ML20031G516
| ML20031G516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1981 |
| From: | Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031G517 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C5257-120-D, TER-C5257-120D, NUDOCS 8110230024 | |
| Download: ML20031G516 (25) | |
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-289 NRC TAC NO. 08086 FRC PROJECT C5257 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-79-118 FRC TASK 120 Preparedby Franklin Research Center Author:
C. Bomberger (WSI)
The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphla, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:
I. Sargent (wsI)
Prepared for Nuclear Ragulatory Commission l
Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:
F. Clemenson l
l September 21, 1981 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agsricy of the United States Government. Neither the United States Govsrnment nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, exp.essed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.
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TER-C5257-120 CONTENTS Section Title Page I
1 INTRODUCTION.
I 1.1 Purpose of Review I
1.2 Generic Background.
2 1.3 Plant-Specific Background 4
2 EVALUATION AND RECOPMENDATIONS 4
2.1 General Guidelines.
14 2.2 Interim Protection Measures.
18 3
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
3.1 General Provisions for Inad Handling 18 21 3.2 Interim Protection.
21 3.3 Summary.
l 23 4
REFERENCES l
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TER-C5257-120 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEN This technical evaluation report documents the. Franklin Research Center (FRC) review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Mett opolitan Edison's hree Mile Island Unit One (TMI-1) Nuclear Power Plant. 'Ihis evaluation was performed with the following objectives:
o to assess conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],
Section 5.1.1 o to assess conforstance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.
1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in of fact at cperating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting i
t information concerning the control of heavy loads near spen,t fuel.
The results of Tcsk A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.
In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. He
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TER-C5257-120 fira portion cf the objective, achieved th ough a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probsbility of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staf f's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2-5, is to ensure that for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequery:es either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:
1.
provide suf ficient operator trair.ing, handling syst em design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system 2.
define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator i
training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment 3.
provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy 19 ads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to es.aure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On June 26, 1980, the NRC issued a letter (3) to Katropolitan Edison, the Licenset for 1MI-1, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for OUd Franklin Research Center A Dnemen af The Fransen kunnese
TER-C 5257-120 handling and control of heavy loads at TMI-1, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On February 17, 1981, Metropolitan Edist a provided the initial response (4) te this request.
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TER-C5257-120 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FRC's evaluation of load handling at TMI-l is divided into two categories. These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of Article 5.1.1 and the recommended interim protection measures of Article 5.3 of NUREG-0612. Applicable guideline's are referenced in each category. FRC's l
conclusion and reco':enendations are provideo in the summary for each guideline.
2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in
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l order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. - These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
o Guideline 1 - Safe Ioad Paths o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator's Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lif ting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (not specially designed)
Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection,, Testing, and Maintenance) o l
a Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in c her areas where a load drop nay damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and l
l FRC's evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding l
l paragraphs.
l 2.1.1 Safe Ioad Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(1)]
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the poter.tial for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe anutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, i l 00h' Franklin Research Ce.n nter i
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TER-C5257-120 the structure ic more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawinga, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations from defined. oad paths should require written alternative procedures approved by tne plant safety review committee."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Lif ting operations involving handling of heavy loads at TMI-l are performed with the intent to conform with " safe load path" criteria.
Load handling procedures and equipment layout drawings are currently being amended to identify safe load paths. When these changes are completed, load handling in the reactor building will comply with safe load path criteria of physical markings, procedures, and drawings. In the fuel handling building, "prohibi-tive zone" markihys have been identified in lieu of safe load paths to identify areas where handling of heavy loads is prohibited in accordance with c'esign studies for the cask drop analysis (5). Ef forts are in progress to redesign the affected areas of the fuel handling building.
Current procedures require that before any overhead heavy load handling (greater than 1 ton) can occur in the reactor or fuel handling building which may adversely affect the ability to maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition or which ceuld be handled over c* in close proximity te. fuil, the following must be performed cr satisfied:
(1) radiation work permit ccmpleted; (2) as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) and quality assurance (CA) reviews completed; and (3) approved maintenance procedures issued.
b.
