ML20033G687
| ML20033G687 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1990 |
| From: | Burdick T, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033G686 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-OL-90-01, 50-483-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9004110193 | |
| Download: ML20033G687 (90) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
REGION 111
)
i Report No. 50-4r,4/0L-90-01 l
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 i
Licensee: Callaway St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name:
Callaway Examination Administered At: Callaway Examination Conducted: Requalification examinations for 10 Senior Reactor
+
Operators and six Reactor Operators.
j Chief Examiner:
M M
49/fC T. D.'Reidinge p Date '
Approved By:
il 3[)f[fd T. Burdick D' ate /
Examination Summary Examination administered on week of February 12, 1990 (Report No. 50-483/0L-90-01)).
l l
Consisted of written and operating requalification examinations administered to ten senior reactor operators and six reactor operators.
Results: All reactor operators and senior reactor operators _ passed the written examination and operating examinations.
The requalification operating l
examinations were administered to four crews; all crews were satisfactory.
The licensee's requalification program is determined to be satisfactory in accordance with the program performance criteria in NUREG-1021 " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," ES-601 " Administration of NRC Requalification Program Evaluations."
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Requalification Program Evaluation Report facility: Callaway Examiners:
T. Reidinger, G. Weale, S. Johnson, P. Isaksen Oates of Evaluation: Week of February 12, 1990 Areas Evaluated:
Written x Oral x Simulator x Examination Results:
R0 SR0 Total Evaluation Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail (S or U)
Written Examination 6/0 10/0 16/0 S
Operating Examination Oral 6/0 10/0 16/0 S
Simulator 6/0 10/0 16/0 S
Evaluation of facility written examination grading S
Crew Examination Results:
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4 Evaluation Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail (S or U) j Operating Examination Pass Pass Pass Pass S
Overall Program Evaluation Satisfactory
)
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Submitted:
Forparded:
Approv d:
T.hurdick T.
nger G. W igh Examiner Section Chief Branch Chief 3//.i/90 3/g/90 3/J'[/90 2
REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Examiners
- T. D. Reidinger Peter Isaksen Steve Johnson Gary Weale
- Chief Examiner 2.
Examination Development a)
Written Examination The facility's extensive effort and timeliness in revising and develo)ing the requalification examination material in accordance l
withtieOperatorLicensingExaminerStandards(ES-601)andin conjunction with the regional meetings and phone calls was commendable in regards to both quality and quantity of material. The examination team, which consisted of NRC examiners and facility representatives, was able to develop all phases of the examination entirely from the facility's developed materials during the requalification preparation week. However, the NRC identified some material that did not meet the requirements of ES-601 and could not be used without revision.
The material deficiencies were brought to the attention of the facility representatives on the examination team so that the eppropriate revisions were made to the material for examination.
The following are a few examples of material deficiencies noted during the examination preparation week:
Some Part B questions were direct "look up" type questions.
This type of question does not meet, as minimum, the comprehension level of understanding, and therefore is not i
appropriate for open-reference examinations.
Some Part A and B questions still exhibited the following deficiencies:
a.
Ambiguous wording; i.e., answers to the written question did not match the intent of the written question.
b.
Open ended questions that did not have one specific answer.
c.
Multiple choice questions had non-discriminate distractors.
d.
Double jeopardy questions, e.
Trick questions (ask for effects when there are none),
f.
Superflous wording - unnecessary information.
g.
Binary or true-false format.
3
[S 601 requires Part A.(Static Simulator) to have a minimum of two static ccnditions on the simulator, one condition for which the plant could have experienced a major transient resulting in ESFAS initiation and one condition being at power with tome equipment in an abnormal status.
Each of the frozen conditions should exhibit one major failure and two to three minor failures to provide sufficient efftets to test a wide range of objectives.
One of the Part A simulator scenarios reviewed had only one malfunction identified with its i.e. Rod Drop.
The f acility had selected one frozen condition on the simulator which combined essentially all the major and minor malfunctions from the two required Part A simulator scenarios.
The facility, however, satisfactorily addressed this oversight by modifying the other
{
Part A scenarios from the examination bank inventory to meet the Part A requirements.
Some of the Part B questions incorporated a good technical relationship but the questions still needed improvement. Questions with a specific set of parameters tended to be written in a long hand form; e.g. the PRT has been stabilized at 80% level and 35PSIGbydraininkywordedsentencesinthesamequestionwasnot and spraying. This sentence in conjunction with five other similar
,S reader f riendly.
Another question reviewtd asked for actions up to and including stepping the RCP, The answer i.3cluded " stopping the RCP" for
(.50 pt) credit. Other questions asked for *effect" when there is really no effect on the component. This could be interpreted as a trick question, as the operator is thinking there is an effect when there isn't.
The facility corrected all the identifieo deficiencies and they 1
should conduct a thorough review of the written examination question bank in order to identify all the additional questions which contain the identified deficitncies and revise the questions as necessary to meet the requirements of ES 601 prior to future examinations.
4
l b.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios The facility identified all knowledge and abilities (K/A) as contained in NUREG 1122. " Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for KJclear power Plants." with an importance rating of greater than/ equal to 3.5.
The f acility representatives incorporated the required Team Dependent and Time Critical tasks in a well developed format and exceeded the minimum standards invoked by ES-601. NRC generally accepted all the final recommendations made by the examination team for assigning the critical tasks for the dynamic scenarios.
Initially the critical step application foralltheoperatorsneededImprovement. The facility had critical status applied to steps that, for example, state
" verify AfW flow". The facility was encouraged to apply critical steps to overt actions rather than covert actions to illustrate definitive actions by the operator.
All the scenarios incorporated an overview of the malfunctions and the tran.ients whic1 comprised the scenario. This enhanced the simul 6 tor operator's comprehension of each scenario set.
Also the simulator setup guides for initializing lining up control boards, and cues for load swing instructions / sign offs were generally excellent.
All the scenarios generally addressed the expected actions for evaluating operator performance for all emergency responses.
The facility included all references to Technical Specifications with a meaningful description of the Tech / Spec LCO and action statements.
The facility included all references to abnormal procedures to incorporate an overview of all the major action steps outlined in the applicable procedure.
One or two scenarios did not exhibit a series of malfunctions which could be logically related or linked events as required per the Examiner Stcndard. The scenarios overall did attempt to have related malfunctions in addition to a linked major plant transient.
The scenarios need to incorporate operator options outside of the textbook anticipated actions to fully develop all the operator's expected actions.
5
1 c.
Job perforthance Measures several JFM's required corrective actions prior to using the JPM's for examination purposes. The corrective actions to modify the JPM's as agreed were accomplished in all cases.
Generally all JPM's exhibited verifiable tine validation for individual completion.
Critical steps in the JFM's, in general, were accepted by the i
NRC. Some critical steps were identified by the examination team as non. critical for the JPM's successful completion.
The required two questions minimum for JPM's was generally addresseo by the facility.
The NRC favorably views the use of a selected number of simulator based JPM's for requalification examinations. This minimized operator's fatigue and enhances operator's performance due to the operator not having to " talk through" r
all the valve, pump, and switch lineups required for that specific JPM.
It also facilitates a high degree of on-the-job fidelity.
3.
Examiniation Administration a)
The facility was responsible for examination administration with the NRC observing the process. The following are a few specific program strengths, deficiencies and observations that were identified by the NRC during eyamination administration.
During one dynamic simulator examination scenario, the simulator encountered a 15-20 minute delay due to simulator modeling being incorrect.
The Chief Examiner and Senior i
Operation's representative mutually agreed that the scenario be cancelled and the spare scenario substituted.
No major perturbation was noted on the crew overall in regards to the additional time to re-initialize the simulator to the new scenario.
Formal checklists had been developed by the facility which were utilized to brief the operators prior to each phase of the exemination.
The formal briefing checklist enhanced the ability of the facility representative to provide consistent information to each group of operators to ensure they fully understood the examination process.
However, the briefing's 6
I 1
for JPM performance needed to be more specific in the Itvel of expected operator's performance. The individual JPM briefing specifically reflects that all operator actions are to be l
simulated.
However for some in-plant JPM's, confusion among the operators existed in the application of physical contact t
required and the simulated performance of that physical action, e.g.
1)
JPM-URO SALO2PB027
" Perform TDAFP Operability Test' I
- Step 11
- Adjust Baseline RPM" i
This step requires the operator to electrically plug in the Strobotach to simulate measuring TDAFW p*ap RPM's. However, the operator would ask; 3
- Do you really want me to plug this in?
2)
JPM-URO-CT502PD020J - Perform evacuation of Control Room"
- Step 38 *0 pen Panel NG040-EF1 to fail open "B" D/G room supply fan suction damper - Circuit No. 11.
r This " critical step" requires the operator to physically open i
the panel to open the bre6Ler for circuit No. 11.
However the operators would ask; I
"Do you really want me to open the cabinet?
Transportation coordination and security accomodiations for the crews during the written examination, were excellent.
Fluid synchronization by the crews between the Training Center Simulator and Callaway station enhanced the timely completion i
of the written and operating examinations, j
Clerical support given during the preparation week and i
examination administration was excellent.
The facility provided a sufficient number of examination i
proctors during administration of the written examinations.
i The two-part examination was administered in two separate locations, with two facility representatives available to i
proctor both examination rooms while at the same time providing escorts to all individuals wanting to leave the examination rooms ensuring that they did not interact with any other individual participating in the examination.
