of Zion's program as
a model for implementation at all stations.
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Assessment of SAQV
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The TWOC request and submittal for the inoperable SI and charging
pump were timely and well prepared. However, the TWOC would not
have been required if the shift engineer had consulted other
management prior to taking the SI pump out-of-service for a check
valve replacement during the same time that the charging pump was
experiencing high vibration readings.
On the positive side, station management's commitment to and
involvement in the IQE process has provided low threshold trendti.g
information for quicker response.
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No violations or deviations were identatied.
8.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)-
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to
determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical
Specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed:
UNIT 1
LER NO.
DESCRIPTION
LER 91014
Missed TS Action Statement
LER 91070
Containment Integrity Broken
LER 92005
Hissed Fire Watch
LER 92006
Pump Autostart
LER 92011
Unanticipated Reactor Trip
LER 92012
DG Autostart
LER 92013
Inoperable Fire Suppression
LER 92015
Inadvertent ESF Actuation
LER 92017
Hissed TS Action Statement
LER 92018
Inadvertent MOV Closure
LER 92019
ESF Autostart
LER 92020
Hispositioned AFW Valve
LER 92021
Inadvertent ESF Actuation
LER 92047
Inadequate CR Shift Coverage
LER 92049
Containment Integrity Broken
LER 92053
Hissed Boron Sample
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UNIT 2
DESCRIPTION
LER 91013
Missed Post Maintenance Verificatfon
Test
LER 92003
Failure To Provide One-Hour Fire
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Barrier
LER 92058
SAT Deluge
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In addition.to the. foregoing, the. inspectors reviewed the licensee's.
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Problem Identification' Forms-(PIFs) generated during the'inspectio'n
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period. This' was done in an effort to' monitor the conditions.related to
plant or personnel performance and potential trends.
PIFs.and the
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results of the investigations were also reviewed to.. ensure that they.
were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent-
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with the applicable procedures'and the quality assurance manual. The-
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following ' completed PIFs were reviewed:
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PIF 29555492180-092
IB AFW Trip
PIF 30455492200-048
Air operated valve. failed to open
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PIF 30455492200-040
2A AFW Hanger Damage
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PIF 29555492200-096
Slipped Rod
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PIF 30455492200-047
Low SW Flow to 2B' RHR Room Cooler
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No violations or deviations were identified.'
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9.
Management Meetings (30703)
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Enforcement Conference
An enforcement conference (Inspection Report No. 295/93004;
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304/93004(DRP) was held in the NRC Region III office on January 27,
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1993, as a result of a Severity Level IV violation of NRC regulations
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identified in Inspection Report No. 295/92031-(DRP) and recent events
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caused by personnel errors. The violation was for failure to
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independently verify the position of Unit 1,-1B motor driven auxiliary-
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feedwater (AFW) pump discharge isolation valve '(IFWOO38) as- fully open .
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during a valve realignment on October 2,1992.
10.
Qualification Information Concerns
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Concern
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As a result of a routine inspection, a violation (91003-01) was
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issued concerning the. failure to meet the minimum ANSI
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qualifications for a radiation' protection supervisor.. One of the
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licensee's corrective actions was to review all Zion personnel
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currently in positions subject' to ANSI qualification to ensure,
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that the scope of the violation did not extend to other positions.
During the review of the licensee's evaluation,, it was noted that-
a May 20, 1991, management's evaluation and documentation of
personnel qualifications of an instrument maintenance supervisor
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were. poor. Numerous inaccuracies were identified between the
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individual's resume and management's letter certifying his
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experience.
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To address the issue and determine whether these differences may
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have been intentional or inadvertent error, the Office of
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Investigations (01) conducted an investigation (3-91-019).
A' copy
of the 01 Synopsis is included for your review.
b.
Conclusion
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Based upon evidence developed during the investigation, it was
concluded that the ANSI certifying statement was not deliberately
falsified.
This issue is considered closed.
However, the files did contain some inaccurate information about
the work experience of the supervisor; specifically,'the_ years of
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ANSI work experience credited from the last two previous
employers. Credit was given for a full two years experience while
a fluid systems engineer at General Dynamics when the individual
had only worked 20 months, and credit was given for one full-year
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of experience while a research assistant at the University of
Illinois when the individual had only eight months experience.
10 CFR 50.9 requires that information required by statute, or the
Commission's regulations, orders, or by license conditions to be
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maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all
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material respects.
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Zion Technical Specification (TS) 6.5.2 J requires that records-
relative to the training and qualification for current members of
the station staff be maintained for the duration of the Operating
License.
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This failure to maintain accurate records is considered to be a
violation of 10 CFR 50.9 (295/92035-01(DRP); 304/92035-01(DRP)) as
required by TS 6.5.2 J.
One violation of NRC requirements was identified.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the
inspection on February 5,1993, to summarize the scope and findings of
the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors
comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational
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content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes
reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not
identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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SYNOPSIS
On November 27, 1991, the Regional Administrator,
U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Region III, requested an investigation to
determine whether the instrument maintenance (IM) master and/or
station manager at Zion Generating Station - (Zion) deliberately
provided false information while qualifying a recently promoted
IM supervisor under certain American National Standards Institute
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(ANSI) criteria.
Based upon the evidence developed during the investigation,
the office of Investigations was unable to substantiate that
Zion management, and specifically personnel within the IM
Department, knowingly or deliberately engaged in providing
false or inaccurate information to the NRC while qualifying
the IM supervisor under ANSI qualifications.
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Case No. 3-91-019
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