ML20033C924

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Submits Evaluation of Addition of Third Emergency Feedwater Pump.Three Pumps evaluated:turbine-driven,motor-driven & diesel-driven.No Pump Design Satisfied Proposed NRC or AIF Cost/Benefit Criteria
ML20033C924
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/1981
From: Baynard P
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F-1181-33, NUDOCS 8112040497
Download: ML20033C924 (4)


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  1. 3F-1181-33 S

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Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 s,

Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Addition of Third Emergency Feedwater Pump

Dear Mr. Denton:

Pursuant to our letters dated November 6,1980 (IREP Study Recommendations),

March 6,1981 (Nuclear Safety Task Force Followup), and August 11,1981 (Emergency Feedwater System Upgrade), Florida Power Corporation has evaluated the addition of a third emergency feedwater (EFW) pump. By this letter, we hereby share with you the results of our evaluations.

Three options were evaluated for the third EFW pump. These were: a turbine-driven pump, a motor-driven pump with a c'edicated diesel generator, and a diesel-driven pump. In addition, two steam supply options and three pump suction options were evaluated. The enhancement in reliability for each option was compared with the reliability of the proposed two-pump system (including an upgraded initiation and control system as described in our August 11,1981, letter to Mr. John F. Stolz).

The costs of the various options having the greatest reliability were estimated and the core melt frequency (assuming loss of off-site power (LOOP)) was calculated for each of the three EFW system configuratiens. Data from WASH-1400 was used to correlate degraded core to risk parameters 'in terms of early deaths, latent deaths, property damage, and radiation dosage. The derived risk parameters associated with core melt are:

ool J

II O!ddd General Office 32o1 Tnir y-fourtn street soutn. P O Box 14042. St Petersburg. Rorida 33733 e 813-866-5151

Mr. Harold R. Denton

  1. 3F-1181-33 Noven ber 30,1981 Page 2 Early Fatalities per core melt

= 0.6 Equivalent Early Fatalities per core melt

  • 2.0 2

Latent Fatalities per core melt

= 420 Property Damage per coce melt

= $780 x 106 Radiatica Dosage per core met

= 4.2 x 106 man-rem

  • ACRS uses equivalent early fatalities in determining safety goals.

The equivalent early death figure accounts for the perceived severity differential between high fatality - low probability accidents and low fatality - high probability accidents.

The product of the LOOP frequency, the probability of con melt af ter LOOP, and the derived risk parameters is the societal risk parameter.

[ societal }

[f oop

[P m/ LOOP

[ derived i

L x

c x

risk risk

=

parameter parameterj j

j The societal risk parameter results are shown in Table 1, along with the ACRS and AIF safety goals. In all cases, the results are at least three orders of magnitude below the safety goals.

The first part of the analysis provided an evaluation of the cost / benefit ratio of the third pump configurations as compared to the two-pump configuration. This is achieved by dividing the differential cost of the modification compared to the base case by the change in societal risk, over a 30 year plant lifetime. For each type of risk evaluated, the incremental cost of the third train designs is not jutifiable under the safety benefit guidelines suggested for use in the regulatory process (ACRS) or the nuclear industry proposed guidelines (AIF).

Based upon the results of our evaluation, Florida Power Corporation has concluded that addition of a third EFW pump is not necessary for the bliowing reasons:

The unavailaoility of the CR-3 upgraded two-pump EFW system (2 x 10-4) is similar to the typical EFW system value (1.5 x 10-4) presented in WASH-1400 Appendix 5, Table V-4-1.

The CR-3 existing two-pump system (with upgrade installed) exceeds all of the proposed safety criteria.

.- -~

s Mr. Harolc R. Denton

  1. 3F-il81-33 Novembe. 30,1981 Page 3 None of the three pump designs satisfy the proposed NRC or AIF cost / benefit criteria.

Very truly yours, Rh' Y

Dr. P. Y. Baynard Manager Nuclear Support Services DGM:mm Attachment i

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TABLEI COST / BENEFIT RESULTS

SUMMARY

Upgraded Steam Driven Diesel Driven Diesel Gen. Proposed Proposed COMMENTS 2-Pump Sys.

3rd Pump 3rd Pump 3rd Pump AIF NRC Goa!

Goal EFW Failures /Yr.

2 x 10-4 2 x 10-5 5 x 10-6 5 x 10 -6 None Dollars to Install 5.9 x 106 7.5 x 106 3,9 x 106 None Core Melts 1.1 x 10-5 3.4 x 10-6 3.4 x 10-6 3,4x 10-6 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4 Rx - Yr Early Deaths 2.2 x 10-5 6.8 x 10-6 6.8 x 10-6 6.8 x 10-6 3 x 10-1 Rx - Yr Upgraded System Latent Deaths 4.5 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.4 Exceeds All Proposed Rx - Yr Safety Goals Total Deaths 4.5 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 8 x 10-1 Rx - Yr Dollars

  • Man-Rem Averted 6,340 8,060 9,564 100 1,000 $

Dollars

  • Early Death Averted 1.3 x 1010 1.6x 1010 2.0x 1010 3 x 106#

Modifications Do Not Meet Proposed Cost / Benefit Dollars

  • Criteria Latent Death Averted 6.3 x 107 8.1 x 107 9.6 x 107 1 x 106#

Dollars Property Damage Averted 34 43 51 2

  • - Assumes 30 Year Plant Life

$ - Regulatory Guide 1.110 " Cost-Benefit Analysis for Radwaste Systems for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants"

  1. - NUREG-0739 "An Approach to Quantitative Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants"