ML20033B890

Forwards Admitted Contentions,Retyped & W/Numerical Designation,To All Parties & Participants

ML20033B890
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	11/30/1981
From:	Barth C NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO., NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD), ZIMMER AREA CITIZENS - ZIMMER AREA CITIZENS OF KY
References
NUDOCS 8112020401
Download: ML20033B890 (52)

Text

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UNITED STATES 8'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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D November 30, 1981

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J All Parties and

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un In the Matter of Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, et al.

(Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. UnTt T6.1)

Docket No. 50-358 During a telephone conference held on Wednesday, November 25, 1981, the Licensing Board provided -the numerical designation of the revised contentions it admitted into this proceeding.

I have had the admitted contentions retyped with their numerical designation and am providing them to the Board and all parties and participants for their convenience.

Sincerely, NM Charles A. Barth Counsel for dRC Staff

Enclosure:

Zimmer contentions cc: Service List i

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K'!IGliATEL ORIGINAI, 8112020401 811130

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11/30/81 UNITED STATES OF A!1 ERICA NLCLEAR REGULATORY COMllISSION BEFORE THE AT0!!IC SAFETY Af1D LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

i John H. Frye, III, Chairman M. Stanley Livingston -

Frank F. Hooper In the Matter of

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CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, )

Docket No. 50-358-0L

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(Zimmer Nuclear Power Station,

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Unit 1)

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CONTENTIONS ADMITTED AS ISSUES IN CONTROVERSY AT PREHEARING TELEPHONE CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 25, 1981 Dr. Fankhauser 4 C 12]. The document known as the " Circle of Safety" is written in vague language and language not calculated to insure that the populace will take the appropriate protective measures in the event of a general eme rgency. The siren system described in the " Circle of Safety" is not presently in place nor has it been tested. Furthermore, several other aspects concerning notification and evacuation contained in the " Circle of Safety" have not been tested to insure that proper and timely notification and evacuation will occur when needed.

Specifically, there is no assurance that the information provided to the local populace will be disseminated in a manner so that it will be readily available when needed. Fu rthermore, there is no assurance that the population will understand and make appropriate use of the "I have been notified" signs.

. Zimmer Area Citizens-Zimmer Area Citizens of Kentucky (ZAC) 20 b 4]. Radio communications between base and mobile radios utilized" by Clermont County energency response support groups within an approximate area of four miles of the Zimmer Station in the near environs of U.S. 52 paralleling the Ohio River are incapable of radio transmission due to topographical and land characteristics of that area creating blank, or void, radio transmission whereby radio signals meet natural terrain barriers.

[No plan provision.]

20 b 5]. The Clermont County Emergency Plan provides for communi-cations among some of its emergency resource agencies by non-dedicated telephone line only, involving limited trunk service to certain agencies (one to four telephone lines), utilization of long distance telephone lines involving General Bell telephone systems, and as such this portion of the comnunications plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that communications necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented, especially where limited trunk lines for telephone usage are subject to overload, e.g.,

20 b 5 1].

Communications between the Superintendent of the Clermont County Board of Education-County E0C and the Superintendent of the Felecity-Franklin School District requires use of limited long distance trunk lines, subject to overload, between Bell and General telephone systems: Felecity-Franklin Superintendent has three trunk lines for use in communications between the County Superintendent and to surinon school bus drivers (approximately 18) to the school site for student evacuation.

, 20 b 5 11].

The Superintendent of Bethel-Tate School District has two telephone trunk lines, subject to overload, for use in -

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communications between the County Superintendent and to sumon school bus drivers (approximately 15) to the school site for student evacuation.

1 20 b 5 111].

The Superintendent of the New Richmond School District has four telephone trunk lines, subject to overload, for use in communications between the County Superintendent and to summon school bus drivers (approximately 17) to the school site for student evacuation and for telephone communications to the Monroe and Pierce Elementary Schools within the District, each school has two telephone trunk lines.

20 b 5 iv].

The telephone trunk' lines for each of the affected school districts will be overloaded during emergency situations due to parental telephoning into the schools.

20 b 5 v].

All notifications to the County Superintendent, affected school districts, reception school districts, school district transpor-j tation supervisor, and school district bus drivers is by non-dedicated, existing telephone trunk lines.

[ Plan, SII-E, Table E-1, pp. III-E-3 and 5; sIII-A, p. III-A-2; III-C, pp. III-C-1 through 3.]

20 b 6]. The Campbell County Emergency Plan provides for communi-(

cations among some of its emergency resource agencies-by monitor radio and non-dedicated telephone lines, involving limited trunk service to certain agencies (cr.e to four telephone lines), subject to overload, and

D 0 as such this portion of the communications plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that communications necessary to a timely and

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prompt evacuation can be implemented; e.g.,

20 b 6 i].

Communications to County School Superintendent by monitor radio and subsequent non-dedicated telephone use (four trunk lines to Superintendent);

20 b 6 11].

County Superintendent's notification to five elementary and one middle school, including A.J. Jolly Elementary School within two miles of the Zimmer Station, is by a single non-dedicated telephone line into each of the six schools, each trunk line vito each school is subject to overload; 20 b 6 11i].

County Superintendent's notification to the Alexandria Elementary School and the bus garage is by two non-dedicated telephone lines into each facility, both of which are subject to overload; 20 b 6 iv].

The County Superintendent's four non-dedicated trunk 1ines and the bus garage's two non-dedicated trunk lines are the means of communications to 54 regular and seven substitute bus drivers to summon school buses to nine school sites for student evacuation; 20 b 6 v].

The telephone trunk 1ines for each of the affected schools, the Superintendent and the bus garage will be overloaded during emergency situations due to parental telephoning into the schools;

. 20 b 6 vi].

All notification (except initial notification to Superintendent by monitor radio) and communications 'between schools, bus driv'ers and transportation supervisor is by non-dedicated, existing telephone trunk lines.

[ Plan, Basic Plan, pp. V-5,6; Annex B, Communications, p. B-3; Annex C, Notification & Warning, p. C-4.]

20 b 7]. The Pendleton County Radiological Emergency Plan provides for notification and communications of and between emergency resource personnel by monitor radio and in most instances by pager or non-dedicated telephone absent reasonable assurance that contact can be made by pager (distance limitation in transmission) or by telephone, and as such this portion of the communications plan does not provide a reasonable assur-ance that communications necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be impl emented, e.g.,

20 b 7 i].

Judge / Executive notified from DES Director by pager or telephone; DES Director notified from Communications Coordinator by pager or telephone; County EOC personnel to be notified by telephone, pager, or radio; 20 b 7 11].

DES Director contact, communication and notification with Fire and Rescue Coordinator by means of telephoning an answering service and thereafter the answering service " contacting" (assumption is by telephone) that coordinator who will in turn' communicate with the DES Director by telephone;

20 b 7 111].

Communications to fire departments will be by telephonc, whether between fire company members or between fire chief and' Fire' and Rescue Coordinator (only the Falmouth Fire Department has radio contact with the EOC);

20 b 7 iv].

Notification to the Law Enforcement Coordinator from the DES Director by pager or telephone; 20 b 7 v].

flotification to key emergency response personnel by pager, telephone, or answering service, and ' communications with certain emergency response personnel is inadequate to present reasonable assur-ance that notification and subsequent communications can be made and sustained where limited to non-dedicated commercial telephone line providing for single telephone trunk.

[ Plan, Annex A, Direction and Control, pp. A-5 through 7 and 9; Annex C, Notification & Warning,

p. C-2-1.]

20 b 7 vi].

Notification of special concerns by monitor radio (except Butler and Grant's Lick Hursinc Homes and Black River 14ining Company, which is silent as to notific6 tion) is Northern Elementary School, other communications by commercial radio.

[ Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-9-1 and 2.]

1 20 b 8]. The Bracken County Emergency Plan provides for notification and communications of and between emergency resource personnel by monitor radio and in most ins +.ances bT pager or non-dedicated telephone absent e

i

. reasonable assurance that contact can be made by pager (distance limitation in transraission) or by telephone, and as such this portion of the c'ommunications plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that communications necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented; e.g.,

20 b 8 1].

Judge / Executive and DES Director notified from Communications and Warning Coordinator by pager or telephone; County E0C personnel to be notified by telephone, pager or radio; 20 b 8 11].