FRC Evaluation hatropolitan Edison's stated intentions with respect to safe load paths in the reactor building are accepteble concerning marking of safe load paths, development of standard procedures, and revision of equipment layout drevings to indicate the safe load paths. hatropolitan Edison's position on the use of
" prohibited zones" in the fuel handling building, however, is not a viable
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alternative to the safe load pa ths defined in Section 5.1.1(1) of NUREG-0612.
Although the concept of " prohibited zones" is acceptable from the etandpoint of preventing load drops in the vicinity of spent fuel storage, it p
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TER-C5257-120 does not satisfy the intent of the NRC guideline, i.e., to provide specific pathways for the movement of heavy loads through the use of procedures, physical markings, and suitable drawings, thus minimising the risk of damage by moving heavy loads to the extatnt practical along structural floor members.
In addition, the Licensee has not addressed the requirement that safe load paths for the movement of htavy Ic ads be selected so as to follow, to the extent practical, s.tructural floor members and beams for either the reactor or the fuel bandling building.
The Licensee did not address the need for review and approval of deviations from defined safe load paths, when incorporated into load handling procedures (see Section 2.1.2).
Interim measures employed to control load handling operations provide for supervisory review of ad hoc maintenance procedures.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation 1MI-l partially complies with Guideline 1.
The Licensee's intentions for implementation of safe lo.d paths in the resctor building comply with the criteria of Guideline 1.
When the safe load paths are implemented, records should be readily available for review by the NRC staff.
1MI-l's use of
" prohibited zones" in the fuel handling building does not comply with the safe load path criteria. Safe load paths should be identified and Guideline 1 implemented in the fuel handling building. The Licensee has provided no information to verify that safe load paths have been selected with due consideration for the location of structural floor members and beams in either the reactor or the fuel handling building. The Iacensee should verify that existing load paths and those to be selected satisfy this c:iteria. Review and approval of deviatigts from defined load paths, when incorporated in procedures, should be addressed within the scope of Guideline 2.
2.1.2 Load Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NURL7 0612, Article 5.1.1(2)]
" Procedures should be developed to ecver load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment...These procedures should klin Research Center A Dhamen ei The Fransen insamese
TER-CS257-120 include:
identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
a.
Sununary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A foral program is being developed to provide the required procedures for the control of heavy loads at 'INI-l and will be implemented in the form of a " Station Lif ting and Handling Control Manual." This manual will contain applicable procedures for handling various heavy loads in the reactor and fuel handling buildings, as well addressing training, safety, QA, and mairtenance procedures. Part of the Control Manual will be maintenance procedure MP 1408, "Lif ting and Handling Control Procedure," which is currently under review and specifically states that
- written procedures are required in the handling of critical loads." Critical loads are defined by the Licensee as those loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.
In addition, MP 1408 requires that " normal periodic inspections shall be supplemented with spec.ial visual, non-destructive examination, and dynamic load tests prior to use on critical loads if required."
Table 2.1 provides a list of heavy loads at 'IMI-l and the current status of implementation of handling procedureo for each heavy load.
It is noted that procedures which have been implemented do not specify the safe load paths as required by Guideline 1, " Safe Icad Paths."
b.
FRC Evaluation The Licensee's discussion of load handling procedures does not specify whether current procedures or those to be implemented as part of the " Station Lif ting and handling Control Maaual" satisfy the criteria listed in Guideline 2.
The Licensee has noted that procedures that have been implemented do net define safe load paths as required by Guideline 1.
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TER-C5 257-120 Table 2.1 Identification Weight Procedure of Heavy Load (tonal Status i
PWR - Refueling Building 1.
Spent fuel shipping cask 15 Prior to 6-30-82 2.
Pool divider gates 2
Prior to 6-30-82 3.
Fuel transf er canal door 2
Implemented (MP 1504-4, 1506-8) 4.
Missile shields 5-10 Prior to 6-30-82 5.
New fuel shipping containers 3.5-4 Implemented (MP 1505-3) 6.
Failed fuel container 1
Prior to 6-30-82 7.
Fuel transfer carriage 1.5 IEplemented (MP 1505-3) t.'. Irradiated specimen shipping Prior to 6-30-82 cask 9.
Reain essk 12 Prior to 6-30-81 Prior to 6-30-81 10.
