ML20033C571

Forwards Final Evaluations of SEP Topics II-1.B Re Population distribution,II-1.C Re Potential Harzards Due to Nearby Transportation,Institutional,Industrial & Military Facilities & III-4.D Re Site Proximity Missiles

ML20033C571
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	11/27/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Counsil W, Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
References
TASK-02-01.B, TASK-02-01.C, TASK-03-04.D, TASK-2-1.B, TASK-2-1.C, TASK-3-4.D, TASK-RR LSO5-81-11-070, LSO5-81-11-70, NUDOCS 8112030443
Download: ML20033C571 (20)

Text

-

o

.m November 27, 1981 LD/ A Docket No. 50-245 Q

/p LS05 11-070 6

g (9

Mr. W. G. Couns11, Vice President ghg wf Nuclear Engineering and Operations Northeast Nuclear Energy Company y

y s'y' Post Office Box 270 f

Hartford, Connecticut 061 01 k7 8

c

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPICS II-1.B. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION; II.l.C. POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO NEA2f TRANSPORTATION, INSTITUTIONAL INDUSTRIAL AND HILITARY FACILITIES; III-4.0, SITE PROXIMITY HISSILES -

MILLSTONE UNIT 1 Enclosed are the staff's final evaluations of SEP Topics II-1.B. II-1.C and III-4.D for the Millstone plant. These evaluations are based on the safety analysis provided by your letters dated May 19, 1981 and April 29, 1981 for Tc, pics II-1.B and II-1.C respectively and April 29,1981 as supplmented September 17, 1981 for Topic III-4.D. The evaluations com-pare your facility as described in Docket No. 50-245 with the criteria currently usec for licensing new facilities.

You will note the evaluations conclude thr^ Millstone Unit 1 meets the acceptance criteria for Topics II-1.B and ;II-4.D. However, the staff has disagreed with your cor.clusion that Topic II-1.C meets current lic-ensing criteria. Specifically, we do not agree with your conclusion that propane does not pose a hazard to the plant. Propane can fom a potentially explosive mixture in air and thus could affect safety related structures, systems and components.

In addition, propane is heavier than air and the shipping route is located upgrade from the plant. Historical data has shown that propane clouds have been known to travel significant distances before exploding. Therefore, we request that you provide further justification for your conclusion that propane does not pose a hazard to the plant or show that plant safety related structures, systems ggoV and components can withstand the effects of a propane explosion.

In order y

to resolve this issue prior to the plant integrated assessment, we request j

that you provide tne requested information within 60 days of receipt of p

.}

this letter.

These evaluations will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. These assessments may b' evised in the future if your M h 2s:sho O!dddh5 PDR i

OF FICE )

SURNAME)

D ATE )

mc ronu m om nace m OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usw e--

r

. facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to these subjects are modified oefore the integrated assessment is complete.

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

See next page r7VW SEP.

SEP :SL.

SEP:BC ORB #5 ORB #5/C'~

AD't' DL

...... udi..,c......

"GER.............. ".

omca>

[;.. " """

""W6ssE1T"' '"J5Hus"

4.U6EhrisTd

^

GCw ina:d t

..............p suaac-s>

...l.1L! '.'./.a1...

.n/.M/a.1........).119.28.1.....).1./.20../

.1..

...l.lIU/.6L.....U N.B.l...

ocre >

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usom osi-s*=

NHCFORM 318 (10-80) NRCM O240 J

I MILLSTONE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC i;

Il-1.B. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

\\

I.

INTRODUCTIO_N The safety objective of this _ topic is to ensure that the previously-

- established low population zone and population center distance specified for the site are compatible with the current population distribution, and are in accordance with the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.

II.