7
l Good simulator execution and coordination was generally displayed by 4.11 the simulator operators involved during preparation week. The sino14 tor operator needs to be " heads up on any phone calls made from any member of the crew, in one case, a phone call was placed requesting offsite assistance for the fire brigade, but no further acknowledgement was made i
back to the specific crew member.
While it is recognized that i
this was not anticipated and not reflected on the simulator setup guide, the simulator operators need to address all phone i
calls from the crew members in a realistic technical fashion without impacting the execution of the scenarios.
Crew application of Technical Specifications and execution of l
normal, abnormal and emergency procedures were generally very good.
Crew response to instrumentation and major safety equipment l
malfunctions was generally good.
All crews correctly determined the Emergency Action levels for all the dynamic scenarios.
i 1he Facility and training center exhibited excellent coordination for JPM's completions at the plant and at the i
simulator, the scheduling of JPM's enhanced the possibility that only one operator would be stationed in a particular area or needing a specific procedure / equipment at any one time. This resulted in the timely completion of this phase of the examination.
Operation and training personnel appeared to be highly srpportive of each other's effort in developing and designing all f acets of the requalification cxamination. The training and operations staff is to be commended for the critical review l
perforned of the examination material utilized for the I
examination.
Security and Rad Chem prearran ements facilitated performance of both the written and operat ng examinations.
The scheduling for the administration of requalification examinations should be reviewed to minimize the extensive deily i
hours for the facility requalification evaluators and support personnel.
4 Evaluation of Facility Evaluators In addition to evaluating the operators performance, the NRC also evaluated the fecility evaluators, using ES-601 as a guideline, in their
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i
ability to conduct consistent and objective examinations, included in l
this evaluation is the ability of the facility evaluators to provide an unbiased evaluation of the facility operators.
The following are some examples of the observations made concerning the
[
facility evaluators:
During administration of the JPMs a few of the facility evaluators at certain times used verbal cues and/or prompting which could lead the operator to a correct decision / action resulting in an inadequate examination.
When an operator exhibited hesitation or difficulty in locating a component or piece of equipment, the evaluators would move over and position themselves in the direction of the component (body english which could assist the operator in locating the proper component.)
l No operators were noted to take advantage of this momentary mental oversight.
I When this occurred, the NRC examiner would point out to the facility evaluator the deficiencies in the examination administration s
techniques. The facility evaluator's generally did not repeat the error.
1 On different occasions several of the facility evaluators accidentally handed JPM question answers to the operators. On all but one t
occasion the answers were successfully retrieved.
On this one occasion the operator had the opportunity to read the answer. This 3
one JPM question was deleted for this operator. This decreases the overall base required per Examiner Standards to judge the requalification program as satisfactory or unsatisfactory on common questions and subsequently does not nwet the requirement that all JPM's for all the operators have at least 2 JPM questions.
Examiner's standards require that the crews shall be evaluated by i
both the NRC and facility evaluators with the NRC observing the facility led critique.
The crew and individual critique with the crew present was generally critical in nature and generally to the degree the NRC expected for crew evaluations.
Significant improvement in the facility's simulator critique was noted after the NRC and Facility Training evaluators reviewed the evaluation results of the first set of dynamic scenarios.
As the individual JPM task completion progressed throughout the d6y, the facility evaluators generally would not require as thorough an answer as he required during the individual's first several JPH completions. This could be attributable to working extended hours for examination purposes.
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i
i On several occasions during the JPM administration, the f acility evaluators failed to ask followup questions when operator's i
knowledge was in question or were unable to re-phase questions f
presented to the operators if the operator stated he was not sure l
what the question was soliciting.
On other occasions when the followup question was asked it tended to generate more confusion of for the operator who initially stated he had answered the question correctly.
Also, the followup question generally wasn't documented on the JPM.
l The facility evaluators generally exhibited excellent judgement in f
grading the JPMs.
The facility evaluators exhibited excellent judgement in several cases by providing additional correct cues when solicited by the operators but were not originally designed into the JPM. This enhanced the performance of the JPM without distracting the operator i
being examined.
The f acility evaluators generally made very good observations of what occurred on the JPMs and made an accurate assessment of those i
observations.
t The speed at which the JPM's were performed was consistent. There was no sense of being in a hurry to "get through" the JPMs.
The facility evaluators ability to discern errors was generally good.
Even though the facility evaluators exhibited lapses in their evaluation l
techniques during phases of the requalification examination, the evaluators were regarded as good overall. The previously mentioned observations point out the need to upgrade the formal training on how to conduct l
examinations to the personnel who will be utilized as evaluators during requalification examinations.
l 5.
Examiner Concerns During administration of the operating examinations, the NRC identified several operational concerns which are described.
t Crew members in sone instances were inattentive to control room panels and indications by conducting side discussions with their backs to the panels.
During one dynamic scenario, 05-04, the Turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump tripped as designed resulting in a loss of all auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators. Subsequently when the auxiliary feedwater manual restoration was accomplished the crew rnembers established full auxiliary feedwater flow (300,000 LBM/HR) f rom the back up essential service water systt:m with the following steam generators wide range levels approximately; S/G A-13%; S/G B-12%; S/G C-9%; S/G D-121 and RCS temp, approximately 450'F and RCS 10
The facility energency functional f
pressure approximately(700 psig.FR-H.1) Response to Loss of Secondary H restoration Guideline
$1nk does not specifically preclude accomplishing the actions by i
the crew members however, the NRC is concerned with the thermal and/cr hydraulic shock caused by the feedwater restoration under these conditions. This issue has forwarded to NRR for review.
The security of the written examination test material appeared to be lax and nearly resulted in the compromise of the written examination.
The followup investigation reflects that the established security utilized for this reoualification examination appeared to have prevented any exposure of the written test material to any unauthorized personnel.
The written examinations were lef t physically unattended for approximately 25 minutes in the training center classroom used for l
requalification review at the tine of the incident, all candidates were under continuous observation by Burns Security personnel or i
Callaway/NRC examination team members. Any operators waiting to serform JPM's were stationed in the clessroom under guard by the Burns Security staff and the operators were not allowed to leave the i
classroom without an Security escort.
Individuals not associated with the requalification program, two plant helpers and two Training Supervisors in the building have signed examination security agreements.
6.
Examination Evaluation Coevaluation by the NRC examiners and the facility evaluators of the operators performance on the examination was performed. Coevaluations provided tie NRC with the necessary information to assess the individual l
operators performance as well as the facilities qualification program i
performance.
The overall evaluations on the operating examination; which consisted of i
dynamic simulator scenario operations and job performance measure (JpM) plant walkdowns, were generally consistent between the NRC examiners and i
the facility evaluators for all 16 operators.
Overall evaluation of the crews and individual performance strongly correlated with the NRC measured observations, i
The overall evaluations on the written examinations with parallel grading of the written examination by the NRC and the facility resulted in generally consistent evaluations for all 16 operators.
The following are observations made by the NRC following the operational l
examinations concerning individual / crew evaluations.
Communications between crew members during dynamic simulator I
scenario events needs to be evaluated for improvement.
There were I
i 11 t
I several instances of 'open loop" communications between the crew members. Some individual crew members failed to ensure that the crew nenbers they were addressing heard and understood the transmitted information which resulted in required actions being delayed.
One of the two required JPM questions was, in two different JPM's, deleted due to the multiplicity of possible correct answers that were received from the operators during the JPM question performance.
1 e.g.
-JPM-EOS-ANNO 3PA011J
" Shift an Instrument Bus from normal to backup power".
-JPM URO-55F02PCC37J
" Recover a dropped control rod".
This resulted in a decreased overall ES-601 JPM question base.
The facility is encouraged to increase the number of available JPM questions per JPM to ensure meeting the minimum number of JPM questions (2) required per ES 601.
While implementation was inconsistent the facility evaluators had developed a good system of reading all the JPM question's to the operator's before handing them the written copy of the question's and subsequently re-reading the questions again after the operator's notification of completion and return of the questions by the operator to the facility evaluator.
7.
Recualification Examination Results The NRC and facility passed all four crews and individuals.
I 8.
Program Evaluation Per NUREG 1021. ES-601, Callaway requalification program satisfactory met the following criteria:
a.
There was a 90% pass decisions agreement between the NRC and fecility grading of the written and operating examination.
l b.
The program was judged satisfactory in accordance with criteria given for sinolator evaluations, c.
At least 75% of all the operators passed the examination.
l i
12
9.
Exit Meeting An exit meeting was held on February 17, 1990 between the facility and the NRC to summarire all of the observed requalification program and operator strengths, deficiencies and concerns.
Attendance' List T. Reidinger, USNRC, R111 P. Isaksen, EG6G Idaho, Inc.
S. Johnson [G&G Idata, Inc.
G. Weale, Sonalysts J. Patterson, U.E.
D. Young, Supt Operation, U.E.
R. Barton, Training Supervisor, U.E.
D. Neterer, Senior Training Supervisor, U.E.
M. Evans, Supt., Training 13
e l
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT i
Facility Licensee: Callaway f
Facility Licensee Docket No. 50-483/0L-90-01 Operating Tests Administered At: Callaway I
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the i
followingitemswereobserved(ifnone,50 state):
f ITEM DESCRIPTION l
Boric Acid / Deviation alarms T/C Subcooling meters reading 770' with RVLIS steady at 105%
i Equipment absent or different location from the simulator control room.