Fire and police emergency response personnel to be notified by pager; field fire response personnel will communicate with the County E0C by telephone; 20 b 8 111].

Law Enforcement Coordinator will be notified by pager or telephone; 20 b 8 iv].

flotification to key emergency response personnel by pager and communications by telephone; 20 b 8 v].

flotification to School Preparedness Coordinator and to Western Hills Elementary School by monitor radio, other communications by telephone, including summoning of school buses for evacuation of students.

[ Plan, Annex A, Direction & Control, pp. A-6; Annex C, flotification & Warning, C-2-1; Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-9-1 and 2.]

. 20 c 1]. The Clermont population in Designated Sectors SSE(H) and SE(G), a permanent population of approximately 800, proceed in an

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easterly direction from the Zimmer Station on the major evacuation route of U.S. 52, through Washington and into Franklin Townships, to S.R.133, the junction of which is not an access control site and then proceed in a northerly direction on S.R.133, a distance in excess of 10 miles to S.R.125 at Bethel, Ohio, at which point they are emerging fraa the plume exposure area (an approximate distance of 11-mile exposure of the plume on U.S. 52 and an approximate distance of 13-mile exposure of plume on S.R.133, for a total approximate distance of plume exposure of 24 mile '; or alternatively the evacuees may proceed northerly on S.R.133 to the Village of Feiecity and then proceed on S.R. 222 to S.R. 232 to S.R.125 at Bethel (an approximate distance of 11-mile exposure of plume on U.S. 52 and an approximate distance of 20-mile plume exposure on S.R.s 133, 222 and 232, for a total approximate distance of plume exposure of 31 miles); or alternatively after traveling on S.R. 222 to remain on that route to its intersection with S.R.125 near Bethel (for a total approximate distance 9f plume exposure of 29 miles).

From entry onto S.R.s 133, 222 and 232 t; a e are no control access control point until the evacuees reach S.R.125. At 0.25 miles east of the inter-section of U.S. 52 and S.R.133, on U.S. 52, there is a manned access control to direct traffic flow return to S.R.133.

The population east of the stated access control point (on U.S. 52 0.25 mile east of S.R.133) involving the populations situated east of S.R.133 and the Village of Utopia and approximately 40 roads servicing residents in the previously stated Designated Sectors and the additional Designated Sectors of E(E),

9-ENE(D) and NE(C), are not within the evacuation route designateo and must either proceed into the plume area by proceeding by roadways

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intersecting S.R.133 or by following county and township roads to S.R.125 west of Bethel, or proceeding directly into Brown County.

The aforestated designated evacuation route fails in its implementation to timely and promptly evacuate this portion of the Clermont population from the plume exposure zone.

[Clermont Plan, QII-I, Protective Response,pp.II-I-17,18,22and23].

i 20 c 2]. The Clermont population in Designated Sectors (portions)

E(E), ENE(D), NE(C), NNE(B) and N(A).. constituting the populations of lionroe and Washington Townships, approximately 1,639 permanent population, are to proceed by alternative routes: one, a southerly direction to U.S.

52 toward the Zimmer Station and thence west on U.S. 52; two, proceed in a northwesterly direction to S.R.132, thence north on S.R.132 to S.R.

125; or, three, a northeasterly direction to S.R. 222, thence northerly on S.R. 222 to S.R.125; in which the roadways servicing that population for travel to an evacuation route consists of two state roadways and approximately 38 county and township roadways. Manned access control points are located on S.R. 756, 0.25 miles south of Brown Road, on Laurel-Point Isabel Road 0.1 miles west of S.R. 222, and on S.R. 743 0.5 miles west of S.R. 222 in Washington Township to direct traffic flow, and at the junction of S.R.s 232 and 756, S.R. 232 0.5 niles north of Ireton Trees Road and at the juncture of Franklin-Laurel and Carnes Roads in Monroe Township. The county, township and two state roadways for travel to an evacuation route situated in the aforestated sectors are narrow, t

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. winding, hilly, and hazardous roadways unsupervised for traffic flow and control, except limitedly manned as noted, for pronpt, safe, and timely evacuation of the pemanent population within the area. The road con-figurations will not afford directions by radio to that population of the numerous roadways that the population must follow to correct evacuation routes and a safe evacuation in a prompt manner in the appropriate direction of travel cannot be implemented.

[Clemont Plan, lII-I, Protective Responses, pp. II-I-17, 18, 22 and 23.]

20 c 3]. Clemont population in Designated Sectors N(A), NNW(R) and NNE(B), consisting of a portion of Monroe Township, Ohio Township and a po-tion of Pierce Township, (a pemanent population of 10,596) are to proceed either to U.S. 52, thence in 3 westerly direction and out of the plume area; or, to proceed to S.R.132, thence in a northerly direction to S.R.125, in which the roadways for travel to an evacuation route servicing that population consists of one state roadway and 27 county and township roadways. There are two access control points on the perimeter of the plume zone, at the junction of S.R. 749 and Cole Road and on Jenny Lind Road 0.25 miles south of Cole Road, but no access control points within the affected township areas. The roadways for travel to an evacuation route in the aforestated sector are narrow, winding, hilly, and hazardous roadways unsupervised for traffic flow and control, except limitedly manned as noted, for prompt, safe, and timely evacuation of the pemanent population within the area and a safe evacuation in a prompt manner in the appropriate direction of travel cannot be implemented.

[Clemont Plan, 911-I, Protective Response, pp. II-I-17,18, 22 and 23.]

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. 20 c 5]. The Clermont permanent population within the plume area is rural, generally s erviced by narrow and winding township roads with-out center line and involving country lanes apprs ximately eight feet in width and ranging from 200 to 700-foot depth fran the township roadway. The use of CART buses, "as available", cannot reasonably assure prompt transportation for evacuees without vehicles assembled at pickup sites. School buses cannot be used for public transportation; 993313.172 and 3327.14, Revised Code of Ohio, preclude use of school buses for public transportation, except transportation of senior citizens and adult education groups, rendering the use of school buses for public transportation unlawful. Vehicles used to afford transportation of handicapped and individuals without vehicles must be capable of driving country lanes, removing the ability of buses, CART or otherwise, from traveling such lanes or negotiating turn-around at resiaences. The timely and safe evacuation of the population without vehicles cannot be implemented.

[Clermont Plan, 9I1-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-5; 9III-A, County Agencies (Gen), pp. III-A-1 and 2; 9III-C, County School Districts, pp. III-C-1 and 2.]

20 c 6]. The evacuation time estimates for evacuation of the Clermont population, ranging from 1.0 to 3.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />, do not recognize the roadway circumstances of Clerment County and evacuation routing, the location of residences from public roadways, fails to take into account roadway blockage due to vehicular mishap, weather circumstances of the area as reflected by the Clermont DSA time study estimating evacuation times within a range of 2.5 to 77.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, fails to consider the character

. of the popult apared as to provisions to be transported, inadequate fut wcuation vehicle, single vehicle families in which vehicle 'is at w t, attempts to make telephone contact with police agency to der. ermine if emergency is a test or actual, detouring from evacuation rcues to gather family members not at home, family returning to haae from off-home site, panic reaction, vehicular mishap, impassable roadways due to flooding, ice or snow and inadequate roadways leading to evacuation routes), paragraphs 1] through 3] and 5], supra, and as such the time estimates are grossly underestimated and the population cannot be evacuated within the mandatory time limitations.

[Clennont Plan, SII-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-15; Table 3-2,

p. 3-7 of Attachment 1-2, Stone & Webster Time Study.]

20 c 7]. The evacuation of the Campbell County population directed in a generally north direction of Persimmon Grove Road to proceed in a generally northwesterly direction on evacuation routes Ky 10 and Ky 8 are inadequate where the plume pathway of radiation release from the Zimmer Station is generally northwesterly, proceeding in the same path as the evacuation routing, and is inadequate in the failure to evacuate that portion of the population away from the plume pathway; and the evacuation i

of the Campbell County population directed in a generally south direction of Persimmon Grove Road to proceed in a generally westerly direction on evacuation routes 1121,1280 and U.S. 27 are inadequate where the plume pathway of radiation release from the Zimmer Station is generally westerly, proceeding in the same path as the evacuation routing, and is inadequate in the failure to evacuate that portion of the population away i

. from the plume pathway.

