ML20031F647
| ML20031F647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1981 |
| From: | Semmel H ANTIOCH SCHOOL OF LAW, WASHINGTON, DC, BIER, MILLS, CHRISTA-MARIA, ET AL |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031F642 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8110200259 | |
| Download: ML20031F647 (23) | |
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o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Sg[0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAh bCT 16 Pid3
//4!II In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
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(Spent Fuel Pool
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Expansion)
(Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant)
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INTERVENORS REPLY TO LICENSEE'S MOTION AND STAFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR'S ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS AND REPLY TO LICENSEE SEPARATE MOTION CONCERNING CONTENTION 9-1.
Each of the Additional Contentions filed by Intervenors are acmissible as of right, and are timely.
1.
The Order following special prehearing conference (p. 35) specifically allowed additional contentions arising out of matters revealed by new information in the Safety Evaluation Report and the Environmental Impact Assessment to be filed forty-seven days af ter theissuance of the SER and EIA.
The date for such filing, as extended :q Order of this Board dated June 16, 1981, was September 8, 1981.
As shown below, each of the Additional Contentions, with the exception of 10, 14, 15,16, and 18 'arise in whole or substantial part form such material in the SER and EIA.
There is no requirement in the Order that additional contentions must also reet the five part balancing test set forth in 10 C.F.R.
s 2. 714 (a).
The regulations specifically provide that the Order on the Special Pre-Hearing Conference may " establish a schedule for further actions in the proceeding."
10 C.F.R. 52. 751 (a) (4 ).
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The Staff's assertion that the balancing test must be met even for contentions timely filed is not supported by any citation, for none exists to support such an absurdity.
The Staff's argument reduces the provision of the Special Pre-Hearing Order allowing additional contentions to a redundancy, since additional contentions can be filed at any time under 10 C.F.R. 52. 714 (b) if the balancing test is met.
2.
Intervenors were advised by the Board at the Special Pre-Hearing Conference that contentions would be entertained at any time if they raise a safety question that ought to be addressed.
For example Chairman Grossman stated (Tr. 195-96):
"Let me say this:
any timo during the pro-ceeding that you discover a safety question that ought to be addressed, you certainly ought to apply to the Board, and I can't see that we would ever deny a request if there is a legitimate safety question."
(emphasis added).
That is the question, the only valid question this Board should consider is there a safety question that ought to be addressed.
The responsiblity of the Board is to review the l
Additional Contentions in light of the information set forth below as to the important safety questions raised and in light of the Board's own expertise.
If the safety questions are raised, the Board is required by its mandate to protect the t
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health and safety of the public', to admit the contentions.
For there is no possible prejudice to anyone from admitting these contentions, even if the hearing is deleved a few months as a result.
The Licensee has stated, and the Appeal Board i
found, that the Big Rock Point plant, can operate until 1984 l
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without expanding the spent fuel pool.
Thus consideration of any safety issue that can be resolved in the next two years falls within the reasonable time schedule for replacing the old fuel racks with new ones, an operation which can be accomplished during the annual maintenance and refueling shut-down of the plant.
It would be a cruel hoax on Intervenors own rights and a deprivation to the public of the protection it may obtain through the efforts of Intervenors, such as here, if the clear, unambiguous language of the order of January 18, 1980 and the statements at the Special Prehearing Conference were suddenly ignored and Intervenors were not permitted to file additional contentions which they had every right to believe was their right, and upon which they relied.
3.
Certain contentions were withdrawn at the Special Pre-Hearing Conference on the specific understanding that they could be " reasserted as a new contention within the same subject matter parameters before the close of discovery without objection as to lack of timeliness."
(emphasis added).
Order of January 18, 1980, p.16.
This arrangement applied to Crista-Maria Contentions four and seven and O'Neil contentions.
IV an VI.
Id at 16, 30, 31.
Christa-Maria Contention four related to the storage racks and the pool environment.
Additional Contentions 2-1,2-2, 4-1,4-2,6-1,6-2,7-1,7-2,8-1,8-2, and 16-1 are within the same subject matter parameters as original Contention four (4)..-
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Christa-Maria Csntention seven (7) related to release of radiation to the atomosphere.
