ML20034F019
| ML20034F019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1993 |
| From: | Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Demiranda O NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| TASK-A-46, TASK-OR NUDOCS 9303020203 | |
| Download: ML20034F019 (5) | |
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- FEB I 61993 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Oscar DeMiranda, Enforcement and Investigation ~ Coordinator l
FROM:
Caudle A. Julian, Chief Engineering Branch Division'of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION CASE NUMBER RII-92-A-0093 BRUNSWICK STRUCTURAL ISSUES
Reference:
Memorandum to O. DeMiranda from C. Julian dated October 7, 1992 The referenced memorandum summarized the allegations and status of inspection / investigation of these issues.
Five issues were reported as requiring additional review or were listed as'open.
These were as follows:
Issue 2.c, 3.a, 6,7, and 8.
Additional inspections have been performed to resolve these issues.
A summary of the inspection.results follows below.
Engineering Branch. considers the-subject allegation case closed.
-Issue 2.a.
Throughout the plant, seismic. supports for conduits, cable trays and other things have shiny-silver bands on them.
These signify that the support has been fully analyzed for seismic conditions.
Supports without the' bands have not been analyzed.
Discussion:
The silver bands are conduit support identification' tags.
The tags indicate the support mark number and refer to the plant modification under which the new support was-installed.
These modifications were installed since completion of construction.
The conduit supports installed when the plant was originally constructed were seismically analyzed.
These supports will be reviewed under the USI A-46 program, Seismic Qualification ofTEquipment'in Operating Plants.
A. detailed approach for the A-46 program is specified in Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of i'
Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved. Safety Issue-(USI)
A-46.'
A schedule for. implementation of the A-46 program'at Brunswick had been approved by NRC.
This issue is' briefly discussed in Report Number 50-325, 324/92-45.
9303020203 930216 PDR ADOCK 05000324
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l Oscar DeMiranda 2
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Conclusion:==
Not substantiated Issue 3.a.
During field installation of conduit and conduit supports above the Control Room ceiling, the licensee determined the span between conduit supports had to be increased far enough to miss-the existing cable trays.
The craft and the ALLEGER located new support proposed support locations and conduit route.
This was done for sketch SK-8-87-110-11 and 25.
The conduit supports and conduit were then installed, but the conduit spans were different from those shown or the drawings.
Discussion:
The following sketches which covered installation of conduit support is the control room were reviewed:
SK-S-87-130-11, Revision A through F SK-S-87-110-25, Revisions A through C Review of the above drawings showed several revisions to proposed conduit support' locations due to interferences.
Each revision was reviewed and approved by design engineers (Nuclear Engineering Department NED).
The final support locations were verified by QC inspectors to be in-accordance with details shown on Revision ~F to SK-S-87-110-11 and Revision C to SK-S-87-110-25.
The resulting conduit spans were approved by engineering, and are shown on the QC verified drawings.
Status:
Substantiated, but has no safety significance.
The conduit spans are different than those shown in Revision A of the' sketches, but the as-built spans were approved by NED.
Issue 6 MCC cabinets with missing anchor bolts The ALLEGER stated that a problem was discovered with MCC cabinets on the elevation 20 level of both reactor buildings.
The problem involved missing anchor bolts which attached the cabinets _
to the floor.
An individual named "A" was assigned the task of performing _ design calculations to qualify the cabinets, for the "As found" condition (i.e.,.with missing anchor.
bolts). However, individual "A"
could not qualify the cabinets.
The ALLEGER stated.that a great deal of pressure was put on individual "A"
to qualify the cabinets and that CP&L supervisory
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Oscar DeMiranda 3-design engineers could not understand what individual "A's" problem was. LThe' ALLEGER stated-that the CP&L's Chief Civil Engineer wanted individual "A"
to go to Raleigh'to discuss the problem concerning the MCC cabinets with,the Chief-Civil Engineer. personally.
The ALLEGER stated, that-in his opinion, individual "A" was being 1
asked to compromise his principles and qualify the
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cabinets regardless of the results of his design-1 calculations.
Discussion:
The licensee identified the problem in March 1989.
NCR A-89-015 was issued.
Due to improper closeout.
1 of the NCR, the licensee reinspected 45 MCC cabinets in June, 1992. -The licensee issued a report August 1, 1992.
This issue was inspected in-detail during several inspections, resulting in-identification of two unresolved items, numbers 325,324/92-18-01 and 92-33-01.
The calculations were reviewed and the licensee's corrective actions were examined.
The problems have been corrected and the unresolved items closed out.
Individual "A" was questioned regarding his involvement with the MCC anchorage problem.
Individual "A" stated that he was not involved in completing the design calculations for qualifying the cabinets with the missing anchor bolts.
This work was performed by individual'"B" who has since left the company.
Individual "B" was able to qualify the cabinets in his original calculations (number 1-01534A-128).
Individual "A"
stated that in his opinion, the problem was not properly investigated when it was first discovered.
He stated they used the. typical CP&L Brunswick approach to
" pencil whip" the problems not repair anything and didn't look in depth for other similar problems.
Individual "A"
stated that he resigned from CP&L because he wanted to become involved in other types of work activities, L
although he said the Brunswick attitude "see no I
evil, hear no evil, speak no evil and fix nothing" did enter into his decision.
==
Conclusion:==
The allegation was substantiated.
The licensee's' corrective actions were inadequate when they discovered the MCC anchorage problem.
- However, they did re-open this issue on their own initiative and have completed corrective actions.
The licensee's overall inadequate corrective action program is an enforcement issue being evaluated as violation / civil penalty documented
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in inspection report 50-325,324/92-12.
Oscar DeMiranda 4
Issue 7 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pipe Supports The ALLEGER stated that numerous problems have been discovered with attachments to the. masonry blocL walls and to platforms in the diesel generator tank building.
Specific issues are addressed in a referenced memo.
Discussion:
The licensee identified these problems several years ago.
The issue is carried on Short Term Structural Integrity (STSI). item number 169.
A Plant Modification, number.81-084, Field Revision-17, was issued in January, 1993.
The licensee plans to implement portions of this modification in February, 1993.
This item will be reviewed further by NRC under the STSI program review, prior to re-start of Unit 2.
==
Conclusion:==
The allegation was substantiated.
However, the licensee identified the problem and is in process of initiating corrective action.
Issue 8 Short Term Structural Intecrity (STSI)
The Alleger also stated that he had serious-concerns, with short term structural qualifications at the site, and wondered if NRC approved this programs.
Discussion:
The STSI program, and implementing procedure, Design Guide II.20, was reviewed by NRR.
This program was accepted by NRR in a Safety Evaluation Report, dated October 8, 1992.
The licensee has also addressed STSI under their corrective action program documented in Enclosure 3 to CP&L letter dated' July 23, 1992, Serial:
The corrective actions included field walk downs of STSI items to verify design assumptions and a third party review of the STSI items.
The licensee is in the process of completing work on several STSI items prior to restart of. Unit 2.
STSI items will be corrected by the next refueling outage.
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i Oscar-!DeMiranda 5
Conclusion:
The allegation was substantiated.
.However, the program.was revised to assure correction'of
' problem in the."short' term",,and not' permitting-STSI items to. remain uncorrected.for an extended time of several years. Prior to restart of Unit.2,.
STSI items ramaining.open will be reviewed by'NRC.
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