ML20033A641

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IE Insp Rept 50-220/81-23 on 810914-16.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Special,Announced Emergency Preparedness Insp of Licensee Emergency Exercise.Approx 268 insp-hrs Expended
ML20033A641
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point 
Issue date: 10/27/1981
From: Abraham K, Crocker H, Dorflein L, John Hickman, Sharon Hudson, Todd Jackson, Kinney W, Linville J, Madden W, Meyers J, Mojta M, Sakenas C, Terc N, Matt Thomas, Thomas W
Battelle Memorial Institute, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20033A640 List:
References
50-220-81-23, NUDOCS 8111250664
Download: ML20033A641 (6)


Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION I Report No.

50-220/81-23 Docket No.

50-220 License No. DPR-63 Priority Category C

Licensee:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS)

Inspection At:

NMPNS, New York Inspection Conduc Septem[er 14-16, 1981

/0-26-#1 Inspectors Ne. men M. Terc, Regional Coordinator, NRC:HQ date (Team Lea er)

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M W."J. Madden, Physical Security Inspector, NRC:I date

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,a C. A Sakenas Radiation Specialist, NRC:I date 2

i. u >r J. B. Hickma, Reactor Safety E(gineer, NRC:HQ date 0

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y S. D Hudson, esident Inspector %MPUS, NRC:I date h-7 p

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W. Thomas, Battelle Laborttori'es date Approved by: t

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H.~ W. Crockbrf Chief, Emergency Preparedness

'date' Section, DEP&OS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 14-16, 1981 (Report Number 50-220/81-

)

Areas Inspected:

Special, announced emergency preparedness inspection of a licensee emergency exercise. The inspection involved approximately 268 inspec-tion-hours by a special team of individuals from the NMNPS and J. A. FitzPatrick NRC Resident Offices, NRC Recion I,-NRC Headquarters and Battelle Laboratories.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.

DETAILS 1.

Individuals Contacted a.

Licensee Personnel J. E. Kaish, NMPC, Director, D*vicion of Public Relations T. E. Lempges, NMPC, Vice President, Nuclear Generation T. J. Perkins, NMPC, General Superintendent T. W. Roman, NMPC, Station Superintendent M. A. Silliman, NMPC, Technical Superintendent, Nuclear Generation R. Abbott, NMPC, Supervisor of Operations E. Leach, NMPC, Superintendent of Chemistry and Radiation Protection W. Drews, NMPC, Superintendent of Technical Services (Nuclear)

8. Taylor, NMPC, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Control (Nuclear)

J. Duell, NMPC, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Management R. Randall, NMPC, Supervisor, Technical Services H. Flanagan, NMPC, Environmental Protection Coordinator P. Volza, NMPC, Emergency Planning Coordinator M. Jaworsky, NMPC, Dosimetry and ALARA Coordinator M. Hedrick, NMPC, Assistant Training Supervisor T. Peeling,.NMPC, Assistant Training Supervisor J. Pavel, NMPC, Supervisor, Training (Nuclear)

W. Thomson, NMPC, Assistant Training Supervisor F. Zollitsch, NMPC, Supervisce, Training (Nuclear)

J. Poindexter, NMPC, Assistant Training Supervisor M. Jones, NMPC, Site Planning Coordinator J. Spadafore, NMPC, Supervisor, Computer Operations and Maintenance W. A. Mosher, NMPC, Site Office Supervisor K. Dahlberg, NMPC, Site Maintenance Superintendent H. Master, NMPC, Sur,ervisor, Mechanical Maintenance F. Hawksley, NMPC, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance (Nuclear)

R. Gerbig, NMPC, Respiratory Coordinator D. Palmer, NMPC, QA Operations Supervisor W. Connolly, NMPC, QA Engineer G. Le kiw, NMPC, QA Engineer K. Shea, NMPC, QA Engineer L. Stucky, NMPC, QA Engineer R. Burtch, NMPC, Director, Energy Information Center P. Francis, NMPC, Energy Informaticn Center Staff M. A. Biamonte, NMPC, Assistant Director, Energy Information Center R. W. Smith, NMPC, Site Reactor Analyst Supervisor W. Davey, NMPC, Reactor Operator C. Newson, NMPC, Reactor Operator K. Rossiter, NMPC, Reactor Operator F. McCarthy, NMPC, Security Investigator K. Crouse, NMPC, Central District Security Manager M. Goldych, NMPC, Assistant Training Supervisor

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b.

