ML20034C595
| ML20034C595 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1990 |
| From: | Kennedy K, Pellet J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034C594 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-OL-90-01, 50-498-OL-90-1, 50-499-OL-90-01, 50-499-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9005040188 | |
| Download: ML20034C595 (10) | |
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N APENDIX h'
U. S. NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
7,3 REGION IV t
l Operator Licensing 'Danination Report:; 50-498/0L'90-01 b
50-499/0L 90-01 Operating Licentes: HPF-76
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flPF-80
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50]98
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J Uocket Nos.:
50-(99!
j Licensie:,-Houston Lighting & Power Company q
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~P.O. Box 1700.
Houston,--Texas-77001 1
w Facility Name: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station g
o Examine ltfl.. at: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Examinatio'nn Conducted: March 12 - March 23, 1990 t l N#v/fo j
u Chief Examiner:
- -f Kriss M. Kennedy, Examyttr.
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' Operator Licensing Sodtion r
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' Division of Reactor Safety:
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ibhn L. TeTies, Chief Date l(-
Operator Licensing Section-c); y Division of. Reactor Sefety y
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NECS@inisteredrequalificationexaminationsto14,seniorreactor.
opsratyrs:($RO)'and 14 reactor operators (RO). Two reactor operators and t.
. senior t! car. tor operators failed the writtea examination while the remainin individuals 'ar.d all crews evaluated were determined to be satisfactory. "T #
.STP requalification training progrom was evaluated as satisfactory.
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Operator per1;roance on the plant walkthrough examinations was,a noted strength.-
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Also, the faci 1My simulator demonstrated significant improvements in performance had.occurredrdnc{theNRChadlastadministeredexaminationsatSTP.
Deficiencies vere,noted:in facility requalification examination bank material,.
bontrol runMmmtwications, component labeling, emergency operating procedure x.
implementation),\\ and procedural guidance to operators for a. steam generator'tilbe
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DETAILS 1.
PERSONS EXAMINED CREW SRO R0 Requalificatien Examirati ns:
Pass -
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- 12 12 A
Fail -
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42 2
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2.
EXAMINERS K.M. Kennedy, Chief'Ex$ miner E. L. B:enjamin J. Keetoo
- 5. L. McCrory J. Nicko hus J. L. Pellet f
3.
EXAMINATION REPORT t.
Performance results for individual examises are n9t included in this report, since it will be placed in the NRC Public Deconent. Room, and the results are not. subject to pu)11c disclosure, t
3.1 Examination Material
' The licende submitted material"for examination construction as required by NUREG-1021
Operator Licensirs Examiner Stendards," Section 601. A review of.
this materia 1 revealed that it was minima 11y' acceptable and that it required significant revision before it could be used for examination construction.
These revisions were made by the facility prior to administration of the examination. The deficiencies found in the examination items are listed below.
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3.1.1 Written Examination items A majority of written i xamination items did not meet the guidelines in t
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NUREG-1021 pertaining to open refert;nce question develcpent.,
Item
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construction deficiene as included:
r Questions' that were direct lookup questions such that the examinee would o
be led to the answer or reference with'no synthesis or analysis of information required, e
o Several examples of excessive wording in the qcestidn stem *: hat added no information needed to answer the question but may have tended to confuse the examinee or use a significant amount of examination. time to read, o-Questions that were open-ended and that lacked fo:us such that it would
,'not be clear to S e examinee what constituted a fully correct response,
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o Multiple choice questions in which the distractors were not plausible or did not follow grammatically from the question Stem.
Some test items developed for Section A, " Plant Operations," and Section B,
" Limits and Controls", of the written exemination did not meet the testing objectives of3those sections. Section A is designed to utilize the simulator
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- as a reference tool,in answering questions related to plant systems and controls
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and for recognition of Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Section B is designed to evaluate the ability of the operator to analyze a given set of conditions and to determine the proper procedural guidance.
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- M tfqn A of the submitted examination contained several questions which-i required diagonsis of the same malfunction in order to answer the questions correctly. This could result in an examinee missing two or more questions based on the same improper diagnosis, thus pena 11 ring the examinee more than once for the same error.
