ML20032E361
| ML20032E361 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1981 |
| From: | Casey S SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8111200463 | |
| Download: ML20032E361 (45) | |
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COPY 00CHETED 03tiRC 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS3bNNW 17 PIUS 3
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING--BOARDggy I!:iG & :iERViCE
.In the Matter of
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/ M GOV)_ g Ip-6 EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
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9 APPLICANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 10 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS ISSUES.
11 12 DAVID R.
PIGOTT EDWARD B. ROGIN 13 SAMUEL B.
CASEY JOHN A. MENDEZ 14 Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE A Professional Corporation 15 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 16 Telephone:
(415) 392-1122 17 CHARLES R.
KOCHER JAMES A.
BEOLETTO 18 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY P.
O.
Box 800 19 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 20 Telephone:
(213) 572-1900 21 Attorneys for Applicants Southern California Edison Company 22 and San Diego Gas & Electric Company 23 Dated:
November 13, 1981 24 25 6gy 26 9a i 9
i 8111200463 811113 PDR ADOCK 050003b1 G
PDR 1
e 9
1 DAVID R.
PIGOTT EDWARD B. ROGIN 2
SAMUEL B. CASEY JOHN A. MENDEZ 3
Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE A Professional Corporation 4
600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 5
Telephone:
(415) 392-1122 6
CHARLES R.
KOCHER JAMES A. BEOLETTO 7
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY P.
O.
Box EOO 8
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 9
Telephone:
(213) 572-1900 10 Attorneys for Applicants Southern California Edison Company 11 and San Diego Gas & Electric Company 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 14 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 15 In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-361 OL
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50-362 OL 16 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
)
)
APPLICANTS' BRIEF IN 17
)
SUPPORT OF PROPOSED (San Onofre Nuclear Generating
)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 18 Station, Units 2 and 3).
)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
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EMERGENCY PLANNING AND 19
)
PREPAREDNESS ISSUES.
20 Applicants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and 21 SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY (" Applicants") hereby submit 22 their brief in support of their proposed findings of fact and 23 conclusions of law on emergency planning and preparedness 24 issues pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
6 2.754, the stipulation and 25 confirming order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 26
///
2
e 1
(" Board") (Tr. 11357), and the Board-approved stipulation' 2
between the parties extending time.
3 I.
4 INTRODUCTION 5
The emergency planning and preparedness portion of 6
the licensing i aarings on Applicants' application for full 7
term operating licenses for San Onofre Nuclear Generating 8
Station, Units 2 and 3
(" SONGS 2 & 3"), wa's concerned with 9
three contentions raised by Intervenors Friends of the Earth, 13 et al. and Groups United Against Radiation Danger (the 11 "Intervenors' Contentions"), and the interim findings and 12 determination of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 13
(" FEMA") regarding offsite emergency planning and 14 preparedness for SONGS (the " Interim FEMA Findings").
15 The Intervenors' Contentions are as stated in
-16
" Applicants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 17 on Emergency Planning and Preparedness Issues"
(" Applicants' 18 Proposed Findings") served herein on November 9, 1981.
19 (FF. 44.)1/
The Interim FEMA Findings were:
20
" State and local government radiological emergency response plans are minimally 21 adequate.
However, until corrective actions have been taken, the off-site capability for 22 implementation of the plans is not considered adequate."
23 (FF. 462.)
24 25 1/
Specific paragraphs in Applicants' Proposed Findings will be cited and referred to by the 26 abbreviation "FF."
3 f
4 1
The procedural background leading up to the 2
hearings on emergency planning and preparedness issues, a
3 description of the exhibits and testimony admitted, as well 4
as the testimony stricken from the record, are fully set 5
forth in Applicants' Proposed Findings.
(FF.15-41, 45-51.)
6 Complete lists of witnesses and exhibits can be found 7
commencing at Pages 30 and 34, respectively, of Applicants' 8'
Proposed Findings.
9 This brief sets forth the applicable legal 10 standards and summarizes the evidence in the record 11 pertaining to the Intervenors' Contentions or the Interim 12 FEMA Findings in the same order as discussed in the 13 Applicanta' Proposed Findings.
14 II.
15 DISCUSSION 16.
A.
Applicable Legal Standards 17 This Board may authorize SONGS 2 & 3 to commence 18 ful' power operation upon an overall finding, regarding the 19 issues in controversy, that the state of onsite and offsite 20 emergency preparedness provides reasonable asr2rance that 21 adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the 22 event of a radiological emergency.
10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).
23 In making this overall finding, the Board is not 24 bound by the Interim FEMA Findings, insofar as those findings 25 have been demonstrated to be erroneous or insignificant; or 26 there is reas'onable assurance that the deficiencies reported 4
E 4
1 in those findings have been or will be remedied prior to full 2
power authorization of SONGS 2; or it appears that said 3
offsite deficiencies are compensated for by other offsite or 4
onsite features so that the level of protection for the 5
public health and safety is adequate.
10 C.F.R.
6 9 50.47(c)(1); see FF. 5-7.
7 In arriving at this determination, the Board is 8
bound by the pertinent standards set forth in 10 C.F.R.
9 550.47(b), (c)(2) and Part 50, Appendix E.
IV., but is not 10 bound by the NRC Staff and FEMA guidance set forth in 11 NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and 12 Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 13 Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 14
("NUREG-0654"), although this guidance is extremely helpful 15 in interpreting the Commission's intentions regarding these 16 standards.
See 10 C.F.R.
$ 40.47(b) n.1.2/
17 B.
Intervenors' Crntentions 18 1.
CONTENTION 3 (Plume EPZ Determination).
19 T.
emergency response plans fails to meet the requirements of 10, C.F.R. 650.47(c)(2) 20 21 2/
Although " entitled to considerable prima facie weight",
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee 22 Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 811 clarified as to other matters, 8 AEC 827 (1974), and 23 compliance therewith is likely to amount to compliance with regulations, Petition for Emergency and Remedial 24 Action. CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406-07 (1978), regulatory guides promulgated by the Staff are not regulations and 25 are not entitled to be treated as such, Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2),
26 ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 (1977).
5 I
l
1 because-local emergency planning officials have arbitrarily established the boundaries 2
of the Plume Exposure EPZ in that they have mechanically applied a 10 mile boundary and 3
'that the Interagency Agreement (IAEP) among all local jurisdictions defines the EPZ by 4
drawing compass lines on a map of the area.
In determining the exact size of the EPZ, 5
emergency planning officials have failed to consider the following local conditions:
6 1.
topography 7
2.
meteorology 3.
evacuation routes 8
4.
demography 5.
jurisdictional boundaries 9
6.
SAI report 7.
land characteristics" 10 10 C.F.R.
950.47(c)(2) in pertinent part provides:
11
" Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ 12 for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in 13 radius The exact size and configuration shall be determined in 14 relation to the local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected 15 by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and 16 jurisdictional boundaries (Emphasis added.)