1 ESFAS panels 2
Red monitors 3
Fire panels l
4 Rod disconnect cabinet j
Seismic panel r
SPDS - Locked out several times Diesel synch scope /with voltmeter readings and synch light.
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EXAM GRADING SNEET EXAM NAME: NRC-R0 (SEC-A1) L C!. ASS NAMEt R0-IAQL TOTAL POINTSt 10.00 DATE GIVENt 90.02.14 STUDENT ID / NAME: ** DRATT **
/ *************** DRAFT ***************
QUEST POINT POINTS QUEST POINT POINTS VALUE MISSED VALUE MISSED 1 - CRX-01PA-20S$0L 1.00 2 - CRX-04PA-025$0L 1.00 3 - CRX-04PA-215$0L 1.00 4 - SBB-04PG-115$0L 1.00 5 - SBB-04 PG-14 S $ 0L 1.00 6 - SBG-06PC-23840L 1.00 7 - SBG-06PC-24500L 1.00 8 - SEG-03PA-09S$0L 1.00
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9 - SSE-03PB-13540L 1.00 10 - SSP-04PB-17890L 1.00
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FINAL SCORE:
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CALLAWAY PLANT DAILY 14G LINE No.
TIME 1
0000 CONTINUED THE WATCH, MODE 1, 100% POWER, MWe = 1218, l
2 BANK D 0 209 STEPS 3
0646 RX TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION i
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5 6
7 l
8 9
10 11 i
12 l
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RTOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS 1.
STEPS 1 THROUGH 20 0F E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR l
SATETY INJECTION MAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
2.
TIME IS 0700.
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1.00 Po!NTS CRK.01FA.20Se0L l
EKLkCENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E, CRIT) f RESP TO RX TRIP V/WO $1 00003 PEA 114(4,1/3.9)
CSMIN..........(4,7)
The total ArW flowrate is at its prese'nt value because of:
A.
Manual throttling to reduce RCS cooldown l
S.
Automatic throttling by the M.D. ATW valves 2
C.
ATW pump cavitation J
D.
Higher than normal S/G pressures t
)
ANSVER:
A.
Manual throttling to reduce RCS cooldown e
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1.00 POINTS CRK.04PA.025a01.
EMERCENCY ACTIONS K$A e....... RATING TIME..++.(U.E. CRIT)
RESPOND TO A SGTR 000038EA136(4,3/4.5) 08 MIN..........(4.9) l i
Vhich ONE of the following is the E g1EN RCS Incore I
Thermocouple Temperature permitted for RCS depressurization?
A.
535'T 3.
524*T C.
478*T l
D.
464'T l
ANSVER:
?
B.
524'T 4
D
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3 1.00 Po!N15 CLK.04FA.21s=0L I
CRERCENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... kAT1pC TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESPOND TO A SCTR 000038EK306(4.2/4.5) 03 MIN..........(4.9) l The RMR pumps voeld be stopped and placed in standby:
A. Because RCS pressure is stable er increasing.
I
- 5. After $/0 isolation.
C. Following RCS cooldown initiation.
i D. After RCS depressurization.
AN5VER:
B.
After $/0 isolation.
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1.00 POINTS sng.04rc.115 0L t
REACTOR COOLANT KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP. TO REAC COOLANT OTT. NORM 011000K103(3.7/4.0) 05 MIN..........(4.4) l The failure of the pressuriser instrument occurred prior to the l
Which ONE of the following describes the IMKEDIATE plant response?
[
A. CVCS letdown isolated and charging flow increased.
{
B. FIR heaters energized and charging flow decreased.
j C. CVCS letdown isolated and FIR heaters energized.
D. Both CVCS letdown and chstging flow unaffected.
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ANSVER:
B. FIR heaters energized and chstging flow decreased.
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5 1.00 POINTS
$58 04PG.145*0L REACTOR COOLANT K$A e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP. TO REAC COOLANT OTT. NORM 062000A201(3.4/3.9) 06 MIN..........(t. 4) i Which ONE of tho'following is Preventing the Croup A Pressuriter Backup Heaters from being manually re. energized?
A.
A loss of power to N501 bus b.
Pressuriser level at On C.
NT039A S/D Sequencer Actuation D.
Pressurizer Pressure at 1550 psig ANSVER:
B.
Pressurite tevel at On l
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$&c.06PC.235*0L CHEM. & V01EME CONTROL KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO CVCS Orr. NORMAL COND.
103000K108(3.6/3.8) 0 $NI N.......... (ti. 2 )
What plant condition is preventing the use of the Pressuriser Spray Valves for RCS depressurization?
ANSVER:
Instrument Air is isolated to contairment / a C!s.A signal is
- present, v
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7 1.00 P01RTS S bC.06PC. 24 se0L CHEM, & VOLUME C0hTROL KSA e....... RAT 1HG TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO CVCS OTT. NORMAL COND.
103000K10$(3.6/3.8) 06 MIN..........(4.2)
After pressuriser level is restored to'204, the normal CVCS charging and letdovn systems are to be placed into service.
Which ONE of the following signals would require manual reset?
A. SIS only B. CIS.A only C. Both SIS and Ci$.A D. CIS.A and CIS.B ANSVER:
C. Both SIS and CIS.A a
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8 1.00 Po!NTS SEC.03PA.09s*0L l
COMPONENT CDOLING VATER KSA e....... KATING TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO CCW $YST OPT. NORMALS 008000K401(3.1/3.3) 05NIN..........(4.1) l Component Cooling Vater pump (CCW)
'A' A. Was started by the LOCA sequencer.
B. Was started by the shutdown sequencer.
C. Was in service prior to the plant trip.
I D. Started on interlock with
'A' CCP.
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ANSVER:
A. Was started by the LOCA $equencer e
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1.00 POINTS
$$t.03Pt.13$e0L l'
NUCLLAR INSTRUKENTATION KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO NUCLEAR INST OFT. NORMS 015000A201(3.5/3.9) 05NIN..........(4.3) l l
I I
The Source Range Instruments are in their current state even though the reactor has been shutdown greater than 15 minutes because:
l r
1 A.
N35 is overcompensated B.
N36 instrument power has failed i
C.
P.6 is not reset i
D.
P.10 is not reset t
I i
ANSWER:
t C.
P.6 is not reset t
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T 61*.0810.8 e 10 1.00 P01NTS
$$P.04P8 17se0L PROCF.S$ MONITORS KSA *....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO PROCESS MON OTP. NORMS 000038EA204(3.9/4.2) 03 MIN..........(0.0)
Which ONE 0f the~ following actions would terminate all potential radiation release paths to the environment?
i A.
Secure the TDATP and close the MSIVs B.
Close the Condenser Steam Dumps and secure the TDAPP
[
C.
Close the
'A' S/C PORV and close the MSIVs i
D.
Close the ' A' S/C PORV dnd close the Condenser Steam l
Damps 4
k i
ANSVER:
j C.
Close the
'A' S/C PORV and close the MSIVs
[
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e
l T 61,0310.8 90.02.07 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALIFIAY TRAININ a
EXAM GRADING SNEET 4
1 i
EXAM NAME: NRC-RO(SEC*A2)I CIASS NAME: R0-LRQL TOTAL POINTS:
9.00 DATE GIVEN: 90.02.14 I
STUDENT ID / HAME: ** DRATT **
/ *************** DRAFT ***************
4 QUEST POINT POINTS QUEST POINT POINTS i
6
' VALUE MISSED VALUE MISSED j
r 1 - SAB-02PF-22560I 1.00 1
2 - SAB-04PA-02S$0!
1.00 3 - SBB-04PC-055001 1.00 1
4 - SBG-04PA-29540I 1.00 5 - SSA-03PA-27860I 1.00 6 - SSE-03PC-03S40I 1.00 7 - SSE-03PC-238001 1.00 i
8 - SSF-02PE-145401 1.00 j
9 - SSF-03PA-185401 1.00 l
t 1
l
~
j
)
\\
j TOTAL POINTS MISSED:
FINAL SCORE:
f 61 A M O.s i
STATIC SINULATOR SCBN&RIO 90. 761.G501.8 BTUDENT INFORMATION CALLAWAY PLANT DAILY IhG LINE No.
TIME j
i 1
0000 MODE 1, Cb = 1135, NWe = 1230, 200% POWER l
1 BANK D 9 220.
l 2
3 0500 A.T.S.
OSP-SF-00002, CONTROL ROD PARTIAL MOVEMENT
)
4 COMMENCED CTNT MINIPURGE, CTNT PRESSURE AT 30" J
5 0600 COMMENCED OSP-88-00009, RCS LEAK RATE DETERMINATION i
6 0615
.I&C TROUBLESHOOTING RCD M-14, ALL RODS EXCEPT M-14, j
ARE DISCONNECTED IN SHUTDOWN SANK
'A'.
LITT COIL 7
TUSE KEEPS BLOWING.
l 8
l 9
i l
10 11 12 i
13 l
i RVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS i
- 1. OSP-BB-00009, RCS LEAKRATE
- 2. PRESENT TIME IS 0700 l
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a Page_,1,o f.i.