REVIEW CRITERIA Sections 100.10 and 100.11 of 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria" provides the site evaluation factors which should be considered when evaluating sites for nuclear poder reactors. These sections include guidelines for determining the exclusion area, low population zone.and i

population center distance.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic II-1.A, reviews the licensee's control over the exclusion area.

i Various other topics will evaluate tne capabiity of the plant to meet l

the dose criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 at the exclusion area boundary and low population zont. The adequacy of emergency preparedness planning for the area surrounding the plant including the low population zone is being assessed by the Commission in a separate review effort.

I l

l l

\\

~

't*"e%

-*r*+n

, w e sy-c w w,

e.

,,ypq,,

p.+7-.m.~-,,

/

I IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES

-The review has been conducted in accordance with Standard. Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.1.3, "P0pulation Distribution."

~

a V.

EVALUATION As shown on the attached Figure 1, the 50-mile radius from the Millstone site encompasses parts of three states - Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York. The total resident population within this area was 2.5 million in 1970. The Low Population Zone (LPZ) has been defined as beina outside of the exclusion area but anywhere else within a 2.4 mile radiur. The attacned Figure 2 depicts the area included in the LPZ.

The mmximum dose received by any individual in this zone, following the hypothetical Design Basis Incident, would be less than the guidelines

.pretented in 10CFR Part 100.

There are no residents within the Exclusion Area.

T i

I The nearest population center, as defined in 10CFR Part 100 is New London, a

Connecticut. The Millstone site is located 3.2 miles west - southwest of the New London town limits.

Population distributions have recently been developed using the most recent available data as part of the E=ergency Planning requirements j

of Appendix E to 10CFR part 50.

Figure 3 is the 1980 projected resident population rose for the Millstone site out to a 50 mile radius, de-i picted in 22 zones each, represented by a compass direction and an identifying alpha-numeric character. Figure 4 is the 1980 projected j

total population distribution for a 50 mile radius around the Millstone site which includes both residential and transient population.

The j

estimates of seasonal population in the vicinity of the Millstone site (0-20 mile radius) are based on increased use of su=mer dwellings.

These estimates include the following assumptions:

j-1.

The capacity of public lodgings is 7,045 persons 2.

The capacity of the Rocky Neck camping facilities is 1,425 3.

Average day users at State parks is 8,100 The coastal land beyond the 20-mile radius attracts many visitors over l

the su=mer months; however, the majority of shore visitors in the Connecticut - Rhode Island area are local residents. Their presence l

at the shore is more representative of a shift in location within the area covered than it is of a net increase in population. No significant l

variations in population occur in periods shorter than by season since the residents typically live around their place of employment. Data on such daily population shifts is unavailable.

i l

Significant governmental, 'public, and private instituti7ns within 10 miles of the Millstone site ~are as follows:

1 I

Nearest Staff /

Name Location Sector Distance -(Miles)

Employee;s U. S. Navy Groton NNE 8.0 16,250 Submarine Base General Dynamics,

_Groton ENE 5.5 20,000 Electric Boat Co.

1 Pfizer (Chemicals)

Groton.

ENE 5.5 2,700 Connecticut College New London NE 5.5 2,07o Mitchel College New London ENE 3.5 1,185 t

U. S.. Coast New London NE 5.5 1,630 l

Guard Academy I

As stated earlier, there are no residents within the Exclusion Area of the Millstone Station.

Although the total population has increased within -

the 2.4 mile LPZ, the populatica distribution has not changed significantly.

The nearest population center is still the city of New London, Connecticut.

,The New London town line is 3.2 miles east-northeast of the Millstone site.

I i

VI. CONCLUSION i

The staff concludes that the low population zone and population center distances specified for the Millstone site is in conformance with the 1

requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 in that the population center distance is one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer.

boundary of the low population zone.

We further conclude that the site conforms to the current licensing criteria for this topic. This completes the evaluation of SEP Topic II-1.B for the Millstone site.

VII. REFERENCES 1.

Standard Review Plan, Section 2.1.3.

2.

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.

1 3.