17 18 In considering how the exact size of the plume 19 exposure pathway EPZ (the " Plume EPZ") is to be determined, 20 the Commission has stated that the " exact size and shape of 21
[the Plume] EPZ will be decided by emergency planning 22 officials after they consider the specific conditions at each 23 site."
(45 Fed. Reg. 55406, August 19, 1980.)
The " specific 24 conditions" referred to by the Commission are " local 25 conditions such as demography, topography, land 26 characteristics, access routes and jurisdictional 6
s 4
1 boundaries."
10 C.F.R. 550.47(c)(2).
2 Accordingly, in admitting the Plume E?Z Contention 3
for hearing purposes the Board indicated it was primarily 4
ccacerned that the Plume EPZ had not been arbitrarily 5
determined, but had been drawn by the responsible emergency 6
planning officials "with some eye, albeit a judgmental one, 7
towards these local conditions."
(Tr. 3504-3505, 5530.)
The 8
Board was also concerned that there was no misunderstanding 9
among the responsible emergency planning officials as to the 10 boundaries of the Plume EPZ.
(Tr. 3500.)
11 Regarding the limitations of the contention, the 12 Board made it clear that the reference to the "SAI Report" in 13 the Plume EPZ Contention did not imply any judgment on its 14 part about the relevance of any or all of that document.
15 (Tr.6804.)
The Board further indicated that the phase "about 16 ten miles" in 10 C.F.R. $50.47(c)(2) meant that the Plume EPZ 17 boundaries may be within a couple of miles more or less than 18 ten miles, but did not permit a Plume EPZ radius of 20 miles; 19 and nothing in the admitted Plume EPZ Contention, including 20 the reference to the SAI Report, should be construed to 21 permit evidence in support of such an expansive 22 interpretation.
(Tr. 5529-5530, 6806.)
23 With these ground rules in mind, the Applicants 24 presented their case on the Plume EPZ Contention.
25 The substantial and uncontroverted evidence 26 demonstrated that the various local conditions and the data 7
s a
1 contained in the SAI Report have been considered by the 2
responsible local planning officials in drawing the 3
boundaries of the Plume EPZ. (FF. 90-93.)
An independent 4
analysis of the eviden e regarding the local conditions 5
specified in the Plume EP2 Contention, r cluding the SAI 6
Report, only supports the conclusion that the responsible 7
local planning officials have not abused their discretion in 8
this regard. (FF. 79-89.)
Any confusion or concerns 9
contained in the record regarding the fact that not all of 10 the City of San Juan Capistrano is included in the Plume EPZ 11 are resolved by the fact that Applicants and the responsible 12 local planning officials are capable of promptly alerting and 13 providing emergency instructions to the population within tne 14 entire area of San Juan Capistrano and Dana Point, and have 15 developed detailed traffic studies, evacuation time 16 estimates, evacuation plans, and a public eduction program 17 for this entire area.
(FF. 95-97, 326-332, 424-425.)
18 Intervenors have provided no evidence in the record 19 controverting these conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants 20 submit that the Plume EPZ has been properly determined as 21 required by 10 C.F.R. $50.47(c)(2).
22 2.
Contention 2F (Emergency Response and Augmentation Capability).
23 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 24 the emergency response planning and capabil-ity of implementation for SONGS 2 and 3, 25 affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 C.F.R.
2G
$50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as follows:
8
1 2
F.
the capability of each principal response organization to respond and to 3
augment this initial. response on a continuous basis, 10 C.F.R.
4 550.57(b)(1);...
5 Substantial' evidence was admitted demonstrating the 6
onsite and offsite emergency planning and response 7
capabilities of the principal and supporting emergency 8
response organizations, at all levels of. government and the 9
private sector, to initially respond and to augment their 10 response on a continuous basis. (FF. 109-134.)3/
i 11 Applicants have more than adequate onsite and 12 offsite planning personnel and equipment to promptly respond j
13 on a 24-hour per day basis and.to augment this response on a 14 continuous basis. (FF. 110-120.)
15 Likewise, each of the principal offsite 16 organizations functions on a 24-hour per day basis and 17 responds to emergency conditions with sufficient regularity 18 to assure an ongoing general emergency preparedness 19 capability. (FF. 122.)
Each of these principal offsite 20 organizations has sufficient planning, equipment and 1
21 22 3/
The principal offsite emergency response organizations are the Orange County General Services Agency, Emergency 23 Services Division; the USMC; the City of San Clemente; the Unified San Diego County Office c Disaster I
24 Preparedness; and State Parks.
The s pporting emergency response organizations are listed in Applicants' 25 Proposed Findings and include the City of San Juan Capistrano and the Capistrano Unified School District, 26 the California Highway Patrol, the California Department of Transportation and the Red Cross. (FF. 102-108).
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personnel, as well as access to additional equipment and 2
personnel'from the larger Federal, State and local 3
jurisdictions of which they are a part or with which they 4
have mutual aid agreements.
(FF. 121,123.)
5 Each of the involved State agencies and local 6
jurisdictions have a legal obligation under State law, as.
7 well as professional commitment, to protect the public health 8
and safety of persons within their jurisdictions, regardless 9
of the public hazard, as well as to render mutual aid in 10 suppcrt of other principal response organizations.
(FF. 124.)
11 The existence of substantial back-up emergency 12 response planning and capability within various supporting 13 emergency response organizations, su.h as the California 14 Highway Patrol, the Red Cross and the California Department 15 of Transportation only provides an additional assurance of 16 the existence of adequate offsite response capability.
17 (FF. 1?7-131.)
18 During the May 13 exercise, each of the principal 19 emergency response organizations and the participating 20 cupporting emergency response organizations demonstrated 21 their extensive capabilities to respond, coordinate and 22 augment their response to a radiological emergency at SONGS.
23 (FF. 125.)
Even the City of San Juan Capistrano and the 24 Capistrano Unified School District, who principally rely on 25 the emergency resources of other jurisdictions, have 26 demonstrated that they have sufficient plans and implementing 10
i 9
1 procedures, as well as sufficient equipment and personnel, to 2
adequately perform their limited, but important, initial and.
3 ongoing emergency response functions. (FF. 132-133.)
4 The foregoing conclusions were only supported and 5
certainly were not controverted by any evidence sponsored by 6
Intervenors.
Accordingly, Applicants submit that Applicants 7
and the principal offsite emergency response organizations 8
have the capability to initially respond to emergencies at 9
SONGS 2 & 3 and to augment this initial response on a 10 continuous basis as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1) and 11 Part 50, Appendix E.IV.
12 3.
CONTENTION 2A (Emergency Response j
Organization Notification and Continuous 13 Communication capacity).
14 "Whether there is a reasonable assurance that the emergency response planning and 15 capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 4
3, affecting the offsite transient and 16 permanent population, will comply with 10 C.F.R.
$50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as 17 regards:
18 19 A.
The procedures for notification by Applicants of State and local response 20 organizations, 10 C.F.R.
950.47 (b)(5),
and for notification of and continued 21 communication among emergency personnel by all involved organizations, 10 C.F.R.
