ML20034D536

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Requests Commission Approval to Publish Proposed Amends to 10CFR72 to Establish EP Licensing Regulations for ISFSI & MRS Facilities,In Fr
ML20034D536
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/19/1993
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-93-006, SECY-93-6, NUDOCS 9301220334
Download: ML20034D536 (53)


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RULEMAKING ISSUE January 19, 1993 (Notation Vote) sECv-93-oo6 For:

The Commissioners From:

James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations Subiect:

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 72 TO ESTABLISH THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LICENSING REGULATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES (ISFSI) AND MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITIES (MRS)

Purpose:

To obtain Commission approval to publish the proposed i

regulations in the Federal Reaister.

Summary:

This paper contains recommendations to the Commission for the emergency planning licensing regulations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS).

Backaround:

On May 27, 1986, following Commission approval, the proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 72 relating to the licensing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS) were published in the Federal Register (51 FR 19106) for comment.

On November 30,1988, (53 FR 31651) the Commission published the final regulations outlining the licensing requirements for MRS and ISFSI but reserved the emergency planning licensing requirements for a later date. This rulemaking package provides these emergency planning requirements.

Contact:

Mike Jamgochian, RES NOTE:

TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 492-3918 WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE i

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2 Discussion:

In the Federal Register Notice (53 FR 31651) dated November 30, 1988, which published the final regulations, j

4 the Commission responded to several comments. relating to

. emergency planning by stating that:

The basic concept of emergency planning in 6 72.32 (6 72.19) has not been changed. None of the respondents provided any additional information to the j

staff or questioned the staff analyses such as to change the basis for the staff's. approach to emergency l

planning for an ISFSI or an MRS. Moreover, in view of the relatively passive nature of facilities for the receipt, handling, and storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste, as compared to operating power reactors, emergency plans for ISFSI and MRS need j

not be equivalent to emargency plans for reactors.

i Since the proposed revision of Part 72 was published 1

for comment on May 27, 1986, the NRC has published proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 30,-40, and 70'

)

which would require certain NRC fuel cycle and other radioactive materials licensees that engage in activities that may have the potential for a -

significant accidental release of NRC-licensed materials to establish and maintain approved emergency plans for responding to such accidents. Although applicable _to persons licensed under different parts of the Commission's regulations, the proposed requirements for emergency plans in Parts 30, 40, and i

70 contain substantially identical provisions because j

they are designed to protect the public against similar radiological hazards. The proposed revision of Part 72, as published for comment, also requires applicants for an ISFSI or MRS license to submit an emergency plan (see 9 72.32). Although the texts of proposed 6 72.19 (redesignated 6 72.32) and the parallel provisions of the proposed Emergency Preparedness rule are not identical, these provisions have the same purpose and use the same. approach.

In 4

both cases, the proposed regulations require onsite emergency planning with provisions for offsite emergency response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite authorities and the public.

It is therefore appropriate that in both cases these requirements should be expressed in the same way.

' Proposed rule on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees, 52 FR 12921, April 20,1987.

3 Until the Commission promulgates the Emergency Preparedness rule in final form, it is not possible to ascertain exactly the language that should be used.

In view of these circumstances and since there is every expectation that this period of uncertainty will be of relativelu short duration, we believe the prudent course vi action is to reserve s 72.32, Emergency plan, in the final rule with the understandalg that the text of this section will be promulgated in final form as a conforming amendment when the Coimission adopts and promulgates the final Emergency Preparedness rule or shortly thereafter.

On April 7,1989, (54 FR 14051), the Commission published in the Federal Reaister the final regulations relating to Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

After reviewing the proposed emergency planning requirements for Part 72 licensees and comparing them to the final emergency planning requirements for Part 70 licensees published in the Federal Reaister on April 7, 1989, (54 FR 14051), the staff has determined that they contain similar provisions because they are designed to protect the public against similar radiological hazards. The staff finds that, even though these provisions are not entirely identi.al, they have the same purpose and use the same approach.

In both cases, they require onsite emergency planning with provisions for offsite emergency response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite authorities and the public.

As a result of the above evaluation, the staff is proposing that the emergency planning licensing requirements for Part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements already codified in 10 CFR Part 70.22 for other Part 70 licensees.

Nonetheless, the staff wishes to establish unique provisions in the emergency planning requirements as they relate to ISFSI's and MRS's. The staff's logic for this decision is not based totally on potential doses resulting from accidental releases for a spectrum of accidents because all accidents that have been analyzed for either an ISFSI or a I

MRS facility have resulted in similar offsite doses. The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1140.

This evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed I rem effective dose equivalent which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

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i Thus the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an

-l ISFSI located on a reactor site would be inconsequential j

when compared to those involving the reactor 'itself.

Therefore, current reactor emergency plans cover all at-reactor ISFSI's. An ISFSI that is to be licensed for a j

stand-alone operation will need.an emergency plan established.in accordance with the proposed requirement in j

this rulemaking. NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated j

worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and safety. Therefore, l

the proposed requirements-to be imposed on ISFSI licensees i

reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite components to their onsite emergency plans.

l Similarly, the staff has conducted an analysis of potential

)

I onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an MRS. The analysis is contained in NUREG-1092. This evaluation shows that the l

maximum dose to a mc-mber of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would likely not i

exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of i

soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

Nonetheless, the reason for requiring enhanced offsite emergency planning 1

at an MRS is strongly influenced by considerations about-potential operations which could be performed such as the handling and repackaging for storage of large numbers of individual fuel bundles (15,000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM)) which includes the receipt, inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport tasks, as wel1~ as the possible consolidation of the stored fuel into casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage. Due to uncertainties in the design and operation of the MRS'(no formal application exists), the staff felt it prudent to raise the level of emergency planning to include some offsite preparedness should an accident exceed those analyzed in NUREGS 1140 and 1092.

