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Requests Util Compare Fire Protection Program w/10CFR50 App R.Deviations from App Should Be Identified & Justified as Soon as Possible.Fr Notice,Dtd 801119,encl
	ML20032B667
Person / Time
Site:	Phipps Bend
Issue date:	10/15/1981
From:	Eisenhut D; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Parris H; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
	NUDOCS 8111060027
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t'r. H. G. Pariis u s. usaua ucutnou 8

ianager of Poicr e,

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500A Chestnut Street, Toter II W

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Daar "r. Parris:

Subject:

lopendix R of 10 CFR Part 50 - Fire Protection Rule (Phipps P.eM Uuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2)

The Comission puhl1shed a revised Section 10 CFR 50.43 and a new Aapendix R to 10 CFP. Part 9) on Noverber M,19B0 (4 5 FR 76602).

Thi s rul e beca.,e effective on February 17, 1991, and it specifies certain fire protection fe.1tures for operatino nuclear power plants licensed hafore January 1979. The technical requirements stated in Appendix R uere adopted after several years experience with the fire protection guidelines of Apcendix A to GTP-45B 9.5-1 in evaluating fire protection progra7s.

A copy of the Federal rtcoister Notice is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The technical requireaents of Aopendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 are now being used as quidelines in our evaluation of the fire protection program for plants under review for operatinq licenses.

It has been our recent practice to perfor, the fire protection reviews for OL plants using the provisions of Ap,iendix R.

Accordinqly, cis part of your overall fire orotection progra, sthnittal, w2 request that you include a cc,parison of your fire protection program to Anpendix R to 10 CF" Part 50.

Saecifically identify and justify any devf ation from Appendix R.

Levi t tions froa Appendix R should be identified as early in the review process as possible, so that they oay be resolved and all fire crotection features he iaple,ented by the time the olant is ready for fuel loading.

1* you have any questions on this subject, please contact the inC Project Manager for your facility, ornco gR ADOCK11060027 'e11015 05000553 sunsa % p.

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_t The reporting / record keeping require 1ents associated with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 have been approved by the Office of "anagexnt and Budget under approved number 3150-0011 unich expires Septenber 30, 1933. Co nents on burden and duplication may be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports !!anagcment Roon 3208, ben Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C.

20503 Sincerely, h,'

b' ex-arrell G. Eisenhut, Director c

Division of Licensing Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

t;otice of Fire Protection Rule cc w/ enclosure:

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Mr. h. G. Farris Manager of Power Tenn::s:c.Vc11cy (,uthority 50~'A l.nestnut.i reet, Toiter II t

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Mr. Jerry E. Wills Tennessee Valley Authority 333 Po.er Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 hr. lierbert S. Sanger, Jr.

A-torney for Applicant Division of Law Tennessee Valley Authority E11533 C-K 4C0 Courerce Avenue i

Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. J. F. Cox Tennessee Valley Authority W10C131C 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. H. N. Culver T ennessee Valley Authority 249-A Hamilton Bank Building Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 i

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m 79602 Fede al Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 1G 1980 / Rules and Regulations

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DOUCLEAR REGULATORY that the com:nent period should brae are already set forth in General Design COMMISSION been exten7ed.

Criterior.3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR The Commission does not agree.The Part 50 and in the NRC guidance 10 CFR Part 50 NRC has been developmg fire protection documents. These general provisions requirements since 1975. The NRC gave rise to a number of disputes over Fire Protection E 4. gram for Operating published comprehensive fire protection

'vhether specific methods adequately Nuclear Power Ptuts guidelmes. Branch Technical Position accomplished th? intended goal. The AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory BTP APCSB 9.5-1. and its Appendix A in propo**d rule is intended to provide Commission.

1976. Licensees have compared their fire sufficieut specific guidance to ensure satisfactory resolution of these issues.

Action-Final rule.

pmtecti n pr grams against these, Thus, reverting to generalized guidance guidelines and have discussed their sumuARY:The Nuclear Regulatory deviations from these guidelines with would not accomplish the intended Commission is amending its regulations the NRC staff for the past four years purpose ci the proposed rule.

to require certain provisions for fire during the NRC's fire protection reviews The second issue involved ome protection in operating nuclear power of operating reactors. A Safety instances in which the specific wordmg plants. This action is bemg taken to Evaluation Report and in most cases, used resulted in unnecessary and upgrade fire protection at nuclear power supplements to the Safety ", valuation unintended restrictions. For example.

plants licemed to operate prior to Report, have been issued for each the proposed rule called for a ' fresh f an9ary 1.1979. by requinng resolution operating reactor. These reports water" supply. For firefightmg purposes, of certam contested generic issues in describe fire protection alternatives that brackish water is satisfactory and a fire protection safety evaluation reports.

have been proposed by the licensee and

" fresh" water supply is unnecessarv.

EFFECTIVE D ATE: February 19.1981, found acceptable by the staff as well as Similarly. the proposed rule CSI d r Note.-The Nuclear Regulatory unresolved fire protection issues an " underground" y ard fire main loop.

Commission has submitted this rule to remaining between the staff and the Often portions of a fire main locp run the Comptroller General for review as licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided above ground in and as they enter may be appropriate t.nder the Federal the Commissian's requirements for structures. The Commission had not Reports Act as amended (44 U.S C.

resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns miended to prohibit running portions of 3512). The date on which the rep 2rting only a limited number of issues derived a fire main loop above ground. Other requirement of this rule becomes from the use of the earlier guides. The sir 1ilar changes are discussed in Section effective, unless advised to the contrary. Commission believes that a 30-day ill. " Specific Requiremems." of this reflects inclusion of the 45. day period comment period was adequate under preamble.

that statute allows for such review (44 these circumstances.

The third issue relates to imysition of mquirements on plants with presently U.S.C. 3512[c)(2)).

2. Many licensees questioned the need installed or with existing commitmar.ts con FURT!!E't INFORM ATION CONTACT:

for backfitting all the requirements of I instaH fim pr tecuan featums David P. Notley. Office of Standards Appendix R.They commented that they previously determined by the staff to Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously complied with staff fire sa eg ance Appendix A to Commission. Washington, D.C. 20555.

protection recommendations in " good BTP APCSB 9 5-1. The Commission phone "1 -443-5921 or Robert L faith" and have committed to or generally agrees that. except for three Ferguson. Office of Nuclear Reactor completed certain modifications. They se m at bad M Regulation. U.S. Nuctor Regulatory contend that the staff has properly Appendix R should not be retroact.vely Commission. Washington, D.C. 20a55.

determined that these modifications applied to features that have been phone 301-492-7096.

provide at least the level of fire sUPPilMENT ARY INFORM ATION:On May protection descnbed by the guidance

[ fin the pro sions ppen x 29,1980 the Nuclear Regulatory contamed in Appendix A to Branch to BTP APCSD 9 5-1 Commission published in the Federal Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

The NRC staff had intended,in its Register (45 FR 3o082) a notice of They also contend that these or:ginal proposal for Appendix R. tha' proposed rulemaking inviting wr tten modifications provide a lesel of the requirements be apphteble orly ' ir suggestions or comments on the protection at least equivalent to that the resolution of unresolved disp.ted pre posed rule by June 30,1980. The contained m the proposed rule. They fire protection features. Thus, the staf t notice concerned proposed amendments express the concern that the proposed had not intended the provisions of to to CFR Part 50 " Domestic Licensing rule was wntten in such specific Appendix R to require modification of of Production and Utilization Facdities."

language that fire protection issues that previously approved features. This w is which would require certain mimmum were thought closed would be reopened not clearly described in the proposed provisions for fire protection in nuclear and new, but not necessanly better-rule as published for comment In fact, power plants operating prior to lanuary modifications would be required. These the Supp!ementary Information 1,1979. Fifty.one comment letters were modifications could be accomplished published with the proposed cuh.

received regarding the proposed only by the expenditure of considerable explicitly indicated that "[apl lir ansees amendments. A number of comments engineering design, and construction wdl be expected to meet the pertained tc specific requirements in the effort and at great undue expense. The requirements of this rule in its efferain w

proposed Appendix R. and these will be commenters lequest that the form, including whatever changer rer It dealt with below. However, there were requirements in the proposed rule be from public comments.'

f three substantive contentions which rewritten to specify only the general In determining whethe-he spedric were raised by many of the commenters. requirements of what needs to be requirements of Append.x i< should be These three comments are summarized accomplished.

imposed on licensees with presently as follows:

These comments raise three related installed or existmg commitmers t.

1. Most commenters stated that the 30 issues. The first relates to the need for install fire protection fea+u es pevn. 'v day c6mment period was too short to specific requirements. The general determined to satisfy Appendix A t~

permit adequate detailed response and requirements relating to fire protection Branch Technical Position BTP AKSi

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday Nov tmber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603 9 51. it is important to recognize that arrangements were accepte.1in some permitted either an oil collection system Appendix R addresses only a portion of early fire protection revie,vs. As a result or a fire suppression system. The staff the specific items contained in the more of some separate r ffec;s tests. the staff has also accepted an automatic fire comprehensive document. Branch changed its positmn on this suppression s3 stem as an acceptable Technical Position U1P APCSH 9 b1 configuration. and subsequent plans method of fire protection for this and its Appendn A. Appenda A to llTP hne been required to prmide apphcation. The Commission has APCSB 9 5-1 has been the basic fire additional protection in the form of fire concluded that fire suppression systems protectioa guidance used by the staff in barriers or substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separation for safe shutdown systems.

that may be induced by seismic events.

for all operatmg plants durmg the past No credit for such coatings as fire The Co.nmi:smn therefore belieses that s

several years. For many plants, barriers is allowed by Section Ill.G of previously approsed suppression hcensees proposed systems and features Appendix R. Appenda A to llranch systems should be replaced with od that satisfactorily achieved the fue Ter hnical Posilmn IITP APCSU 9 5.1 and collection systems that can withstand protection critena set forth m Appenda the proposed Appendn R recognized scismic events.

A to flTP APCSil951 and began to that there were plant.umque The technical basis on which these promptly implement such features and configurations that required fire three sections are based are further systems.

protectmn features that are not identical discussed in Section !!I. " Specific Satisfactory features and systems are to those hsted m Sec tion !!! G af Requirements." of this preamble.

already m place and in operation in Appenda R. For these cases, fire 1 Most commenters stated that the many plants.There is a reasonable protectien features were deseloped by implementation schedule contained in degree of umformity among most of the lii en er and described m a fire the proposed rule is impossible to meet these approved features for all faahties hazards a alysis. Some of these for any of the operating plants. The smce they were reuewed against the arrangemerS were accepted by the staff commenters further stated that if the same critena of Appenda A to IITP as providmg eqaisalent protectmn to the implementation schedule in the effective APCSIl 9 5-1. In general, the features reymrements of Section ill G to rule is the same as that in the proposed preuously approved by the NRC staff in Appenda R.

s the Commission must be prepared its reviews of fire protection using the Requirements that account for all of to either shutdown each operating criteria of Apprmin A to UTP APCSI) the parameters that are important to fire nudear power plant, or process pti n requests.