22 550.47(b)(6);
23 Standard plans and procedures for initial emergency 24 classification and notification by Applicants of the involved 25 Federal, State and local response organizations have been 26 established to assure emergency notification and continuous 11 4
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communication occurs in a prompt and understandable fashion 2
on a 24-hour per day basis. (FF. 140-144).
The capability to 3
achieve such notification and continuous communication is 4
provided by private dedicated telephone systems, regular 5
telephone systems, back-up radio systems, and a teletype 6
syttem. (FF. 145-148.)
7 onsite and offsite procedures, as well as primary 8
and back-up communications system, exist to enable Applicants 9
and the involved offsite emergency response organizations to 10 notify and maintain communications between emergency 11 personnel on a 24-hour per day basis. (FF. 157-169.)
Primary 12 and back-up communication systems have been established 13 between the various onsite and offsite emergency facilities 14 that will be used by Applicants and the involved offsite 15 emergency response organizations to direct and coordinate 16 their response activities. (FF. 170-175.)
17 A program exists for periodically testing the 18 entire notification and continuous communication cystem.
19 (FF. 176-178.)
The system has been successfully demonstrated 20 on a number of occasions and further improvements in the 21 system have since been made.
(FF. 174-175.)
22 The Intervenors did not present any evidence 23 controverting these conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants 24 submit the planning and capability of Applicants and the 25 involved offsite emergency response organizations regarding 26 emergency notification and continuous communication among the 12
t e
1 involved onsite and offsite agencies and personnel is 2
sufficient to protect the public health and safety, as 3
required by 10 C.F.R.
$s50.47(b)(5) and (6), and Part 50, 4
Appendix E.IV.
5 4.
CONTENTION 2E (Existence of Adequate Offsite Emergency Operation Centers, 6
Transportation and Communications Equipment).
7 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 8
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 9
3, affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as follows:
11 12 E.
necessary transportation and 13 communication equipment, and the operation of the emergency operations 14 centers of the principal response organizations, 10 C.F.R.
15 5 50.47(b)(8);
16 Applicants have established onsite emergency 17 operations centers to provide the technical response in an 18 emergency condition and to coordinate the onsite emergency 19 response with the offsite activities of the other involved 20 emergency response organizations.
(FF. 182.)
Applicants 21 have also established offsite centers to provide a point of 22 interface where all involved emergency response organizations 23 can assess conditions and coordinate emergency response 24 activities, and expedite the coordinated dissemination of 25 public information through the media.
(FF. 183.)
26 Applicants' capability to activate, staff and operate these 13
i 1
onsite and offsite centers was successfully demonstrated at 2
the May 13' exercise.
(FF. 184.)
3 Applicants have plans and procedures describing in 4
detail the location and function of the various typer of 5
onsite and offsite communication equipment that are available 6
for emergency uee ;n support of SONGS.
The com:aunication 7
equipment located in Applicants' onsite and.offsite emergency 9
operations centere provides multiple systems and redundancies 9
which ensure the performance of vital-functions in 10 maintaining contact with onsite and offsite emergency 11 response-personnel and transmitting and receiving information 12 between SONGS and involved Federal, State and local response 13 organizationc throughout the course of an emergency.
14 Applicants al'so have plans and procedures to use their 15 considerable air'and ground transportation resources to 16 transport emergency personnel and equipment to SONGS in the 17 event normal access is disrupted or time is of the essence.
18 Additional helicopter and ground transportation assistance is 19 available to Applicants from the United States Marine Corps, 20 should the circumstances necessitate such assistance.
21 (FF. 285-188.)
22 Applicants' capability to use their communication 23 equipment, as well as the availability of necessary 24 transportation equipment in support of Applicants' onsite and 25 offsite emergency response organization, was demonstrated 26 during the May 13 exercise.
(FF. 185-189.)
14
4 1
1 Each cf the principal emergency response 2
organizations has established an emergency operations center j
3
("EOC").
The capability to operate these EOCs is assured by i
4 the existing plans and procedures for their operation, the 5
program for periodic drills and exercises involving 6
activation of these centers,.and the periodic activation-of 7
these cen'.ers for actual emergencies not involving SONGS.
8 The operatior. of each of the principal offsite centers was 9
successfully demonstrated during the May 13 exercise.
i 10 (FF. 190-193.)
1 11 Each of the principal offsite emergency 12 organizations is equipped with a reliable redundant system 13 for communicating with emergency personnel within their own 14 organization, as well as with the other involved 15 organizations.
Each of the principal offsite emergency 16 response organizations has or has access to the 17 transportation equipment necessary to respond to a 7
18 radiological emergency at SONGS 2 & 3.
(FF. 194-195.)
19 Intervenors offered no evidence controverting any 20 of these conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants submit that 21 the onsite and offsite emergency operations centers 22 established by Applicants and the involved offsite emergency 23 response organizations, as well as the communications and 24 transportation equipment available to support the role of 25 each of these organizations during an emergency at 26 SONGS 2 & 3, are sufficient to protect the public health and 15
4:
I safety, as required by 10 C.F.R. $50.47(b)(8).
2 5.
CONTENTION 2I (Interim Emergency Operations Facility).
3 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 4
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 5
3, affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 6
C.F.R. $ 50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as regards:
7 8
I.
the physical design, communications 9
equipment, and operating procedures for the Interim Emergency Operations 10 Facility, 10 C.F.R. $$ 50.47(b)(3) and (b)(8);
11 12 Concerns arising out of the May 13 exercise 13 regarding the crowded conditions in the origina) interim 14 Emergency Operations Facility (" Interim EOF"'t, located in the 15 City of San Clemente Emergency Operation Center, gave rise to 16 this contention.
These concerns have been completely 17 alleviated by development of new Interim EOF facilities in 18 the San Clemente City Hall.
(FF. 474.)
19 It should be noted in this regard that Applicants 20 are not reavi red to have an EOF which meets the functional 21 criteria established by the NRC at this time.
In order to 22 meet these criteria, Applicants are currently designing a 23 permanent EOF which is scheduled for construction and 24 operation by October, 1982.
(FF. 199.)
25 While constructing its permanent EOF, Applicants 26 have complied with the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, by 16
1 establishing an Interim EOF with six physically separate, but 2
interrelated, components, located in three separate 3
locations.
Each location is tied together by a reliable and 4
redundant communication system capable of communicating with 5
all EOCs, required emergency response personnel, and the 6
public.
(FF. 200-206.)
7 The evidence in the record fully describes the 8
physical design and existing operating procedures for the 9
Interim EOF.
(200, 207-208.)
The Applicants' capability to 10 activate, staff and operate the Interim EOF was successfully 11 demonstrated in the May 13 exercise.
A full-scale exercise 12 of the Interim EOF is required on an annual basis to assure 13 an adequate implementation capability is maintained.
14 (FF. 209.)
J 15 Intervenors sponsored no evidence controverting the 16 foregoing conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants submit that 17 the emergency response planning and implementttion caprSility j
18 as regards the physical design, communications equipment and 19 operating procedures for the Interim EOF is adequate to 20 protect the public health and safety as required by 10 C.F.R.