Plant equipment (>l ton)
PWR - Containment Building 1.
Reactor vessel head 157 Implemented (MP 1504-7, 1506-2) l 2.
Upper internals (plenum) 62 Implemunted (MP 1504-8, 1506-1) 3.
In-service inspection tools 1-3 Not identified 4.
Reactor coolant pumps 35 Prior to 6-30-82
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Missile shields 5.5 Prior to 6-30-82 1
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TLR-C5257-120 c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation
'IMI-l does not comply with Guideline 2.
Safe load paths are not identified in current procedures.
Inadequate information is available on the load-ha: idling procedures that have been implemented or are currently being written to determine if the remaining criteria of Guideline 2 have been met.
Tne Licensee should review procedures that have been implemented, and those to be implemented in the " Station Lif ting and Handling Control Manual," and verify that they contain the information required by this guideline prior to any lifts involving the respective loads.
In addition, the Licensee should verify that deviations from specified safe load paths will be approved by the plant safety review committee (or equivalent).
2.1.3 Crane Operator Training (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(3)]
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes'(6]."
a.
Suimmary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that a formal training program with both clacaroom and practical factors training in " Overhead and Gantry Cranes" i's being developed and that the records of all personnel assigned to operate cranes haVe been reviewed to determine their qualifications for operating the.t Programs are in progress to provide exact compliance with the cranes.
standard, including physicals for crane operator personnel and creation of a training record on each crane operator for easy reference and updating.
b.
FRC Evaluation Crane operator training and qualification programs being developed satisfy the criteria of Guideline 3, on the basis of Metropolitan Edison's verification that the program is based on ANSI B30.2-1976.
No information is available to determine that appropriate provisions for ensuring that identified standards for operator conduct during load handling operations are in effect.
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FRC Conclusion and Recommendation
'DtI-l partially complies with Guideline 3.
Training and qualification programs being developed by 'DtI-1 satisfy the intent of ANSI B30.2-1976. When the programs are completed, program records should be readily available for review and inspection by the NRC staf f.
The Licensee should implement suitable programe to monitor or ensure proper operator conduct. These programs may consist of review of operator conduct during training and qualification, surveillance or monitoring of operators during actual load handling by plant safety or quality assurance personnel, supervision of load handling by selected senior crane or plant supervisors, or other suitable alternatives which the Licensee may propose. When implemented, this program and appropriate records should be readily available for review and inspection by the 75tC staf f.
2.1.4 Special Lif ting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(4)1 "Special lif ting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear haterials'(7]. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy
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loads in areas as defined above.
For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.
In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be tased on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design f actor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4)). "
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions a.
Metropolitsn Edison has stated that " strict compliance to required standards exists when lif ting any load which contains radiological material or is around, over, or in any way in the vicinity which may adversely af fect the ability to maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition or which could be handled over or in close proximity to fuel." '
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FRC Evaluation Information provided by Metropolitan Edison is vague and does not specify whether 'special lif ting devices comply with the guidelines of ANSI N14.6 or if special lifting device design stresses are based on static and dynamic loading.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation 21-1 does not comply with the criteria of Guideline 4.
The Licensee should identify all special lif ting devices associated with the heavy loads listed in Table 2.1, verify that they satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6, and verify that the stress design is based on static and dynamic loadings.
2.1.5 Lif ting Devices (not specially designed) (Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]
"Lif ting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' (8].
Howe *?n, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load.*
Thw rating ider.tified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to ura on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Metropolitan Edison's response for lif ting devices not specially designed is the same as that for specially designed lif ting devices (see Guideline 4, Section 2.1.4).
b.
FRC Evaluation The Licensee has not identified general purpose lif ting devices used to handle heavy loads at 21-1.
The Licensee has not verified that these lif ting devices are installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9
"*For the purpose of selecting the proper sling, loads imposed by the SSE need not be included in the dynamic loads imposed on the sling or litting device."
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TER-C5257-120 using the " static load" identified in Guideline 5.
No information is available from the Licensee on any slings requiring marking due to restrictions as a result of static load criteria.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Reccamendation 1MI-l does not comply with Guideline 5.