9.5-1 proude ar. equivalent level of fire protection and conustent with safety m;he commenters then concluded that T

protection safety to ' hat prouded under re<purements for ail plant umque the specific pruusiora of Appenda R configurations haw not been developed U e impkmentation schedule should be Thus. the further beniit that might be in hgh' of the expenent c g.oned m fire wwrmen to aHow an adequate time prouded by 4equiring that preunusl>

protectmn evaluatwns our the past four pruid for comphance.1he proposed rule stated that all fire protection and approved features be mo<hfmd to years the Commission beheses that the ronform to the specific language set hwnsees should rt examme those modifications dentified by the staff as forth m Appendix R is outweighed by preuously apprmed configurations of necessary t satisfy Criterion 3 of Appenda A h) this part, whether the overall benefit of the early

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fire protection that do not meet the contained in Appendix R to this part or imp!cmentation of such previously requirec ents as speofied in Section st r p tio 8"

approved features, which in many cases ll1 G to Appenda R. Based on this yg

) dica e are currently being installed reeumination the hwnsee must either shutdown capabihty) shall be completed Nevertheless, as a result of its meet the reymrements of Sectmr. !!! G of by November 1.1980 unless, for good continumg reuew of fire protertion Appenthx R or apply for an exemption muse shown. the Commission approves matters, the NRC staff has indicated to that rustifies alternatiws by a fire an extension." (proposed paragraph the Commission that there are hazard analysis llowes er, based on 50 4814c)). The Commission went on to requin ments in three sections in which present mfermaimn. the Commission stae ts mtention in the Statement of the protectmn afforded by Appenda R does not oper t to be able to approse Consideration to the rule that *

.no over and above that prevmusly memptions for fac retardant coatings plant would be aHowed to contmue to l

au epted, may be desirable. The el as bre barra is operate af ter November 1,1980, or l

Comm ien has decided that these

'I ha sec ond relates to emergency bes ond an extended date approved by reymre aents should be retroactiwly hghtmg Settmn Hi j of Appenda R calls thi Comission, unless au modifications applied to a5 fauhties. This deasion is for a hour emergem v bghtmg. whereas (euept for alternate or dedicated not meant to refiett adversely on m some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) hae been previon in ensee or staff evaluatons:

emergency hdtm has been accepted as implemented "

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ratheri mrpose is to take fully into satisfymg Appe d x A to Ir!P APCSH The Commissmn has recor.sidered the accoun iw mcreased knowlede and 9 5--1. While au aemate les el of safety implementation schedule and has

exptr,

+veloped on fire protec tion may be prouded 4 ess than an 8-hour determined that it shnuld be modified I

matters mer the last sewral s eats suppl 5. an a hour ss stem wouhl proud" for the followmg reasons:

Tha hrst of these sections is related to

.u!&d protectmn and would generaHy

. After reuewmg the comments and fire protec tmn features for ensurmg that ms oh e only a small cost. ~1 he the mformation developed as a result of systerrs md assoaated circuits used to Commissmn therefere behews that completmn of fire reuews os er the past 4

achiew od mamtam safe shutdown are brensees shouhl uWrade the preuousl>

6 months, the staff has informed the free fm fire damage. Appenda A to approud facuitics to satisf5 the u houc Commission that the date of Nosember DTP APf3B 9 51 perms a i ombmaten hghtiw requireme:.t of Appenda R.

1.1980. is not possible because the of firt vtardant coaWe and fire lhe third relates to proter t:on against effectn e date of the rule will be after detection and supress.un systems fires in nonmerted conta nments that date.

without specifymg a physical separation msoh mg rearfor (oolant rurap

The staff has informed the distance to protectiun redandant lubrn atron od (Ser tion IH O of Comnussion that it would expect systems ( Appendix A. D 1[2)). and such Appenda RI The proposed rule urtually alllicensees to request

76601 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Novernbcr 19. 1980 / Rules and Reciatir.s --

exemptions if the new implementation Section III. we provide a summary of tFe automatic water surression 6 stem dates do not prov:de an appropnate Technical Bam for each requirement.

throughout the plant.

penod of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the pubhc An ensured mmimum vo t me ( !.vate, requirements of Appendix R. The time comments and a statement of the staff's is set aside and deo.cated for f.n and manpower resources needed by the disposition of those comments.

protection t ses to be avadaW tM times rmrdless of other simuh.

vas bcensees to prepare such requests and Section / Introductwn aM Scepe water uses n the plant. This wata by the staff to formulate recommendations on these requests is This section has been resised as a solume is dedicated for fi e service by not warranted from the standpoint of result of comments to include a means of separate storage taas a timely fire protection improvement.

discussmn of the importance of safe separate pump suctius fiern a Lee The revised implementation shutdown capabihty and the distinction body of water. When common te a

schedule provides a careful balance of between requirements fur " safety-is employec for fire service needs end these considerations, calling for the related" equipmer.t and equipment other water services. the fire pr remaims fire protection modifications needed for " sate shutdown."

suctions mt:st be at the bcttom a one tank and other water eply sucHons to be imp!emented and installed on a Section // Genem/ Requimments must be locited at a hw er leve!'.

phased schedola that is as prompt as This section has been substantially ensure that the mimmum de fica t d can be reason,bly achieved.

The resised schedules distinguish ruritten as a result of comments to water volune is set aside for fire hetween requirements imposed for the provide a conese summary of general protection r eeds. Admmisrative first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves. sut h as locked and those requirements already imposed were consohdated with the appropriate valves to er.sure adequate w ater supph n hcense conditions or Technical parts of Section !!! "Specif' for fire fighting needs. are deemed Specifications issued prior to the Requirements." except that the creJit unacceptab6 at nu&ar power pnts effective date of the rule. For given for 50-foot separa: ion has been

&mment Resolution requirements imposed by Appendix R.

dropped.

Many commenters stated thut we including the items "backfit" to all Section 1//. Specific Ilequirements were being too restnctive by stipiatmg piants. the schedule provides a The requirements in this rule are an underground y ard fire main loop and reasonable time after pubhcation of the based upon principles long accepted fresh water supphes. Our intent was rule for completion of required within that portion of American industry only that a yard fire main loop be modifications. For requirements already that has been classified by their furnished %e have deleted the imposed by license conditions providmg insurance carners as "Impros ed Risk" specification for an underground loop for implemention after November 1.

or "llighly Protected Risk". In each of smce special conditions may dictate that 19% the Commission has reviewed these cases. the Commission has part of the loop be above grour.d or these schedules and has found that in decided that the overall interest of inside safety.related buildings Such some instances the allot:ed time for completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangements are acceptable.

establishing some conservative lesel of With regard to the specification for a may be excessive.Thus for fire fire protection and ensuring that les el of fresh water supply. the staff was prnterSon features other than those cosered by App ?ndix R. although the compliance exists at all plants. The attempting to avoid potential plant Commission has extended the following is a hst of the specific prob! cms that are not associated wnh technical bases and resolution of pubhc fire protection. From a fire protection comphance dates bevond the Novembr r comments for each of the specific standpoint. salt or brackish wateris 1,19% date in the proposed rule, the Commmien has added a requuement requirements in Appendix R-acceptable for fire suppression providea that limits the comphance schedule in A. Water Suppirs for Fire the fire protection system is des:gned existing licenses if such schedules Suppression Systems Technica/ Basis-and mamtamed for salt or brackish extend beyond what we now behese One of the basic fire protection water. The requirement for fresh water should have been a reasonable schedule requirements for a modern industnal supphes is therefore dmpped Other site in the United States is a separate operational problems unrelated to fire initially. Relief from such limitation may be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distnhutiun system for fire protecSon that may result tiom the use Reactor Regulation upon a showing that protection with dual water supphes.

of salt or bracidsh watt r for firr there is good cause for niending such Duplicate water supplies are required to suppression activities are outside the date and that pubhc health and safety is ensure unmterrupted f re suppression scope of this rege!ation.

not adversely affected by such capabihty allowing for single fadures Ses eral commenters took issue with and periodic mamtenance and repair of the requirement for two sq a ex tension.

It should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems Duphcate redund ant sections statmg that some licensees wbrse license conditions water supphes may consist of separate plants ese a stade large im L mcture imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a lab or a rner fm ah wat.

date of November 1.1980. or other date body of water such as laks nver, or requirement 1lhe requireiaent for pnor to the effective date of i 50.48. the pond or from two water storage tanks.

separate mtake strutturer Commissmn has suspended such For nuclear power plants. the mtended ard the rule F n bvn clanfwd comphance dates by promulgating on distnbution system is required to consist Ses crd comments rdW

ting October 29.1980. a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedc m J uniis nr

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150.48 (45 FR 715691. which will be valves for isolatog portions of the use of vertical standp pe fu ;tmr vn i superseded by this rule.

system for maintenance or repair services when storage tanis are us ed ror To better understand the nature of the without interruptmg the water supply to cornbmed serviceCer/ fire. water uses.

pubbc comments received and the staff s the vanous fire suppression systems in on the basis that this is oserly -

.e resolution of thew comments, the the plant. Thus. with dual supphes and a anJ other ways are eaili N a

followmg section wdl consider each loop concept. an adequate water supply a dedicated supply sacn as w, s

section of Appendix R to this part. In can be ensured to each manual or suction loc.aios etc. Two se ~ite i

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Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76605 related issues are involved here.The hour water supply is considered by a sisually ind:cating or key-operated i

first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. it should also be noted that (curb) valve." and there was an watet storage tank? for fire fighting this minimum dedicated water volume is opportunity to comment on this purposes.The suggestion that the based on maximum flow rates. Since document.

requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D. Afanua/ Fire Suppressica Technica/

deleted was rejected for the reasons extinguished with much smaller flow Basis. Considerable reliance is placed o

stated in the preceding Technical 11 asis.

rates this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systems i

The other point deals with ensuring represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

minimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours-liowever. manual fire fighting activi"es suppression activities when storage B.SectionalIsolation Valves.

often can control and extinguish slowly tanks are used for combined service.

C.llydrantIsolation Valves developing fires before an automatic fire water / fire. water uses. The term TechnicalBasis. These two suppression system is actuated. In

" vertical standpipe for other water requirements are similar and can be addition. fires that are cor, trolled or service" simply means that the suction treated together. Proper valving is est nguishe:1 by automatic systems for other water uses in common storage required to isolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be located sufficiently high to distribution system for maintenance or response. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water volume repair without 'nterrupting the water do not warrant the installation of needs for fire suppression activities. lf supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assuming that suppression systems mside the plant.

Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to Val es are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas:

pipes inside the tank, this is not the isolation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire case. In fact a stand 'pe exterior to the the water distribution system for fighting capability be present in all storage tank is more desirable since any maintenance or repair without areas of the plant, and that standpipe leakage would be immediately evident.

interrupting water supply to fire and hose stations be located throughout On an internal standpipe a leak in the suppression systems mside the plant.

the plant. The standpipe and hose pipe could actually allow depletion of Visually mdicating valves such as post stations are to be located so that at least 4

the water otherwise to be reserved for mdicator valves are preferred so that one effective hose stream can be fire uses.The rule has been clanfied to the position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any location in the allow physical alternatives for water determm, ed. Ilowever, key-operated plant containing or presenting a hazard supply dedication but to preclude valves (mmm nly mwn as wrb to structures systems, or components I

exclusive use of administrative controls valves) are acceptable for these important to safety. They are to be i

for this purpose.

purposes where plant-specific supplied from the fire water supply Some commenters objected to the "g";d onbI o

' I es$ ' Co-t system except for those inside requirement that other water systems Resolution. Many commenters stated containment, which may be connected t ther reliable water supplies if a used as a backup water supply for fire that the requirement for" approved protection should be permanently visually indica ting" sectional control separa poetradon into catainment cannot be made for fire water service connected to the fire main system and valves was overly restrictive,

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suggested that it would be sufficient tu unnecessary. and not specific with provide a water supply capable of being respect to who should give the approval. Comment Resolution connected to the fire main system within The Commission has accepted this suggestion: the rule now requires that Several c mmenters suggested adding ten minutes of the loss of normal water supply or pumps. The rule does not sectional control valves shall be a sentence reading " Standpipe and hose address backup water supphes. The provided to isolate portions of the fire stati ns are not required if sufficient requirement means that,if another main for maintenaace or repair without justification can be provided that water system is used as one of the shutting off the entire system. Post adequate fire protection features have redundant water supplies, it must satisfy indicator or key-operated valves are been pmvided to account for a given fire 1

i all of the requirements of the fire mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was rejected. The protection water supplies. Additional acceptable valves.

staff has taken the position that the backup supplies need not meet these C.//ydront Block Valves-Comment mmimum requirements are that at least requirements.