}
k
. _... _ _ _.. ~ _ _
T 61,0310.8 I
1 1.00 Po!NTS SAs.02Pr.225 01 l'
MAIN STEAM KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE THE MAIN STEAM $YSTEM 041020K105(3.5/3.6) 04 MIN..........(0.0) l l
l 1
Assume let Stage Pressure Transmitter '(AB.PT.505) fails to 0 PSIC, Select the ONE response belov which correctly describes the i
response of the condenser steam dumps, i
I t
A.
Steam dumps would open since Tggr is now at $57'r and a i
loss of load arming signal is present.
f B.
Steam dumps would open since the turbine trip l
controller (Two LoAp) is less than TAVC-l C.
Steam dumps would remain closed since there is no arming signal present.
D.
Steam dumps would remain closed since Tggp is still equal to T yc A
t ANSWER:
A.
Steam dumps vov1d open since Tgtr is now at $57'r and a loss of load arming signal is present, I
l i
f f
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9
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T 61,0310c8 i
e 2
1.00 Po!NTS SAS.04PA.028e01 MAIN $ TIM ESA e....... BATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO MAIN STEAM OTF. NORMA 1.$
041020A40$(3.0/3.1)
OSMIN..........(4.1)
Which ONE of the following would CLEAR the 'CONDEN$ER STIM DUMPS l
VALVES ARMED
- lights on ($C066V) MISC TRIP S!$7ASLE PANEL?
A. Selecting the OTT/ RESET position on the Steam Dump I
$ witches (AB.HS.63 6 64) i B. Selecting the AB.PT.506 position on the HP TURB 15T Stage i
Pressure switch (AC.?$.5052) l C. Selecting the RESET position on the $ team Dump Selector Switch (AB.U$.5002)
D. Selecting the Steam Pressure Mode on the Steam Dump f
Selector $ witch (AB.U$.5002)
ANSVER:
C. Selecting the RESET position on the steam Dump Selector Switch (AB.U$.5002) i f
i I
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6
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T 61.0310.8 w
3 1.00 POINTS SBB.04PC.055*01 REACTOR C001 ANT KSA w....... RATINO TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP. TO REAC C001 ANT OFF. NORM 000009EA202(3,5/3.8' 07 MIN..........(4.7)
' Which ONE of the following indicates the location of the RCS leak?
A.
Letdown.line, upstream of the Regen Heat Exchanger B.
Regenerative Heat Exchanger Tube 14ek C.
High Pressure 14tdown Relief Valve BC.V8117 seat leakage.
D.
Charging Line Leak, between BC.HV.182 and BC.HV 8106 ANSWER:
r A.
Letdown Line, upstream of the Regen Heat Exchanger.
m v
r--
t T61,0310.8 w
4 1.00 POINTS SBG.04PA 295e01 CHEM. & VOLUME CONTROL KSA #...... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE REAC NAKEUP CONTROL 004020A401(3.8/3.3) 04 MIN..........(4.0)
Which ONE of the following describes the condition of the CVCS7 A. Automatic makeup would NOT occur but letdovn divert would automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank B. Automatic makeup would NOT occur and letdown divert would NOT automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank C. Automatic makeup would occur and letdown divert would d
automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank i
D. Automatic makeup would occur but letdown divert would NOT automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank i
9 ANSWER:
B. Automatic makeup would NOT occur and letdown divert would NOT automatir. ally shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank i
9
)
4 1
1 J
l 1
T61,0910.8 5
1.00 POINTS
$$A 03PA.275e01 ENGINEERED SATETY TEATURES KSA *....... RATING TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO ESTAS OTT. NORMALS 013000K101(4.2/4.4) 06 MIN..........(0,0)
Which ONE of the following caused the. termination of the CTNT mini.
purge ?
A. Containment Isolation Signal. Phase A (CIS.A)
- 8. Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS)
C. Containment Air Monitors (CT.RE.31 or 32)
D. Containment Purge Monitors (GT.RE.22 or 33)
ANSWER:
D. Containment Purge Monitors (GT RE.22 or 33) 4 l
l i
)
T610810.8 0
w 6
1.00 POINTS SSE.03PC 03Se01 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO NUCLEAR INST OFF. NORMS 012000K406(3.2/3.5) 06 MIN..........(4.3) s A plant shutdown to MODE 3 is commenced.
All of the following are required to be performed EXCEPT:
i A. Verify the status of P.13 within ONE hour B. Trip Bistables for N.42 within ONE hour I
C. Jumper the N 42 input to P.10 D. Verify adequate SDM within the next 15 minutes ANSWER:
B. Trip Bistables for N.42 within ONE hour 9
4 I
4 I
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f T 61.0310.8 o
7 1.00 POINTS SSE 03PC.23So01 i
NUCLEAR INSTRUNENTATION KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO NUCLEAR INST OFF NORMS 012000K406(3.2/3.5) 04NIN..........(4.3) f Identify the instrument failure that is causing the ' REACTOR l
PARTIAL TRIP" (83C) annunciator to be illuminated, i
i ANSWER:
Power Range /N42 e
e l
l i
0
=
T61,0310.8 w
8 1.00 POINTS
$$F.02PE.14S*01 i
ROD CONTROL KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO. ROD CONTROL OFF. NORMS 001000K401(3.5/3.8) 06 MIN..........(4.3)
Which ONE of the following is causing the ROD CONTROL URG FAIL, l
Annunciator 79A, to be lit?
A.. Regulation Failure l
B. Phase Failure C. Logic Error D. Multiplexing Error ANSWER:
A. Regulation Failure t
i 1
4 d
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T61,0810 8 l
0 9
1.00 POINTS S$r.03PA.18Sw01 ROD CONTROL KSA #....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
PERT ROD CONTROL SURVEILLANCES 000005EK105(3.3/4.1) 06 MIN..........(4.3)
Which ONE of the following satisfies Shutdown Margin verification requirements?
A.
Control banks rod heights greater than the rod insertion limit.
B.
Control banks rod heights greater than the rod insertion limit including an allowance for rod M.14 C.
SDM calculation including an allowance to compensate for rod M 14 D.
RCS boron concentration greater than the required SDM boron concentration per Table 1 8 of the curve book.
ANSWER:
C.
SDM calculation including an allowance to compensate for rod M 14 j
i i
a 4
1 4
T 61.0 H 0.8 90.02.07 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY TRAININ i
EXAM GRADING SHEET kXAM NAME: NRC-RO-(SEC-B)
CIASS NAME: R0-LRQL t
TOTAL POINTS:
20.00 DATE GIVEN: 90.02.14 STUDENT ID / NAME: ** DRAFT **
/ *************** DRAFT ***************
QUEST POINT POINTS QUEST POINT POINTS VALUE MISSED VALUE MISSED l
1 - CRK-01PA-06C 1.00 2 - CRK-01PB-01C 1.00 3 - CRK-02PA-01C 1.00 4 - CRK-02PA-02C 1.00 5 - CRK-06PA-02C 1.00 6 - CRK-06PA-03C 1.00 7 - CTK-02PA-01C 1.00 8 - CTK-06PA-07C 1.00 9 - SAB-04PA-02C 1.00 10 - SAD-03PB-04C 1.00 11 - SBB-04PA-01C 1.00 12 - SBB-05PE-01C 1.00 13 - SBG-06PA-01C 1.00 14 - SEA-02PA-05C 1.00 15 - SEG-03PA-02C 1.00 16 - SGT-01PB-03C 1.00 17 - SNB-02PA-02C 1.00 18 - SNG-01PA-01C 1.00 19 - SPB-01PA-01C 1.00 20 - SSB-02PB-01C 1.00 1
i TOTAL POINTS MISSED:
FINAL SCORE:
l 4
4 4
--a
+--
r..
w..e-,
....-,-,-.--..--y
,, - -, - - -. - + -.
,ee-r,--
l T 61,0810.8 w
1 1.00 POINTS CRK.01PA 06C EKERCENCY ACTIONS KSA w....... RATING TIKE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO RX TRIP W/WO SI 000007EK301(4.0/4.6) 0$NIN..........(4.7)
The control room is responding to a St.eam Line treak.
Containment pressure has increased to 32 psig and RCS pressure has decreased to 1700 psig.
Why do the emergency procedures require that the RCP's be tripped for this situation?
j l
l 1
ANSWER.
CIS B occurred / CCW to RCP's isolated 1
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I T61;0810.8 l
2 1.00 POINTS CRK 01PB 01C EMERGENCY ACTIONS ESA w....... RATING TIME.
--(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO RX TRIP W/WO $1 000056EK302(4.4/4.7) 07 MIN...
-(4.7) i A natural circulation cooldown is in progress due to a sustained
{
loss of offsite power. NB01 and NB02 are energized by the emergency diesel generators.
I RCS subcooling requirements are at least
- F more subcooled than instrument error.
ANSWER:
100'F l
i l
l s
.l
T61;0810.8 w
3 1.00 POINTS t
CRK.02PA.01C ENERGENCY ACTIONS KSA w....... RATING TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO LOSS OF RX/SEC COOLANT 000011EK101(4.1/4.4) 03NIN.-
.......(4.9)
Following a large break LOCA during the cold leg recirculation mode, the core decay heat is being removed by:
A.