Implementation of the evacuation under the stated circumstances provides no reasonable assurance that the health

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and safety of the affected population is protected.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-14-1.]

20 c 8]. Campbell evacuation routes 1121, California Cross Road, and Persimmon Grove Pike are narrow, wiading, and hilly, with steep inclines; Lickert Road has four 90 turns and a narrow bridge impeding evacuation and, where it intersects U.S. 27, there is no access point control to direct traffic flow, resulting in traffic blockage or accident; Ky 8 is narrow without road bena, or shoulder, and approximately one-half mile southeast of Oneonta for an approximate distance of one-fourth of a mile the road has eroded and been without repair for a substantial period; Wesley Chapel Road and 1197 are narrow, hilly ridge roads; Ky 10 is a narrow winding ridge road and parallels 12-mile Creek and, during flooding, this portion of Ky 10 is impassable; and the approximate 50 rural service roads that the population must travel to evacuation routes are approxi-mately 12 feet wide without centerline; some gravel roadways leading to evacuation routes, due to topography and land characteristics, are not capable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population.

[No plan provision.]

20 c 9]. There are an inadequate number of school buses timely and promptly to evtcuate students of the nine schools within Campbell County subject to plume exposure, and during school session evacuation the use of school buses as vehicles for evacuation of the general public without

. transportation is incapable of affording timely and prompt evacuation of that segment of the population; there are no posted school bus stops or routes and there is no plan provision to educate the public where they are to assemble for school bas transportation to afford timely and prompt evacuation of that segment of the population; the roadways within approximately eight miles of the Zimmer Station are inadequate for TANK bus travel and maneuverability. The plan is not. capable of being implemented in a timely and safe manner to evacuate that portion of the population without personal vehicles. [ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, pp. 5 and 6; Annex, Protective Actions, p. F-9-1.]

20 c 9 a].

Access control points are inadequate in number and placement to direct and control traffic during evacuation,' and the plan does not provide any reasonable assurance that an adequate number of police and other support groups are available to discharge the responsibility, and police and support groups are insufficient in number to be timely deployed to control evacuation traffic.

[ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, p. V-7; Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-10-1 and 2; Annex G, Law Enforcement,

p. G-1-1:

other than a statement of the identity of police units, no information is provided as to number of personnel, vehicles and equipment to provide reasonable assurance that the plan is capable of being impl emented.]

20 c 10]. The evacuation time estimates for the evacuation of the Tampbell population, ranging from 1.0 to 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />, as performed by Stone & Webster, and ranging from 1.25 to 11.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, estimated by

. Kentucky DES, do not recognize the roadway characteristics of Campbell County (the location of residences from public roadways), and fail to

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consider the character of the population (unprepared as to provisions to be transported, inadequate fuel in evacuation vehicle, single vehicle familles in which the vehicle is at the work site, 4ttempts to make telephone contact with a police agency to detennine if emergency is a test or actual, detouring from evacuation routes to gather family members not at home, family returning to home from off-hane site, panic reaction, vehicular mishap, impassable roadways due to flooding, ice or snow, inadequate roadways leading to evacuation routes, and the character of evacuation roadways as to topography and land characteristics), and as such the time estimates are grossly underestimated and the population cannot be evacuated within the mandatory time limitations.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, Appendix F-18, pp. 3-6 and 3-7.]

20 c 11]. Pendleton County evacuation routes Corntown Road, Ky 10, Flour Creek Road,159, Concord Caddo Road and Falmouth Lenexburg Road are ridge roads, steep, narrow, winding and in areas limited to maximum speeds of 25 mph; and the approximate 20 rural service roads that the population aust travel to evacuation routes are approximately 12 feet wide without centerline, several of them being gravel roads, winding and hilly; the evacuation routes and access roadways leading to evacuation routes, due to topography and land characteristics, are not capable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population.

[No plan provision.]

. 20 c 12]. Evacuation time estimates are inadequate for the reasons presented in paragraphs 6] and 10] supra, and this plan again

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sets forth the Stone & Webster study.

20 c 13]. Bracken County evacuation routes Ky 10,1109, and Ky 8 are ridge roads, steep, hilly, narrow, and winding, and the approximate 10 rural service roads that the population must travel to the evacuation routes are approximately 12-foot in width without centerline, winding and hilly and incapable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population.

[Ilo plan provision.]

20 c 14]. Evacuation time estimates are inadequate for the reasons presented in paragraphs 6] and 10] supra, and this plan again sets forth the Stone & Webster study.

20 e 3]. Clermont County has only volunteer fire squads. Fire personnel are assigned supporting access control action as available and no dependable count is furnished by the plan. Fire personnel within the plume area will provide door-to-door verification of population notifica-tion consisting of 113 volunteer personnel and 28 vehicles with an additional combined fire and life squad group of 134 (fire personnel numbers not stated in plan) to perform tasks in either the plume or relocation area and equipped with 18 vehicles. The plan fails to indicate the number of volunteer fire personnel that would or could be available at the time of emergency. The approximate number of fire personnel avail-able on shift at notification for initial service would be 38. The miles

. of roadway within the plume area, together with the miles of country lanes involved, remove any reasonable assurance that fire personnel of 38 to 267 (assuming all volunteers could and would imediately respond) to facilitate door-to-door verification of notification within the plume area and the miles of roadway present. The plan presents no reasonable assurance or upon implementation that any one, more or all of the volunteer fire personnel would or could be present to assume the responsibilities assigned, or that such personnel would or could leave their regular employment and family responsibilities during evacuation.

[Clermont Plan, 9I1-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-6; 9III-B, Emergency Services, pp. III-B-2, 3 and 7.]

20 e 4]. Clermont County has only volunteer life squads in which only Goshen and Miamiville have trained paramedics. The 119 life squad personnel within the plume area possess four mobile and no portable radios and no information is provided as to vehicles or equipment possessed by the plume area life squads.

The plan fails to establish how many, if any, of the plume life squads have certified emergency medical technicians on their staffs. The plan fails to indicate, with any reasonable assurance, or upon implementation, that any one, more, or all of the volunteer life squad personnel would or could.be present to assume any responsibility in the plume area during evacuation, or that such personnel would or could leave their regular employment and family responsibilities during evacuation. [Clemont Plan, 91II-B, Emergency Services, pp. III-B-4, 5 and 9.]

O O 20 e 5). The County Sheriff has 12 road patrol deputies. The local t

police have 14 full-time officers, with support from Pierce Township police in the plume area, providing an additional nine full-time police officers.

The Ohio State Patrol has approximately 25 patrolmen at the Batavia Post.

In addition to the foregoing, there are 16 volunteer police officers associated with the local police departments. At the time of notification of an emergency mandating evacuation there would be approximately four deputy sheriffs, seven local policemen and eight State Patrolmen on duty, for a total of 19 local police officers available to provide emergency response resources to man access control points and direct traffic and maintain order within the plume evacuation area. The Clermont Plan as drawn and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance that local police are capable of performing the respor-se responsibility assigned, especially with the necessity to timely and safely direct and control evacuation traffic. Off-duty local police would be available on the ability to summon such officers to duty based upon the location of such officers and the presence of a point of notifi-cation contact. The plan presents no reasonable assurance (nor can it be reasonably implemented) that there is an ability to contact and sumon off-duty local police officers to respond within the time restrictions present to promptly and safely direct the evacuation of the population.

The time restrictions necessary to activate and deploy flational Guardsmen or to summon police officers from contiguous counties provides no reason-able assurance in the plan, or upon implementation, that such police and guard units can respond within time to support evacuation of the population.

The number of local police officers and the limitation of police vehicles

. fails to provide any reasonable assurance that local police are capable of discharging the assigned responsibility. The number of access

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control points for the direction of evacuation traffic is inaaequate to properly, safely and timely direct the evacuating population for the health and safety of that population, together with the absence of any access control points manned by police or other support emergency response personnel in the intersecting roads for travel by evacuees to evacuation routes.

[Clermont Plan, SII-I, Protective Response, pp. II-I-6,15,~ 18, 23 and 24; QIII-B, Emergency Services, pp. III43-1, 5 and 6.]

20 e 6].

The Clermont County Sheriff is assigned the primary command authority of all county activities in response to an energency, including evacuation, and shall direct all primary and support agencies.

The Sheriff shall direct all personnel involved in access control, including local police, local fire and State Patrol. A county sheriff is enpowered, and thereby limited, by 9311.07, Revised Code of Ohio, to call upon the sheriff of any adjoining county and municipal and township officials in his or adjoining counties, to furnish law enforcement and fire protection, together with appropriate equipment, as necessary, to preserve the public peace and protect persons and property only in the event of riot, insurrection, or invasion. The provisions of the plan providing command authority for emergency response to a Zimmer Station event or accident is not within the provisions of 5311.07(B), Revised Code of Ohio, as the same does not consist of riot, insurrection, or invasion, and the plan as drafted and to be implemented provides a power i

to the Sheriff of Clermont County to control local police, fire and State l

i

O o Patrol contrary to the laws of the State of Ohio and the provisions of the plan are unlawful. Based upon the legal status of the plan, it cannot p'rovide either reasonable assurance of implementation, or implementation, by its assignment of command responsibility contrary to state law.

[Clermont Plan, GII-A, Command & Coordination, p. II-A-1, Protective Response, p. II-I-6; SIII-A, County Agencies (Gen),

p. III-A-12.]

20 e 7]. The fire personnel, in part volunteer, in Campbell County are assigned the task of fire response and, "if capable," to assist other emergency response functions without clarification. The plan provides no information as to either number of personnel and vehicles or support emergency functions. The plan fails to provide reasonable assurance that fire personnel are capable of discharging emergency response roles other than fire related activity. [ Campbell Plan, Annex I, pp.1-1 and 2, I-1-2.]

20 e 8]. Campbell County has no provision or information pertaining to rescue squads, except that rescue squads are present in the county fire departments and possess ambulances. No information is provided pertaining to training to treat radiological injury. The plan fails to provide reasonable assurance that emergency medical technicians are prepared to provide services other than first aid and hospital transpor-tation and are not trained for the identification and segregation of radiation injury.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex H. Medical & Public Health,

p. H-2.]

I

. 20 e 9]. The number of State and local police present and available to provide access control point manning and other traffic control directio'n to provide a reasonable assurance of a safe and timely evacuation of the population are inadequate in number, as well as an inadequate number of police to reasonably assure the safe and timely evacuation of A.J. Jolly State Park and Camp Sunshine. The plan fails to present any information pertaining to the number of police to be punctually available at the time of an evacuation, support police to be summoned, and the times required to afford supported police assuming duty stations, or the number of police vehicles present and to be utilized in controlling evacuation.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-9-2 and 3, F-1-1 and 2; Annex G, Law Enforcement, pp. G-12 and G-1-1, Annex K, Military Support, pp. K-1 and 2.]

20 e 10]. The Fire Departments in Pendleton County are volunteer and are assigned only the duty of fire emergency. All contact with county firc units is by telephone and fire companies will be activated for fire; other functions to be coordinated at the time. The plan and its implementation fails to provide any reasonable assurance that the fire companies will provide emergency response to protect the public in an evacuation. The plan presents no number of personnel or equipment avail abl e.

[Pendleton Plan, Annex A, Direction & Control, p. A-9; Annex I, Fire Protection / Rescue, pp.I-l and 2, I-1-1.]

i 20 e 11]. Pendleton has no provision or information pertaining to rescue squads except that such squads are present in the three volunteer j

i I

l

. fire departments and that they are trained in rescuing fire survivors.

The plan as drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable

~

assurance that rescue personnel can determine and segregate radiological injured persons or to provide any emergency services.

[Pendleton Plan, Annex H. Health / Medical Services, pp. H-1 and 2; Annex I, Fire Protection /

Rescue, pp. 1-1 and 2, I-1-1.]

20 e 12]. The number of State and local police and other resource support groups available to provide and man access control points and to provide traffic, together with providing traffic control and evacuation of Kincaid Lake State Park, is inadequate to present reasonable assurance 4

by the plan or in its implementation that the population affected will be timely and safely evacuated from the exposed area.

[Pendleton Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-9-2, F-10-1; Annex G, Law Enforcement, pp. G-1 and 2, G-1-1.]

20 e 13]. Bracken County has four volunteer fire departments, trained in fire and rescue only. Departments have standby and call up procedures and other than fire related activity, the personnel are assigned access control functions during an evacuation. The plan and its implementation fails to provide any reasonable assurance that the personnel will provide emergency response for the protection of the public during emergency. The plan presents no number of personnel or equipment available.

[B racken Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-10-1; Annex I, Fire / Rescue Services, pp. I-1 and 2, I-1-1.]

l l

. 20 e 14]. Bracken County has no provision or infomation pertaining to rescue squads. The squads will provide ambulance service only. The plan as' drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance that rescue personnel can detemine and segregate radiological injuries or to provide any emergency service. [ Bracken Plan, Annex H, Medical &

Public Health, p. H-2; Annex I, Fire / Rescue Service, pp. I-1 and 2, 1-1-1.]

20 e 15]. The number of local police and other resource support groups present to provide and man access control points and to provide traffic control is inadequate to present reasonable assurance by the plan or in its impleuentation that the population affected will be timely and safely evacuated.

[ Bracken Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions,

p. F-10-1; Annex G, Security and Law Enforcement, pp. G-1 and 2, G-1-1.]

20 f 1]. At flood stage (Ohio River crest of 53 feet), U.S. 52, approximately 1/4th of a mile north of the Village of Neville, is under water and impassable as to U.S. 52, Neville Spur and Maple Creek Road for an approximate distance of h mile and including Maple Creek.

Near the Village of Moscow, just south of S.R. 743 by several feet, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable for an approximate distance of h mile and including Ray Run. On either side of U.S. 52 at the intersection of Laurel-Moscow Road for a distance of approximately h mile, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable,.and at a 64-feet Ohio River crest the bridge over Little Indian Creek near Laurel-Moscow Road-U.S. 52 intersection, on U.S. 52, is under water and impassable.

U.S. 52 at the Village of

. Point Pleasant, including the intersection of U.S. 52-Indian Road, intersection of U.S. 52 and S.R. 232, for an approximate distance of

~

h mile is under water ar.d impassable.

From, and ' including, Clermont-t ville Road, and its intersection of U.S. 52, portions of Clermontville Road and approximately h mile to the north, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable. From a distance of approximately k mile south of the Village of New Richmond to approximately 4 mile south of the intersection of Bethel-New Richmond Road and U.S. 52, U.S. 52 is under water and impassabl e.

Within two hundred yards of U.S. 52 and to the west of U.S. 52, the streets of the Village of New Richmond are under water and impassable. The bridge located on Fagins Run Road within 50 feet of S.R.132 is under water and impassable due to the flooding of Twelve ihle i

i Creek and that evacuation route entry into S.R.132 for the population northeast of the location is closed.

Flooding of the Ohio River at a crest of 80 feet (1937 flood) U.S. 52 is under water and impassable from approximately 1 mile east of the Village of Neville to the west and north to within approximately 200 feet of the entrance to the Zimmer Statier.

- and within 200 feet to the north of the entrance of the Zimmer Station and continuing through the Villages of Point Pleasant and New Richmond and to the northwest of New Richmond, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable.

i Maple Creek Road, S.R._743, Laurel-Moscow Road, Indian Road, S.R. 232 Clermontville Altman Road, and Frank Willis Memorial Road are all under water and impassable at their respective intersections with U.S. 52, totally precluding vehicular travel to the Zimmer Station.

During flood 1

crests of the Ohio River from 53 feet to 80 feet a range from a substan-tial portion of an evacuation route is impassable and vehicular travel to i

l 1

__r

. the Zimer Station is limited to S.R. 743 to U.S. 52 to Zimmer to the exclusion of U.S. 52 as an evacuation route from New Richmond to beyond Neville and the isolation of the Zimmer Station. Unier those circum-stances, including flood of the Zimmer E0F site, evacuation and emergency plans cannot be implemented.

[No plan provision.]

20 g].

During inclement winter weather conditions, roadways in the involved counties of Ohio and Kentucky are impassable due to accumulations of ice and snow, rendering evacuation of the respective populations and response of offsite emergency units to the Zimmer Station impossible for substantial time periods.

The majority of access roadways for evacuation purposes remain impassable for prolonged periods of time, measured in weeks, thereby prohibiting large segments of the Emergency Planning Zone populations of the involved counties from being evacuated promptly and timely by other means. A large segment of the Emergency Planning Zone populations of the involved counties are unable to reach access roadways from their residences for extended time periods during the presence and continuation of large accumulations of snow, thereby precluding either their evacuation by motor vehicle or the timely and prompt evacuation by other means.