Fesolution. A number of commenters one effective hose stream that will be t

One i emmenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any location that contains two-hour water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard the P.rnns Ferry Fire lasted well over ta state the requirement for capability to to the safety-related equipment. The two hnum All of the investigations of isolate hydrants from the fire main Commission cencluded that no analyses the Diowns Ferry Fire clearly show that without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazards so carefully that if wata lad been used immediately, the automatic or manual fire suppression this mmimum requirement can be fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or further reduced.

earlier. indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety.related E. IlydrostaticIlose Test Technical fi hting activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment.

Basis. Fire hoses should be 8

use of rely one fire hose stream, the fire One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested periodically to

'g was citinguished within one-half hour.

requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The staff would find unacceptable any since it "is a new requirement which has use.The requirement for a minimum test conditioriin which a postulated fire that not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 39n psi comes from NFPA could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was rejected No.196 (National Fire Patection could not be controlled and extinguished on the basis that Appendix A to HTp Association Standard No.196--

I within two hours with any combination APCSB 951 contains the following Standard for Fire llose), a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentence: "The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus standard.This i

suppression activities.Therefore. a two-from the yard main should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the

76606 Federal Registcr / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wedneolav. Nm ember 19. 1980 / Rules an lpniatms- _ _ _

use and care of fire hose that most system in all such areas should be I. Are Brstode Traming Techmral industnes find u;cful.

retained.The fire Lazards analysis may Bosa Most modern mdestrial plants tau f r a separate wpprosion s3 stem.

with rtplacement cost '..Ls Comment new/ution but this would be m additmn to the fire approaching thme of a modern i irlear Many commenters pointed out the detection system powered elettnc generatma A n bave erronnms usage of the term "senite G Protection dSde h/an a full. time fully equ:pped far pressure;' rather tha "operatmg ca biht/ Techm< alBas The departm nt. ide:udmg motonzed N pics ure in this requ re ent. The obiettne for the protec tion of safe apparatur llecause of the reduc rd miendel meanmg for tha requirement is shutdown capabihty is to ensure that at sn ents of I're t azanis m a nuclear that all hoses would be tested at "

least one means of at hiesing anti generatme station as compared to a pressure, treater than the maumum m.untainmg safe shutdown condinors manuf.n tunng r tant. the Commiss:on premre found in the hre protection w dl remain annlable during a id af ter 1-hn es that it n not nn emr) to 4

wat. r distnbution systems. T he correct any postulated hre ni the plant. Detause ound* a fdly staffed fire departme; ;

qnunology n operat;ag pressure

'l he it is not possible to prof a t the specihc flowner. mano d fire nepons sua has been so tF inged. In addinen.

r onditions under which fires may nctur capabihty a required at a nui b ir 1 i at the. 4ff adited a speufic mimmum test and propagate, the design basis and a properly equi;' ped and fuhy pressure requirement of.ino psi to meet protective feinures are spenfied nHher framed f:re bng.nfe wdl satisfy this the NFPA standant.

than the design basis bre.Three need. The Comnussion has deierr.,

i 4

Ow i om r.cnter also pomted out that thfh rent means for protettmg the safe that a brig ide id fue persons i on-

.w

.aws should be inspette d for mddew.

skdm tapaluhty outside of the mmimum sure suffu icnt to perforrm iot. i uly. or other damage. Although ihn wnt.unment are ac < eptable. 'l he hrst the actmns that may im requued by the 4..a.! ( omment. it is not an n a m n n-H M dMM M bngade durmg the fue and to tuoude o.

nr u.lscJ mue with any hcensee *o it shi ! iow n tr.ons and assoaaied circuits wme niargin for un.u.m T Hrd es ents i

m. d not be cosered by this rule in by nmans of a hour fire rated bartwrs Simdarly, the tre.inmg rey:arements edthtson, such mspn tions are already

.IM s cond means is a combmatmn of hsted are considered the nunimum ler:g prrformed m accordance with the fW dw M. Ahm needed to casure that the fire brb ole plant s leointod $pecifarations-wdlla able to function effettnely IL,1utomatic f tre !)etection Icchmra!

hour hre rated barner and automatic hre (lunng a [in; emerpm.

them ~1he requirement that automatic' suppression and deter tion tapabihty f or t he proposed mir nupured emergency fart deter. tion systems be mstah. d m all m e.n that cont un safe shutdown or p

bn athmg apparatus without s;s of> mg e

the nundier of wth pieces of apparatus.

3.itely-related systems or component 9 t he rule has been modified to sPeni.v redundant trains and assm iated nrrmis fuilows generally au:epted hre the per.sonnel for w hom such aiiParatus protet tmn practice. Inst.dlatmn of such are separated by 20 feet or more of cle 4r is to be pronted and to sper ify rw rve fire detn tion tapalahty is independent SPdC" I"4"i"' 'unonuta: bre air requirenients of any requirements for automatic or

""PP"*"n and detn tmn Wenn in il Fire Ildm/b4omm d

'he area. An abernatn e or ih dusded manual bre suppressmn capaluhty in an Rem!vtam. Niar.s < ommt nten surgested area The purpose of these detection s.de shutdown capabiht) unlein.ndent of thangmg thn requirement to a mn.;>le s3 stem n to give early warnmg of fire the fire qea n rntu: red if fue protection statement that a tramed.oal equa ped iondmom m an area so that the fue for safe snutdown capahdity cannot be d

M-6 d' w provnh d as outhned abow For < ables be pm&d m M M s n bng ide r i mitiate prompt actions to mmimit. are dan age withm the plant.

and nauipment neeth d fer safe

,g g

gg shutdown located msufe of nomnertnl nu om:nende < hange was nvcted.ay Lmme et Resoluten i ontamments. a lesser ih gree of hre the Commissmn for the reasons 3tated 5.f ary < ommenins suggested that the p otectmn n pernnited becau'"

mbMW4h words "automatm fue detection trane.ent esposme lues are less hkely Se ommenters obwrted to the capabihty ' he substituted for insice containment donng f ant nMS M W N w k.

d

(

" automatic fire detectmn systems" on oper atmn Section 111 N1. tre Ihrners.

Om hm W Me b ranimenters fe:t the bam that. as worded, the dncusses the f t < hna.d basis for the 1 Piit the shdt supervnor shou!d go to the requ:rements are too hmiting They hour barr;cr. and Set tn n 1111 fire and pro.n!c the benefd of his stated that an automatic sprmkler L}Alternatn e and Dedi.ated Shutdown mmm m d enordv. 'l te rule would apabihty. dise

+,es the in hmral not prnent thk flowNer the shift system with appropnate alar;a rheu, valses and central alarm features basis for safe shu,dow n cap.duhty.

,,upen nw mg hue to p ekee n>

proudes act eptable detection /alarmmg cm,,,m Hm/ws, anng the coune M a hn tka A r h capabihty Several commenters claimed

.db e ts plant operati"n I hr fire bnu.nf e' that a separate detection system n not Nf any commenters suesested that the D. Wer must stav mth the hre br.gade l

needed in areas covered by spnnkler first paragraph be r haned shghtly and and be assuned no othn systems eqmpped with fusdJe hnk the rest of this sn non deleted The n sponsders dunng a h er. m nc y.

pnnkler heads A f usible hnk has a basn for P mr rententmn is that the rul" then font the sh;ft suprn nor must be time delay before a actuates. Ilow ner.

shouhl state simp!v the requirement I" m iWed from membr

'e f te more importantly, a smoldeneg pmtect cah!cs or repopment of s> st<ms ggy locabred $re that could do damage may necessary for safe shotdowo of the plant i ryg ynga.fe rm um 4 vem not generate enough heat to melt the and leave specifm unpirmentson Rno/utmn Nians i omnmnters F e fusible ! nk. Whdr we do not dnagree detmls m some other Spc of duument that the alarm from an automatic hre Wa base mod:fied thn sn tmn by

%n % m.ao a g, < w

,n l

suppression s3 stem serves as remoung the Intmq of i ensid"ratmns, h o o a d sta - W %.* 9 m '

notifmation that a hre emts, we delet ng Table I and reuWng tae W la " * ' m -

4 ee W'

com.luded that the mimmum word ng to proude 4 !ar:fu:atmn.

C f,3.$,)

') "I w,

.1 requ:rement for a separam Gre detettion li. Fire Bmade w

i 1

l l

l

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 223 / Wednesday Novernber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76607 stated that NRC used unnecessary detail fire emergency and operators involved modifications to provide alternative in spelhng out sp;cific requirements for in safe plant shutdown should not also shutdown systems are extensive, a classroom instructmn, fire fighting have to be concerned with bghting in the dedicated system that is essentially a practice, and fire dnlls. Some area. The small cost differential minimum capability safe shutdown train commenters felt that these requirements between thour supply and the and is indepencent of those alread3 were more detailed than anythmg th substantial additional protection esisting may be provided. This minimum Commission has published with regard afforded by the 8. hour supply does not capabihty is required to maintain the to operator frammg. The Commission warrant reducing this requirement. The process variablis within those values here pomis out that most of the Commission has decided to require an 8-predicted fo. a :oss of offsite power.L he investigations of the TMI accident hour battery power upply in all areas case ofloss of c ffsite power is assumed identified inadequately trained needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires in certain circumstances operators as an important factor and equipment and in access and egress (e g., electrical distribution systems) that work is now being done in this routes.

could cause or be related to such a loss, area. The fact is not that the traming K. Admmistratne Controls Technica/

Fire damage to cold shutdown capability requirements spelled out here for the fire Basis. The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be brigade members are excessise when admimstrative controls for fire repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to provide a compared to training requirements for prevention and prefire planning.The margin in achieving cold shutdown reactor operators, but that fire brigade items hsted m this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to training is further along in des elopment, accepted within the fire protection associated circtiits because most plants and training parameters that are commumty as mimmum requirements were not de<.igned with this concept in essential to a comprehensive program for an effertive administratmn of the fire mind. Should either the alternative or have been identified.

protection program. Controls are placed dedicated capability be required to L Emergency Lighting Technu al on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire,it must not be Basis. Emergency hghtmg is required in materials to redure the fire loadmg in disabled 1 y fire damage to associated all nuclear power plants. Hattery-safety-related areas ad un ignik..

circuits. Also, this capability does not powered bghts with capacities of 1% to sources to avoid careless operations have to meet the single failure criterion 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months is usually sufficient for Procedures are used to control actions because it is only one of severallevels emergency egress. Ilowever, the postftre to be taken by mdiuduals who discover of d4ense. Scismic Category I criteria is emergency bghtmg requirements in a a fire and by the fire brigade for the not imposed because fires that would nuilear power plant are of a different development of preplanned fire fightmg require the installation of alternati a or kind. The need is for hghtmg that aids strategies and actual fire fightmg dedicated shutdown capability arr ot the access to equipment and techmques seismically induced.

fbet

- "" # N"" " # ""

C"*"#"' ## I"U""

prt I t ers nr t safeplant shutdown durmg plant Man) commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emergenrin. Because such actaities requirement was much too netaded for a this requirement exceeded the scope of may extend mer a considerable period regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative of time both durmg and after the fire,it requirements shoubt apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated is prudent to proude 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery areas having safe shutdown equipment.

that the tu,e requirements are excessive emergency bghting capabihty to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. T hey also sufficient time for normal bghting to be

. statement that admimstrative-contend that this regulation does not restored with a margin for unanteipated procedures should be established to take into account the many plant events.

control the various fire hazards reviews b ing conducted under the throughout the plant was sufficient, and Systemati : Evaluation Program (SEP).

Comment Resolutmn that the detads could be spelled out in a It h generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that the mgulatory guide or some other similar shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirerrent for emergency lightmg is document condition and that, for each fire area, overb restrictive in three specincs: first.