Therefore, the emergency plan requirements for the MRS include an offsite component, codified within that section of the proposed rule. The level of threat to the public health and safety from an MRS facility when compared to that from an ISFSI may not be the same. At this time, the MRS design has not been finalized. The MRS-may be a large industrial facility. The operation would include facilities j

for the loading, unloading, and decontaminating a large i

number of spent fuel shipping containers arriving by both truck and rail.

It could also include facilities to disassemble the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special storage / transport containers, and facilities to handle redundant solidified high-level waste.

Such facilities would require the equipment necessary to treat low-and high-level waste generated by the above operations.

Based strictly on NUREG-1140, an offsite component to the i

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emergency plan for the MRS may not be warranted. However, the potential scale and nature of this type of operation may mandate the ability to achieve an increased level of response, one that should include an offsite component.

To achieve this goal, the proposed MRS emergency plan requirements are modeled after 10 CFR 50.47(d). The intent of this section was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations. The same minimum level of response is considered appropriate to MRS operations..

Because much of the language needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been codified in 10 CFR Part 50, similar language is included within the proposed emergency plan requirements [72.32(b) (15) (i-vi)] for an MRS.

The staff notes that for both types of facilities, this rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety and may not be justified based solely on a comparison of the costs of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and safety. Rather, the staff believes that it is justified in terms of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions.

The staff feels that such preparedness represents a prudent step which should be taken in line with the NRC's philosophy of defense-in-depth.

In fact, since the operations and processes at an MRS are yet undefined, the staff is proposing to focus public comment on whether an offsite component to emergency preparedness at an MRS is reasonable, appropriate or premature at this time.

Coordination:

0GC has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.

FEMA has received an advance copy of this rulemaking package. The Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was provided an advance copy of the package on October 2, 1992.

Their comments are in enclosure 3.

ACNW has reviewed this proposed rule change and concurs that it should be published for public comment.

i Recommendation:

That the Commission:

1.

Anorove a notice of proposed rulemaking (Enclosure 1).

2.

Certify that this rule change, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act [5 U.S.C. 605 (b)].

3.

Note:

j a.

The proposed rule change would be published in the Federal Reaister for a 75 day public comment period.

b.

Appropriate Congressional committees will be notified of the proposed rule change.

c.

An environmental assessment (Section 4.3 in ) has been prepared, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, (42 U.L.C. 4321 et. seq.) and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, and has resulted in a finding of no significant environmental impact.

d.

The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed of the certification regarding economic impact on small entities and the reasons for its implementation as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

e.

The reporting and recordkeeping requirements contained in this regulation will be sent to the Office of Management and Budget for approval.

f.

The Office of Public Affairs concurs that a public announcement is not needed.

g.

The proposed rule change does not constitute a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109, therefore, a backfit analysis is not required.

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h.

A Regulatory Analysis is included as.

i.

A Regulatory Guide amplifying this regulation will be developed.

/

mes M. Ta or xecutive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1.

Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 2.

Regulatory Analysis 3.

Letter from the Office of the United States Nuclear Waste Negotiator dated October 20, 1992.

Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Thursday, February 4, 1993.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Thursday, January 28, 1993, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG OPP EDO ACNW SECY

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

10 CFR Part 72 Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel i

Storage Facilties (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS)

AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

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1 1

ACTION:

Proposed Rule.

l 1

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to 1

amend its regulations to provide, as directed by the Nuclear i

Waste Policy Act of 1982, for the emergency planning licensing requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS).

DATES:

Submit comments by 75 days after publication.

Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only i

for comments received on or before this date.

i ADDRESSES:

Mail written comments to Secretary, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch.

Deliver comments to One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.

weekdays.

Copies of the environmental assessment and findings of 1

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no significant environmental impact, and comments received on the proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C.,

Lower Level.

I FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, D.C.

20555, Telephone (301) 492-3918.

BACKGROUND:

On May 27, 1986, following Commission approval, the proposed revision to 10 CFR Part 72 relating to licensing requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS),

including requirements for emergency planning, was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 19106) for comment.

On November 30, 1988, (53 FR 31651) the Commission published the final rule outlining the licensing requirements for ISFSI and MRS but reserved the emergency planning licensing requirements for a later date.

This rulemaking package provides these requirements.

DISCUSSION:

In the Federal Register Notice (53 FR 31651) dated November 30, 1988, which published the final regulations outlining the licensing requirements for ISFSI and MRS, the Commission responded to several comments relating to emergency planning by stating that:

2

h "The basic concept of emergency planning in S 72.32 (S

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72.19) has not been changed.

None of the respondents provided any additional information to the staff or i

questioned the staff analyses such as to change the basis for the staff's approach to emergency planning for an ISFSI or an MRS.

Moreover, in view of the relatively passive nature of facilities for the receipt, handling, and storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste, as compared h

to operating power reactors, emergency plans for ISFSI and MRS need not be equivalent to emergency plans for reactors.

l l

1 5

i Since the proposed revision of Part 72 was published for

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t comment on May 27, 1986, the NRC has published proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 which would f

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require certain NRC fuel cycle and other radioactive j

t materials licensees that engage in activities that may have i

i the potential for a significant accidental release of NRC l

t licensed materials to establish and maintain approved

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emergency plans for responding to such accidents.