Additional Contentions 1-1,1-2, 3-1,3-2,12-1,12-2,14-1, and 16-1 are within the same nabject matter parameters as original Contention seven (7).
The Order allowing additional contentions within the parameters of the withdrawn contentions refer to the "close of discotery," which Licensee or Staff may argue was August 31, 1981, the date when replies to discovery were due under the Order Following Special Prehearing Conference, as extended.
Intervenors request that the delay of a few days be excused because Intervenors were then laboring under the beight of nassiwe discovery finally released by Licensee after a delay of up to a year.
No delay resulted from the few days because'Intervenors had already filed interrogatories which anticipate d the Additional' Contentions and Intervenors will not seek any other discovery if the interrogatories are answered.
INDIVIDUAL CONTENTIONS - RELATION TO SER AND EIA AND BASES FOR CONTENTIONS Intervenors discuss below each Additional Contention, except No.15-1 which is withdrawn.
To highlight what Intervenors regard as the callousness of Staff and Licensee to the public health and safety, we begin with No. 17, and then return to a chrono-logical order.
Contention 17 This Contention ascerts that there is no basis upon which I I
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approval can be granted to increase the volume of radioactive material stored on site where the plant is not seismically qualified, particularly since the process of determining whether the plant will ever meet seismic qualificaiton will be completed before expansion of the spent fuel becomes necessary to continued operation.
Contention 17 at the outset states a simple fact that Licensee and Staff concede, that Licensee has not yet demonstrated that Big Rock Point Plant is seismically qualified and Licensee has not yet demonstrated that it meets the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A.
The latest correspon-dence from the Staff on the subject is contained in letter of Dennis M. Crutchfield dated September 29, 1981, with attached SER and letter of NRC consultant Porfessor William J. Hall.
The Staff concluded that operations may continue pending the results of seismic analysis.
It is one thing to continue the status quo by continuing operations, but it is a far cry from the status quo to increase the potential risk to public health and safety by increasing the amount of radioactive material in the containment by expanding the spent fuel stored on site.
In fact, there is no reason whatsoever to subject the public to this risk at all, because as Licensee stated, and the Appeal Board found, the Plant can continue to operate until 1984 without expansion of the spent fuel pcol.
The hazards to the public are quite real.
Professor Hall (whose letter is attached hereto) states that " reasonably
(.I demonstrated adequacy of systcm rosistence to carthquakes is necessary" (p. 2) and that "the system as it currently exists may not be as inherently resultant to seismic excitation as believed by the licensee" (p. 3).
He concludes that his brief review of the seismic portion of the risk analysis suggests that an adequate overall comprehensive treatment does not currently exist at Big Rock Point (p. 2).
He notes that structural changes may be required.
Licensee has conceded in its responses that the following are not seismically qualified:
valves - response 3-6II (q) ; piping 3-6V(q); and spent fuel pool lines 3-5 (q).I!
Seismic considerations were raised in the SER, Sections 3.4.-l.1 and 3.2.2.1, from which Intervenors discovered that the plant was not seismically qualified.
The contention is therefore admissible as of right, as discussed above.
But even if the SER had been silent on the subject, the danger to the public from an earthquake in which the containment wall is breached or other leakage develops should not be increased by one iota by increasing storage on sit of spent fuel, particu-larly where the added risk is wholly unnecessary.
If this plant cannot be seismically c,ualified by 1984 it should be closed, not allowed to continue to add more and more radioactive mat-t erial on site.
In the interim, it is perfectly capable of being operated without increasing the spent fuel pool.
It is unthinkable that the Commission should approve increased risks l
to the public which are wholly unnecessary.
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- /Furthermore, a staff memorandum by T.K. Cheng, Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, DOR, dated December 15, 1978 states that there are ancient faults located across Lake Michigan, that a few shocks have occurred within 200 miles of the plant and that large sink holes appeared to exist in areas neighboring i
l the plant. 1 L
G CONTENTION 1.
Additional Contention 1-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA), at p.
6.
Here, t..e Staff notes that Krypton-85 releases from the modified pool when it is completely filled would yield an addi-tional 5 curies per year.
On p. 7 of the EIA, NRC Staff states that "it is not expected that there will be ady significant change in the annual release of tritium or iodine ( such as I-129, I-131) beccuse of increased evaporation as a result of the proposed modification."