4 21
$$50.47(b)(3) and (8), and Part 50, Appendix E.IV.
22 6.
CONTENTION 2H (Plume EPZ Radiation Monitoring and Dose Assessment).
23 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 24 the emergency response planning and capabil-ity of implementation for SONGS 2 and 5 25 affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 C.F.R.
26
$50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as follows:
17
4 1
2 F.
the methods, staffing, nystem, and equipment for assessino and monitoring 3
actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition 4
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for SONGS 2 and 3, 10 C.F.R.
5 550.47(b)(9);
6 Concerns arising out of the May 23 exercise 7
regarding the adequacy of offsite response organizations' 8
radiation monitoring and dose assessment capabilities gave 9
rise to this contention.
These concerns have been resolved 10 not only by the subsequent training and equipment provided by 11 Applicants to these organizations (FF. 476, 478, 480), but 12 also by the fact the Applicants' onsite capability to conduct 13 offsite radiation dose assessment and monitoring is more than 14 adequate to compensate for any shortfalls in the involved 15 offsite response organizations' capabilities in this regard.
16 (FF. 213-229).
- 17 Substantial evidence was offered by Applicants ~
18 describing the considerable resources and capabilities of 19 Applicants in the area of onsite and offsite radiation dose 20 assessment and monitoring, even in situations where critical 21 monitoring or meteorological equipment is inoperable.
(FF.
22 213-230.)
23 To augment these already adequate capabilities and 24 to otherwise coordinate Applicants' dose assessment and 25 radiation monitoring activities with the activities of the 26 involved offsite response organizations, Applicants have F
18
4 1
established the Offsite Dose Assessment Center ("ODAC")
2 within the Interim EOF.
The physical design, equipment and 3
operating procedures for the ODAC are fully described in the 4
record.
(FF. 231-234.)
5 In the event of an emergency at SONGS, Applicants 6
would be primarily relied upon for offsite dose assessment 7
and radiation monitoring.
These activities will be augmented
-8 by the significant resources and capabilities of Orange and 9
San Diego Ccunties, the City of San Clemente, the USMC, and 10 the California Highway Patrol.
Each of these organizations 11
-has the necessary equipment and trained personnel to conduct 12 such activities.
In addition,-this local capability can be 13 augmented, if necessary by additional dose assessment and 14 radiation monitoring assistance available from the California 15 Department of Health Services and the United States 16 Department of Energy.
(FF. 235-236.)
17 The May 13 exercise demonstrated that the 18 capabilities for dose assessment shown by State and local 19 officials operating in the ODAC were adequate to protect the 20 public health and safety.
Applicants and the involved 21 offsite response organizations have implemented a training 22 program to further improve these capabilities.
This 23 training, along with the additional equipment provided by 24 Applicants, assure the maintenance of these capabilities.
25 (FF. 237-240.)
26 Intervenors offered no evidence controverting these 19
1 conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants submit that their 2
existing onsite plans, procedures and capabilities satisfy 3
the standards for offsite dose assessment radiation 4
monitoring capability and protective action recommendation 1
5 set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(9) without relying upon the 6
considerable offsite radiation monitoring and dose assessment 7
capabilities of the involved Federal, State and local 8
agencies.
The existence of these offsite agency 9
capabilities, as coordinated with Applicants' capabilities 10 within the ODAC, only provides additional assurance that the 11 public health and safety will be protected as required by 10 12 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(9).
j 13 7.
CONTENTION 2J (Ingestion EPZ Radiation l
Monitoring and Dose Assessment).
14 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 15 the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 16 3,
affecting the offsite transient with permanent population, will comply with 10 17 C.F.R.
550.47(a)(1) and (c)(1) as regards:
18 19 J.
the methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or 20 potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition within 21 the ingestion pathway EPZ for SONGS 2 and 3, 10 C.F.R.
550.47(b)(9);...
22 23 There is little or no controversy regarding this 24 contention.
The substantial evidence in the record 25 substantiates the conclusion that the required Ingestion EPZ 26 plans and procedures have been developed based on an analysis 20
1 of pertinent land use data and generally accepted 2
methodologies for estimating dose commitments to humans from 3
food and water samples taken from various points within the 4
Ingestion EPZ.
(FF. 246-262.)
5 Ingestion EPZ monitoring and protective action 6
formulation will be coordinated in the ODAC.
Based on the 7
ODAC coodinator's recommendation, the responsible official in 8
each jurisdiction will make protective action decisions 9
ranging from no action to crop or milk condemnation, which 10 will be released to the general public via the Emergency 11 Media Center, the Emergency Broadcast Network, and 12 notification of processors and distributors by the 13 responsible State and county health and agriculture 14 officials.
(FF. 255-262.)
15 More substantial preplanning than has already been 16 accomplished by Applicants and the involved State and local 17 agencies, is not necessary in view of the significant amount 18 of time available for determining protective actions for the 19 Ingestion EPZ.
(FF. 263.)
20 Intervenors offered no evidence controverting these 21 conclusions.
Accordingly, Applicants submit that the 22 existing plans, procedures and capabilities of Applicants and 23 the involved State and local jurisdictions to assess and 24 monitor actual or potential offsite consequences of a 25 radiological emergency condition within the Ingestion EPZ is 26 adequate to protect the public health and safety as required 21
I by 10 C.F.R. $50.47(b)(9).
2 8.
CONTENTION 2G (Radiological Emergency Response Training).
3 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 4
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 5
3, affecting the offsite transient and-permanent population, will comply with 10 6
C.F.R.
550.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as regards:
7 8
G.
radiological emergency response training 9
to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency, 10 C.F.R.
10
$50.47(b)(15);.
11 Any concerns regarding radiological emergency 12 response training have been resolved by the four separate 13 onsite and offsite radiological emergency training programs 14 currently being operated or sponsored by Applicants on an 15 on-going basis.
(FF. 268-285, 480.)
16 First, Applicants have an extensive on-going 17 training program designed to assure that all potentially 18 involved personnel in Applicants' oncite and offsite 19 emergency response organizations are knowledgeable of the 20 applicable onsite and offsite plans and procedures and are 21 proficient in the use of the required equipment.
22 (FF. 268-276.)
23 Second, Applicants are sponsoring an Emergency 24 Medical Assistance Program ("EMAP") for hospital, medical and 25 ambulance staffs at the three local hospitals where 26 Applicants have emergency response agreements.
EMAP is 22
1 designed to maintain a state of readiness for onsite and 2
offsite medical personnel to effectively respond to a 3
radiological emergency involved radiation induced or 4
complicated injuries.
(FF. 281.)
5 Third, Applicants, in cooperation with the involved 6
local emergency response organizations,_are sponsoring an 7
on-going one-day general radiological emergency planning and 8
preparedness program designed to familiarize potentially 9
involved personnel with plans and procedures in all 10 functional areas; and an intensive three-day course in 11 radiological monitoring and dose assessment for both the 12 Plume and Ingestion EPZu.