The Licensee has not sta.ed that the guidelines of ANSI B30.9 have been applied to lif ting devices uhich are not specially designed. The Licensee should verify that slings contev.m to the guidelines of ANSI B30.9.
The Licensee should also ensure that measures are implemented to identify and mark those slings which may be restricted to certain uses due to limitations in static load ratings.
2.1.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1 M "The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 cf ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for pericdic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use.)."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2 has been invoked and reviewed by Metropolitan Edison at 1MI-1.
Implementation of the requirements of this standard is in progress in all applicable areas and is to be completed prior to reactor operation.
b.
7C Evaluation
. Metropolitan Edison's crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program, which is being implemented at 1MI-1, is considered to satisfy the criteria of nk!!n Research Center A DMaan af The Fremann poenme
9 TER-C5257-120 Guideline 6, on the basis of the Licensee's verification that the program is based upon ANSI B30.2.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation
'DtI-l complies with Guideline 6.
Metropolitan Edison is implerenting a program based on the guidelines of ANSI B30.2 to be completed prior to reactor operation. When the orogram is complete, program records should be readily available for review and inspection by the NRC staf f.
2.1.7 Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(7)]
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes' [9]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satistied."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions
'Ihe area of crane design is currently under review by Metropolitan Edison. The crane manufacturer has indicated that the crane met the require-ments of Electric Overhead Crane Institute (EOCI) specifications at the time of crane design (1968), which was at that time the equivalent of CMAA-70.
b.
FRQ Evaluation No information was provided for FRC to evsluate the design of cranes in use at 1MI-1.
The fact that cranes were designed to the EOCI specification, the predecessor to specification CMAA-70, indicates that they will in a substantial portion satisfy this guideline.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation A conclusion with respect to this guideline must be deferred until cospletion of the evaluation currently in progress. Since the Licensee has indicated in preliminary review that EOCI specifications were met at the time nklin Research Center A (>memon of The Frenten kuunde
TER-C5257-120 1
of crane design, the Licensee should address design requirements invoked by CMAA-70 which are more restrictive than those invoked in the EOCI standard (e.g., allowable compressive stress in structural members).
2.2 INTERIM PROTECYION MEASURES
'the NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report' i
consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Icad Paths; Guideline 2, Ioad Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
- 1. Heavy load technical specifications
- 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Atticle 5.3. (1)]
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PM's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 I
(of NUREG-0612]."
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a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions 1:4I-1 '!4chnical Specification 3.11.6 limits the movement of loads in escess of 3,000 pounds over the spent fuel pool by the following adminis-trative controls:
(1) the center of mass of loads is maintained below an elevation of 348 feet (surface edge of the spent fuel pool); or (2) the center nklin Research Center
TER-CS257-120 of mass is maintained at such a distance from the edge of the spent fuel pool that, should a load be released, the center of mass of the load would be at least six feet from the edge or any pool containing irradiated fuel.
hchnical Specification 3.11.8 provides a waiver from the above technical specification to provide for movement of the pool divider gates to an eppropriate storage location if criteria involving fuel assemblies (total number and cooling time) a.id redundant lif ting devices are met.
b.
FRC Evaluation Current 'IMI-l technical specifications do not prohibit the mover.ent of heavy loads over the spent pool fuel. Existing technical specifications allow the pool divider gates to be carried over the spent fuel pool and appear to allow other heavy loads to be moved within the spert fuel pool. The use of redundant lif ting devices for the pool divider gates, while providing some ad31tional assurance that these loads will not be dropped, is not a suitable subecitute for a single-failure-proof overhead crane.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Reconumendation TMI-1 does not comply with thin interim measure.
Technical Specification 3.11.6 allows the handling of heavy loads within the spent fuel pool and Technical Specification 3.11.8 provides a waiver to allow handling of specific heavy loads over the fuel pool. The Licensee should make the necessery changes to the technical specifications to comply with this interim protection measure.
2.2.2 Administrative Controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Articles 5.3(2)-5.3(5)1
" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection)...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of NUREG-0612]."
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Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.4.
b.
FRC Evaluations, Com Ausions, and Recommendations FRC's evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.4.
