ML20031F682
| ML20031F682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1981 |
| From: | Miller L, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031F671 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM 50-206-81-31, IEC-81-12, NUDOCS 8110200296 | |
| Download: ML20031F682 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000206/1981031
Text
-_
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
_ _ _ _
__
__
--
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-206/81-31
Docket No. 50-206
License No.
Safeguards Group
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Connary
P.
O.
Box 800
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead. California 91770
)
Facility Name:
san Onofre Unit 1
Inspection at:
San Onofre. California
Inspection conducted:
Auennt
1-28.
1981
Inspectors:
A
- N J
@d- . /. / kb/
L.\\Md'ler,0sJnfor Resident inspector, unit 1
Date signed
Date Signed
Date Signed
Approved By: ObAE1
,
dd. /. MU
CdZwhtzig,0Cilief, Reactor Projects S e c t i c,.;
1,
Date Signed
Reactor Operations Project Branch
Summary:
Inspection on August 3-28, 1981 (Report No. 50-206/81-31)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident operational safety verifica-
tion; monthly maintenance'and surveillance inspections; TM1 Task
Action Plan II.E.1.2 (Automation of Auxiliary Feedwater System)
l
review; semi-annual review of plant operations (training, procure-
'
ment, and quality assurance); followup on unresolved items, on
licensee responses to Notices of Violation,on Circular 81-12, and
on licensee event reports; surveillance procedure review; spent
fuel pool activities review; and independent inspection.
The in-
spection involved 75 inspector hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: One item of noncompliance was identified (failure to
meet a requirement to not have combustible gas in the waste gas
system, Severity Level 4).
'9110200296 B11002
PDR ADOCK 03000206
e
N
RV Fonn 219 (2)
- - __ - _ __ - ______-__-
m
.
9
i
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J.
G.
Haynes, Manager of Nuclear Operations
- H.
E.
Morgan, Assistant Station Manager, Operations
- J.
D.
Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- K.
N.
Hadley, Supervisor of Station Security
- R.
R.
Brunet, Plant Superintendent, Unit I
- R.
N.
Santosuosso, Assistant Station Manager, Maintenance
- M.
P.
Short, Shift Technical Advisor Supervisor
- C,
C.
Warren, Quality Assurance Engineer
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during
this inspection, including licensed operators, training depart-
ment instructors, shift technical advisors, and members of the
procurement, engineering, and quality assurance staffs.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on August 28, 1981.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed Control Room operations frequently for
proper shift manning, for adherence to procedures and limiting
conditions for operation, and appropriate recorder and instru-
ment indications.
The inspector discussed the status of annun-
ciators with Control Room operators to determine the reasons for
abnormal indications, and to determine the operators' awareness
of plant status.
Shift turnovers were observed.
The Control Operator's log was reviewed to obtain information
on plant conditions, and to determine whether regulatory require-
ments had been met.
Other logs, including the Watch Engineer's
Log and Steam Generator Chemistry Logs, were also reviewed several
times.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System was verified to be properly
j
aligned by visual inspection of valve positions for all principal
valves.
l
The equipment control log vas audited.
During this month, the
t
licensee adopted an equipment control system which incorporated
all equipment control conssderations onto one control form.
No
I
significant discrepancies in the use of this form were identified.
Several tagouts in effect were verified to have been hung as in-
dicated on the equipment control form.
l
!
The inspector frequently toured the accessible areas of the
l
facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls,
physical security, and personnel safs v.
l
'
!
>
,
f
.
-2-
Radiation Controlled Area access points werc generally safe
and cJetn.
Portions of an area survey were witnessed.
Several
radiation work permits were checked; they were correctly com-
pleted.
Several friskers-were observed to be operating properly.
The Physical Security Plan appeared to be properly implemented,
with one exception.
This exception related to the inspector's
discovery of one door to a vital area that was not locked.
Alarms were properly received by the Security Control Center
when the door was opened,.however, and compensatory measures
~
were implementedJin a timely manner.
Other than this, the
inspector verified-that selected security posts were properly
manned, isolation zones were clear, personnel searches were
performed when required, vehicles were controlled within the
protected area,-and-per'sonnel were badged'and escorted as
necessary.
P r o t eh t . d area barriers'_were not observed to be
degraded.
,
'
Plant housekeeping was adequate. sThe inspector discussed three
concerns which were"i'dentified in this crea with licensee repre-
sentatives.
The fire d' ors to the 480 Volt and 4160 Volt Switch-
o
gear Rooms were repe'atedly found to ~be open and unattended.
By
the end of the inspection, the licensee had established close
surveillance of the. status of these doors in response to this
concern.
This item is closed.
Several fifty-gallon drums of
lubricating oil were stored in the chemical feed area west of
the 4160 Volt Switchgear Room and directly underneath the Feed-
water Mezzanine.
The inspector stated his concern that the
approved Fire Protection Plan for the facility had not envisioned
storage of this amount of combustibles in this area.
At the exit
interview, a licensee representative concurred and stated that
the oil drums would be promptly removed.
This item is closed.
Finally, on a tour, the inspector noted that the auxiliary con-
trol cabinet in the south end of the turbine building was not
completely operable while the unit was at full power.
In particular,
the Power Range Nuclear Instrument was out of service, and the
Pressurizer Level Instrument was not calibrated.
In addition, the
inspector questioned whether or not procedures existed to take the
nit to cold shutdown using this panel.
This item remains open
pending further review by the inspector.
(0 pen Item 81-31-01.)
I
3.
Review of Plant Operations (Training, Procurement, and Quality
Assurance)
The inspector attended two operator requalification lectures
and one Shift Technical Advisor qualification lecture.
Lesson
plan objectives were met, the instructor was well prepared,
visual aids were used and were effective, and a test on the
material was scheduled.
l
l
I
l
N
>
,
.
-3-
The inspector reviewed Quality Assurance A>dit Report S01-26-81,
which was a licensee audit of compliance with Technical Speci-
fication 4.12.
The records of the audit indicated that correc-
tive action identified on the audit had been taken.
The audit
record appeared adequate.
The inspector conducted in inspection of the licensee's on-
site warehouse.
The inspector verified that selected materia?
and spare parts had been inspected when received an'd stored
in accordance with the licensee's procedures, that nonconform-
ing items were properly identified and quarantined, that house-
keeping was adequate, and that limited shelf-life items were
identified and controlled.
The traceability of procurement
records on a 1/2-inch globe valve and on an order of 1/2-inch
Garlock Style 98 compression packing was verified.
No items of noncompliance r deviations were identified.
4.
Spent Fuel Activities-Review
.
.
,
The inspector verified-by direct ~ observation on August 24,
1981, that the spent ~ fuel pool ^ level and ventilation system
were in accordance with,the Technical 1 Specifications require-
ments.
,
'
5.
Surveillance.Procedbre Review-
The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures:
S-V-1.16,
Axi~al Offset Correlation Procedure
S-V-1.12,
Containment Penetration Leak Testing
S-E-7,
Turbine and Diesel Generator Periodic Sampling
Requirements
S01-12.4-1,
Periodic Diesel Fuel Oil Sampling
S-II01.4,
Reactor Plant Instrumentation Calibration (Refueling
Interval), Sections 13C-Volume Control Tank L' vel,
2C-Reactor Coolant Flow, IC-Reactor Coolant Tempera-
ture, and 28C-Hydrazine Tank
S01-12.8-15,
Fire Suppression System Functional Tert
S-III-2.30,
Trisodium Phosphate for pH Control during Safety
Injection
The inspector verified that these procedures included prereq-
uisites, precautions, acceptance criteria, and instructions
to restore the equipment to service following testing.
The
,
'
technical content of the procedures appeared adequate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
--
..
--
.
,_.
.
.
..
.
.
.
-
- , , . -
.
.
.
-4-
6.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance.0bservations
The inspector observed portions of the follosing maintenance
and surveillance activities:
(a)
Repair and preoyerational testing of No. 1 Diesel Generator
following the fire on July 14, 1981.
(b)
Addition of standby bottled nitrogen supply to air-operated
auxiliary feedwater valves and the pressurizer power operated
relief valves.
(c)
S01-12.3, " Hot. Safety injection System Test" (Safety in-
jection Pump Timing Portion).
(e)
S01-12.3 1o, " Diesel Generator Load Test" (observed in
the Control Room).
(f)
S0-5-1, "Radwaste Gas System" (release of contents of the
South Gas Decay Tank).