(FF. 282-285.)
13 Fourth, Applicants have already provided general 14 radiological emergency response training to 386 persons 15 representing 105 potentially involved offsite agencies in San 16 Diego and Orange Counties.
(FF. 279-280.)
17 Intervenors have presented no evidence 18 controverting the existence or sufficiency of the training 19 programs described above.
Accordingly, Applicants submit 20 that appropriate radiological emergency response training has 21 been and will continue to be provided to onsite and offsite 22 emergency response personnel who may be called on to assist 23 in an emergency and such training satisfies the requirements 24 of 10 C.F.R. 650.47(b)(15).
25
///
26
///
23
1 9.
CONTENTION 2D (Medical Services for Injured Contaminated Individuals).
2 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 3
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 4
3, affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 5
10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as follows:
6 7
D.
the arrangements for medical services 8
for contaminated and injured individuals, 10 C.F.R.
9 5 50.47(b)(12);
10 There was substantial uncontroverted evidence 11 offered concerning the medical services which have been 12 established for contaminated and injured individuals.
13 Applicants have provided for initial first aid and 14 medical services at SONGS.
(FF. 296.)
Applicants also have 15 written agreements with ambulance services, local support 16 hospitals and medical doctors to provide medical services for 17 contaminated and injured individuals.
Additional ambulance 18 and transportation services may be called upon from Orange 19 County or requested from USMC, if necessary.
(FF. 297-299, 20 302.)
21 In addition to arranging for these medical 22 services, Applicants have arranged specific radiological 23 emergency response trainina for the hospital, medical and 24 ambulance staffs.
This training is designed to maintain a 25 state of preparedness for onsite and offsite medical 26 personnel to effectively respond to a radiological emergency 24
I 1
involving radiation induced or complicated injuries.
The 2
training program will be continuing and will include 3
inspection of equipment and supplies as well as drills for 4
the medical support provided at SONGS and at support 5
hospitals and ambulance companies.
(FF. 281, 305, 309, 6
310.)
As discussed above, additional training has also been 7
provided for representatives of many response organizations 8
including offsite medical personnel.
(FF. 279, 280.)
9 Finally, Applicants also have available the services of Dr.
10 R. E. Linnemann and other experts employed by Radiation 11 Management Corporation on a 24-hour basis to provide 12 consultation and, if required, direct assistance from 13 radiation medicine physicians, certified health physicists 14 and technicians with portable instrumentation.
(FF. 306.)
15 specific prearrangement of medical facilities and 16 services for mass care ic not required for the general public 17 either within or beyond the EPZ.
Mr.
B.
K. Grimes, the NRC's 18 Director of Emergency Planning and Preparedness and 19 Co-Chairman of the FEMA /NRC Steering Committee which issued 20 NUREG-0654, as well as the Task Force which issued 21 NUREG-0396, testified that such arrangements were not l
22 contemplated or required by NUREG-0654 and this pelicy was 23 supported by the testimony of Dr.
R.
E.
Linnemann.
(FF. 291, 24 292.)
Nevertheless, the prearrangements which do. exist for 25 onsite ~ersonnel and offsite emergency workers do provide a 26 basis for the treatment of the general public in the unlikely 25
1 event that the need should arise.
.(FF. 293.)-
2 In considering the possible treatment which might 3
be required by members of the general public in the unlikely 4
event there is a release of radiation offsite large enough to 5-require treatment, a number of factors must be considered.
6 First, decontamination does not require hospital facilities.
7 (FF. 303.)
Second,. once a person has been exposed to 8
radiation, a predictable clinical course ensues which is 9
directly correlated with the exposure of dose and dose rate.
10 This clinical course cannot be interrupted and will evolve 11 ocr a period of days and weeks.
Thus, immediate treatment 12 Jc not re@ ired.
(FF. 54, 58, 304.)
Because time is not a 13
- ritical factor, there is the ability to treat the general 14 public by' making use of the trained pertannel, existing 15 facilities and procedures which are already in place.
16 Hospital facilities do exist within and beyond the Plume and 17 Extended EPZs to handle thousands of patients if the need 18 should arise. (FF. 293, 294.)
19 Although Intervenors attempted to intreiuce 20 testimony concerning medical services and treatment which in 21 their opinion ou;ht to be available,.this testimony was not 22 admitted or was striken by the Board.
(FF. 50.)
Thus, the 23 evidence offered by Applicants and the NRC Staff was not 24 controverted and Applicants submit that the record l
25 establishes that there is reasonable assurance that 26 arrangements for medical services for contaminated and 26
1 injured individuals exist and will be maintained, as required 2
by 10 C.F.R.
$ 50.47(b)(12) and Part 50, Appendix E.
IV.
3 10.
CONTENTION 2C (Public Education and Information Program).
4 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 5
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 and 6
3, affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 7
10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as follows:
8 9
C.
the information and the procedure for 10 dissemination of the information to the public within the plume exposure pathway 11 Emergency Planning Zone on a periodic basis-on how they will be notified and 12 what their actions should be in the event of an emergency, 10 C.F.R.
13
$ 50.47(b)(7);
14 Applicants, as well as the involved local planning 15 officials, provided substantial evidence concerning the form 16 and content of the public education and information being 17 provided to residents and transients within the Extended EPZ 18 and beyond.
19 The principal means of providing specific informa-20 tion en responses to an emergency is the Emergency Response 21 Pamphlet (" Pamphlet") prepared by Applicants in conjunction 22 with local planning officials and based on the local 23 emergency plans.
(FF. 32a.)
More general information is 24 provided by the En.ergency Information Handbook (" Handbook").
25 The Handbook is designed to provide individuals with the 26 basic understanding of how and why emergency responses were 27
i 1
developed and will be applied and how and why various 2
protective actions will be effective.
(FF. 324.)
3 The Pamphlet has been mailed to all residences 4
within the Extended EPZ other than those within Camp 5
Pendleton whose residents have been given similar information 6
through the Base Housing Office.
Newspaper advertisements 7
and other reminders will be used to ensure that all residemts 8
are aware of and have obtained copies of the Pamphlet and to 9
provide means to obtain additional copies.
There will be an 10 ongoing program to make certain that all new residents.
11 receive copies of the Pamphlet.
(FF. 326, 327.)
12 In order to provide information for transients and 13 for residents who are away from home in the event of an 14 emergency, businesses will receive posters similar in format 15 and content to the Pamphlet to be displayed in their 16 establishments.
Likewise, posters and fliers will be used at 17 the State Parks and Beaches to provide emergency information 18 to the users of these facilities.
(FF. 328.)
Residents and 19 transients will also be provided emergency information by 20 means of telephone directory inserts, telephone booth decals 21 and information placed in hotels and rooming establishments.
22 (FF. 329.)
Persons beyond the Plume and Extended EPZs will 23 also be mailed information relative to their concerns.
24 (FF. 330, 331)
To supplement the Pamphlet and Handbook, 25 community meetings will be held and arrangements will be made 26 to deal with the special needs of the handicapped and other 28
v 4
1 special populations.