%nor changes have been made in the different means may be used and may that emer~ncy lahng is unnecessary word,ng of this requaement for be necessary to achiese cold shutdown.

in many ei te d'signated areas. second.

clanfu ation.

Because a fire in certain areas at some that the we ment for sealed beam or L.Utcenatne ed Dedu ated plants would have the capability of fluoi e scen t m s is o erly restrictive:

Shn/on n Capalu/ctt disabling systems required to achieve requirement for indnidual Tc. hmcc/ Basa in some locations both hot and cold shutdown, it is third. tha' s

8-hour b.

v row er supply is (such as the cable spreadmg room) necessary to specify the minimum exessn e ere rummenters withm operatmg nuclear power plants,it capabiht) and time requirement for each rev.n.m".J % a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months batter) power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe s q. A. f..

mmenters rei orumended a protect iedundant s. fe shutdowr; shutdcwn. We agree that evaluations plant-specthe power supp'y and one systems against adserse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commente recommended that there be fire suppression ac taittes only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call no permanent mstallatmn.

the use of fire protection featares for alternative or dedicated shutdown l

These s-estions have been a< cgted because the redund mt safe shutdown capabihty for reasons other than fire in part.16. ng umts with a hour systems m a even fire area are too < !ose protection For esample. seismic.

battery m hes are to be provided m all to each other Alternatne shutdown floodmg. or emergency core coobng areas neWed for operatmn of safe capabihty has usually been required to requirements resulting from the SEP may shutd. w u equipment and in arcess and be mdependent of the control room, require ad htional modifications. Each egress routes thereto. The reasoning e able spreadmg room. switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of behim. A requirement for an 8-hour and cable riser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resulting from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of o'her activity durma a adequately 3epara'ed When plant integrated with those relating to fire

s 766011 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations protection to the extent posiole.

required to ensure safe shut:! awn the national consensus standard used Howeser, the Coinmission has decided capability.The use of a 1-nour barrier in for testing and rat ng these cable that the modifications requteN to conjunction with automati,: fPe penetration seals. Since the rahles comdete the fire protectic.n rogran:

suppression and detection capability for conduct the heat through the barrier.

should not be defe, w mtil the SEP each redundant train of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is review is completed-equipment is based onJhe f.ollowing combustible, the acceptance criter:

,f M. Fire Barricer considerations. Automatic suppression the ASTM Stendard I>119 rela'ing *o Ter hnma/ Basis. The best fire is required to ensure prov st, effecuve temperature on the unexposed side inst potection for redundant trains of safe application of supprensant to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanger safe shutdown b,"**"#' N## "N" unpierced fire barriers-w?!!s and capability.The activation of an s

ceding-floo 'ssemblies. Beca'ise il ese autamatic fire detection or suppression Some comn-enters suggested tha this barriers are pas ac fire protectior.

sptem does not or cur urtil sufficient entire section be deleted and repla,.

featuret they are inherently reliah%

smoke or heat has been developed by with the following two sentences:

nouded they are properly installed and the fire Therefere. the Commission is

" penetration r eals shall provd tb mam'ained. Iire barriers have been requiring a 1-hour barrier to ensure that equivalent protection whit n is remured used successfully for many years t.1 fire damage will be bmited to one train of the fire barrier. Evaluation of I' subdhide large potential fire losses nto untd the fire is extinguished.

penetration seals based upt n a dergn wa..ller, more acceptable risks. Even fire lhese requiremens have now been resiew and re.evant test data or ba n ie rt, with openings have seccessfdly incorporated in Secton !!!.G. " Fire qualification tests may be made."1 he mtcrrupted the progress of many fires Protection of Safety Functions.'

comr.mters felt that sufficient test lita p ooded the openiags wera proper!y are available to permit evaluation O *'"C"' R CS I" M "

pm a ted by fire doors or other design require.ments withoct fulk i ale arreptable means.

Several commenters made a number mockup testma and that many of the Fire barriers arc " rated" for iire of nggestions of an editorial nature.

items spelled out in the regulation, such resistance by being exposed to a One suggestion we to add "or unless as the water hose stream test, were too

" standard test fire".Tnis standard test other fire protection features have been aetaded and did not belone in the fire is defmed by the American Society provided to ensure equivalent regulation. The Commission has for Testmg and Materiale in ASTN E-protection"in the first paragraph. where reconsidered this issue and revised the 119. " Standard for Fire Resistance of three-hour rated fire barriers were rule to (a) require the use of Building Materials." Fire barriers are Apulated unlest. a low er rating was noncombustible materials only in the ccmmonly rated as having a fire iustified by the fire hazards analysis.

construction of fire barrier penetratio, resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Most The Commission feels that this adds seals. (b) require fire barrier renetration

" Improved Risk" or "Ihghly Protected nothing in the wsy of claiification and seals to be quabfied by test; and (c)

Risk" (as classified by instnance the ;uggestion was not adopted. The require such tests to satisfy certain carriers) industrial prnretties in tha second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel forming. part of or O. Fire Doors.

hase a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

supportmg any fire barrier hase a fire TechncalBasis. Door openings m fire Whk a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that low fire load th potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fitu are serious.

metallato and plaster covering as being been tested and rated for certain I re Therefore. the Comn.ission has selected ona means of providing egivalent exposures are installed to protect Sese 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months has been a aa acceptable protecNn. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently Ian to nanimum fire rcsistance rating for fire that they thought this wa too narrow protect the openings in w hich they are harmrs separating redundant trains for and would be interpreted by some installed because they are not f Ily safe shutdown systems. This will give pople as the only acceptabk method closed. Various metbods are auiable to ample time for automaSc and manual permitted Smce the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire du s aie in fire suppression activitica to control any be confusing. a decision has been made proper operating condition and that ' e-patential fire and for safe shutdown to elimic ite it. Other comment i to the will be closed during a fire. These activities to properly control the reactor.

effect

hat the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants. or plants that excessnely restrictise with regard to C"*""'"' N#8"I"'IO" are already budt but that are not yet fire barrier penetrations, including fire operatmg. have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commenters stated that thia shutdown equipment beated in close hardware, and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed an I should praimi'y and a smgle tire could been acted upon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial ch mges haw damage or destroy the functional sequirement, as it had affected these been made in order to more c!e Wy st m capabibty of both redcndant trai:is. If -

ik ms, was dele"d the requirements.

specific plant conditnons preclude the N. Fire Barrier Cane Penetration Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump Lubrication insti.lation of a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire barrier to Qualific 7 tion System.

vparau the redundant trair.s. a 1-hour Technn.of Basis Unpierced fire Technical Basis. Fanh reactor coclant fire barrier and automatic f re barriers olfer the best protection for pump motor assembly typt :aPv co..-ains seppresaion system for each redundant separating redundant trains of safety.

140 to 220 gallons of lobe od. W ' caking I

tram will be considered the equivalent rekted or see shutdown equipment.

from some portions of the tube od of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months hairier.

Ilowever. them barriers mest be pierced system may come in contact with if the 1. hour fire barrier and automatic for both control and power cables.

surfaces that are hot mough to innhe tL fire suppressiv.. for each redundaht These penetrations must be sea' d to od. The resulting fire could t-trar cannot be provided because of acbeve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would b w.

.ed plant-specific conditions. alternative or equivalent to that required of the barrier because of the time req:: red to e: r th dedica:cd shutdawns capabibty witl be that i pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is containment. Containent air temm aturt

Febral Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / W< 'nestlay, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76609 would increase, severe localized pomp oil collection system is covered by Cepability.") In the fire hazards analysis environments would develop in the area paragraph C.2 because its function is for a plant, the equipment relied upon to of the fire and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety-related perform both functions must be would be generated. nese conditions sys' ems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fire area. It follows could affect operability of safety-related function. Duause the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits equipment inside containment.-

collection system for a se.ismically in the fire area that could adversely Therefore, an oil ellection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the ideatified shutdown j

necessary to confine any oil discharged safety-relatJ system from performing equipment by feeding l'.g.ck potentially a

due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regul. 3ry Guide disabling conditions (e, hot shorts or i

lubrication system and to prevent it 1.29. " Seismic Design Classification,"

shorts to ground) to the power supplies s

from becoming a fire hazard by draining paragraph C.2), the oil collection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location.These occurrences should be designed. engineered, and must also be evaluated. Of course such l

could be random or could be seismically installed so that its failurc will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented induced because the existing tube oil to a fire affecting safety-related to provide assurance that the identified l

system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake, safe shutdown equipment will function l

may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted tw design basis seimic event, alternateces-an on,. _llection system or as designed.These requirements have g

an automa r sup s syst Appendix A to D'IP ApCSD 9.5-1

" Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown states that for operating plants.

" postulated fires or fire protection suppression system because Capability "

system failures need not be considered unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Resolution i,

concurrent with other plant accidents or safety-related systems from the burning f il before the suppression system is Many commenters stated that th,s i

the most severe natural phenomena actuated and because the fire water requirement should be deleted because

%e basis for that statement is two fold.

supply system is not designed to many older plant designs did not First, nuclear power plants are massive withstand seismic events. In addition, consider associated circuits and this is, structures, and essential services are desigaed to withstand earthquakes and these pumps are located within the therefore, a new design requirement.

biolog; cal shield eside contams 'nt.

The commenters felt that the analysis other natural phenomena. Second, the therefore, timely fire brigade ac. ton that will be required to satisfy this history of many fires associated with w uld be difficult if the suppression requirement will be both long and rm ent earthquakes have been system maWundions. Further,if the complicated and the requirement should i

evaluated.%ese evalua ions showed suppressi n system becomes moperable therefore be deleted.

I that such fires usually are due to failure during operation. a fire watch or patrol The Commission rejected these of piping or tanks of flammable gasses cann t enter the area dunng operatm.n.

suggestions for the following reasons.

.or liquids such as municipal natural gas 4

i._

distribution syuems or gasoline storage Comment Resolution

1. Virtually all of the fire protection I

and/or dispensing stations. Where such A number of comm enters suggested modifications made to date have been l=

potential fire L zards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that power plants (e.g., hydrogen for should be substantially modified. This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, er oil fuel for the requirement was chan'ged to delete the certain specific items during initial l

emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

space heating boileral they are designed pump lubrication system with an

2. The Browns Ferry fire showed ti,

(

and installed to withstand the damaging automatic fire suppression system. We mecessity of divisional separation of the i

effeds of varicus natural phenomena, have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables and other special fire protection features the tequirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety-are provided as necessary. llowever.

system be designed to provide systems by a single fire. This has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will c!iscussed with hcensees during for Prrtection Against Natural w.thstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomena requires that structures.

Eatthquake can be met by satisfyint shutdown capability and is necessary to systems and components important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29.

erisure that safe shutdown systems will safety be designed to withstand the

" Seismic Design Classification," as be ab'e to function properly in the event effects of earthquakes without loss of described above.

of fire capability to perform their safety Q. AssociatedCircuits.

.The staff considers incomplete any function Regulatory G,uide 1.29.,

Technica/ Basis, When considerm.g fire hazard analysis that does not Seismic Design Classification.

the consequences of a fire m a given fire consider the effectt of fire damage to describ i an acceptalc e method for area during the evaluation of safe i

circuits that are associated with safe identify % snd classuy:ng those shutdown capabilities of a plant. the features of hght. water-cooled nuclear staff must be able to conclude that one shutdown systems.

power plaats that :hould be designed to train of equipment that can be used As indicated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bring the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue, it is 3

Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, shutdc~n condition remains unaffected unclear that associated circuits have in paragrapn C.1 applies to systems that by that fire. The stad.aus also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees in their reviews using the ensure heat removal capability; equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Appendix A to BTp APCSB l

paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown wdl be hmited so that the its-1. To ensure that the associate:1 not have to remin frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are considered, all operating purpose, but whose failur.: could reduce operable coriition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of Gose systems covered Technical Basis fo; S2 ction III.G.

n,ect the requirements of Section III.G o.

by paragraph C.1. %e reactor coolant

" protection of Safe Shutdown Appendix R.