The inspector determined that these activities did not violate
Limiting Conditions for Operations, that required administra-
tive approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating
the work, and dia t verification of key steps was performed by
a second qualified technician or operator.
Nonconformance
reports for the Diesel Generator repair were also reviewed,
and the corrective action identified appeared adequate.
All
activities observed wer* performed in accordance with the approved
procedures, except for item (f) above, the release of the con-
tents of the South Gas Decay Tank on August 24, 1981.
In this case, the inspector noted that the operator had released
the tank with the discharge flowmeter bypassed, contrary to the
procedure, based on his belief that the low level of activity
in the tank had made it safe to do so.
The inspector agreed that,
while in tnis instance it appeared safe to release the tank with
the flowroter bypassed, it did constitute a deviation from a pro-
cedure.
Jhen the inapector discussed this event with licensee
representatives, they responded that tiey did not consider this
practice to be acceptable, and that they had again advised all
operators that procedural compliance was extrenely important.
In addition, they stated that a staff position was being created
with responsibility for validating procedures to ensure they
reflected actual practice in the field.
The inspector stated
that this was acceptable, corrective action for this ' tem.
This
.
item is closed.
_
_
m
_
-
. -
, . -
. _ _ ~.
-
- ~ . - _ _ -
- ~ - . . _
. _ .
.
- _-_. . _ - _ ,
'
.
.
.
I
2
j
-5-
1
?
i
7.
Followup on Unresolved Items
Three items.related to the failure of the North Waste Gas
I
5
Decay Tank were identified in the previous inspection (Report
[
.
No. 50-206/81-27): improper check valve installation, operation
1
of the cryogenic system without an operable oxygen analyzer,
and untimely response to gas samples which indicated high
oxygen concentrations in the waste gas system.
j
The inspector' discussed these items in detail with licensee
representatives,' and reviewed; Station! Procedure S01-5-1,
,
~
" Radioactive < Waste Gas System," the licensee's procedure for
releasing the Was t e' Ga s Decay Tanks.
Licensee representatives
,
stated that post-event testing had indicated that the inter-
- '
system check valve leakage which allowed a combustible mixture
+
to be created throughout the waste gas system had not been
due to the improper: installation of2 the check valves.
They
also stated that prEope' rational (testing'for this type of leak-
l
age had not been performed because of-the absence of a regula-
{
tory requirement or of a recognized safety.need.
i
The licensec's representatives maintained that the manufacturer's
,.
'
precaution against operating the cryogenic unit without an
operable. oxygen analyzer was designed to prevent accumulation
of ozone on the charcoal bed of the unit, thereby preventing
a long term combustion hazard for the bed.
They stated that
the oxygen. analyzer had never been intended to detect the pre-
sence of combustible mixtures.
The inspector's finding that
'
i
an operable oxygen analyzer would have detected combustible
gas entering the cryogenic unit was not disputed by the licensee.
[
The inspector also concluded that if the manufacturer's recom-
mendation to secure the cryogenic unit whenever the oxygen
analyzer was out of service or alarming had been observed,
the rupture of the Waste Gas Decay Tank would not have occurred.
'
J
Regarding the precaution of S01-5-1 to avoid explosive mixtures-
'
of hydrogen and air in the. Radioactive Waste Gas System at all
j
times, licensee representatives stated that this was a " motherhood"
type precaution, that is, one not requiring any specific actions
to ensure it was observed,
i
l
Regarding the samples indicating oxygen contamination of the
l
nitrogen system, the licensee representatives stated that
combustibic mixtures in the system were never expected, so
no urgency was attached to diagnosing-the reason forfcombustible
<
. gas noted in the two samples obtained the day prior to the event.
-
Based on the foregoing, the inspector concluded thatthe
'
-
licensee's explanation did not properly-identify their.respon-
i
sibility forcthe event. .Accordingly, based on the r e q u ir e.n e n t s
of Technical Specification 6.8.1; ANSI N18.7-1976, paragraph
- - , . , , _ , . _ _ . _ _ _ - . , . _ . _ . . . . - _ . . , - - . _ _ . _ . _ . . - _ , - _ . - . . . , . _ . . ~ . . _ . , _ , - - . _ . - . . _ , _ _ _ . - . _ , - , _ .
_
_
.
.
.