20 g 1]. The Ohio roadways set forth in Contention 20 c) 1),

2) and 3) and the Kentucky roadways set forth in Contention 20 c) 7),

8),11), and 13) are rendered impassable due to ice and snow accumulations during the period December 1 to March 31 annually. The roadway crews available in each of the respective counties are not equipped to rapidly l

. remove snow and to sand and salt to render the roa'dways passable. The federal and state highways in the respective counties remain impassable

~

for periods of approximately three hours to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. County and township roadways cannot be made passable from periods ranging for two to 14 days. The topography and land characteristics, together with the roadways being hilly, narrow, steep and winding, precludes any vehicle travel, other than four wheel drive vehicles. Police vehicles were rendered useless during the winters of 1977 and 1978 and police activity was limited to one four-wheel vehicle in Clenaont County and volunteer four-wheel drive operators to transport necessities to families that could not leave their residences. A majority of the population of the involved counties maintain their residences approximately 100 to 700 feet from the public roadway, vehicles at the home are inoperative, and transportation by vehicle is capable only at the intersection of the residence lane with the public roadway. An evacuation during snow or ice accumulation, rendering a portion or all of the evacuation routes impassable and rendering the service roadways of township and county roadways for travel to evacuation routes impassable would result in the inability to e'vacuate the affected population due to impassable roadways and the absence of sufficient support vehicles present to evacuate. No county possesses sufficient snow moving, salting and sanding equipment, and personnel to maintain roadways passable during snow and ice accumu-lation to present reasonable assurance that the population can evacuate during this seasonable condition.

[No plan provision.]

. 21 b 2].

Ohio has employed the l olicy that it will administer i

potassium iodide to emergency workers only and not to the general public.

~

Ohio has made no provision whatsoever to administer potassium iodide to the sensitive and vulnerable group, the child. Ohio will not monitor children or adult for a maximum period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at reception site to determine whether such individuals have been contaminated, a period too long to protect the health and safety of the public, especially the child, and at that delayed period (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) the administration of potassium iodide would be of little effect.

Kentucky will administer potassium iodide to emergency workers and to the general public, including children. The Kentucky plan has no provision for the implementation of the administration of potassium iodide and, unless administered early, its effect is diminished. No plan provides for the timely administration of potassium iodide to school children. The plan as drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance for the timely administration of potassium iodide to school children by school personnel or other emergency resource workers and as such there is no reasonable assurance that the safety and health of children will be protected in the event of contamination.

[0hio Plan, $III, Letters of Agreement, letter 14; Clermont Plan, lII-B, Emergency Response Support, p. II-B-1 (no plan provision); Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, V-8; Annex F Protective Actions,

p. 7, F-11-1; Pendleton and Bracken Plans comparable to Campbell Plan.]

21 c 1]. The New Richmond School District has 17 buses and a student population of 2,562 students. The schools located in this district are at three different sites. The current fleet of buses requires that the

. student population being bused to or from school by each bus traveling three routes for each transportation of students, requiring that the bus be in transit for one hour each morning and evening routes. Monroe and Pierce Elementary students would be evacuated to the receiving site first and then return of buses for evacuation of the student population at the New Richmond site. From boarding of buses to the receiving site at Glen Este and return would consume approximately one hour before commencement of the boarding of the New Richmond school population. Total evacuation time for the last students to be evacuated and out of the 10-mile zone would be approximately four hours. The number of buses necessary to timely and promptly evacuate the New Richmond District school population would be 43 buses.

New Richmond is 26 buses short of the required number to evacuate effectively the school children of this district. The plan as implemented has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that school children can be effectively evacuated in a safe and timely manner.

21 c 2]. Bethel-Tate School District has 12 buses and a student population of 1900. The schools within the district are located at one site. The current fleet of buses requires that each bus transport students on two trips, morning and afternoon. Approximately one-half of the student population would be evacuated to Goshen schools and bus return before the remaining population could be bused. The total time for evacuation would be approximately three hours. The number of buses necessary to evacuate the student population of this district would be 31 buses. Bethel-Tate is 19 buses short of the required number to effectively

. evacuate the school children of this district. The plan 3s implemented has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that school children can be effectiv'ely evacuated in a safe and timely manner.

21 c 3]. Buses sent from other districts can not timely evacuate the children at the two involved Ohio school districts because of the time requirenents for transportation of those buses from original site to the plume school site and the circumstances of the necessity to utilize those buses for the evacuation of the students located at the receiving sites to afford reception of the evacuees, adult and school child.

[Ho plan provision", Ohio or Clennont Plans; see limited discussion, Clennont Plan QII-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-5; 9III-A, County Agencies (Gen), p. III-A-2, SIII-C, County School Districts, pp. III-C-1 through 3 and 5.]

21 c 4]. The Campbell County School District has nine schools at various sites, including A.J. Jolly Elementary approximately two miles from the Zimmer Station.

It has 60 buses, 25 of which are eight years or older and subject to mechanical failure, and a student population of 6,111 students.

I Students are transported to and from school in morning and evening double and triple routing. More than half of the student population would be l

required to remain at school while the first evacuees would be transported i

to a reception site and the buses returned to the schools to continue evacuation. Sixty-two additional buses would be required to provide timely and safe evacuation of the students in the affected area.

In addition to the aforestated buses, the district is required to utilize two lift buses for l

n.

. handicapped children, each bus required to make two trips. fio oth3r buses would be available of any type to acconmradate the evacuation of the hancficapped children in a timely and saf e manner. The time required to evacuate the student population would be approximately five hours. The plan as implemented has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that school children can be effectively avacuated in a safe and timely manner. [ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, pp. II-4, 7 and 8, V-5,6 and 11; Annex C, flotification and Warning, p. C-4; Annex F Protective Actions, p.F-9-2.]

21 d 1]. The schools involved in the flew Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of Ohio and the Campbell County School District of Kentucky have no means of communication to bus drivers while the driver is enroute.

fio present state or county plan presents a reasonable assurance or could be capable of implementation where students have been received at each school site following the first route trip and while the buses and drivers are in the course of picking up students preparatory to transporting them to school and evacuation is ordered and there is no present ability to contact the drivers and to direct them to transport the students currently on the buses to a receiving or other site, during which time the driver would continue on his normal route and there would be no provision for the summoning of those buses to transport the students required to be evacuated to a receiving site.

i 21 d 2].

fio other school district contiguous to the involved school districts could dispatch buses to the three affected districts because of

. utilization of their respective fleet of buses and the inability to communicate with their drivers to advise discharge of their passengers.

Tne converse of 1] and 2] would apply during the 21 d 3].

afternoon initial -routings, where a portion of the student population would be on buses and the remaining student population at school without bus facility.

21 d 4]. The evacuation times set forth in the specified paragraphs of Contention 21 c] would be substantially increased and for which there is no plan or its implementation capable of presenting an assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that the affected school children could be timely and safety evacuated from the affected schools.

[No plan provision.]

21 e 1]. The buses utilized for student transportation of pupils in the New Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of Ohio and the Campbell County School District of Kentucky are maintained by their drivers at the driver's residence or other parking area, in which the buses are parked during the school day offsite of the affected schools within the respective districts. Upon notification that it is necessary to conduct an evacua-tion of school children there are no means to assure the contact of all drivers to sumaon the buses to the school sites, except as such drivers could be reached by telephone at their hones or other normal place during the' non-driving period of the school day. Where the driver could not be contacted and instructed to drive the bus to the school site, that bus would be removed from the transportation means of evacuation. School bus

. drivers during non-driving school hours are involved in other modes of employnent, including farming, and in leisure pursuits, during which

~

time they may not be accessible by telephone contact. The use of pagers to summon drivers are inadeqtate for transmission and notification over a distance of 12 miles.

Shopping areas and other areas for indulging in leisure pursuits, and areas in which one might be conducting business are beyond the 12-mile range for paging. There is no pro-vision in any plan that provides for notification to drivers and as such there is no plan provision presenting reasonable assurance that buses can be summoned to the school site during an emergency.

21 e 2]. The location of school buses during the school day ranges fran five to 15 miles from the school site and upon notification to the driver an approximate hour is consumed from the point of advising that evacuation is being ordered to the point that the notified driver arrives at the school site to commence transportation of evacuating children.