D. L. Ziemann letter to D. Bixel, dated November 27, 1979.

}

I s

L

V M O*

• • M T

_MW yy C

(

d~',

j s

A h

E Q

_z l

5 3

&k P.

i A

'r., ?

/n an g

i b

N 4

m (*^

ub.

I.

M. '

~f O

i

,..;= 3 h'

(

/

~

m

)

r

\\,

~

.gq,,g

\\

\\

jg

\\

O l

oC'

\\

u 2,

)

'\\

n u

g-

. \\.

t U %,

g' N' -

s

$ p 1

[

x i.

(_

g

- s}

=

[

N 7 _.

p

~

~

g

,'s t

i g

'i i

O

.g

.mf

/

O 1

1 J-

\\

f*

h

.s

~~%

?

g L.

i t

\\

t

.~. 3

\\f?'

s9 m

d

tic /','.-'.%,

p,L.-Q n

-y

• • e w

~- -

yj... ' \\g.h b

\\.-s h

\\

s 4 e *..2. w. w, m p,y51 5

- 1 n

• M

-L jfhT jfR a

1-g m pipc.: u'?g$-l' y1 S'h

\\

Sh'V.?,*.

. M':' ' 'ir'

mc m.g.p q I'

n

,.-. w r;Vh.

Y ?'R' u m, j

~

m;

. ;s

{g

~

~ t,l s-2

..i w :..

N, d..w -+- y. m.

-i.

s g

da

.".y - j[ T

~,

-s

l. -

r' A

??,_ '

&.,. * ?. * -

.-)

'f g

• Q,u h,I-..

h g

's

.qu f

s s

a T w.c' J;

• as.,,.::)ts}.

3

,er...e.q;,.r~rpp.'Q.+e*3g

- '- ~ * ' ag 5 ' f,,,,

p

%

• s,

[

1. f,,,'e f

,, '. * %}j, o. '

• s.te ' : e

~?

. [?.[;

Jf E

-.'.y - p. '~ g.

y p[.y[4 o_.

u.) 'o.gyg,y } i 4

l.

.Q.. Wv. 3

. ; ')$.'

-m,%,.y).a.!

V;K. ' : Il 1

v.

3 3

uh,.

c 1

g

},,

+

=.6

, l/

+.~,.p...

seV gn

. -s.

t

/Q

,- n.... s[.g, n.g.

/

~~*

}

y.

i.

p

1. c~

I t*

.{N n

t-1,,

%,,rb.,, v,-r,1f,

... %. *.- ~ #

g

.r

..,:.10

• lE* ~ ' "d ~, P pf. e,

W:.,&,,:.',r

• s,,

9 /a*".

g

' ' ' =

'// l'

,/*f

\\ g { '

u

.m.

^//.9l I

.m.~g.,.W/p,

• I- }

4.

.,. ar*.; *.

r

.~

• t **

- r... -

g.

g*

2;.

y.

J n,;

,.e (2:e..,

t 5

a 7

,s.

e

.c.,

1 I

,n g.. g

,j 2

s i.

, il

. j t-e'.

{p

,\\

.q.

-2 N

A.-

-, p t c..-, m. )'

,5 a <

.. %gA- ' *, a

)

... z.

9 g

. f-. q 93 j"

• >,. '. ~~.w 7;.

i, 1

.a

=

sY i/SD,f.h. ' I

.i C

~

f

. ). N= c-.,.. r mM #g % Q. r.:r s..s

~

s j

O

,1

.v.

e, I 1 s

r 1

.T

~ * ~, =+a.s

.%...;h.

3

-::..n s '-...

m~

.9 ish C j.~ w,,;.,--

.r-.. - i g.. : <

• ' ; W. :

4.~, y*

n...,,;e w-

pp ;..n4++.

M, n

.,cg.-)W...f. g:

y I,s m,h.]U,7 N

.' ', I

~

t

-/

w..'( NA%j.--

'b s.

