ML20031G530
| ML20031G530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031G529 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8110230180 | |
| Download: ML20031G530 (4) | |
Text
8 UNITED STATES 8 ' } y (f( p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/J WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g, d qE
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF Nt'"'f s REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 67 TO PROV" 7AL _ {RATINGLICENSENO.20 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated December 18, 1980 and May 7,1981, Consumers Power Company (the licensee} proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2,1980.
2.0 BACKGROUND
INFORMATION By our let;3r dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident.
Certain of thess requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to Mr. David P. Hoffman, Consumers Power Company dated April 6, 1980.
In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A": items, we requested that licensees amend their TS to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1900.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
The licensee's application is in direct response to our request.
Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.
3.0 EVAL'JATION 2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements The pressurizer water level indicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are important in a post-accident situation. Adequate emergency power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components.
The licensee has the r2quisite emergency power supplies. The TSs provide appropriate actions in the event of component inoperability and are thus acceptable.
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.. 2.1.3.a Direct Indication of Flow from Relief and Safety Valves THe licensee has provided direction indication of flow downstream of the Power Operate Relief Valves (PORV) and safety valves in the control room.
These indications are a diagnostic aid for the plant operator and provide no automatic action.
The licensee has provided TSs with a channel check every eight hour shift and channel calibration every refueling outage; thus, the TSs are acceptable and they meet our July 2,1980 mcdel TS criteria.
The licensee also has provided a direct indication of the PORV Block valves position in the control room. This meets our requirements and is acceptable.
2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Co61ing The licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core-cooling. These instrum.:nts, subcooling meters, receive and process data from existing ' plant instrumentation. We previously reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 6,1980.
The licensee submitted TSs with a channel check every eight hour shift and channel calibration every refueling outage and actions to be taken in the event of component inoperability. We conclude the TSs are acceptable as they meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.1. 4 Diverse Containment Isolation The licensee has a containment isolation system with diverse parameters sensed to ensure automatic isolation of non-essential systems under postulated accident conditions. These parsmeters are containment high pressure and high radiation. We have reviewed this system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation dated April 6,1980. The system was modified such that it does not result in the automatic loss of containment isolation after the containment isolation s.ignal is resat.
Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate operator action.
The existing TSs provide for the appropriate s"rveillance and actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
2.1.7.a Auto Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sy3tems The licensee has provided for the automatic initiation of auxiliary (emergency) feedwater flow on loss of normal 'feedwater flow. The auto-initiation signals used by the licensee are low steam generator water level. The TSs submitted by the licensee describe the tests and provide for proper test frequency. The
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TSs contain appropriate actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
2.1.7.b Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication The licensee has installed auxiliary feedwater flow indication that meets our testability and vital power requirements. We reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 6,1980. The licensee has proposed a TS with channel check every month and channel calibration every refueling outage. We find this TS acceptable as it meets the criteria of our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The licensee agreed to add one STA to each shift to perform the function of accident assessment.
The individual performing this function will have at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.
Part of the STA duties are related to operating experience review function. We find this satisfies our requirements and is acceptable.
2.1.4 Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a Systems Integrity Measurements Program. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appro-priate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor contain-ment.
In discussions the licensee agreed to the requirements for this program being added to Section 6 of the Technical Specifications. Accordingly this amendment includes that addition.
2.1.8.c Iodine Monitoring Our-letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborn iddine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions.
In discussions the licensee agreed to the requirements for this program being added to Section 6 of the Technical Specifications. Accordingly, this amendment includes that addition.
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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551'.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection vith the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because that amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or conseq'lences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the. common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: October 8, 1981 b
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