21 c 3].

tione of the three school districts have the facility or the relationship with their respective drivers to park and maintain school buses at each respective school site. This circumstance removes any reasonable assurance that students can be timely and safety evacuated fran school sites during a radiological emergency.

[fio plan provision.]

23 1].

The affected population of the involved counties ranges in education fraa elementary education to University trained and within the five-mile radius of the Zimmer Station is rural, farming and factory employed e

yynw e

-p

. populace. Because of flooding circumstances and being within the tornado belt, the population has been instructed by various means as to protective

~

actions to be taken in the event of flood and in the event of tornado, as well as the use of sirens and other types of warning device, including door-to-door notification.

In each situation there has been a large segment of the population who telephone local police agencies to inquire if the siren is actual or for drill, notwithstanding the educational measures taken, and who upon being advised by door-to-door notification nonetheless neglect to take protective action until forced to do so by police authority.

Inquiry to police agencies have overloaded the trunk lines within the community serviced by an assigned number of telephone trunk line.

[No plan provision.]

23 2].

Times necessary to take protective action during flood and tornado have been greatly in excess of estimated times because of the reactions of a large segment of the population.

[No plan provision.].

23 3].

The " Circle of Safety" as the mode of hducating the affected population as to the nature of nuclear power, radiation, pro-tective action, and preparation is beyond the capabilities of the majority of the population within the affected area. Based on the average number of sentences per 100 words and the average number of syllables per 100 words the publication, in accord with Fry's Readability Graph, is within college level readability. The publication is too involved, too long, and too sophisticated in its writing style to be either read or understood by a large segment of the involved population. The publication's style is

comparable to text-book 3ndustry publications that do not interest the average reader and, due to le'ngth, frustrates the average reader and f i

deters " complete reading.

Further, the publication 'in preliminary

. sentences, attempting to ninimize the potential hazards, directs the~

average reader to stop reading those oortions becausa the reader is initially informed that the matter will probably not occur and thus is~,

extraneous infonnation. The publication has no reasonable assurance df T

being read, understood or educating the population within the EZP, and 7

thus has no educational value of informing the affected public of the n.

matters necessag! to be known by that public to properly. respond to an emergency at the Zimmer Station.

[Clerinont County, 911-F, Public Information, Attachment F-1, pp. II-F-3, et seq.; each of the Kentucky counties have the same publication present in their plans.]

g tn 23 4].

The plans provide no~ reasonable assurance that the information

/

to be disseminated to the public, pemanent and transient (to be mailed e

/

to all permanent population, placement in local telephone books', or the; installation of signs), willy be sufficient to inform or in its mbthod of' B

~

dissenination (style), will not mininize the hazards and deter the' '

~N

~

education value of the mate' rial, or being written.in such a manner that it -

• is not readily understood by the public, e.g., " Circle of Safety."

[Clermont Plan, II-F; Public Information, pp. J-5 and 6; same infomation contained in Pendleton and Bracken Plans.].

7 23 5].

There is_ no pla, provision,,or adequate assurance presented, as to the method, manner,7nd text of thegublic5tions,to bo posted for the m

k l

.y g

I.

__, 3 _ __

e,

. infomation of the transient population, particularly those visiting parks, historical sites, and engaged in recreation pursuits on and near the Ohio River, all of which are within the affected area.

[No plan provision.]

f 24 1].

Clemont County and Cincinnati General Hospitals are the two Ohio hospitals which would provide inpatient treatment to radio-logically injured individuals. The Central Ohio River Valley D

Association (CORVA) will provide guidance to those hospitals for develop-r

~.

ment of disaster plans to include radiological emergency patient handling.

Clermont County Hospital claims that it will treat radiological casualties and will institute procedures for radiation exposure treatment.

Clemont County Hospital has 109 beds, but of that number would provide 45 beds by discharging ambulatory patients and transfer of others. Clemont County Hospital would transfer overage patients to Cincinnati General r

Hospital. Clemont County Hospital has not sought guidance from CORVA to

,~

$ the date of the filing of these revised contentions. Clemont County Hospital has not revealed its hospital plan for radiological treatment.

CORVA will be disbanded April 1,1982. Clemont County Hospital has two full time radiologist and one radiotherapist, as a consultant, and two

/-

radiation monitors and sufficient decontamination equipment for minor radiation accidents. There is nothing to indicate that Clermont County Hospital has separate, segregated emergency facilities so that other patients are not contaminated.

The plan as drawn and as to be implemented does not provide reasonable assurances that Clemont County Hospital can provide adequate facilities and personnel to treat radiologically injured i

individual s.

[Clemont Plan, 91I-K, Med & Pub Health Sup, p. II-K-1; SIV, Letters of Agreement, Clemont County Hospital to Conover,

~

January 21, 1981.]

24 2].

Other than noted in paragraph 1] above, no other infor-mation is presented by the Clemont Plan pertaining to Cincinnati General Hospital.

[No plan provision.]

24 3J.

Campbell represents that three hospitals have the capabilities to treat radiological injuries: St. Luke Hospital, Cincinnati General, and the University of Kentucky Medical Center (Lexington, Kentucky, approximately one hour travel time from Campbell County); in which each has submitted a letter agreement.

Only the letter from St. Luke Hospital is presented in the plan. St. Luke Hospital does not indicate its bed capacity or how many beds would be available to hospitalize radiologically injured patients. This hospital has two radiology technicians and sore monitoring equipment.

Isolation of contaminated patients is not indicated, nor is the presence of sept. rate, segregated emergency facility. The plan as drawn and as to be implemented does not provide reasonable assurances that St. Luke Hospital can provide adequate facilities and personnel to treat radiologically injured individuals.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex H, Medical & Public Health, p. H-2; Annex P, Inter-Government & Private Relations, letter St. Luke Hospital to Flynn.]

l 24 4].

Other than noted in paragraph 3] above, no other infomation is presented by the Campbell Plo pertaining to Cincinnati General Hospital l

v,,, ~,-+

. or University of Kentucky Medical Center.

[No plan provision.]

~

24 5].

'0hio applies the policy that it will not administer potassium iodide to the general public, including children. This position, taken by the State of Ohio and its political subdivision of Clermont County, removes any consideration of a reasonable assurance being presented by state and county plans and the failure to implement any procedure for the prompt administration of potassium iodide to block radioactive iodine intake to the thyroid gland, and presents a substantial departure from required protective action to safeguard the health and safety of the exposed population.

[0hio Plan, SIII, Letters of Agree-ment, letter 14; Clermont Plan, QII-B, Emergency Response Support,

p. II-B-1 (no plan provision).]

24 6].

The life squads present in Clermont County, Ohio, have no training for the examination and determination of persons contaminated t

and to take required safeguards to exclude such individuals fran non-contaminated members of the public. The members of the respective life squads in the plume area of Clermont have no training or qualifications in rendering aid to individuals contaminated and individuals sustaining radiological injury. The members of the plume area life squads in Clermont County may or may not respond as emergency resource personnel based upon a

priority commitnents to one's vocation and the needs to assist one's family during the evacuation process. The Clermont Plan in its implemen-tation of providing volunteer life squads to assist and render aid to radiological injured and contamined individuals provides no reasonable

. assurance that such volunteer will in fact volunteer one's services during an emergency.

[No plan provision.]

24 7].

The monitoring of evacuees by 1ocal police and fire personnel at relocation centers within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the evacuees arrival is inadequate to screen, separate, and isolate contaminated individuals, providing exposure by the contaminated person to the population at the relocation center. There are no provisions set forth and no implemen-tation of training to police and fire personnel to properly monitor evacuees at relocation centers, to screen evacuees and isolate those contaminated or decontaminate such individuals or the facilities for decontamination. There is no provision for monitoring of persons present at relocation centers before such persons exit the premises.

[Clermont Plan, 9II-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-4; otherwise no plan provision.]

24 8].

Campbell County provides no plan or its implementation for the timely administration of potassium iodide as to the manner, place, administration and timely presentation of such blocking agent to the general public, and as such there is no reasonable assurance that the blocking agent can be systematically and timely administered to the public.

[ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, p. V-2; otherwise no plan provision.]

249].