Heat transfer from the RCS to the S/G's due to natural circulation.
B.
Heat transfer from the RCS to the S/O's due to reflux boiling.
C.
Injection of water from the RWST and removal of steam / water out of the break.
D.
Injection of water from the recirculation sump and the removal j
of steam / water out of the break.
ANSWER:
)
D.
Injection of water from the recirculation sump and the removal of steam / water out of the break.
l 1
I
P T 61~,0910.8 4
1.00 POINTS CRK.02PA 02C EMERGENCY ACTIONS KSA #....... RATING TIME...--(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO LOSS OF RX/SEC COOLANT 000038EK306(4.2/4.5) 06 MIN..........(4.9) f During post LOCA cooldown and depressurization CCP's and SI pumps are stopped on alternate ECCS trains when possible.
The reason for using alternate trains is to:
A.
Minimize primary leakage while ensuring adequate subcooling.
l B.
Equalize flows on ECCS trains to maintain pump suction head.
I C.
Increase the probability of RCS injection flow if one ECCS train becomes inoperable.
D.
Equalize loading on the NB buses, since the diesels may be supplying power.
ANSWER:
C.
Increase the probability of RCS injection flow if one ECCS train becomes inoperable.
(
1 e
T6f:0ff0'Y w
5 1.00 POINTS CRK.06PA.02C EMERGENCY ACTIONS KSA e.....*. RATING TIKE.....(U.E. CRIT)
INTERPRET / RESP TO FRG's/CSF's 000074GN11(4.5/4.6) 11NIN..........(4.9)
{
The unit was operating at full power when it experienced a loss of reactor coolant.
The following plant conditions exist I hour after the event:
75' superheat t
Subcooling meters 651'F increasing Core exit thermocouples 384 stable RVLIS full range All secured RCP's 250,000 lba/hr AUX feed flow (total)
Energized Negative SUR Source Ranges 452*F increasing RCS CL temperatures 1100 psig stable RCS WR pressure t
19 psig stable CTMT pressure On PZR level 125'T stable
,i CTMT Temperature S/G NR Levels:
384 244 C
A 226 394 D
8 i
S/G Pressures:
1180 psig 1185 psig C
A 1202 psig 1180 psig D
B i
i Per the critical safety functions, which plant procedure must be implemented?
2 i
i
(
T 61 ~,0810:9 l
.................................. CONTINUED...............................
1 ANSWER:
1 l
71t C.2 / Response to Degraded Core Cooling l
f 4
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9
t I
T 61.0910.9 i
e 6
1.00 POINTS CRK 06PA 03C l
EMERGENCY ACTIONS KSA #
RATING TIME - -(U.E. CRIT)
INTERPRET / RESP 70 FRG's/CSF's 194001A113(4.3/4.1) 04NIN.
-(4.9)
?
A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred due to containment pressure being at 5 PSIC.
E 0, ' Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" has been performed up to step 7.
The BOP Operator reports to the CRS that NO Auxiliary Feedwater is being delivered to the S/G's and all S/G 1evels are less than 4% narrow range.
Select the ONE statement which describes the action to take.
A. Transition to FR H.1, ' Loss of Secondary Heat Sink" per the E 0 foldout page Red Path Summary.
B. Continue in E 0 until step 24 and then transition to E 1,
" Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant' C. Continue in E 0 until step 24 and then transition to FR-
)
H.1, " Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", when the transition to E 1 is directed.
D. Continue in E 0 and transition to FR H.1, ' Loss of i
Secondary Heat Sink' at step 16.
ANSWER:
1 1
i D. Continue in E 0 and transition to FR H.1, " Loss of l
Secondary Heat Sink" at step'16.
1 a
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T 61,0810:8 s
7 1.00 POINTS CTK.02PA.01C INTEGRATED OPERATIONS KSA #....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
CONDUCT RX S/U VITH NEG NTC 001010A207(3.6/4.2) 09 MIN..........(4.2)
A normal reactor startup is commenced with an initial source range counts of 30 CPS and an ECP of 80 steps on control bank "D".
After withdrawing control bank "B" to 65 steps, the reactor operator records 60 CPS on the source range instruments.
Which ONE of the following describes the actions the operators should take?
A. Terminate the startup by fully inserting all control rods.
B. Stop rod withdrawal, recheck ECP and RCS boron concentration.
C. Withdraw control bank *B" to 115 steps and check SR levels.
D. Withdraw control banks until 120 CPS indicated on source ranges.
ANSWER:
A.
Terminate the startup by fully inserting all control rods.
T 61:0810.4 r
8 1.00 POINTS CTK-06PA 07C INTEGRATED OPERATIONS KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
C/D PLANT FROM HSB TO CSD 004000 GEN 10(3.1/3.4) 04 MIN..........(3.8)
A plant cooldown to Mode 5 is required from the following plant conditions:
557'F Stable TAVE 30 CPS Stable SOURCE RANGES 50% stable ALL S/G NR LEVELS 575 PPM RCS BORON 350 Days EFPD REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS.
Open 25% Stable PRESSURIZER LEVEL State TWO reasons why the cooldown should NOT be commenced, under these conditions.
ANSWER:
1.
S/D banks not withdrawn (0.5 PT) 2.
RCS boron less than required for CSD concentration SDM / RCS not borated to cold S/D concentration (0.5 PT) 4 J
.- eg
T 61.0810.9 9
1.00 POINTS SAB 04PA 02C MAIN STEAM KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO MAIN STEAM OPP. NORMALS 035010A203(3.4/3.6) 06 MIN..........(4.1)
While in Mode 1. at 1006 power operations the
'A' S/G Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller (AB.PIC.1A), output fails to MIDSCALE due to failure of the 'A' S/G Pressure Transmitter (AB.PT 1).
S/G 'A' Atmospheric Steam Dump (AB.PV.1) opens.
Which one of the following would HQI close AB.PV.17 A.
Placing controller AB.PIC lA in MAN and CLOSE B.
Transferring control of AB.PV 1 to the Aux S/D Panel C.
Isolating the air / gas supply to AB.PV 1 D.
Adjusting AB.PV 1 setpoint to the high and of scale ANSWER:
B.
Transferring control of AB.PV 1 to the Aux S/D Panel I
e t
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T 6110910,8 I
1 SAD.03P8 04C a 10 1.00 POINTS CONDENSATE KSA #....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESPOND TO OFF NORM CONDITIONS 039000A105(3.2/3.3) 03NIN.........(3.9) i f
A complete Loss of Condenser Vacuus occurs with the plant at:
Mode 3 S/D Banks Withdrawn TAVE 557'T 2235 PSIC All RCP's Operating With no operator actions, RCS TAVE will stabilize at:
A.
550'F B.
557'F C.
561'F D.
564'T ANSVER:
C.
561*F (S/G Atmospheric Steam Dumps at 1125 PSIG) 4
T610910c8 w 11 1.00 POINTS SBB.04PA 01C REACTOR COOLANT KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
+
RESP. TO REAC C001 ANT OFF. NORM 000037EK305(3.7/4.0) 04 MIN..........(4.7) l While in Mode 1, 1004 operation, Process Radiation Monitors on RM11 indicate the following:
CE.RE.92 - 5 x 10E.5 pci/mi and slowly increasing BM.RE.25 - 3 x 10E.5 pei/a1 and slowly increasing Which valve should have automatically closed based on the above?
A.
S/C SAMPLE CONTAINMENT IS01ATION (BM.HV 19) 8.
S/G BLOWDOWN CONTAINMENT iso 1ATION (BM.HV 1)
C.
S/G BLOWDOWN DISCHARGE PUMP DISCH VALVE (BM.FV 54)
P D.
S/G B14WDOWN TIASH TANK VENT TO ATMOSPHERE (BM PV.72)
ANSWER:
B.
S/G BLOWDOWN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (BM.HV.1)
T 61',0910c4 r
- 12 1.00 POINTS SBB.05PE.01C REACTOR COOLANT KSA #....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
PERT REAC COOLANT SURVEILIANCE 0020205012(3.7/3.7) 08 MIN..........(4.0)
During a plant cooldown the RCS cold leg temperature is 360'F.
The reactor operator inadvertently increases RCS pressure to 735 psig.
Which ONE of the following should occur?
A.
Both Pressurizer PORVs, BB.PCV.455A and BB.PCV.456A open.
B.
Only Pressurizer PORV, BB.PCV.455A, opens C.
Only Pressurizer PORV, BB.PCV.456A, opens D.
Neither Pressurizer PORV should open ANSWER:
B.
Only Pressurizer PORV, BB.PCV.455A, opens
)
0 l
Tsr.o910.s w 13 1.00 POINTS
$5G.06PA.01C CHEM. & VOLUME CONTROL KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO CVCS OFF. NORMAL COND.
004000K101(3.6/4.0) 0$NIN..........(4.1)
Charging, letdown, and the pressuriser level control system are in automatic, with the "A" CCP in service.
The following plant conditions exist:
LETDOWN HX OUTLET FI4W (BG.FI.132)
The controlling PZR level control channel fails HIGH to an indicated 1004 level.
Total seal injection flow INITIALLY :
(Choose ONE)
A.
Decreases to approximately 0 gps.
B.
Decreases to approximately 12 spa.
C.
Increases to approximately 45 gpa.
D.
Increases to approximately 75 gps.