3.1.2 JobPerformanceHeasures(JPMs).
A majorf ty i;f the JPMs did not correctly identify critical steps _ Several JPMs had stepp which should have h w critical but were not identified as such, or they had steps,; identified as critical that should not have been. Also, verbal system response cues necessary.to prompt the tasks were not provided or were' inadequate.
Questions on the JPMs had the same deficiencies as the written examination c
items and had to be reworded or replaced. These questions should be written to the same construction standards as the written examination items.
3.1.3 Dynamic Simulator Scenarios f
Dynamicsimulatorscenarioslackedsufficientobjectiseperformancestandards I
in that the individua1'y did not adequately identify the expected operator actions-or the simulator critical tasks for the various malfunctions.
3.2 ExaminatlonAdministration s
3.2.1 ' Written Examinations Written examinations were administered to 28 examinees. Two R0s,and two SRO's failed the exam. A comparison of NRC grading with facility grading indicated o
g agreement in the results, o
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l 3.2.2 Plant Walkthrough Examinations l
l Plant walkthrough examinations were administered to 28 examinees in the form of JobPerformanceMeasures(JPMs). Each examinee performed a total of 10 JPMs.
i All 28 individuals passed this portion of their examinations and there was no disagreenent between NRC and facility pass / fail results.
3.2.3 Dynamic Sinclator Examinations Dynamic simulator examinations were administered to 28 individuals making up 6 crews. The facility evaluators failed one crew and passed all individuals, e-1 the NRC passed all crews and all individuals.
3.2.4 Observed Operator Performance 3.2.4.1 Plant Walkthrough Examinations i
Operator performance on the plant walkthrough examinations was a noted strength. However, one examinee was unable to perform a JPM because he had not had a recent whole body count and could not enter the radiologically controlled area to perform the task. The NRC evaluated the JPM as unsatisfactory for that individual.
3.2.4.2 Crew Communications l
The following generic weaknesses in crew and individual communications were observed during the dynamic simulator scenarios.
o Crew members failed to keep the Unit Supervisor informed of actions they 1
were taking or reasons for alarms, i
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The Unit Supervisor failed to communicate his intentions clearly to the l-crew and failed to indicate clearly when procedural transitions occurred.
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0 The Shift Supervisor directed panel operations without informing the Unit Supervisor, thus complicating the Unit Supervisor's ability to direct the crew.
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L Weaknesses in crew and individual communications have been observed on previous NRC replacement examinatior.s.
3.2.4.3 Emergency Operating Procedure Usage Unit Supervisors were not consistent in the implementation.of emergency operating procedures.
In directing the crew's actions, some Unit Supervisors read only the major steps of the procedure out loud to the crew, some read the major steps and their associated substeps to the crew, and others read only the step numbers to the crew. This weakness contributed to one crew failing to isolate excess letdown which was an immediate action of Procedure IPOP05-E0-E000, j
9eactor T<ip or Safety Injection," during a dyamic simulator examination.
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?.2.4.4 Procedure Weaknesses trocedure OPOPO4-RC 0004, " Steam Generator Tube Leakage," and Procedure IPOP05 E0-E030, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture," did not contain edequate guidance for the operation of a power operated relief valve (PORV) on i
a steam generator with a tube leak or a tube rupture, j
trocedure OPOPO4 RC-0004 directs the operator to verify that the PORV setpoint l'
is at 1225 psig for the-affected steam generator and to ensure that the'P0RV is closed. During one scenario, the crew placed the PORY in manual to close it and left it in manual, thus defeating the automatic pressure relief function of the PORV. A subsequent pressure increase in steam generator pressure caused the code safety valve to lift. This was an unnecessary challenge to the code safety valve.
.i Procedure IPOP05-E0aE030 directs the operator to adjust the ruptured steam.
i penerator PORY controller to 1260 psig and to check it closed, if steam i
generator pressure is less than 1260 psig. Da two separate occasions, with steam generator pressure less than 1260 psig, operators placed the PORY controller in manual and'1 eft it in manual throughout the remainder of the scenario, even after increasing the setpoint as required by the procedure.
This defeated the automatic pressure relief function of the PORV and placed.the function of overpressure protection on the steam generator code safety valves.
Such action is clearly contrary to the intent of the procedure to prevent t
unnecessary challenge to the code safety valve.
Facility staff informed the NRC that these procedures would be revised to provide the operators more guidance concerning the operation of the steam generator PORY in these situations.