",g,* -f

=

- *- '9,u#M. [,

[

Ts. ln~ ^. ;. m**h /

s.t.4.*g n-.,&.~- &.~N Y~.

4-C,&, g

~

5

.,c..

• W sp \\

m.

a

' e-

.. p -

h%

.y -

pa p

-,. g 2

bh!

,(

A.,**

,.4 a.

1. /

s:

f es

... b.V.Yy ~'

l

?Y '.

~ ~ - - - ", ' '

M 'e

'55)

. f; u

I Jf

.g.ts ',$ (*....h, 2 h

5*

s f ***

- } - - -- ~ ~

o

+

e s

ti~~ "~~

h

~

4 i

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Figure 3 1980 PROJECTED RESIDENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 4

g ) M4*

8 (4) g gtSt21 IfJ eg 1st,1 as,33 8

ss%)

EI282 j,

fe, 4, '<,

f+*

sit' 9*s1

/

se1 s<n, r.,,,

s, it) 883 g

o,4 3

1 r

.e es -

sn

t C $

tss

.ro

. '9 e /p$

+

,,;;~

.+

n,

~,

b "%

1\\0 E

f Js,

s s

11

'3J

$g 4

1,g,

,,, o

 ?.

p en szus s

t tr>., # +<,

's,,,

.1

• g S

v1:

s,#

1. p g-t1 l Js, 4

'e E5i E

5iile

- % ~

~5 ps t o,h s*

s\\\\5*i3 t

e s

E

" c * '%

s v x\\,/

+,,,g g;O~='y$

=

33s1

~

3,,

., s a = = * * *. /

i ' :) =} rn===.

. g..i-n.

==ees,

=

e

-t 1-

,a e

3.,,

. 8g a

e i

_a g

0 5,3 g

g

~

a e

i s

d' t

'oj, s

b' 8

4,,

s 1,

S*

9 a,,

p, s

'2* t 1

r r,,,

yt' by,,

3,,

• +

q p*

e r

p*

ll q

9#

I (JJ til \\*I Fa* Iff KEY N = 1913 RE310ENT POPULAil0N

• l ry b

~,

v

(

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Figure 4 1980 PROJECTED TOTAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 4

gs) ***

1. I4; stas 1'

'*J 18 1stit 3 sag 3 I

8 sss3

!!!st 4,, fej p'

s111 9es1 h,

O O

1102 8887r 4

4

+

!!\\

,4 Y

C$

s.'

s1s 12s

,'r,,#s

~

N S

sss ;

sss n,, '

,, s, int Jfr

s or,4 e,%'

s 8e W

. '94

!s,

s r A2%3 C]hy s

10S

• • St h

'.!o, se f

1sti 1402 4,

4

,Q

~

9 E 55:

E $#

&, Tss nasj, '#

1l$iI *i %

5 4

, 'e,

• I5II!'!!:,Et g

' /,, ',, o, +

2'

's

$33E' r

g, E 5.5.g te 3)3 Y i * *

'E I

5 5 f' C 1] _ =_ - ;_

=

s

-111

e.,

s s

e s

~

8 di a

q-3, e,

a a

ei s

O P fs 0

0 g

6 a g

o

1. , D r

2 g

4 's s 8s M

a S

'0 p

e, 4,

g

+,

Jr.,,

}'

3 f,,

S

y$

oy s,

Ps s

• '4g,

, s

'I90 1

$\\

,9 f

e p**

\\ uitf 5 7RCu s

8 (J)

SS W Fat:ufT KET M - 1880 POPULATION (INCLUDES RE3:0ENTS AND TRAN31ENi$)

6

MILLSTONE 1 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM

~

11-1.C, POTENTIAL HAZARDS'DUE T0

.(

NEARBY TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTIONAL INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY FACILITIES 1.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of this topic is to ensure that the integrity of the safety-related structures, systens and components would not be jeopardized due to the potential for hazards originating at nearby facilities.

II.

REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Basis,"

of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"

requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components k,

important to safety be appropriately protected against events and con-ditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant.

111.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic III-4.D, " Site Proximity flissiles reviews the extent to which the facility is protected against missiles originating from offsite facilities.

TV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.1-2.2.2, " Identification of Potential Hazards in Site Vicinity."

l i

i

2 i

V.

EVALUATION 4

Three significant industrial complexes exist within 10 miles of the-Millstone site.

These are:

~

Approximate No.

Name Location

_ _of Employees Distance Sector j

Dow Chemical Corp.

Ledyard 300 10 miles NE (general chemicals)

Pfizer Corp.

Groton 2,700 5.5 miles ENE (general chemicals)

Electric Boat Groton 20,000 5.5 miles ENE (Division of General Dynamics -submarines)

In addition to the submarine base and Coast Guard Academy there is a i

training headquarters at Camp O'Neil :n East Lyme for Connecticut j

Army National Guard units.

Camp O'Neil is owned and operated by the Military Department of the State of Connecticut.

It consists of 80 adres on which there are located 70 buildings for various purposes.

It is an administrative training center for troops of the. Connecticut Army National Guard.

i On a full-time basis, besides a small contingent of post operations personnel, it contains the headquarters for the Connecticut Military Academy, the 745th Signal Company, and an Organizational Maintenance i

Shop (regional maintenance of vehicles and equipment).

On a part-time basis, during various weekends from March through November, it is occupied by troop units for administrative training, billeting, and supply functions.

Because of the administrative nature of its occupancy, the camp's operation has no effect on station operation.

No other military operations such as firing ranges, military airfields, ordinance depots, and missile sites exist near the site.

The area around the Millstone site was investigated and found to contain no explosives, chemicals, airborne pollutants, flammable or dangerous gases, nor tanks or pipelines near enough to the site to pose a danger if they were to explode or burn.

i i

A railroad right-of-way of the Penn Central Company transverses the site l

t from east to west.

The mainline tracks are about 0.5 miles from the

(

Unit 1 Reactor Building and upgrade from the plant.

Traffic on the spur i

I of the mainline track which extends onto the site is controlled to min-i l

imize the possibility of railroad traffic related accidents.

i i,

i i

A spur of the Penn Central railroad serves the Millstone Nuclear Power Station exclusively.

The switch for that spur is ncrmally set ~

for through traffic. To reach any station facility, the locomotive must pass through a second switch, which is normally set to direct

_J traffic past the station to a dead end near the sound.

Therefore, the possibility of unauthorized transport of hazardous materials does 4

not exist on the spur.

Hazardous materials that are shipped on the track which crosses the site between New Haven and New London include Chlorine, Anhydrous Ammonia, Carbon Dioxide, Propane, Ethyl Alcohol, Rosin, Ammonium Nitrate, and Hydrochloric Acid. Among these materia's,. only the shipmer.t of propane (about 44 carloads per year) is in the " frequently shipped quantitics of hazardous material" category as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.78.

Propine gas is heavier than air anc can form a potentially explosive 4

mixture in air. Since the tracks are upgrade from the plant and past evidence has shown that propane can travel a significant distance and explode, an accidental propana relea,se could affect plant safety.

Therefore, the licensee must provide assurance that the plant safety related structures, systems and components are adequately protected from an accidental propane release.

The effect of accidental gaseous releases on control room operators is evaluated as part of the TMI Action Plan, Item III.D.3.4, " Control Room Habitability" and as such is independent of the SEP program.

1 There are no grade grossings on or adjacent to the site at which hazardous materials might be trans arted across the tracl;.

There are no major gas transmission lines within 5 miles of the site.

The nearest low pressure gas distribution line is more than 3 miles from the site and is located at the corner of Clark Lane and the Boston Post Raad in Waterford.

i The closest oil transmission line is approximately E miles from the site in Groton, Connecticut.