ANSWER:
B.
Decreases to 12 gps.
(Since charging flow will decrease to a minimum of 45 gpa, seal flow will be greater than 0 spa, but less than 32 spa. The 12 spa estimato is calculated by taking a ratio of total seal irijection flow and charging header flow.
l (32/130 x 45) i l
l 1
t l
T 61 ~.0910.8 w 14 1.00 POINTS SEA 02PA 05C SERVICE WATER KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE THE SERVICE WATER SYST 076000K116/(3.6/3.8) 07NIN..........(3.9) i Both ESW trains are aligned per OTO EA*00001, 'Imss of All Service j
Water'. Control board annunciators 55A, 'ESW PUMP 'A' PRESS LO/STR DP HI", and 550, 'ESW PUMP TROUBLE *, both alara due to a trip of the
'A' ESW pump.
Which ONE of the following statements describes system response?
A.
'A' train ESW component flow goes to 0.
B.
Service water componer.t f goes to 0.
W f0 C.
'B' ESW pump (PEr0 flow nereases.
D.
Both service water and 'B' train ESW flow increase.
/
ANSWER:
$W z[/WO C.
'B' ESW pu.p crEr01 > flow iner.ases.
L w
,,+
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i T 61 ~.0910.9 w 15 1.00 POINTS SEG 03PA.02C COMPONENT COOLING WATER KSA w....... RATING TIME.....(U.E, CRIT)
RESP TO CCW SYST OFF. NORMALS 008000A202(3.5/3.5) 03 MIN..........(4.1) f A plant cooldown is in progress.
The RHR system has not been placed An service.
Annunciator window 53D (CCW SRG TK B LEV HILO) alarms.
The MCB indicates the water level in
'B" CCW surge tank is slowly decreasing.' The primary operator has reported the CCW makeup valve is full open and there are no signs of system leakage.
Which ONE of the following is a possible cause of the above conditions.
A.
A leak exists in an RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger.
B.
A tube leak exists in the
'8" CCW heat exchanger.
C.
An ESW makeup supply valve to the CCW pump suction header is partially open.
D.
An excessive primary plant cooldown rate exists.
ANSWER:
i B.
A tube leak exists in the "B" CCW heat exchanger.
(Service water pressure is less than CCW system pressure).
1
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l Tiii 0810.6
~
w 16 1.00 POINTS SCT 01P8 03C CONTAINKENT PURGE KSA w RATING TIME.. +-(U.E. CRIT)
STARTUP CONTAINKENT PURGE SYST 029000A301(3.8/4.0) 05 MIN +++
+-(3.9)
The C7NT S/D Purge System is in service when the outside air temperature drops from 45'T to 36'F.
\\
How will the S/D Purge System respond to this occurrence.
1 ANSWER:
Supply fans will trip (when downstream air is <40'F).
e B
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D, 61,081008 l
/
i w 17 1.00 POINTS SNB 02PA 02C SAFETY RELATED 4160 VAC KSA w RATING TINE... -(U.E. CRIT)
SHUTDOWN SAFETY 4160 VAC SYST 062000A305(3.5/3.6) 05 MIN.
-(4.0)
The plant is at 1004 power with all systems in their normal lineups. Annunciator 14A 'S/U XFMR LOCKOUT' alarms due to failure I
e of the startup transformer (SUT).
l Which ONE of the following statements describes what occurs as'a l
result of the SUT failure, i
A.
A load shed occurs on NB02 due to both the normal and alternate feeder breakers being open.
B.
Both emergency diesels NE01 and NE02 start due to l
undervoltage conditions.
C.
An automatic Reactor Trip / Turbine Trip actuates due to loss of power to NB02.
i D.
Both the normal and alternate feeder breakers to NB02 l.
receive a trip signal due to undervoltage.
1 ANSWER:
D.
Both the normal and alternate feeder breakers to NB02 1
receive a trip signal due to undervoltage.
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i
l T 61,0810,8 w 18 1.00 POINTS SNC 01PA 01C SAFETY RE1ATED 480 VAC KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE SATETY RELATED 480 VAC 000058EA203(3.5/3.9) 09NIN..........(4.1)
With the plant in MODE 1, a systen gro,und is being investigated on NK41.
Determine what valves / components will be actuated due to flashing circuit all on NK41.
ANSVER:
- 1. S/C blowdown isolation / closure of BN.HV.1 through BM.HV 4 / Blowdown Containment Isolation valves close(0.5 PT)
- 2. Loss of instrument air to containment / closure of KA.HV.29 / Instrument Air Containment Isolation valve closes (0.5 PT) 4 i
i e
e i
i a
t T61 JO 910.8 e 19 1.00 POINTS SPB.01PA.01C 4160 VAC ELEC. DISTRIBUTION KSA e....... RATINC TIFE.....(U.E. CRIT) l STARTUP 4160 VAC ELEC DIST SYS 000055LA203(3.9/4.7) 07 MIN..........(3.7) i While attempting to energize bus PB03 from transformer KPB03, bus PB03 feeder breaker (PB0306) fails to close from the control room.
Which ONE of the following could NOT be the cause of the feeder breaker (PB0306) failing to close?
A.
Loss of control power to PB03 feeder breaker (PB0306) l B.
186 Lockout on PB03 feeder breaker (PB0306)
C.
186 Lockout on PB03 04 bus tie breaker (PB0401)
D.
Undervoltage on the PB03 bus (127 Relay)
ANSWER:
D.
Undervoltage on the PB03 bus (127 Relay)
j fTC6Ein e 20 1.00 P011rts
$$8 02Pt.01C REACTOR PROTECTION R$A e....... RAT!p0 TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
S OPERATE TME REAC PROT SYSTEN 012000A406(4.3/4.3) 03NIN..........(4.0)
I
~
)
A General Warning Alors occurs on both $$P8 trains (Annunciatosa i
75A and 76A) due to Reactor Trip Sypass treakers when:
i I
I l
A.
both bypass breakers are closed in test position t
l S.
Both bypass breakers are racked in l
1 C.
Both bypass breakers racked tri with either one closed j
D.
Both bypass breakers racked in and closed 1
l
)
ANSWER:
j D.
Both bypass breakers racked in and closed
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COURSE No. 761.cs10 e l
8888!0N NO.
=-
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TOTE 70?AL 7974
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i REVIEWS BY:
MM APPROVED BY:
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j Pag. 1 of 2 CA= 195d i
j 07/14/87 l
TDP-22-00002
1 T6P,0310.8
[90.02.07 UNION E1JLCTRIC COMPANY CALIAWAY TRAININ KXAM GRADING SNEt?
s EXAM NAME: NRC-SR0(SEC-A)L CIASS NAME SRO-LRQL j
TOTAL POINTS 9.00 i
DATE GIVENS 90.02.14 STUDENT ID / NAME: ** DRAFT **
/ *************** DRAFT ***************
QUEST POINT Po!NTS QUEST POINT PCINTS VALUE MISSED VALUE MISSED 1 - ERI-02PA-25860L 1.00 2 - CRX-01PA-208$0L 1.00 3 - CRK-04PA-028$0L 1.00 4 - CRX-04PA-21890L 1.00 J
5 - CRX-06PA-04860L 1.00 6 - SBB-04PG-11860L 1.00 7 - StG-06PC-248$0L 1.00 8 - SEG-03PA-098$0L 1.00 9 - 88P-04PS-17890L 1.00
=
i
+
)
i
[
l TOTAL POINTS MISSED:
FINAL SCORE:
4 i
h
[
=.
T610810.8 0
STATIC SINULhTOR SCENhkIO 90.
l STUDBWT INPORHkTION CALLAWAY PIANT DAILY IDG LINE No.
TIME 1
0000 CONTINUED THE WATCH, MODE 1, 1004 POWER, MWe = 1218, l
2 BANK D 9 209 STEPS j
i 3
0646 RX TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION l
I 4
I 5
i I
6
{
l 7
~
9 l
i 10 l
I 11 l
12 f
13 i
RYCLUTIONS IN PR00RSSS8 1.
STEPS 1 THROUGH 20 or E-0, REACTon TRIP CR SATETY INJECTION MAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
l 2.
TIME IS 0700.
l t
I i
Page 1,_of,,,L, j
l L.-
T 61.0 313,8 e
1 1.00 Po!NTS ERI.02PA 25$e0L RERP IMPLEMENTATION ($RO)
KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
CLAS$1FY EMER EVENT POR RERP 194001A116(3.1/4.4) 07 MIN....++....(4.0)
A loss of offsite power occurs and both emergency diesels.
Nt01 and Nt02, energine their respective emergency buses.
Which ONE of the following Energency classifications and Emergency Action Level is required:
i A.
Alert, 2B B.
Alert, 2C 1
C.
Site Leergency, 2D D.
Site Energency, 2E l
l
)
ANSWER:
C.
Site Energency, 2D I
n
T61*.0310.8 e
2 1.00 POINTS CRR.01PA 20$e0L EKEJtGENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RATING T1RE.....(U.E. CRIT)
REs? TO RX TRIP V/WO $1 000038EA114(4.1/3.9) 05 MIN..........(4.7)
The total AW flowrate is at its present value because of:
A.
Manual throttling to reduce RCS cooldown B.
Automatic throttling by the M.D. AN valves C.
A N pump cavitation D.