The report continues by stating that even if there were a higher eva-poration rate from the (modified) spent fuel pool, such increase would be less than the amount normally released from the plant (mostly through leakage of reactor coolant).
The EIA is deficient in that it does not provide any analysis on which these conclusions might be based, and is deficient in failing to consider the radiological effects of these " increased" releases during postulated accidents, such as failure of th?e containment shell.
Such analyses must be made to insure that radiation dose levels will not exceed applicable criteria outlined in 10 CFR Part 100, 1100.11 a(1), a(2), and a(3). -.
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Additionni Contention 2-1 is in reintion to the NRC Staff EIA, Section 5.3.3: " Solid Radioactive Wastes", at p. 8.
The NRC Staff recognizes the probable increase in t
total radioactvity in the modified pool due to greater concentration of radionuclides in the pool and also recognizes the increase in rad-waste due to the modification.
Licensee should encapsulate failed spent fuel elements before placing them in the SFP to insure that radiation levels in the modified pool will be "as low as reasonably ac hieva bl e" under 10 CFR 8 20.1(c).
3 Additional Contention 3-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff SER, sections 3.3: " Installation of Racks and Fuel Handling", and 3.3.1 of that same report.
Under CPC's list of safety pre-cautions, it is not clear whether or not containment would be isolated.
Because the proposed modification will.necissitate additional fuel moves, thereby increasing the likelihood and corresponding risk of fuel handling accidents, containment should be isolated as a precaution against fuel haq' ting accidants which could conceivably cause large releases of radioactive gases.
See Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station),
LBP-80-7, 11 NRC 245 (1980), at p.
286.
4 Additional Contention 4-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff EIA, section 5.3.3.
In this section, the Staff explicitly states that the present failed fuel rack to be removed from the SFP is contaminated and will be decontaiminated onsite.
Radioactive crud will become dislodged into the SFP because of the bulk handling of the rack when it is removed and because it will be washed down ensite.
Because of the additional crud to..
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be rolecced into the epent fuci pool, r diction levnls should be monitored and the cleanup system should continue operateing until levels return to pre-modification levels.
This contention is primarily based on a Board order in Northern States POver Co.
(Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant), LBP-77-51, 6 NRC 265 (1977), at p.
277.
5 Additional Contention 5-1 is founded on section 5.3.3 of the NRC Staff EIA, at p.
9.
Staff states that about 300 cu. ft.
of solid radwaste will be removed from the plant when the failed fuel rack is disposed.
This amount of radwaste repre-sents a 15% increase over the average total waste volume (2000 cu. ft.) normally shipped from the plant each year.
This increase makes NRC Staff's statement that "this assumes that the rack will not be c"t into small peices" particularly confusing.
Because Intervenors are left to guess at Licensee's intentions concerning disposal of the failed fuel rack, this contention must be addressed.
This contention is based primarily on Northern States Power Co., supra, on appeal in Northern States Power Co., 7 NRC 41 (1978).
Also, licensee must meet "as low as reasonably acheivable" standards of 10 CFR E 20.1(c).
6 Additional Contention 6-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff SER at section 3.4.1.1.
The Staff concludes that the worst case drop, where a fuel assembly is postulated to drop into an empty fuel can and impact the base plate of the rack, results in kinetic energy at impact of 195,000 inch-pound.
NRC Staff _ _ - - -
makes no cimiAd ennlysic for drop of th. $1 -ton trcnsfer 4
cock which 10 trcnsported ovar the cpsnt fuel pool.
In cddition,
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the SER is not sufficient in its analysis of the heights at which i
various loads will be carried over the pool.
This contention.
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(andethe 240,090 specification) is based primarily on
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Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant),
LBP-78-32, 8 NRC 413 (1978) at pps. 424-25.
Additional Contention 7-1 is also related to the NRC Staff SER at section 3.4.1.1.
The report suggests that three heavy casks will be transported over the pool, and generally, postulates that "even if they drop on the fuel pool liner, it will not result in a' loss of pool water in excess of the 200 gpm makeup capability."