Although applicable to persons licensed under different parts of the j

Commission's regulations, the proposed requirements for i

emergency plans in Parts 30, 40, and 70 contain similar provisions because they are designed to protect the public against similar radiological hazards.

The proposed revision of Part 72 as published for comment also requires applicants Proposed rule on Emergency Preparedness br Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Materiet Licensees, $2 FR 12921, April 20, 1987.

3

for an ISFSI and MRS license to submit an emergency plan f

(see S 72.32).

Although the texts of proposed S 72.32 and the parallel provisions of the proposed Emergency Preparedness rule are not identical, these provisions have the same purpose and use the same approach.

In both cases,

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the proposed regulations require onsite emergency planning 9

with provisions for offsite emergency response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite authorities and the public.

It is therefore appropriate that in both cases these requirements should be expressed in the same way.

Until the Commission promulgates the Emergency Preparedness rule in final form, it is not possible to ascertain exactly the language that should be used.

In view of these circumstances and since there is every expectation that this period of uncertainty will be of relatively short duration, we believe the prudent course of action is to reserve S 72.32 (S 72.19), Emergency plan, in the final rule with the understanding that the text of this section will be promulgated in final form as a conforming amendment when the Commission adopts and promulgates the final Emergency Preparedness rule or shortly thereafter."

On April 7, 1989, (54 FR 14051), the Commission published in the Federal Register the final regulations relating to Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees (10 CFR Part 70).

The requirements for Part 70 licensees state that:

4

e I

"5 70.22 (i) (3)

Emergency Plans submitted under Paragraph (i) (1) (ii) of this section must include the following information:

t (i) Facility description.

A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site.

(ii) Types of accidents.

An identification of each type of radioactive materials accident for which protective actions may be needed.

(iii) Classification of accidents.

A classification system for classifying accidents as alerts or site area i

emergencies.

(iv) Detection of accidents.

Identification of the means of detecting each type of accident in a timely manner.

(v) Mitigation of consequences.

A brief description of the means and equipment for mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.

(vi) Assessment of releases.

A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.

5 I

(vii) Responsibilities.

A brief description of the i

responsibilities of licensee personnel should an l

accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite. response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.

l

,1 (viii) Notification and coordination.

A commitment.to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify:

offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the l

treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when j

appropriate.

A control point must be established. :The j

-i notification and coordination must be planned so that l

1 unavailability of some personnel, parts of the j

facility, and some equipment will not prevent the 4

notification and coordination.

The licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center immediately after notification of the appropriate offsite response organization and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.1 (ix) Information to be communicated.

A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recommended protective l

These reporting requirements do not supersede or release licensees of complying with the requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub.

L.99-499 or other state or federal reporting requirements.

6

actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations and to the NRC.

(x) Training.

A brief description of the frequency, performance objectives and plans for the training that the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency including any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.

The training shall familiarize personnel with site-specific emergency procedures.

Also, the training shall i

thoroughly prepare site personnel for their responsibilities in the event of accident scenarios postulated as most probable for the specific site, including the use of team training for such scenarios.

(xi) Safe shutdown.

A brief description of the means of f

restoring the facility to a safe condition after an I

accident.

(xii) Exercises.

Provision for conducting quarterly j

communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.

Quarterly communications checks with offsite response organizations must include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers.

The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the 7

biennial exercises.

Participation of offsite response l

organizations in biennial exercises although recommended is not required.

Exercises must use l

accident scenarios postulated as most probable for the specific site and the scenarios shall not be known to most exercise participants.

The licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan.

Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response.

Deficiencies found by the critiques must be corrected.

(xiii) Hazardous chemicals.

A certification that the applicant has met its responsibilities under the l

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the special nuclear material.

(4)

The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.

The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan."

8

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l Proposed emergency planning regulations for Part 72 licensees were published on May 27, 1986, (51 FR 19106) proposing to i

require the following:

"5 72.19 Emergency Plan

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An application to store spent fuel in an ISFSI or to store spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste in an MRS must include plans for coping with emergencies.

r (a)

An emergency plan must include the following:

(1)

A brief description of the licensee's facility, site, and area near the site; 1

(2)

Identification of each type of accident for which an emergency response may be needed; 1

(3)

Identification of methods for the detection of approaching an accident condition; (4)

A brief description of methods and equipment for mitigating the consequences of accidents, including those provided to protect workers onsite against radiation hazards, and a description of j

the program for maintaining the equipment; 9

i

(5)

A brief description of the methods and equipment to measure and assess accidental releases of radioactive materials; (6)

A brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should an accident occur, i

including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response l

organizations and the NRC; (7)

A brief description of the methods for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and requesting assistance, including medical assistance; k

(8)

A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recommended actions, as appropriate to be given to offsite response organizations and to the NRC; (9)

A brief description of any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical, and other emergency response personnel; 1

(10) A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident; i

and 10

(11) Provisions for conducting onsite quarterly communications checkr end biennial drills and for deficiencies in the identifying and correct r..

plan.

(b)

The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of emergency 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting the plan to NRC for approval.

The licensee shall provide any comments that have been received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.

(c)

For an ISFSI that is located on the site of a nuclear power reactor licensed for operation by the Commission, the emergency plan required by 10 CFR 50.47 shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this section."

After reviewing the proposed emergency planning requirements for Part 72 licensees and comparing them to the final emergency planning requirements for Part 70 licensees published in the Federal Register on April 7, 1989, (54 FR 14051), the Commiscion has determined that they contain similar provisions because they are designed to protect the public against similar radiological hazards.