Higher than normal $/G pressures ANSWLR:
A.
Manual throttling to reduce RCS cooldown t
G 1
T610810.4 0
a 3
1.00 POINTS CRK 04PA 02So0L EMERGENCY ACTIONS K$A e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESPOND TO A SCTR 000038SA136(4.3/4.5) 08 MIN..........(4.9)
Which ONE of the following is the 5g1508 RCS Incore Thereoccuple Temperature po mitted for RCS depressurization?
A.
535'T 4.
524'T C.
478'T D.
464'T ANSVER:
B, 524'r 4
I
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T61;0110.9 e
4 1.00 POINTS CRK.04?A 215e0L ENERCENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESPOND TO A SCTR 000034EK306(4.2/4.5)
- 0) MIN..........(4.9)
The MR pumps would be stopped and placed in standby:
A locause RCS pressure is stable or increasing.
B. After $/C isolation.
C. Following RCS cooldown initiation.
D. After RCS depressuritation.
h AN$k'ER:
8.
After $/C isolation.
s 1
s T61;0810.8 s
5 1.00 Po!NTS CRK.06PA 04se0L EKERCDCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
INTERPRET / RESP 70 FRC's/C$r's 000038EA145(3.9/4.0) 06 MIN..........(4.9)
Which ONE is the most' limiting valid Critical Safety runction challenge?
A.
ORANCE. CONTAINMENT B.
YEL1hW HEAT SINK C.
ORANCE. $U& CRITICALITY D.
YELihW
$U& CRITICALITY ANSWER:
D.
YEL1hV. $U& CRITICALITY i
T 61'0M O.B m
6 1.00 POINTS SBS.04PC.11So01.
REACTOR C001 ANT KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP. TO REAC C001 ANT OTT.MORM 011000K103(3.7/4.0) 0$NIN..........(4.4)
The failure of the pressuriser instrument occurred pr;or to the reactor trip.
Which ONE of the following describes the INKEDIATE plant response?
A. CVCS letdown isolated and charging flow increased.
B. PZR heaters energized and charging flow decreased.
C. CVCS letdown isolated and PZR heaters energized.
D. Both CVCS letdown and charging flow unaffected.
ANSVER:
B. PZR heaters energized and charging flow decreased.
+
9
T614810.6 e
7 1.00 P01NTS SDC 06PC.245e0L CHD(, & V01AME CONTROL KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO CVCS OFF.N01UEL COND.
103000K108(3.6/3.8) 06 MIN..........(4.2)
Af ter pressuriser level is restored to 204, the normal CVCS charging and letdown systems are to be P aced into service.
l Which ONE of the following signals would require manual reset?
A. $1$ only
- 5. CIS.A only C. Both $1S and CIS.A D. CIS.A and Ci$.B ANSWER:
C. Both SIS and Cis.A 4
e e
m e
T81;0310.9 e
8 1.00 POINTS SEC.03PA 095e0L COMPONENT COOLING VATER KSA e....... RATING TINE.....(U,E. CRIT)
RESP TO CCW $Y$T OPP. NORMALS 008000K401(3.1/3.3) 05NIN..........(4.1)
Component Cooling Vater pump (CCW)
'A' A. Was started by the LOCA sequencer.
B. Was started by the shutdown sequencer.
C. Was in service prior to the plant trip.
D. Started on interlock with
'A' CCP.
ANSWER:
A. Was started by the LOCA Sequencer e
T61<0310.8 e
9 1.00 POINTS
$$P.04P3 17seot PR0ct$s MONITOR $
KSA e....... RATING TI M.....(U.t.
CRIT)
Ets? TO PRoctss MON OPP.MORMS 000038EA204(3.9/4.2) 03NIN..........(0.0)
Which ONE of the'following actions would terminate all potential radiation release paths to the envirorument?
A.
Secure the TDAFP and close the MSIVs S.
Close the Condenser Stean Dumps and secure the TDATP C.
Close the
'A' $/C PORV and close the MSIVs D.
Close the ' A' S/G PORV and close the Condenser Stean Dunpa ANSVER:
C.
Close the 'A' S/C PORV and close the MSIVs l
l l
T61.0310.5 90.02.07 UNICH E12CTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY TRAININ EXAN GRADING SNEET EXAN NAME: NRC-SR0(SEC-A)I CIASS NAME: SRO-LRQL TOTAL POINTS:
9.00 DATE GIVEN: 90.02.14 STUDENT ID / NAME
- DRAIT * *
/ esseeeeeeeee6e* DRAFT ***************
QUEST POINT POINTS QUEST POINT Po!NTS VALUE NISSED 9
VALUE MISSED 1 - SAS-02Pr-228001 1.00 2 - SAS-04PA-028901 1.00 3 - SSS-04PC-058601 1.00 4 - PLM-04 PA-295 $ 0I 1.00 5 - a T-02PE-288401 1.00 6 - Sha-03PA-278901 1.00 7 - SSE-03PC-03840I 1.00
~
S - SSF-02PD-245901 1.00 9 - SST-03PA-188001 1.00
=
TOTAL POINTS HISSED:
FINAL SCOREt e
T 61.0310c8 STATIC SENULATOR SCSM&RIO 90. T61.8801.4 STUD 8NT INFORM & TION CALLAWAY PLANT DAILY 100 LINE No.
TIME 1
0000 MODE 1, Cb = 1135, MWe = 1230, 100% POWER BANK D 9 220.
2 3
0500 A.T.S.
OSP-SF-00002, CONTROL RCD PARTIAL MOVtMEliT 4
COMMENCED CTNT MINIPURGE, CTNT PRESSURE AT 30" 5
0600 COMMENCED 08P-88-00009, RCS LEAR RATE DETERMINATI0!1 6
0615 I6C TROUSLESN00 TING ROD M-14, ALL RODS EXCEPT M-14, ARE DISCONNECTED IN SMUTDOWN BANK
'A'.
LITT COIL 7
TUSE KEEPS BLOWING.
8 9
10 11 12 13 STOLUTIONS IN PROGRBSS
- 1. 08P-BB-00009, RCS LEARRATE
- 2. PRESENT TIME IS 0700 Page Lof_,L i
1
T61'$31k.8 e
1 1.00 POINTS SAA 02Pr.225 01 MAIN STIAM KSA o....... RATING TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE TWE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM M1020K105(3.5/3.6)
MMIN..........(0.0)
Assume 1st stage Pressure Transmitter (AB.PT.505) fails to O PSIC.
Select the ONE response below which correctly describes the response of the condenser staan dumps.
A.
Steam dumps would open since Tggp is now at $57'r and a loss of load arming signal is present.
B.
Steam dumps would open since the turbine trip controller (Tyo toAp) is less than T yg.
A C.
Steam dumps would remain closed since there is no arattig signal present.
D.
Steam d' asps would remain closed since Tagp is still equal to TAVC ANSVT.R:
A.
Steam dumps would open since TRET is now at $57'r and a loss of load arming signal is presort.
T 61,0310.8 e
2 1.00 POINTS gA3 04PA.02$e01 MAIN STEAM KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
EESP 70 MAIN STEAM 0FF.90RMALS 041020A408(3.0/3.1) 0$NIN..........(4.1)
Which ONE of the following would C12AR the ' CONDENSER STEAM DUKP$
VALVES AAKED' lights on ($C066W) MISC TRIP 81STASLE PANEL?
A. Selecting, the OTF/ RESET position on the Steam Dump
$ witches (An.HS.63 & 64)
C. Selecting the RESET position on the $ tees Dump Selector Switch (AB.U$.5002)
D. Selecting the Steam Pressure Mode on the Steam Dump Selector Switch (AS.U$.5002)
ANSWER:
C. Selecting the RESET position on the Steam Dump Selector Switch (AB.U$.5002) t t
l.'
T 61,0310.8 e
3 1.00 P01NTS sas.04PC.05se01 REACTOR C001 ANT KsA e....... BATING T1RE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP. TO REAC COOLANT Orr. NORM 000009EA202(3.5/3.8) 07 MIN..........(4.7)
Which ONE of the following indicates the location of the RCs leak?
A.
14tdown line, upstrean of the Regen Heat Exchanger t.
Regenerative Heat Exchanger Tube taak C.
High Pressure 14tdown Relief Valve DC.V8117 seat leakage.
D.
Charging Line task, between DC.HV.182 and BC.NV.8106 ANSWER:
A.
IAtdoVD Line, upstrean Of the Regen Heat Exchanger.
o
T61,031008 4
1.00 POINTS
$bG.04PA-295e01 CHEM & VOLUME CONTROL KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPERATE REAC MAKEUP CONTR01, 004020A401(3,8/3,3) 06 MIN..........(4.0)
Which ONE of the following describes the condition of the CVCS?
A. Automatic makeup would NOT occur but letdown divert would automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank i
B. Automatic makeup would NOT occur and letdown divert would l
NOT automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank I
C. Automatic makeup would occur and letdown divert would j
l automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank f
1 D. Automatic makeup would occur but letdown divert would NOT i
automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank i
l l
ANSWER:
B. Automatic makeup would NOT occur and letdown divert would NOT automatically shift to the Recycle Hold Up Tank
[
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6
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Tu,oato.6 e
5 1.00 PolWTS SCT.02Pt.28$e01 CONTAINNENT PL4,CE K$A e....... RATINC TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
OPEAATE CONT PURCE SYSTEN 029000A301(3.8/4.0) 04NIN..........(3.7)
Which ONE of the following describes the requirements necessary to restart the containment purge?