This conclusory statement is not backed up by credible analysis and fails to postulate the The basis for drop of the heavier 24-ton fuel transfer cask.
this contention is that a pool cover, used in other plants (such as the one at the Pebble Springs nuclear facility),
would preclude heavy object drop or cask tipping accidents and insure the health and safety of the public.
8 Additional Contention 8-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff SER, section 3.4.1.21 " Materials".
The report states that the storage pool environment is " demineralized unborated water...."
The SER is deficient because it doesnot say whether the pool will be borated during removal and installation of the racks and until completion of the rack replacement task. Such a condition should be required to preclude criticality situations.
The basis for this contention is found at Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Plant), LBP-78-32, 8,NRC 413 (1978) at p. 434.
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Also, note that in the " Order following Speical Precluding Conference" Jan. 18, 1980 contention 4 concerning pool boration could be reasserted without objection to untimeliness.
This contention is within the parimeters of the subject matter of l
the previously asserted contention 4.
l 9.
Additional Contention 9-1 is in relation to NRC Staff's dis-cussion of alternatives to the proposed pool modification starting on p.
12 of the EIA.
The issue of additional contention 9 is discussed below.
10 Additional Contention 10-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff EIA, section 5.3.1: " Radiological Impacts" and section 5.0: Environ-mental Impact of Postulated Accidents" of the NRC Staff EIA.
The EIA is deficient in that it fails to consider the environmental impact of an accidant involving tornado or turbine missiles impacting the spent fuel pool. Licensee has not demon-strated that the modified pool will withstand such accidents within the limits set forth
'm. NRC regs. 10 CFR Part 100.
Licensee should be required to analyze these risks, as Vepco did in North Anna, 11 NRC 451 (1980), at pp. 241-42.
11.
This contention merely preserves Intervenors position at to the application of NEPA Section 102 (2) (C).. -
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12.
Additional Contention 12-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff i
SER, at section 3.2.1.
The SER states that increasing the number of spent fuel assemblies in the pool from the present 193 to 441 would yield a 3% increase in peak heat loads from the present to the modified pool.
Since, unlike most nuclear facilities, the spent fuel pool is inside containment, the radiological consequences of a core meltdown or a steam explosion inside containment must be analyzed in relation to dose limit criteria expounded in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Sections 100.11a (1), 10 0.11a (2), and 100.113a (3).
Furthermore, in CPC's answer to Interrogatory 9-2, they state that 100% of the core inventory would be released in the worst case accident.
Since the core is next to the SFP at B.R.P., can Licensee assure that the 100% core inventory would stay intact - and not affect the SFP?
13.
Additional Contention 13-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff SER, section 3.2: Spent Fuel Cooling." The Staff postulates accidents such as loss of offsite power, and concludes that makeup water from outside containment "will be available," thus failing to specify whether such capability is presently available or still in the design stage.
In addition, l
the SER states that the emergency diesel generators are historically unreliable, licensee must show that a sufficient backup system exists in case of electrical malfunction, notwithstanding the use of the emergency diesel generator.
This contention is based on 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A (Criteria 17 and 18).
14 Additional Contention 14-1 is in relation to the NRC Staff SER, 1
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section 3.4.1.2:
" Materials".
(See Contention 8-1, supra.)
This Contention is based on Portland General Electric Co (Trojan Plant), LBP-78-32, 8NRC 413 (1978).
Also this con-tention is assertable without objection to untimeliness and within the parameters of the subject matter of previous contention 4, as provided in the " Order Following Special Prehearing Conference," January 18, 1980.
15.
Withdrawn.
16.
This contention is within the parameters of Christa-Maria Contention No. 7 which was withdrawn subject to resubmission with objections as to timeliness waived.
The contention relates to Cischarge of radioactive matter in the special circumstances of the experimental use of enriched plutonium as fuel at Big Rock Point.
17.
See above.
18.
This contention arises from new information obtained as a result of an application in 1981 for zoning approval for con-struction of a new rad-waste facility at the Big R.mk Point.
Licensee has not furnished information as to the health and safety problems raised by the cumulative effect of rAding the additional spent fuel on-site to additional radioactive material in the rad-waste facility. -
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- t. 1 IF THE BALANCING FACTORS WtdRE APPLIED, THE CON-TENTIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN LIGIT OF SAFETY FACTORS RAISED AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY PREJUDICIAL DELAY.