2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core (Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.3(6)]
...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads:
(1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes,
, slings, and special lif ting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions l
THI-l review of procedures outlined in general Guideline 2 is considered to be performed in sufficient detail to be acceptable. Inspections perforr.ed in accordance with general Guidelines 4, 5, and 6 are suf ficient to satisfy interim protection measures. Crane operator training programs outlined in general Guideline 3 are suf ficient for this interim protection measure.
l b.
FLC Evaluation THI-l's review of procedures for movement of heavy loads over the core I
does not satisfy this interim measure.
In addition to the procedures already required by Interim Protection Measure 3 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3, these
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TER-C5257-120 interim actions specify that special attention be given to heavy loads over the core. TMI-l has not provided a verification that such special attention has been identified beyond that required by Interim Protection Measure 3 and general Guideline 2.
Licensee inspections and repairs of load bearing components are not defined sufficiently to sat.isfy the "special attention" required by these interim measures for handling of heavy loads. Similarly, the Licensee has not verified that operators receive the necessary training on specific procedures used for handling heavy loads over the core beyond that required by general Guideline 3.
c.
FRC Conclusion TMI-l does not comply with the criteria of interim protection measure 6 in that the Licensee has not verified that any special attention or consid-erations have been made for handling heavy loads over the core. The Licensee should take appropriate action to satisfy the criteria or verify that special attention exists as identified by Interim Protection Measure 6.
1 l Franklin Research Center A themen of The hereen kusue
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,, - - -,. - - - - -, ~. -,,,., - - - -
e
TER-C5257-120 3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
This summary is provided to consolidate the conclusions and recommen-dations of Section 2 and to document FRC's overall evaluation of the handling of heavy 3oads at THI-1.
It is divided into two sections dealing with general provisions for load handling at nuclear power plants (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1). and the staf f recommendation for interim protection, pending complete implementation of the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3). In each case, recommendations for additional Licensee action, and additional NRC staff action where appropriate, are provided.
l 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage safe shutdown systems. Compliance with these guidelines is necessary to 2nsure that load-handling system design, administrative controls, and operator training and qualification are such that the possibility of a load drop is very small and suitable for the critical functions and potential consequences of failures of cranes at nuclear power plants. These guidelines are partially satisfied at TMI-1.
This conclusion is presented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
Specific recommendations for achieving full compliance with these guide-lines are provided as follows:
Guideline Recomme nd at ion 1
- a. Verify compliance with safe load path criteria upon implementation of revised procedures and layout drawings for the reactor building.
- b. Identify and establish safe load paths to be used in the fuel handling building.
- c. Verify that all safe load paths follow, to the extent practical structural floor members and beams.
nk!!n Research Center A DMesen af The Freassa inesue
6 Table 3.1.
ItsI-1/uungG-4412 Crump!!ance sentris Interla Interto theR$t or Goldeline 1 Guide!!ne 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline S Guideline 6 Guideline 7 steasure 1 tenseere 6 Cepecity sete toed Crane operator Special Lifting Crane - Test Tectanical Spgelen C
RoseY taede
[ tonal hthe Procedures Traintne Daeices Sitnee peut Inspection C*4ne Deelen epocif icet trote Attent g D 'yg
- 1. Feet Bendtleg 3
Creae 110 B
1 3
E spent rue!
a lpe., Casa 15 iC aC sc w:
ts n
$te gg Pool Dielder ta Gates 2
iC DC m;
uC fn#
Feel Transfer Canal thoc 2
sc C
IC SC Q
Riestle IC
~
NC mielde S-10 uC sc l
Inew Fuel alpping SC MC Contenner 3.5-4 NC C
Failed fuel emntainer 1
N ree! Trenefer MC IC y
Carriage 1.5 BC C
Irredtated Specleen
=
IEC
~
IEC alpping Caek I
~
IC IC poeta Cast 12 BC IC Plant egelp-MC IIC ment (91 ton)
DC 3C
- 2. Contelnment Peter Crane ISS R
R I
Deactor vessel q
peed 157 a
C IEC IC g.:
25 d
upper Intermale IFlene) 62 R
C IIC NC g
Nw Inserelce In-y spection 1eele 1-3 m
aC IIC uC 4sa N
peactor Cool-o ant Pe ps 35 3
BC DIC
==
NC Miselle mielde S.S a
IC sc DC C = Licensee action compttee with pureG-0412 Guideline.