The Commission finds that, even though these provisions are not entirely identical, they have the same purpose and use the same approach.

In both cases, they require onsite emergency 11

planning with provisions for offsite emergency response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite authorities and the public.

l As a result of the above evaluation, the Commission is proposing i

that the emergency planning licensing requirements for Part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements already codified in 10 CFR Part 70.22 for other Part 70 licensees.

Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to establish unique provisions in the emergency i

planning requirements for ISFSI facilities versus MRS facilities.

The Commission's basis for this decision is not based totally on potential doses resulting from accidental releases for a spectrum of accidents because all accidents that have been analyzed for either an ISFSI or MRS have resulted in similar offsite doses.

The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1140.

This evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

Thus the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI located on a reactor site would be inconsequential when compared to those involving the reactor itself.

Therefore, current ~

reactor emergency plans cover all at-reactor ISFSI's.

An ISFSI that is to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an 12

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emergency plan established in accordance with the proposed requirement in this rulemaking.

NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and safety.

j Therefore, the proposed requirements to be imposed on ISFSI licensees reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite components to their onsite emergency plans.

Similarly, the Commission has conducted an analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an MRS.

The analysis is contained in NUREG-1092.

This evaluntion shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the EPA Protective Action Guices or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

Nonetheless, the reason for requiring enhanced i

offsite emergency planning at an MRS is strongly influenced by considerations about what operations could be performed such as the handling and repackaging for storage of large numbers of individual fuel bundles (15,000 Metric Tunc Heavy Metal (MTHM))

which inclodes the receipt, inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport casks, as well as the possible consolidation of the stored fuel into casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage.

Due to the uncertainties in the design and operation of the MRS, (no formal application exists) the Commission believes it prudent to raise the level of emergency 13

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planning to include some offsite preparedness should an accident exceed those analyzed in NUREGs 1140 and 1092.

1 Therefore, the emergency plan requirements for the MRS include an offsite component, codified within that section of the proposed i

rule.

The level of threat to the public health and safety from i

the MRS when compared to that from an ISFSI may not be the same.

At this time, the MRS design has not been finalized.

The MRS may be a large industrial facility.

The operation would include facilities for the loading, unloading, and decontaminating a large number of spent fuel shipping containers arriving by both j

truck and rail.

It could also include facilities to disassemble 1

the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special

)

storage / transport containers, and facilities to handle solidified high-level waste.

Such facilities would require the equipment necessary to treat low-and high-level waste generated by the above operations.

Based strictly on NUREG-1140, an offsite j

component to the emergency plan for the MRS may not be warranted.

i However, the potential scale and nature of this type of operation i

may mandate the ability to achieve an increased level of I

response, one that should include an offsite component.

To achieve this goal, the proposed MRS emergency plan requirements are modeled after 10 CFR 50.47(d).

The intent of this section was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations.

This same minimum level of response is considered appropriate to MRS operations.

14 l

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i Because much of the language needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been codified in 10 CFR Part 50, j

I similar language is included within the proposed emergency plan requirements for an MRS, [72. 3 2 (b) (15) (i-vi) ].

j i

The Commission notes that for both types of facilities this

-f rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety l

and may not be justified based solely on a comparison of the I

costs of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and safety.

Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified in terms of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to assure the public that-local authorities 1

i will be notified in the event of an accident so that.they may

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r take appropriate actions.

The NRC feels that such preparedness l

J represents a prudent step which should be taken in line with the i

NRC's philosophy of defense-in-depth.

i Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to note that because the operations and processes at an MRS are yet undefined, the public is requested to comment as to whether an offsite component to emergency preparedness at an MRS is reasonable, appropriate or premature at this time.

l It is the Commission's intention that the enclosed proposed l

l Part 72 Emergency Planning requirements supercede the proposed Emergency Planning requirements published on May 27, 1986, (51 FR f

l 19106); therefore, the 1986 proposed amendments are hereby l

withdrawn.

l i

15 i

. I

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:

AVAILABILITY l

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the_ quality of the human environment; and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.

The rule would not affect the probability or the size of accidental radioactive releases.

It might in some cases reduce the doses people near the facility site could receive.

The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L

Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C.

lower level.

The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are contained in Section 4.3 of NUREG-1140, "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees."

Single copies are available without charge upon written request from NRC Distribution Section, Office of Information Resources Management, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C.

3501 et seq.).

This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of these requirements.

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REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation.

The analysis examines the accident scenarios considered by the Commission as well as the costs and benefits of actions considered.

The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W.,

t Washington, DC.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained without charge upon written request from:

Distribution Section, Office of Information Resources Management, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.

t REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C.

6059b), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

The-proposed rule would require the development and implementation of emergency plans by licensees who are authorized to possess significant amounts of radioactive material.

These companies do not fall within the definition of a small business found in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.

632, or within the small business size standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.

The 17

i proposed rule will affect three (3) licensees.

Two licensees hold Part 50 licenses and are required to comply with the i

provisions respecting emergency plans set out in Part 50.

Thus, the proposed rule would not impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.

Any small entity affected by this regulation which determines that, because of its size, it is likely to bear a disproportionate adverse economic impact, should notify the Commission of this in a comment that indicates the following:

(a)

The small entity's size in terms of annual income or j

revenue and number of employees; i

(b)

How the proposed regulation would result in a significant economic burden upon the small entity as compared to that on a larger entity; (c)

How the proposed regulations could be modified to take into account the entity's differing needs or capabilities.

The comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTN:

Docketing and Service Branch.