The Additional Contentions under consideration raise important questions of public sefcty.
The Commission has applied the five part balancing test of 10 C.F.R.
- 52. 714 (a) in the only way consistent with its statutory mandate.
If safety questions are raised, however belatr 11y, they will be admitted into the proceeding if there is no prejudicial delay.
In Nuclear Fuel Services,'Inc. and New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority (West Valley Reprocessing Plant, 1 NRC 273 (1975), intervention was allowed nine months late even though the Commission found no perit in the reasons given for the delay.
An important safety issue was presented and no prejudicial delay would occur.
There will be no prejudicial delay if the contentions are admitted.
As noted, Licensee has stated and the appeal Board has found that the plant can operate until 1984 without expanding the spent fuel pool.
Even with the additional contentions admitted, there will be only minor delays in the hearing, if any, and those delays are the responsibility of Licensee and Staff.
i 1.
It took Staff sixteen months to prepare an EIA and l
SER, documents totaling eighteen and nineteen pages respectively.
1 Intervenors filed additional contentions, relying in substantial part on the SER and EIA in three and a half months, even though, _ _ _ _. - _. _ _ _ _ _. - _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..,
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at the same time Intervenors were sif ting through thoucands of pages of discovery suddenly dumped on them and preparing additional interrogatories within a tight time schedule.
The SER and EIA were dated May 15, 1981.
Intervenors filed additional interrogatories in August 1981 and the Additional Contentions on September 4. 1981.
2.
In May, 1981, when Licensee learned the SER and EIA was finally going to issue, Licensee dumped thousands of pages of alleged discovery responses on Intervanors.
Much of this material was not relevant but at the same time many questions were not fully answered.
Some of the material delivered suggested additional contentions.
Obviously the contentions could not be prepared until the material was read and analyzed.
This Board's Order of June 16, 1981 reflected its understanding of the magnitude of that task.
3.
To avoid delay, Intervenore filed interrogatories on August 11 which anticipated the additional cont entions, and have stated, and now reiterate, that they will not seek any additional discovery if the Interrogatories are fully answered.
If Staff and Licensee had put the energy and time into answering that they put into their massive motions to avoid answering, the discovery on the new contentions would be completed by now.
4.
It must be apparent that the hearing in this matter away, not a serious matter since the plant can is many mond operate until 1984.
There are outstanding discovery motions of considerable magnitude.
The Board has yet to consider the issues raised under NEPA Section 102(2) (E), and Licensee has
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moved to set a briefing schedule on that issue.
These motions on contentions must be adjudicated.
Staff and Licensee served motions for summary disposition on October 5 which are approxi-mately 1000 pages in combined length, and these require consid-erable time to just read, let alone respond.
So any additional time needed in light of the Additional Contentions is readily available.
It goes without saying, and Staff admits, that no other 4
party could represent the interests of Intervenors or the public on these Additional Contentions because no other party has raised them.
Nor could any other party develop a record on the issues if these contentions are not admitted.
Not only does petitioner have good cause for filing these additional Contentions on September 4, 1981, they could not have done it sooner because of the delays of the Staff and Licensee.
There ;.11 be no prejudicial delay whatsoever, and possibly no delay of any time, no matter how small, if these Additional Contentions are admitted.
What is at stake is the safety of the public.
The issues raised must be tested at a hearing.
A REASOraBLE ERIEPING SCHEDULE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED j
FOR THE IEGNL ISSUES UNDER NEPA SECTION 102(2)E.
i Intervenors have no objection to the establishment of a reasonable briefing schedule for legal issues arising under j
NEPA Section 102 (2) (E).
However, it is impossible for Intervenors
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to address that issue while motions for summary disposition, with I
pages of about one thousand, must be answered.
Intervenors will L
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shortly move for defarrment of the motion for summary dispo-sition on a number of grounds.
If that motion is granted, Intervs. ors are prepared to proceed on the NEPA issue.
Intervenors see no reason why they must file the first brief as Licensee suggests,but if required to do so, request a ten day right of reply.
Intervenors wish to make it clear that Additional Contentions 9-1 goes beyond the legal issue and raises the question of the sufficiency of the EIA, a proper issue in this case.