Campbell County does not provide for any monitoring of pli xposed persons, except that persons transported by school buses l

who do not wish to go to a reception center will be decontaminated at Northern Kentucky University. The absence of any reasonable assurance that i

. contaminated persons will be monitored and decontaminated, as necessary, fails to provide reasonable assurance that monitoring of persons and decontaInination procedures will be implenented.

[ Campbell Plan, Annex F, ProtectiveActions,p.F-9-1.]

24 10].

The procedures in Clermont and Campbell Counties to acquire lists of disabled, handicapped and senior citizens requiring special transportation fails to provide reasonable assurance by the plan or in its implementation that all such individuals are identified and that adequate vehicles and personnel are available and dependable to enter the plume exposed area to evacuate such individuals.

[Clemont Plan, 9I1-B,

Emergency Response Support, p. II-B-1; $11-I, Protective Response,

p. II-I-5; Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-9-1.]

25 3].

The Clennont County Board of Health and the Clermont County Cooperative Extension Service are jointly responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of radiation release upon county farm products and livestock and based upon such monitoring and assessment will institute protective actions pertaining to milk and livestock feed control. The plan provides no procedure, and no procedure can be implemented with reasonable assurance for the protection of the public that livestock and dairy cattle within the monitoring range can be provided stored, closed feed, removed from pasturing, that facilities exist at the respective fam to remove livestock from field and house them, and to store in sufficient quantity feed in closed containers, and to monitor that such protective agricultural practices are followed at the fam level.

[Clemont Plan, lIII-A, County

. Agencies (Gen), pp. III-A-3 and 10; otherwise no plan provision.]

25'4].

There is no provision for the monitoring of milk produced in the EZPs and transported in bulk to a processing and bottling facility for distribution to retail groceries and subsequent human consumption.

[No plan provision.]

City of Mentor, Kentucky 2.

The proposed Kentucky and Campbell County radiological response plans invalidate themselves as responses to the requirements for plans in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.33(g),10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a), (b),10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG-0654 because they repudiate their own use during an emergency. The Campbell County plan (p. V, Plan Organization) contains the following statement:

"During an emergency, Standard Operating Pro-cedures (S0Ps), developed from the plan, will be employed to respond to the emergency rather than this planning document". This statement is essentially repeated in the Campbell County Basic Plan, Appendix 8,

p. VII-8-1, and twice in the Kentucky plan:

Plan Organization, p. VI and Basic Plan, Appendix 5, p. 5.

SOPS are not included in the plans and have not been sub.,itted separately.

Since the plans disavow themselves and establish SOPS as the sine qua non of emergency planning during an emergency, and since no S0Ps are contained in the proposed plans or have been otherwise submitted, the people of Mentor, of Campbell County, and of Kentucky have no plan to protect their health, safety, and interests during a radiological emergency at the Zimer

i

. pl ant. As they stand, the so-called plans are, by self-description and by objective inspection, simply statements of intentions or, at best,

~

plans for plans. To consider them in any other light would deny Mentor its right to make a timely evaluation of plans that would actually be used during an emergency, those that, if they exist, are hidden in the undisclosed S0Ps.

3.

Although the 50-mile ingestion pathway for the Zimmer Station EPZ includes about 700 square miles of southeast Indiana, there are no radiological emergency plans by or on behalf of the State of Indiana or the affected local Indiana governments. This oraission endangers the health, safety, and interests, not only of the people of Indiana, but also of the people of Mentor, Campbell County, Kentucky, and Ohio, and is in violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,10 C.F.R. 5 50.33(g),

10 C.F.R. 5 50.47, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, II-J-11, p. 79 (and all other criteria for state plans which are related to ingestion pathway planning).

The people of Mentor, of Campbell County, and of Kentucky (and of Indiana and Ohio) do not live in a vacuum; political boundaries are of no significance here.

Parts of Kentucky (including Mentor)

Indiana, and Ohio fonn a tri-state area within which there is production, distribution, and consumption of milk and other foodstuffs with little or no regard to point of origin. The people of Mentor buy their food in this tri-state market and must not be exposed to the hazards of contaminated food from the unprotected Indiana part of the 50-mile EPZ. Simple humanitarianism extends this concern to all people who might be similarly exposed.

. 4.

The proposed radiological energency response plans for Kentucky or Campbell County, or both, do not respond, or respond in-appropriately, inaccurately, incompletely, or vaguely to several elements in HUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and to 10 C.F.R. l 50.47,10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, or'to their rationales.

4 B).

The Stone and Webster evacuation time study (Kentucky plan: Annex 3, Appendix F-5 and Campbell County plan: Annex F, Appendix F-18) is deficient in several respects and gives a falsely optimistic impression of the ability of the people to evacuate in a safe and timely manner during a radiological emergency.

[In the following recitation the parenthetical citings after sub-parts i, viii, and x refer to clarifying addenda that follow these contentions; all others refer to requirements in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-RE-1 by section, part, and page number.]

The study:

4 B i).

grossly underestimates evacuation times and the conclusions are not supported by the assumptions.

4 B i 1). At the prehearing conference Mentor used the following exampl e.

The best estimate evacuation time with prompt notification for the 0-2 miles zone in Sector II is given as 1.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (Table 3-1). An evacuation time is the sum of the notification, preparation, and travel times (p. 4-1) for the 0-2 miles zone in Sector II; notification time is

.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (Table 3-1) and preparation time is.20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> (p. 5-7), which sum is.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />. This leaves a travel time (not given) of.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />

43 -

(1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> evacuation time minus.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> preparation and mobilization).

Assuming an evacuee must travel eight miles to get outside the plume exposure EPZ, he must travel at 32 miles per hour (eight miles in.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />).

The study, however, assumes a rate of only 25 miles per hour (p. 5-7).

The study further assumes a distance of twice the radial distance to the edge of the evacuation zone (p. 4-1). The evacuee then must travel at 64 miles per hour rather than 25 miles per hour to reach the edge of the plume exposure pathway.

The applicant has since then interpreted " edge of the evacuation zone" to mean " edge of the 0-2 miles zone" rather than " edge of the 10 miles evacuation zone" which Mentor had assumed.

Under this interpretation the above calculations are obviously not correct.

However, because the City has not had time to study the rest of Table 3-1 with this interpre-tation in mind and because this interpretation raises new problems about warning times, plume speeds, road capacities, etc., that influence evacuation times, the City is not ready to withdraw this part of this contention.

4 B i 2). Table 5-1 (pp. 5-9 to 5-11) names evacuation routes and gives the number of lanes, width of lanes, and the average capacity in vehicles per hour of each road. A spot check of road widths in Campbell County (SR 8, SR 10, US 27 and CR1121) revealed that not one of them is as wide as the table indicates.

c..

.w

- ~

y

..r

... Width Implied Actual Width Evacuation by Table 5-1 by Spot Check Route (ft.)

(ft.)

SR 8 24 20 SR 10 20 17k US 27 24 22 CR 1121 20 15 Table 5-1 gives the average capacity as 1000 vehicles per hour for each of these roads, but does not indicate whether this figure is for volume in one direction or both directions, and cites Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook as an authority.

If 1000 vehicles per hour average capacity is for travel.in one direction (a reasonable assumption, since the discussion is about evacuation in one direction), a cursory look at the reference shows that this figure is pure fantasy. Table 8.9 (p. 331) gives the maximum service volume in both directions under ideal conditions on two-lane rural highways as 2000 vehicles per hour. Short passing sight distances, low average highway design speeds, narrow lane width and small lateral clearances, the combination of low performance vechicles and grades, as well as driver psychology, are among the factors that reduce service volumes considerably.

If the 1000 vehicles per hour average capacity is for travel in both directions, then that qualification is inapplicable and inappropriate in the context of one-way evacuation and the figure is still inflated and subject to modifying factors.

4 B i 3). Table 3-2 (p. 3-7) compares Stone and Webster evacuation time estimates and those of KyDES, ODSA and CCDSA. With two exceptions,

-~,_. -

... the Stone and Webster times are invariably lower than the othe:,

Differences between Stone and Webster and KyDES with prompt notification

~

considered range from.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> to 7.85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br />. Differences between Stone and Webster and ODSA and CCDSA without prompt notification range fraa.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> to 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />.

In a "run for your life" situation when minutes count, these differences between planners raise the question of the veracity of radiological emergency response plans written by the same people.