(FF. 325, 332-335.)
2 At least annually, or more often if required, there 3
will be a public information update which will include 4
efforts to make certain that all persons are aware of the 5
appropriate emergency information.
(FF. 336-338.)
In 6
addition, the public information and education program has 7
been enhanced by efforts to inform the media of emergency 8
information which is available and by special arrangements to 9
acquaint the news media with emergency plans, information 10 concerning radiation and points of contact for release of 11 public information and emergency instruction.
Local public 12 information officers have been identified and trained to 13 further aid in this process.
(FF. 339-342.)
14 A question did arise nt the hearings concerning 15 information and instructions available to special 16 institutions such as schools.
This confusion was later 17 clarified by counsel for Applicants, and it became clear that 18 all residents as well as all special institutions would 19 receive appropriate information prior to fuel load at SONGS 20 2.
(Tr. 8728, 1012.)
21 The information and procedure for dissemination of 22 such information to the public within the Plume and Extended 23 EPZs on a periodic basis was established by the evidence to
~24 be adequate to inform the public on how they will be notified 25 and what their action should be in the event of an emergency, 26
///
29 i
~-
h 1
as required by 10 C.F.R.
5 50.47(b)(7) and Part 50, Appendix 2
E.
IV.
3 11.
CONTENTION 2B (Emergency Public Alert and Notification System).
4 "Whether there io reasonable assurance that 5
the emergency response planning and capability of implementation for SONGS 2 & 3, 6
affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 C.F.R.
7 5 50,47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as regards:
8 9
B.
the means for notification and instruction to the populace within the 10 plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone, 10 C.F.R.
$ 50.47(b)(5);
11 12 There was substantial and uncontroverted testimony 13 concerning the means for prompt public alert and notification 14 within the Plume and Extended EPZs and the means for 15 providing prompt emergency public instruction during an 16 emergency.
Intervenors did not present any evidence en the 17 subject.
18 Within the Plume EPZ public notification will be 19 accomplished by the prompt alerting system which fully 20 complies with the requirements and guidance set forth in 21 Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654.
(FF. 350.)
Specifically, the 22 sirens meet or exceed minimum and maximum sound levels 23 specified.
(FF. 352, 353.)
24 Installation of the sirens within the Plume EPZ has 25 been completed, although Applicants note that the NRC has 26 indicated its intention to revise its regulations to defer 4
30
__-.~.._..-...c 1
until February 1, 1982 its requirements for prompt public 2
notification systems, 46 Fed. Reg. 46587 (September 21, 3
1981.
(FF. 354.)
4 The locations of the sirens and the procedure for 5
their operation, including provisions to prevenc accidental 6
activation, were fully described in the testimony.
7 Specifically, there is a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day capability to 8
activate each of the sirens.
(FF. 356-359.)
Procedures also 9
exist for the coordination for the use of the sirens by the 10 local jurisdictions.
(FF. 362.)
11 Within the Plume EPZ, the sirens should provide 100 12 percent coverage during nignttime hours for all persons 13 indoors or outdoors and 100 percent coverage outdoors during 14 the day.
During daytime hours the indoor siren coverage 15 within the Plume EPZ would be achieved at least 85 percent of 16 the time.
However, since the sirens produce a three to five 17 minute signal, even where interior ambient noise levels are 18 such that the sirens could not be heard at all times, during 19 some of the tire the sirens were activated, they would be 20 expected to be audible indoors.
(FF. 355, 360.)
21 In addition to the siren system, and specifically 22 within the areas of the Extended EPZ not included within the 23 Plune EPZ, other means exist to provide prompt public alert.
24 These means include a public address system on ths. perimeter 25 fence at SONGS; as well as CHP, County Sheri ff's Department 26 and State Park vehicles, and helicopters equipped with 31
1 loudspeakers.
Orange County's extensive communications 2
capability permits direct contact with SONGS as well as each 3
of the two thousand emergency vehicles in Orange County.
4 These alerting systems will make it possible to alert and 5
notify the public within the 45 minute period suggested for 6
the area beyond a 5-mile radius of SONGS in NUREG-0654, 7
Appendix 3, p. 3.3.
(FF. 97, 361.)
8 The primary means of providing public instruction 9
during an emergency would be through the Emergency Broadcast' 10 System ("EBS").
Arrangements now exist to utilize the EBS 11 and additional arrangements are in place for broadcasting 12 emergency information and instructions over local radio 13 stations.
(FF. 365, 366.)
Emergency public instruction may 14 also be provided through the USMC communications systems, the 15 SONGS public address system, loudspeaker-equipped emergency 16 vehicles (including helicopters) as well as through Coast 17 Guard communication systems.
(FF. 367.)
18 In order to facilitate the coordination and 19 dissemination of public information, each jurisdiction hac 20 identified a public information officer and procedures exist 21 to establish the Emergency Media Center from which Pios can 22 operate.
(FF. 368-372.)
The Emergency Media Center provides 23 a means to coordinate information to be provided to the media 24 and aids in rumor control.
By using communications systems 25 which exist, accurat; information can be provided to the 26 media and specific information to prevent or deal with.2mors 32
4 I
can be obtained and disseminated.
(FF. 374, 375.)
In 2
addition, SCE, SDG&E, Orange County and San Diego County have 3
established systems and procedures for responding to and 4
controlling rumors.
(FF. 376-380.)
5 Provisions exist to use the extensive 6
communications facilities which are available to provide 7
supporting information and recomrendations to local public 8
officials for decision making and emergency public 9
instruction as required.
(FF. 384.)
Pre-written public 10 instructions exist in order to achieve consistency among the 11 jurisdictions and so the public can be quickly and accurately 12 informed of the decisions of those responsible for emergency 13 actions.
(FF. 381-383.).
14 The testimony of Applicants and the local planning 15 officials demonstrate that the physical and administrative 16 means for prompt emergency notification to the transient and 17 permanent population within the Extended and Plume EPZs is 18 adequate, and that means exist to provide instruction to the 19 populace within the Extended and Plume EPZs in the event of 20 an emergency, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(5) and Part 21 50, Appendix E IV.
22 12.
CONTENTION 2K (General Plans for Reentry and Recovery).
23 "Whether there is reasonable assurance that 24 the emergency response planning and capabil-ity of implementation for SONGS 2 and 3, 25 affecting the offsite transient and permanent population, will comply with 10 C.F.R.
26 5 50.47(a)(1) and (b) or (c)(1) as regards:
33
1 2
K.
general plans for reentry and recovery, 10 C.F.R.
5 50.47(b)(13);
3 4
The substantial and uncontroverted evidence in 5
record srbstantiates the conclusion that general plans for.
6 onsite and offsite reentry and recovery have been established 7
by Applicants, and the responsible agencies within the State 8
of California, as well as San Diego and Orange Counties.
9 (FF. 388-400.)
10 The onsite plans for r'eentry and recovery include a 11 pre-established recovery organization and arrangements for 12 augmenting existing recources, as necessary, from other 13 utilities, suppliers, consultcnts, and engineering firms.