]

Because they are 5 miles or more away from the site, both the gas and i

oil transmission lines constitute no threat to the safe operation of Millstone Unit No.1 or to the site in general.

Ships that pass by the site in the shipping channels of Long Island Sound are of two types: general cargo freighters which usually are partially unloaded with drafts of 20 to 25 feet and deep draft tankers with drafts of 35 to 38 feet. Both of these ship classes must remain at least 2 miles offshore for fear of running aground on Bartlett Reef.

)

-a i

4 No oil barges pass to the shore side of Bartlett Reef; and, since there are no tank farms in Niantic Bay, no oil barges pass within 2 miles of the site.

The possible damage to the pump house by a drifting barge was investi-gated. The barge can only approach the pump house through the intake j

channel which is perpendicular to the front of the pump house.

The -

5 relatively shallow bay bottom surrounding the intake channel will pre-i vent the barge from hitting the pump house from its sides. Should a barge hit the pump house from the front, damage will be limited to the front wall of the recirculation distribution box which projects seaward from the pump house. The service water pumps which are the only safety related equipment housed in the pump house are located approximately 40 feet from the front wall.

The operation of these pumps will not be impaired and the water intake source will not abe blocked as the water intake source lies between El (-) 28 ft - 0. in. and-(-) 8 ft - 0 in.

i For these reasons, the staff has concluded that shipping r.ccidents would not adversely affect any safety related facilities.

There are presently two small commercial airports within 7 miles of the site, New Londor. (Waterford) Airport and Trumbull Airport. No plans are anticipated by the owners of the airports for expansion of airpcrt facil ities.

Trumbull Airport, apprcximately T miles east of the site, handles regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights, but is inadequate for handling le.rge jets, j

New London Airport, h miles nortn of the site, is relatively small and handles nc regularly scheculed co==ercial air traffic. Maximum runway length is 2000 feet.

Except for occasional sightseeing t-ipa over the c

site, the landing patterns are such that most planes are at least 3-1/2 miles from the site.

l Trurbull Airport has three runways: 5-23 which is 5000 feet long, 15-33 which is h000 feet long, and 10-28 which is 3000 fee.

ong and unlighted. Due to lL:ited traffic at Trumbull, there it no control tower. Eovever, Instru=ent Landing Syste=s (ILS) service is available i

on runway 5-23 and Very-High Frequency Omni Range (VOR) service is available on runway 5-23 from Quonset Approach Control.

The air lane nearest to the site is V58 which is approximately h miles l

northeast of the site.

Other adjacent air lanes include V16, which is approximately 6 miles northwest of the site, and V308, which is approximately 8 miles east of the site. The nearest high-altitude jet route, J121-581, passes approxi=ately 9 miles southeast of the j

i site. A second jet route, J55, passes approximately 12 miles to the ncrthwest of the site.

Based upon the size of the airports and the location of flight paths, the impact of an airplane on Millstone Unit No.1 is highly unlikely.

Topic III-4.D. Site Proximity Missiles contains a more detailed analysis of aircraft hazards to the site.

The nearest major highway which would be used for frequent transportation a

of hazardous materials is U. S. Route 95, which is located at a distance of 4 miles from the Millstone site.

This separation distance exceeds the minimum distance criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1; and, therefore, provides assurance that any transportation accidents resulting in explosions of truck size shipments of hazardous materials will not have an adverse effect on the safe operation of the plant.

This separation distance also eliminates the possibility of a toxic' gas release adversely affecting the safe operation of the plant.

VI. Cenclusions We have concluded that Millstone Unit No.1 is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to in-dustrial, transportation, and military activities in the vicinity of the plant with the exception of the potential hazard due to the shipment

^

of propane gas as discussed above.

Therefore, in order to assure that the plant can be operated safely with respect to offsite hazards, the licensee must provide assurance that a potential propane release will not affect the plant.

Y i

?

s #.

VII.

References 1.