18

BACKFIT ANALYSIS i

2 The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this proposed rule, and thus, a backfit analysis is not required for this proposed rule, because these amendments do not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in S 50.109 (a) (1).

4 i

10 CFR PART 72 Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel.

Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C.

.5 5 3, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 72.

19 w-e

-ew

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Part 72 Proposed Rulemakina PART 72 - LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE o

1.

The authority citation for Part 72 is revised to read as I

follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186,187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 t

U.S.C.

2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub.

L.86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as l

amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C.

5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.W.

5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C.

4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. L.97-425, I

96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub.

L.

100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C.

10151, 10152, 10153, 10157, 10161, j

10168).

Section 72.44(g) also issues under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d),

Pub.

L.

100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C.

sec. 189, 68 Stat. 935 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub.

L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154).

Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub.

L.

100-203; 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C.

10165(g)).

Subpart I also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19),

20

117(a), 141(h), Pub.

L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2244 (42 U.S.C.

10101, 10137(a), 10161(h), Subparts K and L are i

also issued under sec. 133, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198).

2.

In S 72.32 paragraphs (a) and (b) are revised to read as t

follows:

S 72.32 EMERGENCY PLAN (a)

Each application for an ISFSI (that is not located on the site of a nuclear power reactor) that is licensed under this part must be accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following information:

(1)

Facility description.

A brief description of the i

licensee's facility and area near the site.

(2)

Types of accidents.

An identificatica of each type of radioactive materials accident for which I

protective actions may be needed.

(3)

Classification of accidents.

A classification system for classifying accidents up to an alert emergency.

21

1 (4)

Detection of accidents.

Identifications of means l

for detection of approaching an accident l

1 i

condition.

i i

(5)

Mitigation of consequences.. A brief description i

of the means of mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.

(6)

Assessment of releases.

A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of I

radioactive materials.

(7)

Responsibilities.

A brief description of the j

t responsibilities of licensee personnel should an s

accident occur, including identification of t

personnel responsible for promptly notifying c

offsite response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for devel ping, maintaining, and updating the plan.

{

(8)- Notification and coordination.

A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request i

offsite assistance, including medical assistance

{

t for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite l

f workers when appropriate.

A control point must be t

22-j

I i

established.

The notification and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and i

coordination.

The licensee shall also commit to I

notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response j

organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.3 2

(9)

Information to be communicated.

A brief description of the types of information on facility status; radioactive releases, and recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations and to the NRC.

(10) Training.

A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offe'r to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.

1 These reporting requirements do not supersede or release licensees of complying With the requirements under the Energency Planning and Comunity Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title !!!, Pub.

L.99-499 or other state or federal reporting requirements.

23 i

,,...-...-,n

+,-a...

,w-,

)

(11) Safe Condition.

A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.

(12) Exercises.

Provisions for conducting semiannual communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.

Semiannual communications checks with offsite response organizations must include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers.

l Radiological / Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drill should be conducted semiannually.

The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the biennial i

exercises.

i Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial exercises although recommended is not required.

Exercises must use scenarios not known to most exercise participants.

The licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan.

Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the 24

a response.

Deficiencies found by the critiques

?

must be corrected.

(13) Hazardous chemicals.

A certification that the l

applicant has met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the special nuclear material.

I (14) The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.

The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.

(15) Review of applicant's emergency plans shall include the following for potential offsite i

assistance:

i (i)

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accomodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site emergency facility have been made, and other 25

F c* augmenting the organizations capu.

planned onsite response have been identified.

(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.

(b)

Each application for an MRS that is licensed under this part must be accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following information:

(1)

Facility description.

A brief description of the l

licensee's facility and area near the site.

(2)

Types of accidents.

An identification of each type of radioactive materials accident for which protective actions may be needed.

(3)

Classification of accidents.

A classification system for classifying accidents as alerts or site area emergencies.2 (4)

Detection of accidents.

Identification of the means for detecting of approaching an accident condition.

l l

l Site Area emergency means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that could lead to significant release of radioactive material and that could require a response by offsite response organizations to protect persons offsite.

26

(5)

Mitigation of consequences.

A brief description of the means of mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.

(6)

Assessment of releases.

A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.

l (7)

Responsibilities.

A brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and the NRC; also l

responsibilities for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.

i (8)

Notification and coordination.

A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate.

A control point must be j

established.

The notification and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and 27

coordination.

The licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response j

organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.3 (9)

Information to be communicated.

A brief description of the types of information on facility status; radioactive releases, and recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations and'to the NRC.

(10) Training.

A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.

(11) Safe Condition.

A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.

These reporting requirements do not supersede or release licensees of conptying with the requirements under the Emergency Planning and Conrnunity Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub.

L.99-499 or other state of federal reporting requirements.

28

i l

(12) Exercises.

Provisions for conducting quarterly communications checks with offsite response crganizations and annual onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.

Radiological / Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills should be held semiannually.

Quarterly communications checks with offsite response organizations must include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers.

The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the annual exercises.

Participation of offsite response organizations in annual exercises although recommended is not required.

Exercises must use scenarios not known to most exercise participants.

The licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan.

Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response.

Deficiencies found by the critiques must be corrected.

(13) Hazardous chemicals.

A certification that the applicant has met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 29

of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the special nuclear material.

(14) The licensee shall allow the offsite response I

organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.

The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC sith the emergency 1

plan.

(15) Review of applicant's emergency plans shall include the following for potential offsite assistance:

(i)

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near--site emergency facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response have been identified.

(ii) Provisions exist for prompt communcations j

among principal response organizations to 30

offsite emergency personnel who would be responding onsite.

(iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.

(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency condition are available.

(v)

Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and injured onsite individuals.

(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency onsite.

(16) Arrangements made to provide information to the public.

31

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of 1993.

For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I I

L Samuel J.

Chilk, Secretary of the Commission t

I r

I i

l l

l l

32

A REGULATORY ANALYSIS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES (ISFSI)

AND MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITIES (MRS) 1.

PROPOSED ACTION 1.1.

Description of the Proposed Action l

This regulatory analysis evaluates the need for a proposed rule to establish emergency planning licensing regulations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS) licensees.

The purpose of the rule would be to require licensees who are authorized to operate these facilities to establish emergency plans for responding to releases of radioactive materials.

The emergency plans required for a ISFSI license would include:

(1)

Facility description: A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site.

(2)

Types of accidents: An identification of each type of radioactive materials accident for which protective actions may be needed.

(3)

Classification of accidents: A classification system for classifying accidents.

(4)

Detection of accidents: Identifications of means for detection of approaching an accident condition.

(5)

Mitigation of consequences: A brief description of the means of mitigating the consequences of each type of accident.

(6)

Assessment of releases: A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.

(7)

Responsibilities: A brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should an accident occur.

1

l 9)

Notification and coordination: A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance.

l (9)

Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types of information to be given to offsite response organizations and to the NRC.

(10) Training: A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to response to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.

(11) Safe Condition: A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.

(12) Exercises: Provisions for conducting communications checks with offsite response organizations and onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.

(13) Hazardous chemicals: A certification that the applicant has met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the special nuclear material.

(14) The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to i

comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting l

it to NRC.

The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.

(15) Review of applicant's emergency plans shall include the following for potential offsite assistance:

(i)

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site emergency facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response have been identified.

(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.

i 2

1 i

The emergency plans required for an MRS license would include all of the above requirements as well as the following:

j (1)

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be responding onsite.

j (2)

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.

(3)

Adequate methods, systems, and equipment of assessing and j

monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency condition are available.

(4)

Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and injured onsite' individuals.

i (5)

Radiological Emergency Response Training has'been made available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an.

emergency onsite.

1.2.

Need for the Proposed Action 1

The NRC has always required that its licensees take steps to-reduce the likelihood of serious accidents to a minimal level, but yet be prepared to cope with accidents should they occur.

The Commission considers that an emergency plan is an integral part in protecting public health and safety.

There is no i

assurance that emergency response would always be effective in reducing exposures offsite or that specified dose levels would not be exceeded.

The requirement is that the licensee must be 1

prepared to take practical steps that would be expected to reduce radiation exposure of employees and the public.

The' Commission notes that for both types of facilities, the ISFSI and the_MRS, this rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety and may not be justified based solely on a comparison of the costs of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and safety.

Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified in terms of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions.- The NRC feels that such preparedness. represents a prudent step which should be taken in line with the NRC's philosophy of defense-in-depth.

]

3

l l

i 1

f 2.

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE PROPOSED RULE f

l The Commission is proposing that the emergency planning licensing requirements for Part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements already codified in 10 CFR Part 70.22 for other i

1 Part 70 licensees.

Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to

]

establish unique provisions in the emergency planning requirements for ISFSI facilities versus MRS faclities.

The Commission's basis for this is not based totally on potential

(

doses resulting from accidental releases for a spectrum of accidents because all accidents that have been analyzed for ISFSI or MRS have resulted in similar offsite doses.

The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-i 1140.

This evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which

{

is within the EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 i

milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

Thus the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI located on a reactor site would be inconsegential when compared to those involving the reactor itself.

Therefore, current reactor emergency plans cover all at-reactor ISFSI's.

An ISFSI that is to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an l

emergency plan established in accordance with the proposed requirement in this rulemaking.

NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and safety.

Therefore, the proposed requirements to be imposed on ISFSI

.,1 licensees reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite i

components to their onsite emergency plans.

i Similarly, the Commission has conducted an analysis of potential l

onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an MRS.

The analysis is contained in l

NUREG-1092.

This evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

Nonetheless, the reason for requiring enhanced offsite emergency planning at an MRS is strongly influenced.by considerations about what operations could be performed such as the handling and repackaging for storage of large numbers of individual fuel bundles (15,000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTRM))

which includes the receipt, inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport casks, as well as the possible consolidation of the stored fuel into casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage.

Due to the uncertainties in the design and operation of the MRS, (no formal application exists) the Commission felt it prudent to raise the level of emergency 4

l i

l l

~

planning to include some offsite preparedness should an accident exceed those analyzed in NUREGS 1140 and 1092.

Therefore, the emergency plan requirements for the MRS include an offsite component, codified within that section of the proposed rule.

The level of threat to the public health and safety from the MRS when compared to that from an ISFSI may not be the same.

At this time, the MRS design has not been finalized.

The MRS may be a large industrial facility.

The operation would include facilities for the loading, unloading, and decontaminating the large number of spent fuel shipping containers arriving by both l

truck and rail.

It could also include facilities to disassemble the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special storage / transport containers, and facilities to handle solidified high-level waste.

Such facilities would require the equipment necessary to treat low-level waste.

Such facilities would require the equipment necessary to treat low-and high-level waste generated by the above operations.

Based strictly on NUREG-1140, an offsite component to the emergency plan for the MRS may not be warranted.

However, the potential scale and nature of this type of operation may mandate the ability to achieve an increased level of response, one that should include an offsite component.

To achieve this goal, the proposed MRS emergency plan i

requirements are modeled af ter 10 CFR 50.47 (d).