4 B ii). Does not give estimates of evacuation times for the segment of the non-car-owning population dependent upon public transport (IV-B, p.4-9).

4 8 111). Does not indicate the critical assumptions which underlie the time estimates (e.g., day versus night, workday versus weekend, peak transient versus off-peak transient, and evacuation on adjacent sectors versus non-evacuation) (IV-A, p. 4-7).

4 B iv). Does not address the relative significance of alternative assumptions (VI-A, p. 4-7).

4Bv).

Does not make evacuation time estimates for each special facility on an individual basis (II-C, p. 4-3; IV-8, p. 4-10).

4 B vi).

Does not consider the impact of peak populations including behavioral aspects (IV-B, p. 4-10).

.... t 4 8 vii). Does not make specific recommendations for actions that could be taken to significantly improve evacuation time (V, p.' 4-10).

4 B viii).

Contains errors in measurements of road widths that could influence calculations of road capacities and result in additional undertstimations of evacuation times (Addendum 2).

i 4 B ix). Does not contain comments by the principal organizations resulting fraa their review of a draft submittal cf the study (V, p. 4-10).

t 4 B x).

Contains unresolved conflicts of great proportions between efacuation time estimates by Stone and Webster and those by the Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services, the Ohio Disaster Services Agency, and 1

the Clermont County Disaster Services Agency (Addendum 3).

4 C).

There are no provisions for alternative evacuation routes or for evacuation in opposite directions on the provided routes in-consideration of different radioactive plume directions, traffic conges-tions, or impassable roadways. Maps in Annex F of both plans have arrow-i heads pointed inexorably in fixed directions and the Kentucky Division of Disaster and Emergency Services has publicly stated that no consider-4 ation whatsoever will be given to changing the plans in this respect.

Since Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 is devoted entirely to meterological measurements and predictions of atmospheric effluent trans-port and diffusion and criterion J-2 provides alternate evacuation routes for onsite individuals, the regulations clearly imply, and common sense L

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..... -., _... - _ ~,,,.,,

... dictates, that the general public should be able to flee away from a radioactive plume rather than be forced to pass through it.

4 D).

A designated major evacuation route, Kentucky Route 8, is dangerous in places for ordinary use and obviously unfit for emergency evacuation purposes.

In particular, south of Twelve flile Creek, the road is built into the side of a steep hill and i; frequently subject to slippages, some of them so severe that the north bound lane has been practically unusable for weeks at a time.

Piles have been driven recently in an effort to support the roadway, but the road surface is dangerously irregular and convoluted and would be particularly hazardous during emergency evacuation conditions.

4 E).

The several schools, public and private, located within the 10-mile EPZ in Kentucky lack sufficient buses and drivers to evacuate the school children in a fast, safe and orderly manner; the buses do not have conmunications equipment for use during an evacuation or for notifi-cation and instructions to drivers in the event of a radiological emergency during the picking up or delivering of school children to and from schools or during the use of buses in school activities; there is no radio ccomunications system for warning (first alert) or for use during an evacuation between the schools and the Zimmer plant, and the various local, state and federal response agencies; there is no internal telephone system of dedicated lines between the central office and several schools; and there is no agreement between the local boards of education and the state and local radiological response planners and agencies that the schools I

. m..

' or the response agencies have the procedures, equipment or manpower to ensure a fast, safe and orderly evacuation of school children.

The' Kentucky Division of Disaster and Emergency Services has j

publicly stated that neither it nor its Campbell County counterpart has written or will write S0Ps for the schools, but that it is the schools' responsibility to write them. There is no evidence that S0Ps_for schools have been written or will be written in the foreseeable future.

Despite the fact that the Campbell County school system does not have enough buses to evacuate schoolchildren simultaneously (it daily -

uses' 54 buses to accommodate 5800 children and about half of the buses are involved in shuttle, double, or triple runs), the proposed Campbell 4

County plan says that the school system is the " primary agencyLfor transportation" during an evacuation (Annex M, IV-A, p. M-2) and assigns the system the additional duty of patroling the 10-mile EPZ and providino evacuation transportation for people without personal vehicles (Campbell County plan: Annex C, IV-D-1, p. C-4; Appendix F-6; Appendix F-9, II, i

p. F-9-1; Appendix F-9, III-A, p. F-9-2; Appendix F-18, pp. 3-4, p. 3-2, I

pp. 4-1 and 4-2, p. 5-6).

4F).

Although the plans acknowledge that it is important that potassium iodide (KI) be administered as early as possible after a radioactive release and that it loses effectiveness quickly over a short period of time, there are no plans for the storage or distribution in Mentor or in the immediate vicinity of Mentor or within the 10-mile EPZ of f

KI for use by the general public (Campbell County plan: Annex F, IV-A-3,

p. F-4 IV-F, p. F-7; Appendix F-11).

1

.m

.... 4G).

Plans for the safe and timely evacuation of people with-out personal vehicles and for those who are alderly, handicapped,

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confined or othemise incapable of evacuating themselves are rudimentary, inadequate, undeveloped, and unworkable. The proposed Campbell County plan for such people calls for their evacuation by school buses and through.the assistance by the Eastern Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department-(Annex F, Appendix F-9, II, p. F-9-1 and III-C, p. F-9-3).

The schools lack sufficient buses to evacuate school children (see Contention 4-E, above) and can not provide buses for this purpose; the-fire department is not capable of providing this assistance (See Conten-tion 4-H, below).

4 H).

The Eastern Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department is located about one-fourth mile outside Mentor and serves ilentor as well as an area in the southeast portion of Campbell County. The proposed Campbell County plans call for its participation in an emergency response (Annex F, Appendix F-6, p. F-6-1 Appendix F-9, III-C, p. F-9-3.

Appendix F-10, III, p. F-10-1, Appendix F-11, II, p. F-11-1; Annex I, pp. I-1-I-2, Appendix F-11; and Annex it, I-B-2, p. M-1, and possibly IV-C, p. M-2, which refers to an Appendix I-2 which does not exist).

This fire department has no plans for a radiological emergency response, has not participated in any state or local planning effort, has had no training for fixed nuclear facilities radiological emergencies and does not anticipate such training, has inadequate or inappropriate radiological monitoring equipment, has no radiological protective gear, and has no radio communications with the Zimmer plant and inadequate radio communications with other state and local

o... response agencies; and there is no evidence that the other fire depart-ments within the 10-mile EPZ in Kentucky have adequate plans, training, and equipment to respond to a radiological emergency.

4 I).

The proposed system for prompt notification of the public (Campbell County plan: Annex C, I-A-1, p. C-1 IV-C, p. C-3, Appendix C-5) is inadequate and a burden to the people in that the siren system is designed to warn only 40% of the people within the 10-mile EPZ and has not been tested to ensure that it will achieve that design objective in any or all weather conditions for people outside or inside their homes during all their various activities; the radio system will not serve people who are outside their homes, farmers in the field, or people in their automobiles and no arrangements have been made to recompense the people for the electricity used by the radios or for the rental of space in their homes; and the integrated siren and radio system is not adequate to protect those with hearing or sight impairments or those who operate or are near loud or noisy equipment and, being dependent upon electricity, will not function during periods of electric power outage.

4 K).

Provisions for the monitoring, control and regulation of public water supplies, or for the availability of uncontaminated water to the public, before and during a radiological emergency (Campbell County plan: Annex D, Appendix D-3); Anrex F, G, p. F-8, pp. f-11, F-12, and F-13, Appendix F-12, IV, p. F-12-1; Annex H, IV-B, p. H-2; Annex P.

Appendix F) are not adequate to protect the health and safety of the people of Mentor or for a large population within the 10 and 50.aile EPZs in

s.. o Kentucky because there is no radio communications systems between the Zimmer plant or state or local response agencies and the water treatment and suppiy facilities; the water treatment and supply facilities do not have the equipment or trained personnel for continuous monitoring of water before and during a radiological emergency; the present plans are too undeveloped and too clumsy and time-consuming to ensure that prompt and appropriate protective action can be taken; and, further, the people of the City of Mentor and a large population within the 10- and 50-mile EPZs, who receive their water from treatment and supply facilities that are situated near and are not unlike those of the City of Cincinnati, have not received consideration and potential protection similar or equal to that given the people of Cincinnati as evidenced by the recent settlement between the applicant and Cincinnati in a matter cf radio-logical protection.

,