14 (FF. 388-394.)
15 Tne principal offsite emergency response 16 organizations' plans for reentry and recovery are set forth 17 in their emergency response plans.
There would never be a 18 critical time element for emergency reentry by an offsite 19 agency.
Once reentry is authorized by the appropriate 20 Federal, State and local health officials, the recovery 21 operation will operate out of the Interim EOF, which serves i
22 as the central location for coordination and functional 23 activity.
(FF. 395-399.)
i 24 Intervenors did not submit any evidence 25 controverting these conclusions.
Accordingly, based on the 26 substantial and uncontroverted evidence in the record, J
34 f
-r v,,-
-a r--~,---
.--,,,e--
,w-,.-,,,,,~~--,n,,-,,-
-, ~ - - -, - - - - -
,--.---,...vw--,-
-.-.--e-
--,--rw,
+
~
1 Applicants submit that the existing general onsite and 2
offsite plans for reentry and recovery following a 3
radiological emergency at SONGS 2 & 3 are adequate to protect 4
the public health and safety, as required by 10 C.F.R.
5 5 50.47(b)(13) and Part 50, Appendix E.IV.
6 13.
CONTENTION 1 (Offsite Public Protective Action Capability).
7 "Whether the state of emergency preparedness 8
for SONGS 2 and 3 provides reasonable assurance that the offsite transient and 9
permanent population within the plume exposure pathwa Emergency Planning Zone, 10 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(
2), for SONGS 2 and 3 can be evacuated or stherwise adequately 11 protected in the event of a radiological emergency with offsite consequences occurring 12 at SONGS 2 and 3, as required by 10 C.F.R.
SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(10), and Part 50, 13 Appendix E.IV."
14 It was never entirely clear in what respect 15 Intervenors believed that the involved offsite emergency 16 response organizations were incapable of adequately 17 evacuating or otherwise protecting the public in the event of 18 a radiological emergency at SONGS 2 & 3.
Applicants submit 19 it is sufficient under 10 C.F.R.
5 50.47(b)(lO) for 20 Applicants to demonstrate that a range of protective actions, 21 including evacuation, sheltering and thyroid prophylaxis, are 22 available; and that the means for choosing between these 23 actions under any particular circumstance has been 24 established bared upon consideration of the environmental, 25 demographic and temporal factors, as well as resource 26 availability, type of radioactive release, and exposure 35
r 1
duration, with the goal of minimizing harmful effects.
2 (FF. 404-422.)
3 In this regard it is important to note that the 4
" Protective Action Guidelines" ("PAGs") to be used as 5
" trigger values" initiating a protective action response are 6
extremely conservative and are set far below those levels 7
which would produce detectable short-term biological effects 8
and at levels which would minimize the risk of long-term 9
biological effects.
(FF. 55-58.)
This fact combined with 10 the numerous other factors mitigating against receipt of a 11 harmful radiation dose by the offsite population around SONGS 12 2 & 3 provides reasonable assurance that available protective 13 measures can be taken in sufficient time to mitigate any 14 potential harmful effects.
(FF. 58.)
15 Th_re is substantial and uncontroverted evidence in 16 the record that Applicants and the involved offsite emergency 17 response organizations have developed detailed plans and 18 procedures and have sufficient resources to implement 19 evacuation, sheltering or thyroid prophylaxis for all persons 20 within the Plume and Extended EPZs requiring such protective 21 action.m.
(FF. 423-459.)
22 The detailed evacuation planning takes into acccunt 23 all the factors specified in NUREG-3654 II.J.lO.
24 (FF. 423-444.)
The evacuation time estimates are extremely 25 conservative and provide decision-makers with a range of 26 estimates covering optimum conditions, peak population 36
1 conditions and adverse weather conditions.
(FF. 445-452.)
2 Intervenors concerns and criticisms regarding the evacuation 3
time estimates were shown to be without basis and in error.
4 (FF. 453 l.54.)
5 Substantial and uncontroverted evidence was 6
presented in support of the offsite emergency response 7
organizations' capability to implement the full range of 8
protective actions.
The demonstrated commitment of each of 9
these organzations to maintain and improve upon this 10 capability through an on-going program of plan coordination, 11 periodic training, drills and exercises only provides 12 additional assurance that the public health and safety will 13 be adequately protected.
(FF. A59.)
14 Accordingly, Applicants submit that the substantial 15 and overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the 16 conclusion that the offsite transient and permanent 17 population with the Extended and Plume EPZs for SONGS 2 & 3 18 can be evacuated or otherwise adequately protected in the 19 event of a radiological emergency with offsite consequences, 20 as required by 10 C.F.R.
6 50.47(a)(1), (b)(10) and Part 50, 21 Appendix E.
IV.
22 C.
Interim FEMA Findings 23 During the hearing the Board was presented with a 24 significant amount of testimony and written evidence 25 concerning the status of offsite emergency preparedness.
26 This evidence incluoed the status of the offsite plans 37
1 themselves and the capability of the local principal and 2
supporting emergency response organization to implement the 3
plans.
4 With respect to the plans themselves there was no 4
5 conflict in the evidence.
Representatives of the principal 6
and supporting offsite emergency response organizations 7
testified concerning their planning efforts and the plans 8
themselves were introduced into evidence.
(Exhibits 9
- 53-57.)
The local planning officals concluded that the 10 plans themselves were ade7uate.
This conclusion was 11 confirmed by Mr. Murri, an expert in emergency planning and 12 preparedness, as well as by FEMA's own review which concluded 13 that the plans themselves were minimally adequate.
(FF.
9, 14 24, 25, 30, 463, 464.)
15 Intervenors did not offer any witnesses who 16 challenged the testimony and conclusions of the local 17 planning officials or the conclusions of Mr. Murri and of f
18 FEMA.
Thus, there is no dispute in the evidence concerning 19 the adequacy of the plans themselves.
20 With rezrect to the capability to implement the 21 offsite emergency plans, there is what first appears to be a 22 conflict in the evidence.
23 The Interim FEMA Findings concluded that, "until 24 corrective actions have been taken, the offsite capability 25 for implementation is not considered adequate."
(FF. 462.)
26 In contrast to the Interim FEMA Findings, Applicants and 38
_=.
i j
1 representatives of the local primary and sup porting emergency 2
response organizations challenged the validity of many of the 3
specific findings made by FEMA, questioned the significance l
4 of other deficiencies reported in the FEMA /RAC Comments and 5
the FEMA Exercise Evaluation, and took issue with FEMA's 6
conclusion regarding the capability to implement the plans.
7 However, it was clear that at least some of the conflict 8
arose because Applicants' evidence related to the capability
- j 9
of implementation at the time of the hearings and at the time 4
10 of fuel load or full pot <c operation of SONGS 2, while FEMA's 11 conclusion was based largely on the May 13, 1981 exercise and 12 an assessment period ending one week later.
(FF. 461, 464.)
