ML20033E817
| ML20033E817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033E816 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9003140295 | |
| Download: ML20033E817 (4) | |
Text
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+1 UNITED STATES A
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.
154 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 MTRODUCTION By letter dated January 17, 1989, the Power Authority of the State of New York PASNY or the licensee), submitted an amendment to the Technical Specifications TS) for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment would:
- 1) establish controls for the valves in the Standby Gas Treatment System SGTS) which are used for primary containment inerting and deinerting to ensure the integrity and operability of the SGTS if a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurs while inerting or deinerting the prirary containment; (2) describe actions to be taken in the event a primary containment isolation valve becomes inoperable and actions which ensure maintenance of containment isolation capability; (3) specify the maximum opening angle for the containment vent and purge valves; and (4) reflect the addition of new containment isolation valves in the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System (RBCLCWS) and exclusion of them from quarterly surveillance requirements applied to other primary containment isolation valves. By letter dated October 25, 1989, the licensee supplied information which better explained some of the details of its submittal and identified the penetrations associated with the RBCLCWS proposed cha60e. The information served to clarify the submittal but did not alter thi ution noticed in the Federal Register on April 5,1989, or affect the stW 's determination that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazard.
EVALUATION The first purpose of the proposed amendment would be accomplished by specifying that the 6-inch line to the SGTS and Valve No. 27 MOV-121 would be used for inerting or deinerting the primary containment whenever a vent path is needed and primary containment integrity is required.
If a LOCA should occur while the valve is open, calculations performed by the licensee show that the maximum flow through the line would be limited such that the pressure drop across the SGTS filter assembly will not exceed the design limits.
Thus, the probability of a LOCA adversely affecting the operability or availability of the SGTS is reduced.
Restricting vent paths to the use of Valve No. 27 MOV-121 during normal plant operation does not adversely impact
' the normal primary containment inerting and deinerting activities, 003140293 900305 pDR p
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In order to ensure that the only primary containment vent path available to the SGTS is through Valve No. 27 MOV-121, the proposed TS amendment would add a surveillance requirement to ensure that Valve No. 27 MOV-120 is verified closed whenever primary containment integrity is established, and then monthly thereafter.
This valve is in the 20-inch primary containment vent line to the SGTS. The potential exists to exceed the allowable differential pressure across the SGTS filter assembly if the valve is open when a LOCA occurs, which could cause a loss of integrity of the SGTS. Maintaining this valve shut whenever primary containment integrity is required, does not adversely affect normal plant operation.
The.second purpose of the proposed amendment would be accomplished by specifying that, if an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7-1 becomes inoperable, at least one isolation valve in the penetration which is open must he operable and (1) restore the inoperable valves _ to operable status within four hours, or (2) isolate the penetration within four hours using at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the closed position (the amendment would allow a valve closed for this purpose to be reopened intermittently under administrative control and the containment vent and purge valves to be opened for safety related reasons), or (3) isolate the psnetration within four hours using at least one closeo manual valve or a blind flange.
If this condition cannot be met, an orderly shutdown must be started and the reactor must be in a cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The result of this proposed change, therefore, is to strengthen and specify controls related to the primary containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.7-1 over the present TS requirements. The present TS do not specify a time limit for restoration of an inoperable valve, for isolation of the affected penetration, or provide allowence for operation of valves which are closed to provide isolation of the affected penetration with an inoperable valve.
Additionally, the present TS do not require that, if an isolation valve is inoperable, its companion isolation valve must be operable when the penetration is open. Since double isolation valves are provided on piping Ifsted in Table 3.7-1, the result of this proposed TS change is to more clearly specify the required status of the operable isolation valves when one valve is inoperable. Administrative controls (tagging or procedures) will be used to address the conditions under which the operable isolation valve will be opened on an intermittent basis.
For example, this condition could exist if one of the drywell sump valves became inoperable.
Since this would require that its companion valve be shut and deactivated, the controls would be designed to allow the operable valve to be open periodically so that the sump could be pumped out.
The proposed change would also 4 W use of a closed manual valve or a blind flange as an alternative to either repairing an inoperable primary containment valve or use of a deactivated automatic valve secured in the the closed position.
This is satisfactory since the contingency is explicitly stated in the Standard Technical Specifications.
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~3-The third purpose of the proposed amendment, containment vent and purge maximum opening angle, is designed to ensure operability of the designated valves during a design basis LOCA.
By limiting the valves to the angles specified, calculations performed by the licensee have shown that the valves will close under the loads imposed during a design basis LOCA. Thus, integrity of the primary containment is enhanced.
The final purpose of the proposed amendment, RBCLCWS isolation valves, would be accomplished by listing the subject valves and specifying that they be cycled whenever the reactor is in the cold condition for a period exceeding 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, unless they have been cycled within the preceding 92 days. These valves were added to the RBCLCWS in order to comply with Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria 57. They are air operated, normally open and are designed to fail open on loss of electrical power and "as is" on loss of instrument air. A Seismic Class 1 accumulator tank for each valve allows operation of the valve upon loss of instrument air for at least 2 full valve cycles.
The valves are designed to permit continued cooling water supply to the Recirculation System pump motor coolers and the drywell coolers during normal plant operation and accident conditions. Should the need arise, the valves can be shut by the operator from the control room.
The testing frequency ensures that the valves are tested at least once each operating cycle and more frequent 1y'if dictated by plant conditions (cold shutdown lasting longer than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />). The valves are specifically exempted from the quarterly surveillance tests required for other normally open, power-operated isolation valves by the proposed amendment since operation of the valves during power operation might cause equipment damage. Thus, the testing requirements ensure that the valves are operable.
SUMMARY
All of the proposed TS changes contained in the amendment serve to better ensure maintenance of containment integrity and component o)erability.
They are consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications w1ere applicable, and establish improved controls relating to the primary containment.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change will not adversely affect the conclusions reached in either the Final Safety Analysis Report or the Fitzpatrick Safety Evaluation Report accident analysis.
The proposed TS changes are, therefore, acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and changes to the surveillance requirements.
The stafi has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that l
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no i
significant hazards consideration and there has been no pubic comment on such I
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3 finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
l CONCLUSION Based on.the considerations discussed above, the staff concludes that:-
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the. health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,' and (2) such activities
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will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical-to the common defense and I
, security or to the health snd safety of the public.
Dated: March 5, 1990 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:
D. LaBarge I
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