I~ _ _.._______.__.____._ ___,_

m.___,,___

76610- Federal Regisler / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, Novernber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations Cenere/ Com.aents Resolutio :

shutdown capabihty. The Commission comments receised on the proposed does not gree. We believe that the regulations other comn caters Several commenters contended that Commeston s overa!i fire protection demonstrated a horough undo nandMg Commissmn regulations mandate that program involving extensive plant-of the proposed requirements.

an adjudicatory hearing be conducted specif.c fire protection modifications Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of prior to a final decision. One commenter that are based on guidance set forth in 1954, as amende i the Energy labeled the regulation an " order" within Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB Reorganization Act of 1974, as amer a d, the mcaning of the Administrative 9.5-1 and its Appendix A and the and Sections 55: and 55,3 of Title i a. ae Pracedure Au (5 U S C,551(6))( APA) speafic reqmrements of Appendix R to United States Code, notice is heway ard asserted that to CFR 2201 of the resolve disputed issues provide given that the foilowing amendments to Commission's regulations. "Ordar for adequate fim protection.

Title 10 Chapter 1 Code of Federal Modification of License," apphes to this One commenter stated that the Regulations, Pe-t 50, are publishi J :

e a rulemakmg proceedmg ambiguity of the proposed r<gulation document subject to codificatiom 1he Comm:ssion disagrees with these with regard to critical items requires

1. A new i 50.48 is added to maJ as comments. A " rule" n defmed n the that it Le.enoticed the commenter follows:

APA to mean "the whole or a part of an "d

P ples of i 50.48 Fire Protection.

apm.V statement of general or di e

particular applicabd:ty and futt te effect such ambiguity. They wer 2 Section bl.G, (a) Each operating nuclear pow Section Ill.N. and Section Ill.Q. We have plant shall have.t fire protect.un plan designed to implement,

, ot "escric !aw or pohc3,,, 0 U.S.C.

reviewed these examples.

that satisfies Cnterion.3 of Appendix A M1f43 Th agency action questioned In reference to the first example, the to this part. This fire protection plan here b ck.irly one that treats similarly commenter stated that the first shall describe the cveran fire protection uted I ceasees equally and that paragraph of Section !!!.C identifies program for the facility, identify t' preurAes future conduct or alternative shutdown vapability as an various positions within the licensu 's reymrements. I or those licensees wh optional protective feature and that organization that are responsibile for the have not already provufed an equivalent paragraph Ill.G.2.c then identifies program. state tl e authorities that are level of fire protection, certam specific alternative shutdown capabihty as a delegated to each of these positions to fire protection features are required.

nunimum fire protectior, feature. We do iraplement those responsibilities. and

\\ arious of these requirements wouhl not agree with this statement.The f;rst outline the,lans for fire protection, fire apply to approximately 40 facilities. The paragraph of Section Ill.G identifies detection and suppression capability.

commenter s characterization of the rule alternative shutdown capabihty as one and limitation of fire damage.The plan as an order, alorg with the assertion optian in a combination of fire shall also describe specific features that to Lim 2.204 mandates a hearing protect on features for a specific fire necessary to implement the program before the riste becomes fmalis area. paragraph lit.GJ indicates wher described above. such as administrative incorrect. On its face that regulation this option should be used.

controls and personnel requiiements for (which does grant a hearmg righq in reference to the second example.

fire prevention and manual fire applies only to Commission orders that the commenter stated that Section Ill.N suppression activities, automatic and modity a hcense 21t does not apply t requires a pressure differential across manually operated fire detection and requuemts promulgated through a the test specimen c armg the testing of suppression systems, and the means to rulemrkmg action conducted in fire barrier penetration seals but fails to limit fire damage to structures, systms, define the pressure differential. This or components important to safety o accordance with the requirements applicable law.

comment is incorrect. The pressure that the capability to safely shui down Several commenters rontended that differential called for by the preposed the plant is ensured.'

the environmental impact had not been provision was the maumum po ssure (b) Appendix R to this part establishes adequately addressed. One commenter, dif ferential that the barrier would fire protection features required to citmg the requirements in Section Ill.A experience in the specific plant satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this of Appendix R for two water supphes nstaliation. In any esent, the part with reapect to certain generic and two separate redundant sectmns as requirement for pressure differential issues for nuclei,r power plants hcensed examples of requirements mvolving during such testmg has bem deleted to operate prior to January 1.1970 environmentalissues, contended that smce only noncombustible material is Except for the requiremen.s a: ctions the Commission reliad upon its staff's now being usad for such seals.

Ill.G. Ill,J. and 111.0. the proviuors of unsupported determination that-In reference to the third exampla, the Appendix R to this put shall not be pursuant to lo CFR 1 St.5(d). an commenter stated tb.si Section Ill.Q is applicable to nuclear power plants environmentalimpact statement-totally lacking in Jefmition. We do not hcensed to operiste prior to January 1.

appraisal. or negative declaration is not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 1979, to the extent that fire protection required?, The Commissmn has Gaide 1.75 ard IEEE Std 3M-1974. The features proposed or im; icmented by considered Section lil.A and has further h tier document a commonly used considered :he remaining requirements ir dustry standas that defines

. nmc f n wi,m 'n e.ideri:. for t < we pier of Appendix R and remains convinced a.sociated circuits and provides planis is cont ined m two NRC dxume :t.

that the regulatioris are not substantive g sidance for ensurmg that such circuits

1%mth Technaal Positmn Amhm Power and are insignificant from the standpmnt d i not compromise tne independence of Consersion System Bramh DTP APCS 1M M

$," N.P"" '""'"' "'*"*" '" N* T' ""

of enuronmentalimpact.

ti e shutdown cirnits they are yE" One commenter suggested that all associated with.

plants be required to install dedicated Based on the abuse examples and our Appendix A to BTS APCSH 9 %1. ' Gu.h hnn r hre Proteen for Nuclear Pw Nnts review of the other prousions of the f"actea Prmr to m t w fu van 's.i ~

o

'tt should also be noted r% 12 r04 r cod fed m proposed rule. we do not believe that

"""#""""""""'r'""

u.

Subpart B of to CFR Pm 2 lhe scop

of Subpart D tile rule as proposed was ambiguous so constructmn before July 1.1

.1 is speuhed:ly hmited to "re mitaa%t by the staff at to require renoticing. Moreover, it iro.

s

*

io impose requirements by onke on a I

lerensee" 00 CHt 2 2m(a,) (Fmphasis supphed )

should be noted that. based on other Also see Note 4 l

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. :05 / Wednesday. Novernher 1S 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76611 the licensee have Leen accepted by the after the effectise date of this section determines, upon a showing by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of and Appendix R to this part licensee. that there is good cause for Appendix A to Branch Technical (i) the first refueling outage; extending such date and that the public Position BTP APCSil 9 5-1* reflected in (iil another planned outage that lasts health and safety is not adversely staff fire protection safety evaluation for at least 60 days. or affected by such extension. Extensions reports issued pnor to the r frectis e date

[iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for of sui h date shall not exceed the dates of this rute, or to the extent that fire at least 120 days.

determined by paragraphs (c)(1) through protection features were ai r epted by (4) Thosa fire protection features that (c)(4) of th s section.

the staff in comprehensive fire require prior NRC approval by (1) Those fire protection features that protection safety evaluation reports paragraph (cm 1 of this section. shall be insoise revisions of administrative issued before Appendix A to Branch implemented withm the following controls, tranpower changes. and Tee hmcal Position BTP APCS!3 9.5-1 schedule: Dedicated shutdown traming shall be implemented wi'

~ 4 was published in August 1T6. With systems-30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC siatf respect to all other fire protection approval; modifications requiring plant Fire Protection Evaluation Repart features covered by Appendn R. all shutdown-before startup after the accepting or requiring such features.

nuclear power plants hcensed to operate earhest of the events given in paragraph (2) Those fire protection features prior to January 1.1979 shall satisfy the (c)D) commencmg 180 days after NRC mvolving iastallation of modifications appbcable requirements of Ap;)endis R approval: modifications not requiring not requiring pnor apprm al or plant to this part, including specifically the pl nt shutdown--6 menths after NRC shutdown shall be implemented within requirements of Sections til G.111l. and appros41 12 months after the date of ine NRC (5) Lkensees = hall make any staff Fire Pmtection Safety Esaluation pg p m Miune neaq to comp!v with Report acceptmg or requinng such all fire protection modifications th+ se requirements m accordance with features.

require to sahsfy the provisions of

. (3) Those fire p otection features, Appendix R to this part or directly the abow syule w nhat pnar remw nd approsal by NRC cuept for meludmg alternam e shutdown affectr d by such reqmrements shall be im ns required by Section Ill.G 3 capabdity. involving mstallation of mo completed on the folla.vmg schedule:

of Appenda R to this part. Lu ensees modifications requirma plant shutdown (1) Those fire protection features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the startup insolve revisions of admmistrative meetmg the provisians of paragraphs after the earhest of the following events controls. manpower changes, and (cH2). IcH3). and (clB1 within 30 Ms commencing 9 rnonths or more after the traming, t. hall be implemented within 39 Mter the ef fi ctn e de-of this sectmn date of the NRC staff Fire Protection days after the effectne date of this and Arpenda R to tra part Licensees Safety Es aluation Report accepting or section and Appenda R to this part shall subn.it design descnptior.s of requiring such features:

(2)TF ise fire protection features that modif: cations needed to satisfy Section (i) The first refuehng outage; mvolve installation of modifications that 111 G 3 of Appendn R to this part within (n) Another planned outage that lasts da not require prior NRC approval or 30 days af ter the the effettne date of for at least 60 days: or plant shutdown shall be implemented this sectmn and Appendis R to this part.

(iii; An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the offective date (6lIn the esent that a request for for at least 120 days.

of tnis section and Appendis R ta this ewmption from a requirement to comply IO Tho:e fire protection features pa-t.

with one or more of the provismns of involvmg dedicated shutdown capability (3) Those fire prcection features.

Appenda R fded within 30 days of the requiring new buildings and systerns euept for those requiring prior NRC effectne date of the rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 mor.ths approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the lacrisce that such o' NRC approval. Other modifications section. that involve mstallation of required modificatons would not requ rmg NRC approval prior to modifications that do require plant enhance fire protection safct) in the installation shall be implemented within shutdown. the need for which is justified facihty or that such modifications may 6 months after NRC approval.

in the plans and schedules required hv be detnmental to merall faciht3 safety.