The intent of this section was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations.

This same minimum level of response may be appropriate to MRS operations.

Because much of the language needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been codified in 10 CFR Part 50, similar language is included within the proposed emergency plan requirements for an MRS, [ 72. 3 2 (b) (15) (i-vi) ].

3.

VALUE/ IMPACT 3.1 Alternatives Three alternatives have been identified:

(1) adopting a l

regulation containing the proposed requirements, (2) imposing the requirements by license condition rather than by regulation, and (3) imposed no new requirements with regard to emergency planning.

The first two alternatives would have essentially the same value and costs.

Those values and costs are discussed below.

The third alternative, no new requirements, would have essentially no value or costs.

l l

5

l 3.2 Value of the Proposed Action The current licensing requirements in 10 CFR Part 72 (72.122h) ensure safe fuel handling, by requiring that the fuel cladding be protected during storage against degradation and gross ruptures.

While gross cladding failures, if not contained, could provide a route for fuel fission products to be available for release to the environment, the current licensing requirements restricts releases of radioactive material and thus the safety of storage and handling operations are not compromised.

Receipt, handling, nd storage of spent fuel requires special care to prevent accidental releases of radioactive material.

Fuel at an MRS may be susceptible to handling problems during packaging operations, therefore the hazards associated with repackaging operations should be considered.

Appropriate equipment and facilities must also be available for the handling of fuel having degraded cladding.

Fuel handling I

systems and operations must be designed to minimize radiation i

exposure and fission product gas releases.

The storage system must also be designed to provide protection to the workers and the public from the potential release of radioactive material l

during off normal operations and potential accidents.

The public is protected from radiological releases from spent fuel storage operations to the levels prescribed by 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart E,

" Siting Evaluation Factors."

The NRC experience in more than 100 individual safety evaluations of wet spent fuel storage shows that the possibility of significant releases of radioactivity from spent fuel under licensed conditions is remote.

The safe operation of dry, spent fuel storage is based on over 40 years of DOE exparience and on Commission findings that the known degradation mechanisms permit confidence in engineered systems designed to limit radiological releases from dry spent fuel storage.

Radiation releases to the environment from degraded fuel stored in a dry or wet installation are therefore expected to be minimal.

Nonetheless, the Commission believes that this rulemaking is justified in terms of the intangible benefit of being able to assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions.

The NRC feels that such preparedness represents a prudent step which should be taken in line with the NRC's philosophy of defense-in-depth.

Considering the above potential releases, the area that might be exposed would be approximately 0.006 square miles.

If this area contained people at the average population density of the continental United States (83 people / square mile), it would contain on the average about half a person.

6

Although cne facilities under consideration are usually located in very rninl areas, an average population density (half a person) is assumed for the sake of conservetism.

The total collective dose for the area is estimated to be about 0.5 person-rem, but for the sake of conservetism 2 person-rem is assumed.

Expected protective actions are primarily evacuation and sheltering.

Evacuation would be the more effective if it could be done promptly before the plume arrived.

Sheltering would also be effective if it could be done before the plume arrived.

Sheltering would often be more practical because it can be done faster.

3.3 Cost For the ISFSI, the licensee is considered to have approximately a 20-page plan telling what would be done in the event of emergencies.

Cost data were obtained from two radiopharmaceutical manufacturers when the Commission promulgated the emergency planning regulation in 10 CFR Part 70.22.

Both licensees calculated the cost of the emergency plans.

The manufacturer with a small program and limited facilities estimated the initial set-up cost to be $84,000.

Annual operating costs were estimated to be $18,000.

Labor accounted for 1/2 to 2/3 of the cost in each category.

Labor was given a value of $30/ hour with no overhead charged.

The main equipment costs were for radios, extra monitoring equipment for emergency use, ana extra respirators.

The largest annual expense is for training.

Other operating expenses are for drills, and equipment replacement and maintenance.

To place all expenses on an annual basis the initial set-up cost was divided by 10, assuming a 10-year useful life of a plan.

Thus annual costs are estimated to be $26,000/ year / facility for this radiopharmaceutical manufacturer with a small program.

The Commission feels that this may be a reasonable estimate of costs associated with an emergency plan for an ISFSI.

l i

A second radiopharmaceutical manufacturer with one of the largest i

programs that would be covered by the regulation reported that the cost of establishing their emergency plan was more than

$550,000.

No annual operating costs were given.

Assuming a 10-year plan life and operating costs of $18,000/ year (the estimate of the other manufacturer) the total annual cost is

$73,000/ year / facility for large facilities.

The Commission feels that this may be a reasonable estimate of costs associated with an emergency plan for an MRS.

7

1 I

i i

Costs to NRC to review and inspect plans have been estimated to be $4,000/ year / facility.

3.4 Value/ Impact of Alternatives The costs of emergency preparedness are expected to exceed the benefits in terms of protecting public health and safety as shown below.

Table 1.

Comparison of Costs and Benefits of Special Emergency Preparedness l

Size of Licensee Cost Benefit ISFSI

$18,000/yr r approx 1 person-rem per year facility

$73,000/yr MRS 4.0 STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS 4.1 NRC Reculatory Authority I

The Atomic Energy Act gives NRC authority to adopt regulations for protecting public health and safety.

This proposed rule would be justified under that authority.

4.2 Environmental Assessment The NRC's regulations [10 CFR S 51.5(b)] require that substantive and significant amendments (from the standpoint of environmental impact) of regulations require an environmental impact statement.