3.2.4.5 Control Board Indications Operators did not consistently use all control board indications available to i
diagnose malfunctions or to verify plant response but tended to focus on a single indicator, most often QDPS. This resulted in errors or delays in diagnosis and delays in responding to plant transients.
3.2.5 Observed Facility Evaluator Performance 3.2.5.1 Plant Walkthrough Evaluations All facility evaluators were determined to be satisfactory. Several instances
.of improper evaluator practices or techniques were observed during the performance of JPMs and are listed below.
Following the first week of examinations, these coments were discussed with the facility and evaluator performance improved during the second week.
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o On three occasions, the facility evaluator did not recognize that a critical task had been performed incorrectly. The subsequent cees were given as if the steps had been completed correctly.
Improper cuing by the facility evaluators resulted in the NRC not evaluating these three l
JPMs fer the affected examinees, o
Evaluators were not consistent in how they acknowledged answers to JPM questions. Typically, if the examinee gave a correct answer, the evaluator moved right on to the next question or JPM.
If the examinee gave an answer that was incorrect, the evaluator would pause for a longer i
period of. time before moving on or ask a follow on question that prompted the examinee to the correct answer. The examinee could determine if the correct answer had'been given by the way the evaluator responded.
o Some evaluators asked examinees to elaborate on answers to JPM questions even though the examinee had given a correct answer according to the answer key, j
o Evaluators allowed examinees to use non-controlled reference material i
located in the control room, such as Westinghouse Owner Group background documents and training material, to answer JPM questions.
o some evaluaters had difficulty giving prompt and accurate cues.
Evaluator unfamiliarity with the JPMs and the format and bulkiness of the i
JPM evaluation sheets appeared to contribute to cues that were either delayed or incorrect.
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3.2.5.2 Dynamic Simulator Evaluations On the afternoon of March 15, following completion of the first week of examinations, the facility and the NRC met to discuss preliminary results.
i After this meeting the NRC learned that they had not been informed of facts the i
facility had developed concerning a particular dynamic simulator examination that had been administered the previous day. The facility determined that l
during the course of a steam generator tube rupture malfunction, a steam I
generator code safety valve had lifted. This was significant because it was e
the failure criteria for a previously identified individual simulator critical
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task. The fact that the code safety lifted was not discovered by the facility or the NRC during the course of the examination, nor was it discussed during the critique following the scenario. The facility determined on the morning of March 15, the day af ter the examination, that the code safety had lifted by reviewing simulator strip charts.
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It is not believed that this information was intentionally withheld from the NRC. However, this breakdown in communication resulted in the NRC having to reevaluate the performance of the affected crew and individuals using these newly learned facts. This delay significantly increased the stress on the l
affected crew while they awaited any changes to the previously announced j
results.
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In order for the evaluation of the individuals, the crews, and the training program to be valid, it is critical that the facility and the NRC base their evaluations on the same facts and that they are in agreement concerning what took place during the examination. The primary forum for the discussion of facts is the post scenario critiques between the facility evaluators and the NRC evaluators; however, any facts that are discovered by either the facility or the NRC at a later time must be made known to both NRC and f acility evaluators as soon as possible.
3.2.6 Examinee Stress Several indications of high stress were observed among the individuals and crews examined. While it is recognized that a certain amount of stress will exist during an NRC requalification examination, it was observed that the anxiety level was higher than expected.
Factors contributing to the high stess level included a lack of understanding of the requalification examination
)rocess by the operators, the amount of time an operator or crew had to wait aetween examination segments, and the perception by some operators that it was more difficult to perform a >1 ant walkthrough examination on the unit in which e
they do not normally stand s11f t.
The facility was encouraged to review these factors and take appropriate measures to reduce this stress.
3.2.7 Plant Observations The following observations were made by the NRC evaluators during the two week examination period. The Senior Resident Inspector was informed of these observations.
3.2.7.1 Improperly Locked Valve During the performance of a JPM it was discovered that the locking device for the manual.boration isolation valve on Unit 1, CV-0226, was installed I
improperly and could be removed without the use of a key. This valve-is normally locked closed. The examinee installed the locking device correctly and the facility evaluator notified the Unit 1 control room.