13 Indeed, a prime focus of Applicants' evidence was 14 the corrective actions already taken to remedy many of the 15 deficiencies noted by FEMA and other corrective actions which 16 would be taken prior to fuel load or full power operation of 17 SONGS 2.
(FF. 465.)
i 1
18 In reaching its conclusion, FEMA itself had noted 19 that implementation capability could be demonstrated "within 20 the very near future" provided certain corrective actions 21 suggested in the Interim FEMA Findings were taken.
i 22 (FF. 466.)
Most importantly,, FEMA National concurred that i
23 the corrective actions identified by Applicants would be t
24 sufficient to remedy the deficiencies noted in the Interim 25 FEMA Findinga.
(FF. 467-470.)
26 FEMA's view that if the corrective actions 39
. ~
1 identified are completed there would be a reasonable 2
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 3
taken in the event radiological emergency at SONGS 2 & 3 is 4
particularly significant in view of the substantial evidence 5
in the record that corrective actions recommended by FEMA are 6
either complete or will be complete prior to the schedule 7
full-power operation of SONGS 2.
(FF. 471-480.)4/
FEMA has 8
agreed that it will review the corrective actions which have 9
been identified to determine if, as implemented, they are 10 sufficient to remedy he deficiency noted in the Interim FEMA 11 Findings.
(FF. 4P,1.)
12 Under chese circumstances Applicants believe that 13 what appears to b<3 a conflict in the evidence concerning the 14 capability to implement the offsite emergency plans is more 15 apparent than real.
The conflict derives largely from the 16 timing of the May 13, 1981 exercise and of FEMA's review of 17 the plans as compared with the corrective action identified 12 to remedy the :eficiencies noted by FEMA as well as the 19 20 4/
Applicants will be responding by separate letter to the two letters dated October 15, 1981 from Marshall E.
21 Sanders, Acting Chief, Technological Hazards Division, Office of Natural and Technological Hazards, Federal 22 Emergency Management Agency.
We note here, however, that by letter dated October 15, 1981 from Applicants to 23 Mr. Sandwina, FEMA, Re9 ion IX, Applicants reported the completion of all corrective actions proposed by 24 Applicants and agreed upon by FEMA National as necessary to resolve FEMA's concerns as set forth in the Interim 25 FEMA Findings.
Earlier progress reports for the period ending September 16, 1981 are contained in Applicants' 26 Exhibit #149.
40
r 1
ongoing efforts to improve the plans and the general 2
capability for their implementation.
While the substantial 3
weight of the evidence does demonstrate that the capability 4
to implement the offsite emergency response plans currently 5
exists, the Board does not need to make such a determination 6
at this time and can await the further FEMI. findings.
If 7
FEMA should concur that the identified deficiencies have been 8
corrected, the conflict concerning whether the offsite 9
emergency respons.. plans are capable of being implemented 10 will have been eliminated.
11 D.
Conclusions 12 It is submitted that the evidence in the record 13 refuting the Intervenors' Contentions is complete and 14 conclusive.
The corrective actions recognized by FEMA as 15 sufficient to resolve the concerns expressed in the Interim 16 FEMA Findings have been completed.
The overwhelming and 17 mostly uncontroverted evidence leads to the conclusion that 18 there is more than a reasonable assurance that adequate 19 protective measures on behalf of the offsite transient and 20 permanent population can and will be taken by Applicants and 21 the involved Federal, State and local offsite emergency 22 response organizations in the event of a radiological 23 cmergency at SONGS 2 & 3.
Accordingly, no reason appears in i
24 this regard why issuance of a full power, full term operating 25 license to SONGS 2 & 3 will be inimical to the common defense 26 and security or to the health and safety of the public, and 41
1 should not be issued at the earliest possible date.
2 Dated November 13, 1981.
3 Respectfully submitted, 4
DAVID R. PIGOTT 5
EDWARD B. ROGIN SAMUEL B. CASEY 6
JOHN A. MENDEZ Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 7
A Professional Corporation 8
CHARLES R.
KOCHER JAMES A. BEOLETTO 9
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 10 11 By ___ /s/ Samuel B. Casey Samuel B. Casey 12 One of Counsel for Applicants l
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO!4PANY 13 and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY i
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1
23 24 25 26 42
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 2
I certify pursuant to 10 C.F.R. $2.712(e)(2) that:
3 I am an attorney employed in the City and County of 4
San Francisco, California, by one of counsel for Applicants 5
Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas &
6 Electric Company.
7 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party 8
to the within entitled action; my business addressis 600 9
Montgomery Street, loth Floor, San Francisco, California 10 94111.
11 On November 13, 1981, I served the attached 12
" APPLICANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 13 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON EMERGENCY PLANNING & PREPAREDNESS 14 ISSUES", in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof 15 enclosed in the United States mail, first class (or where 16 indicated by asterisks by Express Mail), at San Francisco, 17 California addressed as follows:
18 19 James L. Kelley, Chairman Robert Dietch, Vice President Administrative Judge Southern California Edison 20 Atomic Safety and Licensing Company Board P.
O.
Box 800 21 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Commission Rosemead, CA 91770 22 Washington, D. C.
20555 23 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Alan R. Watts, Esq.
Administrative Judge Rourke & Woodruff 24 c/o Bodega Marine Laboratory California First Bank Building University of California 10555 North Main Street 25 P.
O.
Box 247 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Bodega Bay, CA 94923 26 1
r
,e 1
Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson
- Lawrence J. Chandler, Esq.
Administrative Judge Richard K. Hoefling, Esq.
2 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Donald F. Hassell, Esq.
Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3
Office of the Executive Legal Director 4
Washington, D.
C.
20555 (3 copies 5
David W.
Gilman Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
6 Robert G.
Lacy J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
San Diego Gas & Electric Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq.
7 Company California Public Utilities P.
O.
Box 1831 Commission 8
San Diego, CA 92112 5066 State Building San Francisco, CA 94102 9
Mr. Lloyd von Haden Atomic Safety and Licensing 10 2089 Foothill Drive Board Vista, CA 92083 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 12 Mrs. Lynn Harris Hicks Docketing and Service Section 13 GUARD Office of the Secretary 3908 Calle Ariana U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory 14 San Clemente, CA 92801 Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 15 James F. Davis
- Charles E.
- McClung, Jr.,
Esq.
16 State Geologist Fleming, Anderson, McClung &
Division of Mines and Geology Finch 17 1416 Ninth Street, Room 13341 24012 Calle De La Plata Sacramento, CA 95814 Suite 330 18 Laguna Hills, CA 92653 19
- Richard J. Wharton, Esq.
- Phyllis M. Gallagher, Esq.
2660 San Marcos Avenue 1695 W. Crescent Avenue 20 San Diego, CA 92104 Suite 222 Anaheim, CA 92801 21 22
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1 Spence Perry, Esq.
Federal Emergency Management 2
Agency Office of General Counsel 3
Room 840 500 C Street, S.W.
4 Washington, D.
C.
20472 5
/s/ Samuel B. Casey 6
Samuel B.
Casey One of Counsel for Applicants 7
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
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