(el Nuclear power plants licensed to the provisions of paragraph (cH5) of this the schedule requirements of paragraph operate af ter January 1.179. shall section, shall be implemented before M shall be to!!cd untd fml Commission complete a!! fire protection startu,1 after the carbest of t e following ac tion on the ewmption request upon a mod'ftcations needed to satisfy 5

events commencing 180 das s or more determmation by tho Rrector of Nuclear Criterion 3 of Appenda A to this part in Reactor Regulation that the hcensee has accordance with the prosisions of their pros ad a sound technical basis for hcenses ctet. atior. and amaani c.mi rewect to news :c aiicmme. io ssy um, s a such assertmn that warrants further

'. A new Appenda R is added to a

In e An. m m m t.een prmae i m f.,

o*

staff reuew of the icoest to CFh Part 50 to read as follows:

sRc o "

idl Fire prow.te,n features auepted Appendn R-Fire Protection Prograrn for Sg imenury Guntance on I %r Mf F P on

m de

re hirei ucE d m -n'a4,d Nuc!*cr Power Fatihties Operating Prior to contier :t 37s Safety b.aluation Fepor:s referred to in January 1.19"9 o

= % i e Tn krnal Spn -f.ec 1 de ej M e paragraph (h) of this ser! ion and supplements to such reports other than

/ WLcLe s&re i.19 "

.%%4 Nnt he rrmemn F n. : end featares cowred hs paragraph (cl. shall Es Arpenas arphes to hcensed nuclear g

be r ompleted as hn as prnMable but pow er electnc generahr.g stations that were Re e n-nies A?nes' ram e Co 1ed

.or a nce. Jordtweis n

- on d A.

eperanne pnur t [anuarv 1. tr9. escept to Qup.

n the es 9nt set forth in paragrar;h So Wb) of M egeer RNw crne-tm far We aws i vd My 11 tra c lir* LtW spes n.ed in aanw conditions Nean tm s 4

Apeewiemn%rm baa -Re,m m er technnal speafwatmns for such inues f ar wh fanhnes a sets forth fire ho t.een med far eac h grrand ; mi gits how

[CD. or the date determmed b) prt t t M feares repred to satisfy N

, awaph $1) thrcuzh (dh4} of th;s Cre r m 3 of AppenJ.s A to this part

e e f er i

wctmn. whu erur n seoner. un!co the rnaea enJef.umi u..er e r

.s requecments of Ammda R h W5 ; 4

[) ace for af Mrbar Rem tur Regulat on e4

76612 hderal..egister / Vol n No. 225 / W ednes&y. Wwmher 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations t.ntenen 3 of Appenh A to n.n grt program shall estabhsh the file protection D. Alternattie or Deda afedSNtd< u specifies that Tructures sy steras al pohc) for the protmm 4,,f s trudares.

Ccpc!n/ity components 'mportant 'o safety sh 11 be o stems. and compor.e 's irt.portant to safety in areas where the fee protettmn features de0gned arid located % miromize nnsistent at eat.h plant and the prm rdures. equipnent.

cannot ensure safe shtadow 1 c apabihty m with o+er safets reqmrements the 4nd personnel reqaire.1 to implement tha the esent of a fire m that area. alternarna,

pm%ht) and efferi of f.res ei prem at the plarv 5 ta ded2cated safe shttdown < apabda sn e pba.nm '

The f:re prc:ectmn procam shall be ender pmided n he. c nnudermg +e effects of re 'h isa the drett.oa of an indmiual wh'a his been III Od## AC NC7# ~F#"I8 u stws Msm uted w th achleur a and ddesated authonts commenstu ve with the eta mng s ife shutdem n t neta ns t cpoc s6 hties of the pm.non and who has A. Water Sup;d es fa Mre %ppressmn ass'ir e matnr impcrtar're to s 4 fen % mise asailarle staff personr.el knowledgeable m Systems damage in them can lead to u re d. mage both hre proterhon an i nudear safety Two separate water supphes shau be resultirw frorn loss of i oolant throuh bwkff The fire proter tian g rr ram srtall estend provided to furnish necessary water vclurre TN phrases impor' int to safety or the accept of defensun letah to fire and pressure to the fire mam loop.

' safety rated " wd: be used throu :ht this protection m f:re areas important to safety.

Each sapply shall consist of a storage tar;k Appenh k is appiprg to all safe' -

with the folic

.ig ebpstn es.

pump. pipmg. and appropnate isolat on and f n t' m The phrase ' safe s%tdm :n" wdl

to present fires 'rern startmg control s alves. Tw o eparate redundant to detect rapidly, control. and estmgu:sh suctions m one or more intake strurt:

a i e u r d throughout tb Append s F as e

gpipng.o both hot d mi i shutu iwn proinptly those fires that do occt:r:

from a large body of water (river. la c j to proude protecnon for structures.

wdi satisfy the recuirement for twa u paraied f actv,s Ex ause fire r ay affect aafe shut ! awn systems. and companents important to safety water storage tanks. These supphes shall be part s and because the loss of function of so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that a fadure of one supply w -

.>ste ns used to mihaate the consequences of estmguished by the fire suppression activities not result m a failure of the other supply.

-! syn Ssis vriden's under postfare wdi not prevent the safe shutdown of the Each supply of the fire water distnbutmn ond tmes does not per se impact puhhc plant system shall be capab!e of providmg for a

..fe t ) the need to hmit fire damage to il fire Hazards Analysis penod of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the masimum espected syst;ms required to achiese and mamtam A fire hazards analy sis shall be performed water demands as deteemmed by the fire sa e sh Atown onnd:tmns is grea'er than the by quahfied fire protertion and reactor hazards analysis fe safety-related areas or f

wd t, hmit fire damage to thc se systems sy stems engmeers to (1) consider potential in other areas that present a fire esposure rqwrd 13 minga& 'ha consequences nf utu and transient fire hazards, C) determme hazard to safety-related area s devg, haus accidents *!hree les els cf f:re the consequences of fire in any location m When storage tanks are used for combined c ' mage bmits are estabhshed accordmg to the plant on the abdity to safely shut down service-water / fire-water uses the mmimum the safety functmns of the structura. s> ecm.

the reactor or on the abihty to min:rnize and volume for fire uses sha!! be ensured b) mntrol the release of radmactiuty to the means of dedicated tanks or by.ame er corrponent.

enuronment. and DJ speuf> measures for physical means such as a s ertical standp pe fire pres ention. fire dete, tmn. fire f,r other water seruce. Administrative s..e, w,on rn or.g. i,~,

.upprmon. and fire e entamment and controls. mcludmg locks for tank nutlet alternatne shutdown c spabd.ty as required sahes are unacceptable as the only means w use e wm m a.cnm.to re wowa

- - - - sw****'

for nach fire area contammg structures.

to ensure mmimum water so!ume Other water systems used as one of the

"',Z7".,7/lZ ss stems. and romponents important to safet>

m acwrdance with NRC guidelmes end two fire water surphes shall tw permanently o.a s w, w.g n. s,ng, u, e ;aa.eew.w*'

regulations connected to the fire mam sy3 tem and shall see waes o.oem-a.cnwv '."

C. Are Prewntien Featares be cajable of autcmatic at:gament to 'he fire r

cmvna h.re protection features sball meet enc mam system. Pumps. controls. and ; o we r cce sm-s me, :

3,,,ga 3,.,,,, u. y%i follow mg general requirements for all fire supphes in these s) stems shall satisfy the e.ww. '.. nie cam g. w d wvec so mat at seast one v**

areas that contain or present a fire hazard to requirements for the mam fire pumps The

'*7.,,,$((

structure

systems. or t omponer.ts important use of other water systems for fire protection to safety.

shall r:ot be incompatible with tner functions 3

1 in situ fire hawds shall be identifwd required for safe plant shutdowr F,ainre of twga sa*.

8,*

w.as a.onwt,.casaw acce w egema o ec-s.e,.ac**

and suitable protertmn prouded the nther system shall not degnede the ' ire N.$$o,*

2 fransient fire har-rds assoaated with mam system t

we normal operation. m.or tena nc e. repair. or B Secaonal/solctwn Valves meif cation actiuties shall bc ident;fied anil Sett:onalisolation salves such as post mai een w.,

.= vow. we., a en e a gr e,.* el snated where poss:b!e Those transwn' mdicator vahes er ke > eperated sahes shall

'recu e<,a-

.rerrw io e, sw,cun.w ai m comtu,aen.n ano.a.

fire harirds that can not be ehmmated shall be mstM!ed m the fire main kp to permit wu or v sic m

s iocr ra,c~ap e,ci. g o u.

he controlled and so.:oble protection isolation of p >rtmns of the hre mam loop for m.

e. g. ow.aie.o mt same a,n er i

i in,cun sw

t. tv qw.oaicormon.-,eoe.se.m to sem prouded.

m.untenance or repair without inteartptr-sme can

, awt me.

m or evoa Te,awee 1 bre detectmn s) stems portable the enSre wate supp!v ma, conw.vww.ag on. *.c e sa'e svsc.n.o;o-,"

incs.o e me same a,e n1 a 9. evo~eg come.,,,,er,,

atmguishers. and standpipe and hose C lhdrart Iselot; m va/res aa.eosu e we w m.

eo,aows r

neer teaa cer= r.%naani wa.a ma, cmsw. a.w w

,tatmns sh ill he ms:ai!rd Vahes shall be mstaFed to permo isof atmn riom wwows trans tocar.o e n wa. o..e ef outside h> drants from the fire m.nn for we w 4

ers o: Romatm suppressmn 1he most strmgent fire damage hmit shall ssstems or both sidl Le mstalled as m unienance or repair withnut mterrc t a l

apply fo* those n> stems that fil mio mere necessars to profet t redundant nstems or the water supply to au cmat - or.;anam f ue than one categors Redundant systems used components nec esurs for safe shutdown suppression sy stems in an. a + i containir.g to rmigare the consemiences of of er design 5 A site hre brw de 3 hall be estabbshed.

or presentmg a fire hawa to saferelati-d basis arudents but not necessars "r safe tra.ned. and eqmppd and shall be on site a or safr shutdown equipment shutdown may be lost to a sma!r e sposure all 1 mes-D Manuu! hre Suppression fire Howes er. proteamn sha!t be i rouded so 6 Iqre drter tion and suppression s) stems Standpipe and hose systems shJ f e f

that a fire withm onh one such su em will shan be desar.ed mstal:ed. mamtamed. an '

ms'alled so that at least one effect. hw not d imaae the redadant n stem tested by personr:el properly quahfied by stream wil! be ab!e to reach any locanon tb41 esponencr and tra.rra iri f.re protection rentams or presnts an espasare f:re hazard to structures. n stema. m componer is

// (,,enera/ Requirernts ss. ems A bra Pretert;r "r..

? Sursedlant e procedures shall Fe important to safety A fire protection pra m sh.dl b estabhsbed to ensure that fire barners are in Atress to perrmt effm tn

.ttmma estabbshed as each rmcInr power lant The plate and that fire soppression sy stems and the f rr bngade shall be proudea to ah areas

.omponents are operabic that contam or present an esposrr f.re l

l Fedent Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 78613 l;

hazard to t,?ructures. systems. or components hour ratiag. In addition. hre detectors and an Institute for Occupational Safety and important to safety.

automatic fire suppression system shall be flealth--approval formerly given by the U.S.

Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside installed in the fire area; Dureau of Mires) shall be provided for fire pWR containments and DWR containments Inside noninerted contairiments one of the brigade, damage control, and control roora that are not inrted. Standpipe and hose fire protection means specified above or one personnel. At least to mask 9 shall be connected to a high quahty water supply of be provided.

available for fire brigade personnel. Control stations mside containment may be of the following fire protection means shall room personnel may be furnished breething e

sufficient quantity and pressure other than

d. Separation of cables and equipment and air by a manifold system piped from a the fire main loop if plant-specific features associated non-safety circuits of redondant storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated l.

prevent extending the fire main supply inside trains by a horizontal distance of more than operating life shall be a minimum of one-half

)'

E 4

containment. For BWR drywells, stands.ipe 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or hour for the self-contained units.

and hose stations shall be placed outside the fire hazards; At least twc extra air bottles shall be dry well with adequate lengths of hose so

e. Installation of fire detectors and an located on site for each self-contained I

reach any locationinside the dry welt with automatic fire suppression system in the fire breathing unit in addition, an onsite (thour an effective hose stream.

area; or supply of rese ve air shall be provided and i

I E. Hydmstoric Hose Tests

f. Separation of cebles and equipment and arranged to permit quick and comple'e Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at associated non-safety circuits of redundant replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles a pressure of 300 psi or 50 psi abow trains by a noncombustible radiant energy as they are returned. If compressors are used shield.

as a source of breathing air. only units maximum fire main operatmg pressure, whichever is greater. Ilose stored in outside

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown approved for breathing air shall be used; hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior capabihty and its associated circuits.'

compressors shall be operable assuming a standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables, systems or loss of offsite power. Special care must be components in the area, room or zone under taken to locate the compressor in areas free years.