Standard Review Plan Section 2.2.1-2.2.2, lientification of Potential Ea:ards in Site Vicinity.

2.

Regulatory Guide 1 91, Revision 1.

3.

D. L. Zie= ann letter to D. Bixel, dated November 27, 1979, a

h.

Millstone Unit No. 3 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.

M e

i l

a.

MILLSTONE UNIT 1 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC TOPIC III-4.D. SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES a

(INCLUDING AIRCRAFT)

I.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of this topic is to ensure that the integrity of the safety-related structures, systems and ' components would not be jeopardized due to the potential for a site proximity missile.

II.

REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criterion 4 " Environmental and Missile Design Basis."

of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,"

to 10 CFR Par'. 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"

requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be appropriately protected against events and conditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic II-l.C, " Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial and Military Facilities" provides a description of the potential hazardous activity in the site vicinity.

IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3, "Evaluction of Potential Accidents," 3.5.1.5, " Site Proximity Missiles (except Aircra f t),"

and 3.5.1.6, " Aircraft Hazards."

y

, V.

EVALUATION An evaluation of nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities is well documented in Section 2.2 of the Millstone Unit 3 PSAR. The following is excerpted from this section.

_s Three significant industrial complexes exist within 10 miles of the Millstone site.

These are:

^

Name Location of kmpio$eh!'

Distance Sector Dow Chemical Corp.

Ledyard 300 10 miles NE (general chemicals)

Pfizer Corp.

Groton 2,700 5.5 Miles ENE (general chemicals)

Electric Boat Groton 20,000 5.5 Miles ENE (Division of General Dynamics-submarines)

Dow Chemical is a general chemical industrial facility primarily in-i volved in plastic products.

The facility is ten miles from Millstone Site and as such does not pose a credible hazard to the site.

Pfizer is a general chemical industrial facility primarily involved in pharmaceutical products.

~4e facility is 5 5 miles from Millstone Site In regard to the subnarine base in Groton, ihe licensee does not have access to information concerning missiles carried by submarines stationed at any time at the base.

Based upon the distance separating these industrial complexes from the Millstone site and the non-hazardous nature of their operations the staff has concluded that they do not pose a credible hazard.

In addition to the submarine base in Groton and Coast Guard Academy in

~

New London, there is a training headquarters at Camp 0'Neil in East Lyme for Connecticut Army National Guard units.

Camp O'Neil is owned and operated by the Military Department of the State of Connecticut.

It con-sists of 80 acres on which there are located 70 buildings for various purposes.

It is an administrative training center for troops of the Connecticut Army National Guard.

t

\\

n

-V----w-sww%-p+ge, g--+--w--r q-g-

-.w_m__w

,-g y,

-g,-.

p vr,im,w

---

* rem-m-+m

-r+

to

-=yr---- - - - -- ~'

r*-"W

7

'-m-a"*

N

e-

. 1 On a full-tite basis, besides a small contingent of post operations personnel, it contains the headquarters for the Connecticut Military Academy, the 745th Signal Company, and an Organizational Maintenance i

Shop (regional maintenance of vehicles and equipment).

4 On a part-time basis, during various weekends from March throuah November, it is occupied by troop units for administrative training, billeting, and supply functions.

Because of the administrative nature of its occupancy, the camp's operation has no effect on station operation.

No other military operations s"ch as firing ranges, military airfields, ordinance depots, and missile s, '. exist near the site.

The site is transversed from east to west by a railroad right-of-way of the Penn Central Company. The mainline tracks are about 1/2 mile i

from the Unit 1.

Traffic on the spur of the mainline track which ex-tends onto the site is controlled to minimize the possibility of rail-road traffic related accidents. A chlorine rail car is periodically delivered to the south end of the site. The location of the car and the shielding provided by surrounding structures precludes any threat to safety-related components. The adequacy of the control room venti-lation system to protect the operators in the event of a toxic gas release will be evaluated as part of TMI Action Plan Item lll.D.3.4, Control Room Habitability.