-6-
5.3.2(5), and Station Procedure S02-5-1, the failure to main-
tain the oxygen concentration in the Radwaste Gas System below
5 percent is un item of apparent noncompliance.
8.
Followup on Licer,,ce Event Reports (LER)
a.
LERs 81-10 and 81-16 (Containment Personnel Air Lock
Failure)
The inspector reviewed these reports and discussed them
with licensee representatives.
The representatives stated
that the actions taken after the first event had been to
make a repair and to station a guard to direct personnel
in the proper technique for operating the air lock.
The
latest event apparently occurred when the guard misoperated
the air lock, and opened both the inner and outer doors
at the same time.
The most recent corrective action, there-
fore, had been to completely rebuild the locking mechanism.
The inspector observed that the licensee's original report,
LER 81-10, stated that some damaged parts in the interlock
had been replaced and realigned without mentioning that
other worn cams and cam followers had not been replaced.
These were not replaced until after the event of LER 81-16,
The inspector expressed concern that this sequence of air
lock failures indicated insufficient corrective action had
been taken after the first event.
The licensee representa-
tive acknowledged the inspector's observations and agreed
that the accuracy and corrective action of licensee event
reports was important.
This item is closed.
b.
LER 81-15 (Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil Tank Inad-
vertently Drained)
The inspector reviewed this report, and discussed the
corrective action with a licensee representative.
The
inspector noted that the tygon tubing which was removed
from this drain line was another example of an unauthorized
installation on the diesel generators, similar to the one
which two weeks after this event caused the fire in the
No. 1 Diesel Generator.
The inspector stated that the
inspection of the Diesel Generators to identify unauthorized
installations following the latter event appeared adequate
to resolve this matter.
This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
.
.
.
- .
-
.
..
..
-7-
9.
Followup on Licensee Responses to Notice of Violation (80-19-02)
The in
c reviewed the licensce's implementation of
a more
formal
utive maintenance program and of a retraining pro-
gram fo
ntenance personnel.
Based on discussions with
trainint
maintenance personnel, the Assistant Station Manager
(Maintenanc.), and the maintensuce planner, the inspector
concluded that the licensee's commitments to establish these
programs had been adequately met.
This item is closed.
10. Followup on Circular 81-12 (PWR Protection System Testing)
The inspector discussed the' licensee's protection system con-
figuration with instrumentation personnel, and reviewed the
licensee's procedure for surveillance testing of reactor trip
circuit breakers (S01-11-2.4).
The inspector determined that
this procedure required independent testing of each trip function,
including position verification to ensure that the breaker actually
trips.
This item is closed.
11. Inspeccion of TMI Task Action Plan Requirements
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had completed the
installation of a safety-grade auxiliary feedwater system
including safety grade flow indication (TAP II.E.1.2).
The
inspector also reviewed the licensce's-design change for this
modification (No. 80-27 through Revision 2 and Addendum 2).
This design change was properly reviewed and approved by the
Onsite Review Committee.
The inspector also verified that
.
preoperational testing had been performed and evaluated, as-
built drawings prepared, system procedures modified where
appropriate, and operator training accomplished consistent
with regulatory requirements.
This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12. Independent Inspection (Potential Flooding of Safety-Related
Equipment from Non-seismically Qualified Sources)
The inspector verified that the licensee had met the commit-
ments made in the August 29, 1980 letter from K.
P.
Baskin to
D.M.
Crutchfield.
The inspector observed that the licensee
had installed sleeves around the bellows of the condensers to
mitigate flooding upon bellows rupture, and had replaced and
locked the door between the turbine building 20' level and the
Condensate Storage Tank, to minimize flooding of the turbine
building if the Condensate Storage Tank ruptured during a
seismic event.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
_
_
...
.-- .
-
_
_
.
,
-
.. ..
..
-8-
4
13. Exit Interview
A meeting was held on August 28, 1981, to summarize the scope
,
and findings of this inspection.
Significant findings are
discussed in the text of this report.- One item of noncompliance
(Severity level.4) was identified.
.
I
e
p
f
i
k
l
'
4
l
-
. . . . . . . . - - , . . , _ ,
. - - . - _ . ~ . . - , -
- - - , . . . . . - - - - - - . - - _ . - -
- .,,- -, ~- - - , . . . _ _ = - - - - - - .
. - - , . , . . .
-