F. Automatic Fire Detec' ion consideration. shall be provided:

of dust and contaminants.

Automatic fire detection systems shall be

a. Where the protection of systems whose I. Mre Brigade Tmining installed in all areas of the plant that contais.

function is required for hot shutdown does

'Ihe fire brigade training program shalf or present an exposure fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G;t ensure that the capability to fight potential I this section; or fires is established and maintained.ne shutdown or safety-related systems or components.These fire detection systems

b. Where redundant trains of systems program shall consist of an initial classroom shall be capable of operating with or without required for hot shutdown located in the instruction program followed by periodic i

same fire area may be subject to damage classroom instruction fire fighting practice.

offsite power.

G. Fire Protertmn o/Sofe Shutdown fmm fin suppcession actmties or from the and fire drills:

rupture or inadvertent operatwn of hre

1. Instruction gggg

1. Fire protection features shall be provided suppressmn s3 stems.

a. The imtial classroom instruction shall in addition, hre detection and s fixed fire include:

for structures. avstems, and components 2

suppression system shall be installed in the (1l Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting iroportant to sah - bu'down. These features area. room. or zone under consideration.

plan with specific identification of each shall be capable of. 'iiing firJ damage so H.,ne Brigade individual's responsibihties.

that.

A site fire brigade trained and equipped for (2) Identification of the type and location of

a. One train of systems neces*ary to fire fighting shall be established to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that achieve and mat, in hot hutdown adequate manual fire fightmg capabihty for could occur in the plant.

conditions from e Aer the.nntrol room or all areas of the plant containing structures.

(3) De toxic and corrosive c iaracteristics 1

emergency control station (s)is free of fire systems, r components important to safety.

of espected products of combustion.

i damage: and The fire bngade shall be at least hve (4) Identification of the location of fire

b. Systems necessary to achieve and members on each shift. He brigade leader fighting equipment for each fire area and maintain cold shutdown from either the and at least two bngade members shall have famdiarization with the layout of the plant.

control room or emergency control station (s) suffir.ient training in or knowledge of plant including access and egress routes to each e.an be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

safety related systems to understand the area.

2 Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of effects f hre and fire suppressants on safe

[5] The proper usa of available fire fighting this section, where cables or equipr,ent.

shutdown capabihty. The quahfication of fire equipment and the correct metFod of fightmg includmg associated non-safety circuits that mem ers shallinclude an annual eacn type of fire.The types of fires covered i

a could prevent operation or cause rhysical rumination to determine their should include fires in energized electrical maloperation due to hot shorts. open circuits.

aluhty to perform stenuous fire fighting equipment fires in cables and cable trays.

or shorts to groend. or redundant trains of actiutms The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fires, hres mvolving flammable and sptems accessary in achiese and maintain member of the fire bngade. The brigade combustible bquids or hazardous process I

hot shumown cenditions are located within er aH e cmnpetent to assess the chemicals. fires resulting from construction or the same tire area outside of pnmary potential safety consequences of a fire and modifications (welding). and record file fires.

contamment one of the followmg means of WP 41 R

00 e proper use of communication, r

ensuring that one of the redundant trains is c mpetence by the bngade leader may be lighting, ventilation. and emergency breathing free of fire damage shall be provided:

evidenced by possession of an operator s equipment.

a. Sepawson of cables and equipment and lense or equivalent knowledge of plant (7) The proper method for fighting fires associatm renaafety circuits of redundant safety-related systems.

mside buddmgs and confined spaces.

trains by a fire barner having a 3-hour rating-The minimum equipment provided for the (a) The dmction and coordination of the Structura. stal formms a part of or bngade shall consist of personal protective hre fighting activities (fire brigade leaders d

supportina such fire barriers shall b" equipment such as turnout coats. boots.

only}.

i protected to provide fire resistance gloves. hard hats. emergency communications (9) Detailed review of fire fighting

'j g

equivalent to that required of the barner; equ pment. portable hghts. portable strategies and procedures.

b.Separcion of cables and equipment and ventilation equipment, and portable (10) Review of the latest plant associated non-safety circuits of redunda it extmguishers. Self contamed breathinH modifications and corresponding changes in trains by r, horizcatal distance of more than apparatus unma full face positive pressure fire fighting plans.

20 fret voth no intervenmg combustible or masks apprnsed by NIOSil(National Note.-!tems (9) and (to) may be deleted fire hazards. In addition. hre detectors and an from the training of no more than two of the automatic fire suppression system shall be n

ut own capatnhty is pr uded bY non. operations personnel who may be installed in the hre area; or reroutmg. relm atmg or mosfwaimg of esintmg gned M the fhe bngade a

l

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and speems; dedmated shutdown capabihty is prowded associated non-safety circuits of one by metaHmg new strudures and setems for the

b. The instruction shall be provaded by redundant train in a fire barner havmg a 1-function of post fire shutdown.

qualified individuals who are knowledgeable.

4 766M Federal Register / WL 45. No. 25 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations espera nt ed and swiab!> trame !in Imhtmg bngade, and selec'>un. placement and use of required additu.nal fire protechon m the the in es of br s that om!d no ur m the plant equpment. and fu fmhtmg strategies work actn ity procedure and m usmg the types of tympment avedable

12) Assessment of each bngade member's

5. Covern the use of igmtion sources by use m the nuc lear power plant knowledge of his or her role m the fire of a flame permit system to control weldmg.

Instrur non shMI be prouded to all fire fightmg strategy for the area assumed is flame cuttmg. brazing or soider.ng t

bnMe members and 6te bngade leadi rs.

cer;tain the hre Assessment of t e brig operatioris A separate permit shall be issued h

d Regular t anned mm ungs s%:1 he held member's conformanc e wiitt estab'ished for each area where work is to be donc !!

' '. et es ery 3 mm.ths for all Engade plant fire fuhting precedures and use of fire work continues over more than one shif t tho e

i mehrs to truew i har c s m the hre fmhuna equipment. moludmg self contained permit shall be salid for not more than 24

' ion, ucam and other wbn i ts as emera ncy bra athmg aparatas hours when the plant is operatmg or for tr.c

(.m:munnation eqmpment, and senblahon duration of a p=rticular tob a armg plar t n

-s-c 3 6

peno bi refresher traimr:g sessmns shall equ:pment. ta the e cent practicabic.

shutdown

. 'i hl ta n pr it thr classroom mstrue tior.

Di The simulamd use of bre hgnhng

6. Control the removal from the area of all p <nm. f.i a!! brwaJe n embcs w r a two.

eqmpraent rey cred to upe with the situation waste. debris. nrap. od spuls. or othe r se ir permi these sessums me be and t>p of fee s< ici ted for the dnll The combustibles resultmg ftom the work auiuty em mth the reger pLnned area and ty pe ( f hre c hosen for the dnll immediately fullowing (ompletion of the

,t.

should d;ffer frum those used m the previous actiuty. or at tre end of each work shd-

.. t.n p B or drdt so that bngaJe membos are tramed m whichever comes first I'r.o me s.u.sw s5aa he teld for each f.ghtma fires in s arious plant areas 1he I Maintain tt e perioibc housekeepmt sh bn I rw.h oa th-preper mvhod of sJuahon selected should simuiste the size inspections to ensure contmued t empba:xe 0 w

'tr. armus y pes of hre, that rould and arrangement of a fire th. t could mth these adm mstratne contro!*

.. a ma le ir p er plant. I he=e reecnably m rur m the area s< !ctfed.

el Control the use of specific i nrabushbles s s

? ~ 4 W pros a!e bngade meiabers ni'h d!owm t for tire des elopmr nt due to the time m safety related areas A!! wood used m

.gr~

. m attu d bre extinguahment an1 reymred to respond to obtam eqwpment, and safetprelated areas durmg m.untenam e of emergen. s breathma apparata, organve for ine bre. assunung loss of modificatren. or refurbng operatmns tuu 5 as in u

. : crenuous condmons encountered m automatic s ippression apabibty lay-down ided i or scaffoldmgl shall be Wng these prsht e sessmns hall be 141 Assessment of I nede leader's treated with a flame retardant. Eqmpreent or p nided at least om e t,er 3 ear Mr eai h hre ihn, t t.n t,f the fire hehtmg effort as ta suppbes (.uih as new fuell shipped m t r gade me nber.

thoroaghaess. an uracy and effertaeness untreated corrbustible padmg runt uners i D: ch 4Rrmnh may be unpacked m safety related areas if a hre hngade drdis shall be performed m Indnidual records of trainmg prouded to ragmred for s abd operahng renons the rdant so ' bat the for 3 bngade i an prai tu e e.o 5 fire bngade member. in< ludmg dnll floweser, all combushble matenak s5.dl be as a tea n trsp.es shall be mamt uned for at least 3 remosed from the area immediately fodowmx b Drdh shall be p, rformed at regular p.es to ensure that rai h memher recenes the unpac kmg Such transwnt rombushtde wen als no* to eu ced i c onths for e u h framme m aH parts of the tr.come procram matenal, unless stored m apprined sh;:t fue bngade ho h f;re br:gadr rvmber

'itew recorJs of trnng shall be as adable contamers. shall rot im icf t unattended shoubi part.ctpate ir est drdi. hat must I m MC res tew Retra!ning or broadened dunng lunr h breaks. shift t hanges or other parmpate i at least two drius per year.

tn,mmg for hre hght nu withm bmidmgs shall smular permds. I.oose combushble p.o kmg 3 wffmwet number of these dalls. but not be m Feduled for all thow bngane members matenal such as wood or paper escels'or. or

'cu ihan one for ech shJi hre bngade per whose performance remrds show polyethylene sheetme shall be placed in sear. e W be unantmunt ed to determme the de f;r mnew s metal conta ners with tight fittmg self closmg fue f.,.

..g readmms of the plant hre

! Eme.m Lichtme metal un ers br ode. bng ule leader. and hre pmtettion b nwgene s bghtmg units with at !eet an H 9 Control actions to be taken by on sy stems and equipment persons plannme hou batten power wpph shah be prouded mdnidual discosenne a fire f or cumple, mi i amhuntmg an anannounced dnu shall man areas need. d fer operanon of safe notificat on of control roorn attempt to ensun "ut the revon.bng shift hre bngade shutdow n eqmpment and m av i e ss ard estmguish bre. and a< tuahon oflocal f.re memben are not aware that a dn!8 is beme eg ru routes thereta suppression estem*

la Control achons to be taken by the pianned enSI a e begun l'nannoern ed drdh is. tdw s trem e. 'or -

s shall m t be u be+ mi cher than four Adnumstratne controh shad be r ontro! room operator to drtermme the need weeks.

e stabMbeil to r ummue bre hazards m areas for bng.ute assistance upon report of a fire or At le.nt one drdi per 3ee sF H be i.mt enmg urm tures s3str m and m eipt of alarm on t ontrol room annuncutor pe:formt d on a "be k *ft for mu h sh!f t fire compenents impor!.mr ta saf.t> These panel. h r esample announcmg im atmn of bn g..d e i octrok shad reabhsh proi cA.res to hre osri FA system sound;ng hre darms c 1he dn!!S shall be preptarmed to 1 G.n ern the hand!ma ana hmitation of the and noteymg the shdt superusor and the hre estabbsh the tra.nmg ob et tnes of the dni!

uu of ordmary rombushbir matenah.

bngade made: of the type sae. and locahon i

and shall be entiqued to determme how well combushble and f'a.mab!r m esand of the f,re.

the trammg ebmc+nes base been met hyr:ds. high effn. m s parh< ala'e air and it. Control achons to be taken bs the f re l'nannm.nred dnik sF411 be planned and i han oal fdrers dr> :on r v hance resi n. or bngaib after nonhcation by the control room pphes m safet) related operat. r of a hre. f or cumple. assembhne m ontqued b3 members of the management ether < ombust ble u

a desu. ated locatmn. rec enmg directions staff respons ble for plant *afets and fae tre es protectmn performac-def trwnacs of a f:re