IC = Licepeee action does not empty with leJstrC-0612 Guldeline.
R = Licensee bee proposed reetatons/modif teet tena designed to comply with numsc-0412 Guideline.
I = Insuf ficient taformation moeided by the Licensee.
TER-C5257-120 l
Guideline Recommend at ion 2
- a. Define safe load paths in all load-handling procedures and require that deviations from such paths be approved by the plant safety review committee.
- b. Verify that load-handling procedures which have been implemernted or those being written satisfy the remaining criteria of Guideline 2, i.e., identification of required equipment, inspections and acceptance criteria, steps and pecper sequencing, and other special precautions.
3
- a. Verify that training and qualification programs comply with guideline criteria when implementation of ANSI B30.2-1976 is complete.
- b. Implement a program for monitoring crane operator conduct or verify that such a program is currently in existence.
Identify all special lif ting devices associated with heavy 4
a.
loads listed in Table 3.1.
- b. Verify that each special lif ting device satisfies the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978.
- c. Confirm that special lif ting devices are designed to meet the stress design factor of Guideline 4.
5
- c. Verify that all lif ting devices not specially designed are installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971 or that an equivalent program exists to ensure that slings in use conform to those guidelines.
- b. Identify and clearly indicate those slings that may be restricted to certain cranes due to limitations in static load ratings.
6 (TMI-1 complies with this guideline.)
i 7
- a. The Licensee should further evaluate crane design to ensure that applicable criteria and guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70 are satisfied.
- b. Demonstrate equivalency for all actual design requirements where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
1 43 UUUU Franklin Research Center a coa a w n r,wea w.
4 TER-C5257-120 3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be parformed in a safe manner until final implementation of the genere.1 guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Specified measures includes the implementatic] of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load-handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eli..inate deficiencies that could lead to component failure.
FRC's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that the staf f's measures for interim protection at 1MI-1 are met:
Interim Measure Recommend ation 1
- a. Revise technical specifications to include a prohibition against handling heavy loads over the stored fuel pool.
- b. Revise the technical specifications to preclude the waiver for moving the pool divider gates over the spent fuel pool or provide analyses to justify the waiver.
2,3,4 Implement the recommendations of Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and [4.
identified in Section 3.1.
5 (1MI-l complies with this interim orotection measure.)
6 Demonstrate the required special attention identified in this interim measure for procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the ccre.
3.3
SUMMARY
NRC's general guidelines and interim protection measures of NUREG-0612 have not been satisfied at 1MI-1.
Several programs being implemented comply with staff guiuelines, in particular crane operator training and crane inspection, testing, and maintenance.
Licensee action is required on the u00m.niain ae.rch cent,
A DMusen of The Frereen insumme
s a
TER-C52b 7-12 0 remaining general guidelines and interim actions to establish the necessary procedures and programs or to provide adequate justification to demonstrate compliance with NUREG-4612.
l f
l t
e e
ranklin Research Center AChtuenedTheF w w
,ev s
TER-C5257-123 4.
REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Ioads at Nuclear Power Plants letc 2.
V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)
Ietter to all Licensees.
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control *of Heavy Ioads Hear Spent.*uel NRC,17 May 1978 3.
D.G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Letter to H.D. Hukill (Met Ed).
Subjects NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Ioads Near Spent Fuel at MI-l NRC, 26 June 1980 4.
H.D. Hukill (Met Ed)
Ietter to D.G. Eisenhut (NRC).
Subject:
Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Ioads at 'IMI-l Metropolitan Edison,17 Feb 1981 5.
Cask Drop Analysis for Fuel Handling Building Metropolitan Edison hchnical Data Report No.142, Rev.1.
Metropolitaa Edison, 13 May 1980 l
6.
AMBI B30.2-1976 l
overhead and Gantry Cranes 7.
ANSI N14.6-1978 Standard for Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials.
l 1
8.
ANBI B30.9-1971 Slings l
9.
(MAA-70 l
Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes 1
a l WUUU Frenidin Reneerch Center A b af The Frerene timmas
_