Non-Licensee _ personnel R. Friess, EDS Nuclear, Supervising Engineer R. Crosby, EDS Nuclear, Supervising Engineer C. Heitz, EDS Nuclear, Engineer R. A. Sullivan, RG&E, Public Affairs-Lee Lang, RG&E, Superintendent, Nuclear Production E. DeMerritt, RG&E, Emergency Planning Coordinator.

J. Noon, RG&E, Assistant Superintendent Dick Morrill, RG&E, Training Coordinator Bud Stengren, Con Ed, Assistant to Vice President Public Affairs G. Liebler, Con Ed, Emergency Planning Director W. Renz, LILCO, Emergency Planning Coordinator M. Miele, LILCO, Supervisor, C5emistry and Radiation Protection 2.

Emergency Exer 'se a.

Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the exercise, the inspectors met with licensee representatives to review the nature and scope of the exercise scenario.

During this meeting, the licensee representatives stated that they intended to omit the implementation of certain actions that would otherwise be part of the response. The reason given was that the plant was presently at maximum power and they didn't want to disturb its operation. These actions included:

Evacuation of the NMPNS, Unit I and adjoining construction site (Unit II), accompanied by monitoring, decontamination and relocation of evacuees; Evacuation / loss of access to the HP checkpoint; and Extended play of operator actions to bring the plant to cold shutdown under emergency conditions.

The licensee's exercise scenario involved a larne release of rd;o-activity to the environment with the intent of exercising tne responses of cfkite agencies.

For this reason the scenario had been developed in coordination with the participating agencies.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, b.

Exercise Observation During the conduct of the exercise, 13 NRC inspectors and contractors made detailed observations of the following activities:

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(1) Operational staff actions concerning detection, classification and operational assessment of the accident; (2) Notification of licensee's personnel and offsite agencies; (3) Radiological (dose) assessment and protective action decision making; (4) Assembly and accountability; (5) Security and access control; (6) In plant, onsite and offsite radiological surveys; (7) P.diation protection of emergency workers; (8) Comn.unications and information flow; (4) Coordination and direction; (10) Technical Support; and (11) Public information.

The NRC team noted that the licensee's organizational response was in accordance with established procedures and that facilities and equipment were used consistent with these procedures.

The NRC team determined, however, that there were procedural, facility and equipment shortcomings identified by licensee and NRC observers that need to be evaluated and resolved. An evaluation of these shortcomings showed that they were consistent with the findings of the emergency preparedness implementation appraisal, performed during August 17-27, 1981.

Tne depth of the operational response did not provide enough free play to exercise some functional areas of emergency response (e.g.

public announcements from the control room had been prearranged as a function of time; press releases had been prepared in advance).

Within the scope and limitation of the exercise scenario, the licensee's response was effective.

c.

Exercise Critique The NRC team attended a post-exercise critique, on September 16, 1981, during which licensee observers discussed their findings.

During the critique, the licensee observer presentations highlighted areas for improvement. The licensee documented all observers' and participants' comments for subsequent evaluation and appropriate corrective action.

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6 The NRC team compared its findings with those of the licensee observers and determined the licensee's observers had identified the following findings which exhibited a potential for a degraded response:

Radiation protection of emergency workers was inadequate in some areas (e.g. inadeqcate pre-entry briefings; air samples not taken; team :nembers accumulated dose was not followed-up or recorded etc.)

Communciation deficiencies were noted (e.g. between TSC and EOF failure of offsite team radio and lack of scheme for backup communication)

The licensee's scheme for radiological assessment of offsite consequences failed to use a sufficient number of data points.

Information flow between members of the response organization was found deficent in some areas (e.g. survey teams and security personnel were not kept abreast of conditions, and were provided little or no information)

Coordination and direction were not unambiguously defined after the arrival of the corporate support group Based on the above, the NRC team determined that the licensee's existing exercise audit and critique provisions had been implemented as described in the r Emergency Procedure EPP-18 " Exercises and Audits".

3.

Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives and their observers listed in Sections 1.a and 1.b above. The Team Leader summarized the purpose and scope of the NRC inspection and major findings. The Team Leader emphasized the need to exercise to the extent possible each functional area of emergency response, while keeping simulation to a minimum.

Simulations should be done only to the extent required to protect the plant and personnel. The Team Leader stated that a proper compromise should be reached, so that the extent of depth each functional area of emergency response is exercised would allow adequate free play, and decision making actions from the participants. The Team Leader informed licensee's management that NRC exercise findings were consistent with those identified during the recent emergency preparedness appraisal (Inspection Report 50-220/81-18) (To be issued).

The Team Leader concluded that within the context of the particular scenario used for the exercise, and subject to the above limitations, the licensee's actions were consistent with their Emergency Plans and Emergency Implementing Procedures.

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