/ prMt t% u. r me of c ombushbb s m from 11 fire bngade irader. iind d.schareme boede or of mda.Jual hre bngade members uh is tel ved an e or coabbsh dessnuted speofo fire hehrmg respons6hhes mcludmg sha be irmedvd by si hei.!me cdshtw nal st - c aren mth appropnate f:re selet to i and transportanon of bre f'ghtmg ha mne for the brwde er members

r tei tmn eqmpn. nt to hre Im anon. selechon of tinsataf u tnrv EU rerform mr e sha: 1 be i Gmern the ha o!!mg et and hmit protes t.e equ:prnent, operatma mstruchons fAwed bs a r. pr it dnll withm m day s trans.cr.1 hre loa 6 s a h e i ombust:ble and for use.I fire suppre'uon >> stems aed use d A' 1 scar nten ah a randWV sr!er ted fleemab;e lamh wo,d and plastu.

of prepunned strateg:es fer hghbrg hres m g

unann.mra ed d-dl sha" be rnuquad by pn.d.e is or oth r. o nbost+1e matenals m speuh. areas qubhed mda niuaN mdepandrnt of the behf o as cont ieung safen m lated systems 12 Dehne the strateams for hghtir.g hres m he enwe s taf f.\\. ps i the wrmrn eport er ep; nu nt d.a ma all phers of oper.itmg all safety related areas and areas present.ng frorr sm.h mdn du s J a be.n.oi ible W and es, m i P h J w a mamt.wmr e a hazard to safety re!ated emapment These NRC reuew med fu atmn or n Lehng operahons strateg es shall desynate N.um im tm lade the 4 thqqMe tb i sae Maf f member

a. bre hazards m can_ h area t esen a by th.

e I)rdh shah as e

, tant tre protn hon spn the prefire plans fa h ng rnpont.b!c f or ti.

i t ; Assessment ni 1.n aDrm elfe aneness rm ww of prop. sed n urk.o huhe> to idenbfy bCire eshngmshants best smted for hme requ; red to nm ', m J

.emNe f re pctenhal trans. : f ac haards and spe< ify

u..olling the hres as,ocuted wi.h the hre

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76615 hazards in that area and the nearest lot atmn roolant level above the top of the core for separation and barriers between trays and of these extmguisbants flWRS and be withm the lesel mdication in conduits contaire, associated circuits of one

c. Most favorable direction from which to the-pressunrer for PWRs safe shutdown oivision and trays and attac k a fire m each area in view of the

c. The rearfor heat removal funcimn shall conduits contamma associated circuits or venidat on direction, access hallways. stairs.

be rapable of as hievmg and maintaming safe shutdown cables from the redundant s

and doi rs that are most bkely to be free of det ay heat removal.

division. or the iso.ation of these associated bre. and the best station or elevatmn for d The process rnomtonng function shall be circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, fightmg the hre All access and egress routes capable of proudmg direct readmgs of the shall he such that a postulated fire involving that mv. he los.' doors should br process vanables necessary to perform and associated circuits will not prevent safe e

sm i hc.dly identifmd m the procedure with control the abose functions.

shutdown a

the appropnate precautions ami methods for

c. The supporting functions shall be M. Fw Barrier Cable Penetmtion Sco/

access specified capable of providmg the process cochne Qualification

d. P; ant systems that should I.c managed to lubncation. etc necessary to permit the Penetration seal designs shall utdize only reduc e the damage potential dunng a local operation of the equipment used for salt noncombustible materials and shall be hre and the hication of hmal and remote shatdown funrtions.

quabfied by tests that are comparable to tests controls for such management l-g. any 1 The shutdown capabihty for specific fire used to rate fire barners. De acceptance hydraulic or elettrical systems it. the zone arras may be umque for cath such area. or it critesa for the test shall mclude:

cosered by the speafic fire fighting procedure may be one unique combmation of systems t The cable fire bamer penetration seal that rould mercase the hazards in the area for all sut h areas. In either case. the has withstood the fire endurance test without herause of overpressunzatmn or ehstncal alternative shutdown tapabihty shall be passage of flame or igmtion of cables on the hazardsh independent of the specific fire areals) and unexposed side for a penod of time

e. Vital heat sensite system components sha!! accommodate postfire i onditions where equ.<alent to the fire resistance rating that need to be kept cool whde Inzhtmg a offsve power.s as atiable and where offsite reqmred of the barner; local fire. Particularly hazardous power is not asadable for 72 hnurt

2. The temperature levels rewrded for the combustibles that nee i coohng should be Procedures shah be m effect to implement unexposed side are analyred and designated this i apabihty demonstrate that the maximum temperature

f. Organizatmn of fire fightmg bngades and 4 If the i arabihty to athwse and maintain is sufficiently below the cable insulation the assignment of sperial duties ac cording to ro!d shutdon n will not be available because ignition temperature; and job title so that all fire fightmg functions are of fire dama e. the rqmpment and systems 1 The fire barner penetration seal remains covered by any r omplete shift personnel compnsmg in. means to athme and intact and does not allow projection of water complement Thew dutms mclude < ommand ma ntam the hot standbv or hot shutdown beyond the unexposed surface dunng the control of the bnuade. transportmg fire condenon shal1 he e apable of maintammg hose stri am test.

suppression am! s'ipport equ:pment to Ibc hre sm h 4 onditums acid i oll shutdown can be N. Fir, Doors scenes. upply mg tne mimguishant to the tire.

m hmsed if sm h eqmpment and systems wdl Fire doors shall be self t!asing or provided commumcatmn mth the contrW room. and not be capable of bemg powered by both with closmg mechamsms and shall be coordination with outside f.re departments onsite and effs:te elettne power systems mspected semiannually to venfy that g Potential radmlogical and tout banrds because of fac damagr. an mdependent automatic hold open release, and closmg in fire zonet onsite power ssstem shall be prouded The methamsms and latches are operable, h Ventilation system operatmn that number of operatmg shift personnel.

One of the followmg measures shall be ensures desired plant air distnbution when culusise of hre bngade members. required provided to ensure they will protect the the ventd mon flow is mo.hfwd for hre to operate su< h eqmpment and systems shall opening as required in case of fire:

contamment or smoke c leanns operahon.

be on site at all times t Fire doors sha!! he kept closed and

i. Operations reymnng umirol room and S Equipment and s> stems compnsma the electncafly supervised at a contmuously shift engmeer roordmatan or authoraration rneans to achine and maintam rohl manned ;ocation.

j inst uctions for plan operators and shutdown i onditmns shall not be damaged

2. Fire doors shall be locked c.losed and general plant personnel dunng fire.

by fae. or the hre damage to such equipment

'nspecte I weekly to venfy that the d(mrs are L Alternatsre and th dicated shutdown end sy stoms sba!I be htmted so that the m the <losed position; Capability systems ran be nude..perable and i oh!

3 fir' doors shall be prouded with t Aliernatne or dedicated shutdown shutdown a< hwsed wittim '2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , automat c hold open and release mechanisms capab bty prouded for a spec ific hre area Matenals for sm h repmrs shall be readdy and mspected dady to senfy that doorways shall be able to m hmse and mamtam avadablc on site and procedures shall be m are fme of obstructions, or e fei t to implement sm h repmrs. If sut h 4 f're doors shall be kept closed and subentmal reactivity r ondshons m the r

feat for, mam'ain reactor toolant m entor) e ppment and sy stenis u*.ed pnor to 7? hours inspeded duly to venfy that they are in the CI"5"d I "SII*"

achieve and mai:'t.un hot st mdhs after ihn hre wdl not be rapable of being ira powered b) both onste and offsae etertnc The ke bngade leader shall have ready condit ons for a PW R (hot shutdown o

IlWR) amt + laeve told shutdown -

power systems bm.nac of fire damage. an au cu t i k eys for any locked fire doors.

ronditions waiun 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and ma ntam e old mdependnet onsne power sprem shall be Ama proteded b automatic total floodmg shutdovm maditmns thereafter Dur'ng the pin nled Eqmpment and s> stems used after gas supression systems shall have I

posthra N.tdown the reartor coobmt system 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months may be powered bs offwe power eindni aHv supenned self closing fire doors l

pnwcw s.oiabms shall be maintamed within only or shall satisfy optmn 1 abuse O O ' Co#cdion System for Reortar those pn t !nt for a loss of normal a c h hhutdown ssstems mstalled to ensure d

power. and the f ssion product boundary posthre shutdown capabihty need not be

""' #" *P l

integnty shati not be af ferted i e. there shall designed to mrrt snsma Category I < niena.

The n.nur roulant pump shall be npune I with an od collection system if the I

be no feel rlad damagm ruptme or ans smde f.nlum i ntena or o%r desixn basa conhnm u nt is not inerted during normal

[

pnmary toolant boundary or rupture of the ar cident cntena. eu ept where reymred for I

operate a The oil nWedmn system shall be contammert boundary other n-asons e g. bn auw of m'erf we with t

so dnvied engmeend and mstalled that

2. The rformance goals for the shutdown or impact on miens safety wstemt or I'"!ure w 11 not lead to hre dunng normal or functmn shall be because ed 4. rs.> Use m tums due to hre design b sis ar rident ronditions and that a Th reactaity control font. tion shall be damage cap 4 o ni at hmtmg and ma:ntamma cold

? The safe shutdown equipment and ble method of t omplymg with this shutdmm reactissty Londihons.

% stra for tw h fire area shah 1.e k nown to "An4 e

b The reactor roolant makeup function i e notared from assoiiatrd non-s.dely "ld"]'

'",'[

"j D

I shall be r.apab e of m untammg the reactor arrua m the fee arra so that hot short*

Md m i L7 N o.>n 4 4 where trays from open r ir( mts or shorts lo pound m the red >>nd.mt safety dmmns are no proter.ted that r As def,ned m the Siant ent lei hrural awmated c art m!s wdi not prevent operatmn po,w.d Dres affett trays frorn only one safety Specihcahrme of the safe shunlown ppment The amsnm

760lti va l. r.il Remister i Vol. n No. 225 / hhn sdae. November 19 1930 / Rules and Regulations the:e is seasmahle omrari e tFat the syste n wiii withstand the Safe Shot bewn F..e r ? hy aa ki Sui h owe < imn sptoms si...il be capable of udici tmg latie od f rom all pmntral pie.,urized.ml unpressurited leakage sees

, une ro.sc.f m e aid int pump lui.,e oil systems, g

i raage sh.id he wW ue.1 and dramed to a ni. d i.!osed e antainer firstt an hold t!.e h.b. ! sp c n unent ;n.\\ flaw f

6 urester a requued - : the s cot if the flash k

pi.ut i harru.ternh.s of the.d present the Lewd of firr flashbar k 1.cakage potr ts to be

. ted shotl nu lude hf t ;'unp and py mg pi,

hit e od wol. r od f dl and i.w (b.w l rn t

drain t.n. 4 and pluu, Dar ged < onnectier 3 on

.d i.nes..ind luhe ou resen mrs w here such tea ur s e ust on the reactos cool. int pump 3 1 he dr.uo Irne itt ! e lon ge enoi.sh to

.t.

~ ad i 1h. ia sesi pote ntiat oil leak D

W 1,. Pt.1, l. 8.) JilJ bd 5 tat. 948. set 2nd I ole t !)J 4 M. 83 Stat.1242 l4211 S (-

. U b),.%41 } }

ILa d n Wasl.cq.on U C this 1 10 1 o i t N2 etnbu 19aa

) or the Nuclear Regulatart i.omnhsuiu riamael J. Chdk.

~.., r,. n s rh,1.. an w o, gk N Ilso I4 L4 6 M F ir d i 6 ln@ N 4%emi B:LLtNG COCE 7590 01-M e

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ML20032B667

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Subject:

Enclosure:

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