To make the finding that amendments are not substantive and significant from the standpoint of environmental impact, NRC regulations [10 CFR S 51.5(c) (1)] require the preparation of a negative declaration and an environmental assessment.

The environmental impact appraisal mist include [10 CFR S 51.7(b)]:

(1)

A description of ti... pzoposed action.

8

7 (2)

A summary description of the probable impacts of the i

1 proposed action on the environment.

(3)

The basis for the conclusion that no environmental'

)

impact statement need be prepared.

]

The proposed action is a rule to require emergency procedures for releases.

A description of the proposed requirements is i

contained in Section 1.1,

" Description of the Proposed Action."

i A summary description of the probable impacts of the proposed l

action on the environment is contained in Section 3.2, "Value of the Eroposed Action."

The basis for the conclusion that no environmental impact statement need be prepared is that this rule, if adopted, would i

not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality

.I of the human environment.

The rule would not affect the l

probability or the size of accidental radioactive releases.

It j

might in some cases reduce the doses people near the facility site could recei/a.

l i

l j

5.

CONCLUSIONS I

The conclusion of this Regulatory Analysis is that accidents at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored l

Retrievable Facilities pose a very small risk to the public.

l Serious accidents are infrequent and would generally involve j

relatively small radiation doses to very few people located in j

small areas.

l This is not to say that radiation doses large enough to exceed i

guides for taking protective actions cannot occur.

It may be i

possible to have an accident at some licensed facilities which I

would cause offsite doses exceeding protective action guides.

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However, offsite radiation doses large enough to cause an acute fatality or even early injury from an airborne release are not considered plausible.

For an ISFSI licensee, protective actions might save j

approximately 1 person-rem per year per facility. -These facilities will be required to submit their emergency plan to I

offsite authorities for comment, however, no special facilities,

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equipment, or other resources for responding to emergencies are considered necessary.

j For a MRS licensee, protective actions might save approximately 1 person n.s to per year per facility.

The cost of this preparedness may not be justified based solely in terms of protecting public health and safety.

Rather, it is 9

justified in terms of the intangible benefit of being able to assure the public that local authorities will be notified 2.3 the event of an accident so they may take appropriate actions.

i Although emergency preparedness for ISFSI and MRS licensees is I

not required in order to provide adequate safety and may not be justified based solely on a comparison of the costs of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and safety.

Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified I

in terms of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of j

being able to assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions.

The NRC feels that such preparedness represents a prudent step which should be taken in line with the NRC's philosophy of defense-in-depth.

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l f %,,'o, yi UNITED STATES y

,) s,c y i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p}'?Qj

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g %i..... f June 2, 1992 Mr. James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Taylor:

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES (ISFSI) AND MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITIES (MRS '.

During its 43rd meeting, May 28-29, 1992, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste met with representatives of the NRC staff to discuss the proposed rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 72,

" Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitared Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS). "

Overall, we believe that the proposed rule has been well developed and should be published for public comment.

In the way of specific comments, we suggest the following:

1.

The discussion in the rule should be expanded to clearly state that the reason for enhanced emergency planning at an MRS is the larger number and types of fuel handling operations anticipated at such a facility, as compared with those at offsite ISFSIs.

2.

A statement should be added to the proposed rule to place limitations on the number and types of fuel handling operations that can be conducted at ISFSIs.

3.

The text of the proposed rule should be revised to explain that the limit for the ingestion of soluble uranium is based on its chemical toxicity.

Similar limits should be specified for other radioactive elements, if appropriate.

We hope these comments will be helpful.

Sincerely, k

CeI Dade W.

Moeller Chairman

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Mr. James M.

Taylor 2

June 2, 1992 I

Reference:

Memorandum dated March 4,

1992 from Warren Minners, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, transmitting " Proposed Amendments to j

10 CFR Part 72 to Establish the Emergency Preparedness Licensing I

Regulations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS)"

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OFFICE oF THE DAVID H. LERoY I

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WASTE l *l m oolaton i

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NEGOTIATOR s'm eT /

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j October 20, 1992 Maria Lopez-Otin Federal Liaison Office of State Programs United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C.

Dear Maria:

Thank you for providing me with a copy of the proposed rule change

" Emergency Preparedness Licensing Regulations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facilities".

As you may know, the United States Office of the Nuclear Waste

~

Negotiator has encouraged the Department of Energy to create a process by which state, local or tribal governments receive funding to study the feasibility of hosting an MRS facility.

Other jurisdictions, in cooperation with us, engage in studies without initially seeking federal funding.

These processes are based on the assumption that leaders or citizens of these government entities will act as independent fact finding organizations to discuss nuclear issues.

The primary concern for many of these groups is safety.

I support the proposed rule change and its precautionary measures.

I understand that requiring offsite emergency response strategies could be considered excessive in relation to the potential dangers of an MRS facility.

However, I agree with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that

" defense-in-depth" is i

appropriate considering the general reaction of the public to things nuclear.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that these measures do not indicate an increased concern about the safety of an MRS, but are a response to help address perceived' dangers and theoretical threats.

In this light it is also expected that the rule and its enforcement would be reasonably, cost effectively, and i

PO BOX r77

  • 208/336 9876
  • FAX 208/3369S80 UAISON 1 3

e...-~.~,.823 JEFFERSON PLACE, N W.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20036 202/C34-6244 FAX 202/634-6251 EWu.

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logically imposed and interpreted to make it an enhancement rather than a detriment to the MRS siting process.

The Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator wants to promote an open, honest, and credible tialogue between groups about MRS facilities.

I appreciate your diligence in keeping us informed about potential changes in NRC policy.

If the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Si

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David Leroy Negotiator i

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