3.2.7.2 Labeling t
The following labeling discrepancies were,noted during the performance of the plant walkthrough examinations.
o For a local manual start of Emergency Diesel Generator 21,.
Procedure 2 POP 02-DG-0001 directs the operator to close the " Diesel Generator #214.16 KV Output Dreaker." The label for this breaker at the local diesel generator control panel reads "ESF Diesel Generator EIA 4.16 Feeder Bkr." This difference between the procedure and the label nonenclature was a source of confusion for at least two examinees.
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Procedure 1 POP 05-E0 EC00 " Loss of All AC Power," Step 14.1, directs the Unit Supervisor to dispatch a reactor plant operator (RPO) to shed all i
non-essential DC loads. The cubicle numbers listed in the procedure do not match the labeling on the distribution switchboards, for example, the procedure directs the operator to open the breaker in Cubicle 5 on r
switchboard EIA!! but the label on the switchboard reads Cubicle 4A. The 1
correct nomenclature Cubicle 5, has been handwritten with a black marker on the switchboard panel.
o In Unit 2, some of the breakers listed in Procedure IPOP05-E0-EC00, Step 14.1, had no labels on the switchboard panels indicating what breaker was
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located in a particular cubicle. An operator would have to open the i
panels to determine the location of the breakers that had to be operated. '
i 3.2.7.3 Cleanliness HRC evaluators observed a significant amount of sandy residue covering the surfaces and equipment in the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms on. Unit 1.
It is believed that this residue was the result of recent sandblasting activities that had taken place on the contsinment building's exterior surfaces, i
3.3 Site Visit Summary The NRC met with facility licensee staff to provide requalification program evaluation and individual examinee results. The licensee training department staff were informed of the-comments and observations noted above in detail
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prior to'the exit meeting.
The exit meeting was held March 23, 1990, at the STP site. The following
-t personnel were present:
HRC dL&P K. M. Kennedy P. T. Appleby J. L. Pellet C. A. Ayala J. 1. Tapia R. W. Chewning J. A. Constantin A. K. Khosla J. W. Loesch M. A. McBurnett S. L.'Rosen G. E. Vaughn L. G. Weldon M. R. Wisenburg
'The following items were communicated to the facility representatives:
o Based on the NRC examination team's evaluation, South Texas Project has a satisfactory requalification program.
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4 On the basis of NRC grading, four o
Twenty-eight operators were examined.
individuals failed the written examination.
Because.the requalification.
i program is satisfactory, the facility may remediate and retest the failing individuals and return them to licensed duties in accordance with.
the facility program. The NRC will reexamine the four individuals within six months for license renewal purposes. All other portions of the examination were passed by all operators, 3
o Operator performance on the plant walkthrough examinations was a noted strength.
o Crew and individual communications, including the implementation of the emergency operating pro:edures, were inconsistent. These weaknesses have been noted on previous replacement exams.
o The examination bank material submitted to the NRC by the facility for exam development was minimally acceptable and required significant revision before it could be used for this exam. Exam naterial submitted for subsequent exams must reflect the improvements and revisions made to the material used for this exam or delays in future requalification exams j
could occur. These revisions will require a commitment of resources i
similar to those required for the development of the current exam bank, o
The performance of the facility simulator significantly. improved since1 i
the November 1988 replacement exams and no new deficiencies were noted during this exam.
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There were several indications of high stress among the individuals and crews evaluated.
Some contributors to this increased stress' included a lack of understanding of the requalification exam process, the amount'of time an examinee had to wait between exam segments, and the operators' l
perception that it was more difficult to perform plant walkthrough exams on the unit in which they do not normally operate.'
3.4 Simulation Facility Fidelity Report t
i All items on the attached Sino1ation Facility Fidelity. Report have been discussed with the facility personnel.
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ATTACHMENT-i r
Simulation Facility Fidelity Report i
Facility Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company l
Facility Docket Nos:
50-498 1
50-499 l
Facility License Nos:
NPF-76 NPF-80 1
Operating Tests Administered at:
South Texas Project j
f Operating Tests Administered: March 12 - March 21, 1990 f
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating examinations identified above, no significant discrepancies were observed.
It is apparent t
that significant improvements have been made to both the simulator hardware and sof tware since the NRC administered examinations on the simulator in November i
I 1938.
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