A.
Containment Purge may be placed into service only after generating a new release permit R.
Containment Purge may be placed into service using the current permit er generating a new permit C.
Containment Purge may NOT be placed into service due to excessive contains,ent airborne contamination D.
Containment Purge may NOT be placed into service due to failure of the CTNT Purge Isolation signal to fully actuate ANSWER:
A.
Containment Purge may be placed into service only after generating a new release permit i
k
T 61.0810.h a
6 1.00 POINTS
$$A.03PA 275e01 ENGINEERED SAFETY FLATVRES KSA e....... RATING TIKE.... (U.E. CRIT)
RESP 70 ESTA5 OFF. NORMALS 013000K101(4.2/4.4) 06HIN..........(0.0)
Which DNE of the following caused the.' termination of the CTNT sini.
purge ?
A. Containment Isolation Signal. Phase A (Cl$.A)
- 8. Control Roon Ventilation Isolation 8tgnal (CRVIS)
C. Containment Air Monitors (CT.EE.31 or 32)
D. Containment Purge Monitors (CT.RE.22 or 33)
ANSVER:
D. Containment Purge Monitors (CT.RE.22 or 33)
T.61,0310cl o
7 1.00 POINTS
$$E.03PC.03se01 WCLEAR INST 1ttMENTATION KsA e....... RATING TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO WC12.AR INST OFF. NORMS 012000K406(3.2/3.5) 06 MIN..........(4.3)
A plant shutdown to MODE 3 is' commenced.
All of the following are required to be performed EXCEPT!
A. Verify the.tatus of P.13 within ONE hour
- 3. Trip Bistables for N.42 within ONE hour C. Jumper the N.42 input to P.10 D. Verify adequate $DN within the next 15 minutes ANSWER:
- 8. Trip 81 stables for N.42 within ONE hour k
T 61,0310.4 l
e 8
1.00 POINTS ssr.02rD.24se01 i
R0D CONTROL KsA e....... RATING
'f1NE.....(U.E. CRIT)
Ets? To 10D cont *0L orr.NORns 000005EK504(3.4/4.1) onMIN..........(4.3) l 1
4 With no change in existing plant condittens t.he plant l
1s proceeding to MODE 3.
l select which ONE below indicates the latest time allowed to be in MODE 3.
I i
A.
1015 B.
1215 C.
1415 D.
1615 h
F ANSVER:
f s.
1215
( (&ASED ON sHUTDOVN &ANK ROD NOT WITHIN 112 STEPS) h I
i I
1 F
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i
In,oato.h a
9 1.00 POINTS
$$F.03FA 18So01 ROD Colf7ROL KSA e....... RATING TIME.....(U.E. CRIT)
P$RI' ROD ColtTROL SURVEli.1ANCES 00000SEK105(3.3/4.1) 06 MIN..........(4.3)
Which ONE of the following satisfies Shutdown Margin verification requirements?
A.
Control banks rod heights greater then the red insertion limit.
8.
Control banks rod heights greater than the red insertion limit including an allowance for rod M 14 C.
SDN calculation including an allevance to compensate for rod M 14 D.
RCS boron concentration greater than the required SDN boren concentration per Table 1 8 of the curve book.
AN8VER:
C.
SDN calculation including an allowance to compensate for rod M.14 s
.y
l,*.
T8fDIlb.$
i j
90.02.07 UNION ELECTRIC CoKPANY CALIAWAY TRAININ EXAM GRADING SNEET EXAM NAME: NRC-SRO-(SEC-B)
CIASS NAME: SRO-LRQL j
, TOTAL POINTS 20.00 DATE GIVEN 90.02.14 STUDENT ID / NAME: ** DRAFT **
/ *********.****** DRATT ***************
i QUEST gy y
{ %Q QUEST i
1 - ADM-08PA-04C 1.00 2 - CRK-01PA-06C 1.00 l
3 - CRK-01PS-01C 1.00 4 - CRK-02PA-01C 1.00 5 - CRK-02PA-02C 1.00 6 - CRK-06PA-02C 1.00 7 - CRK-06PA-03C 1.00 8 - CTK-02PA-01C 1.00 9 - CTK-06PA-07C 1.00 10 - SAB-04PA-02C 1.00 11 - SAD-03PS-04C 1.00 12 - SBB-04PA-01C 1.00 13 - SBB-05PE-01C 1.00 14 - SBG-06PA-01C 1.00 15 - SEG-03PA-02C 1.00 16 - SGT-01PS-03C 1.00 17 - SNS-02PA-02C 1.00 18 - SNG-01PA-01C 1.00 19 - SPD-01PA-01C 1.00 20 - SSB-02PB-01C 1.00
~
~
~
TOTAL POINTS MISSED:
FINAL SCORE:
161,0810.8 e
1 1.00 Po!NTS ADN.08FA.04c ADMINISTRATIVE ($RO)
KSA e....... RAT!WC title. **.(U.E.
CRIT)
VRITE OPEAATIONAL REPORTS OD000 GEN 03(2.8/3.8) 06 MIN..........(4.0)
The plant is ascending MODES in preparation for initial criticality after a refueling.
$$FS is operable, but the reacter trip breakers have not been closed.
One $/C becomes underfed and a $/C 14/1b 1.EVEL reactor trip signal is actuated.
What is the maxinua time allowed to notify the NRC?
A.
1 Hour B.
4 Hours C.
24 Houn's D.
48 Hourb AN$VER:
8, 4 Hours
16tA316.s e
2 1.00 POINTS ChK.01PA.06C ERERCENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RAT 1pG TEME....*(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO RX TRIP W/WO $1 000007tK301(4.0/4.6)
ObMIN..........(4.7)
The control room is responding to a steam Line Sreak.
Containment pressure has increased to 32 pois and RC8 pressure has decreased to 1700 psig.
Why do the emergency procedures require that the RCP's be tripped for this situation?
AN$VER:
Cl$. B occurred / CCW to RCP's isolated
T61,0810,8 enK.olys. ole e
3 1,00 totyTs DLEACENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RAT!MC TiltE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO RK TRIP W/WO $1 0000$6Dt302(4,4/4,7) 07NIN..........(4,7)
A natural circulation cocidown is in progress due to a sustained loss of offsite power. MbO1 and NbO2 are energised by the energency diesel generators.
RCS subcooling requirements are at least
'T more subcooled than instrument error, ANSVER:
100'T t
i
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IALA8.1.0.4.
e 4
1.00 P01NTS CRK.02PA.01C ENERGENCY ACTIONS RSA e....... RATING' TINE.....(U.E. CRIT) l RESP TO LOSS OF RX/SEC COOLANT 000011tK101(4.1/4.4) 03 MIN......+...(4.9) i u
Following a large break LOCA during the cold les recircu1ation
~
t mode, the core decay heat is being removed by:
A.
Heat transfer from the RCS to the S/G's due to natural t
circulation, j
B.
Heat transfer from the RCS to the S/C's due to reflux boiling.
C.
Injection of water from the RWST and removal of stids/ water cut of the break.
D.
Injection of water from the recirculation sump and the removal l
of steam / water out of the break, h
t ANSWER:
D.
Injection of water from the recirculation sump and the removal
+
of steam / water out of the break.
i i
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+. - -
w
s.
T 61 coa 10.8 w
5 1.00 POINTS CRK.02PA.02C f
ENERGENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RATING TIKE.....(U.E. CRIT)
RESP TO LOSS OF RX/SEC COOLANT 000038tK306(4.2/4.5) 06 MIN..........(4.9) l l
During post LOCA cooldown and depressurization CCP's and $1 pumps are stopped on alternate ECCS trains when possible, f
The reason for using alternate trains is to:
[
A.
Minimize primary leakage while ensuring at. equate subcooling.
i B.
Equalize flows on ECCS trains to maintain pump suction head, t
C.
Increase the probability of RCS injection flow if one ECCS train becomes inoperable.
D.
Equalize loading on the NB buses, since the diesels may be supplyin5 power.
ANSWER.
C.
Increase the probability of RCS injection flow if one ECCS train becomes inoperable.
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6 1.00 p0INTS CRK.06PA.02C ENERGENCY ACTIONS KSA e....... RAT 1pG TINE.....(U.E. CRIT)
INTERPRET / RESP TO FRG's/CSF's 000074GN11(4.5/4.6) 11 MIN..........(4.9) l The unit was operating at full power when it experienced a loss of i
The following plant conditions exist I hour after the event:
75' superheat Subcooling noters 651'F increasing" Core exit thermocouples t
384 stable RVLIS full range All secured RCP's 250,000 lbs/hr AUX feed flow (total)
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Energized. Ne'gative SUR i
Source Ranges 452'T increasing RCS CL temperatures 1100 psig stable RCS WR pressur6 19 psig stable f
CTNT pressure PER level 04 i
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l CTNT Temperature 125'F stable i
S/G NR Levels:
24%
C 384 j
A 394 D
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224 S/G Pressures:
1185 psig C
1180 psig A
1180 psig D
1202 psig B
Per the critical safety functions, which plant proced,ure must be implemented?
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a
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