ML20034E419

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Discusses Implementation of Fire Protection Sprinkler & Hose Station Design Changes.Physical Mods to Backup Suppression Capabilities No Longer Necessary,Based on Results of Review Which Indicate That Addl Hose Lengths Adequate
ML20034E419
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse 
Issue date: 02/19/1993
From: Shelton D
CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
2114, NUDOCS 9302260130
Download: ML20034E419 (2)


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Donald C. Shelton 300 Madison Avenue I

Vice President Nuclear Toledo, OH 436524001.

Davis-Besse (419)249 2300 l

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2114 February 19, 1993 l

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subj ec t:

Implementation of Fire Protection Sprinkler and Hose Station Design Changes Gentlemen:

The NRC's letter dated December 17,.1986 (Log Number 2166) to Toledo Edison provided a series of questions regarding fire protection at the

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). Question Number.6 requested Toledo Edison (TE) to identify locations outside the Turbine Building where sprinkler systems and standpipe systems are supplied such that-a j

single failure vould require isolation of the' room sprinkler system and j

normal backup standpipe system and to describe how backup fire fighting' l

capability will be provided if this single failure occurs.

J In a letter dated July 30, 1987 (Serial Number 1396) to the NRC, TE provided its response to Question Number 6.

Twelve rooms-(outside the.

Turbine Building) were. identified as being susceptible to single failure. Three of these rooms vere-identified'as having alternate, separate hose. stations available, therefore requiring no modification.

For the remaining nine rooms, TE described its plans to implement

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modifications providing isolation between the sprinkler system and hose v.tations where a single failure would not require isolation of both

, hose stations and the area suppression' system. These plans' vere-reflected in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Related to Fire Protection at the DBNPS (Log 3480, dated May 30, 1991).

As' a.rerult of further.~ review, TE has identified.that'through the'

. connection of additional hose lengths,..there are.adequatei backup.

' suppression capabilities available to each'of.the nine. rooms. These backup suppression capabilities vould be unaffected by a singleLfailure

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3

" Serial Number 2114 Page 2 in the water supply pipe supplying the sprinkler systems and standpipe systems to each of these rooms. These specific backup measures vill not be proceduralized since the DBNPS Fire Hazard Analysis Report Operating Specifications require ensuring backup capability. Based on the availability of independent backup suppression capabilities, physical modifications are no longer required. This alternate approach vill not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

Should further information be required, please contact Mr. Robert V. Schrauder, Manager - Nuclear Licensing at (410.- 249-2366.

Very t ly yours, k

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cc A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III J. B. Hopkins, NRC Senior Projeht Manager S. Stasek, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board i

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