There are no major gas transmission lines within 5 miles of the site.

The nearest low pressure gas distribution line is more than 3 miles from the site and is located at the corner of Clark Lane and the Boston Post Road in Waterford. Thus, gas distribution lines do not pose a hazard to Millstone Unit 1.

The closest oil transmission line is approximately 5 miles from the site in Groton, Connecticut, and does not pose a hazard to the site.

l

\\

There are presently two small commercial airports within seven miles of the site, New London (Waterford) Airport and Trumbull Airport. No plans

-l are anticipated by the owners of the airports for er:pansion of airport facilities.

Because of the nature of traffic at New London (Witerford) Airport no log is maintained on landings and takeoffs.

The operator has indicated that there are no present plans for expansion of runway facilities, nor for accommodation of larger aircraft.

Trumbull Airport, approximately 7 miles east of the site, handles regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights but is inadequate for handling large jett.

l l

1 l

.4_

A semi-quantitative assessment has been performed to determine the probability of an aircraft striking safety related structures in accordance with retiew procedures contained in the SRP: where exact data were not available, conservative estimates were made to arrive at a defensible conclusion. The two airports located in the Millstone Unit i vicinity and as described in the SAR are as follows:

New London Airport (New London /Waterford)

Distance from site: 4 miles NNE Largest aircraft utilizing airport; Piper Aztec (4,800 lbs)

N'anents per year: No fc,;,nal records are kept, however, the operator estimates an average of 50 flights /

day (summer) and 3 flights / day (winter).

Trumbull Airport (Groton/New London)

Distance from site: 7 miles E largest aircraft utilizing airport: Cl30 (150,000 lbs)

Movements per year: 110,000 (obtained from Trumbull Airport)

The probability of an aircraft hazard at the site is assessed as follows:

PROBABILITY 00E TO AIRWAY OR AVIATION CORRIDOR IN VICINITY OF SITE PFA = C x N x a.

W Assumptions:

-10 C = 4 x 10 N = 128,000 = 64,000 (conservatively assume that one half of all

~

2 ~

movements at both New London and Trumbull Airport pass overhead)

A = 0.0003587 miles (based on 10,000 square foot critical effective area)

W = 1 mile (arbitrary) + 2 x 4 miles to air lane V-58 = 9 miles P

-9 DA = 9.2 x 10 PROBABILITY DUE TO PROXIMITY OF AIRPORTS PA=LM C N A

3 43 3 i=1 j=1 i

[

1

• Assumptions:

L = 1 (assume one flight path affects site)

M = 1 (assume largest aircraft)-

C = 1 x 10-8 (derived from SRP 3.5.1.6) 3

' N = 128,000 = 32,000 (assume one fourth of all operations at both airports follow a path over the site) 4 A = 0.0003587 (as above)

P A = 1.1 x 10 TOTAL AIRCPE T HAZARD PROBABILITY P=

FA + PA = 1.2 x 10-7 Although this calculation results in a probability slightly' exceeding the guidelines of SRP 3.5.1.6, the conclusion reached is that the probability is sufficiently low to be of no concern Jue to the conser-vative assumptions used in the calculations.

Therefore, the staff con-

~

cludes that this estimate assures that the Millstone site is adequately designed against aircraft hazards.

VI.

CONCLUSION Since current regulatory criteria are met with respect.to SEP _ Topic III-4.0, " Site Proximity Missiles", it can be concluded that this topic is complete for the Millstone site.

No additional review for this topic is required during the SEP integrated assessment.

VII. REFERENCES 1.

Regulatory Guide 1.91, Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Sites.

2.

Standard Review Plan Sections i

2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents 3.5.1.5 Site Proximity Missiles (except aircraft) 3.5.1.6 Aircraft Hazards 3.

D. M. Crutchfield letter to D. P. Hoffman, dated January 13, 1980.

.