CONCLUSION Intervenors' Additional Contentions (except 15, which is withdrawn) are properly in contention in this proceeding.
Respectfully submit d,
p:nU HERBERT SEMMEL U
Attorney for Intervencrs Christa-Maria, Mills and Bier ANTIOCH SCHOOL OF LAW 2633 16th Street, N.
W.
Washington, D. C.
20009 202/265-9500 Student Interns:
Fernando Chang-Muy Mathew Mackie 17 -
.s gbV W WILUAM J. HALL 3808 VAM2Y BRDOR DA CMAMPAtON, ll,LtNQts 3 3 ggg s
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44.s July 15,1981 Mr. T. A. Nelson L-90 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory P. O. Box 808 Livermore, CA 94550 Re: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant -- Docket No. 50-155 LLL Agreement 1523501
Dear Mr. Nelson:
Comments arising from my review of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant and in particular pertaining to its ability to accommodate seismic effects follow.
Over the past several months I have received the following material for re-view pertaining to this case.
Mate. !al orioinatino from Consumers Power Comoany 1.
Letter of March 31, 1980 (8 pages) -- Re: Anchorage and Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment 7.
Letter of October 10, 1980 (7 pages) -- Re: Response to Staff Letter dated August 4,1980 - p roposed Seismic Evaluation Program and Basis for Continued Interim Operat.o,
3.
Letter of January 9, 1981 (20 pages) -- Re: Preliminary Seismic Safety Margin Evaluation 4.
Letter of March 26, 1981 (4 pages) -- Re: Anchorage end Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment 5.
Letter of June 19, 1981 (3 pages) -- Re: SEP Topic III-6, Seismic Design - Proposed Progress and Justification for Continued Operation 6.
Excerpt pp. 53-55, copy from BRP risk analysis 7
Excerpt pp. VI-il3 to VI-174, copy from BRP risk analysis e
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2 Material originating from U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 1.
Letter of August 4, 1980 (3 pages plus Attachments 1 and 2) 2.
Letter of April 24, 1981 (5 pages) - SEP Topic III-6, Seismic De-sign Considerations Big Rock Point 3.
Letter of June 8, 1981 (28 pages) -- Site Specific Ground Response Spectra for SEP Plants Located in the Eastern United States 4.
Letter of June 22, 1981 (11 pages) -- Summary of Meeting Held with Consumers Power Company to Discuss Se'ismic Design Considerations (SEP Topic III-6) for the Big Rock Point Plant 5.
Plot (undated) -- 1 page, illustrating USNR Site Specific Spectrum and the 0.12 g anchored REG. Guide 1.60 Spectra (34.1 percer. tile) employed by applicant for analysis 6.
Copy of Repor
-ntitled " Derivation of Floor Responses -- Reactor Beilding," p
..e ed by D' Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc., June 1978, 62 p.
On June 30, 1981, in conjunction with T. Cheng and W. Paulson a d W. T.
Russell, I made a site visit to the Big Rock Point site and participated in technical discussions and a plant inspection.
On the basis of my review of the seismic portions of the risk analysis strdies made available to me, and reflecting on i;.: brief discussions at the time of the site visit wherein some of the uncertainties and gaps in the analysis were identified, I car.not recommend employing such an approach as a solc basis for continued operations. Such studies, when they encompass rig-orous total system perfonnance and the interactions therein, can be helpful as a basis for forming an opinion as to the adequacy of expected performance under various conditions of system disturbance. My brief review of the seismic portion of the risk analysis studies suggests that such an overall comprehensive treatment does not currently exist in the present case.
As one might surmis: from my foregoing statements, and irrespective of whether or not the level of earthquake hazard is perceived to be low based on recent recorded seismic history, I believe reasonably demonstrated adequacy of system resistance to earthquakes is necessary.
In view of the recent seismic quiescence of the region in which the plant is located, and on the basis of the recent USNRC/ TERA site specific studies, spectra anchored at 0.11 to 0.12 g horizontal ground acceleration appear acceptable in tnis particular case. Although I appreciate the bases upon which the USNRC site specific spectra were gener ted, I do wish to note that I
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3 Dr. Newmark (prior to his death) and I expressed concern verbally that in some cases the amplified regions (acceleration and velocity) were low compared to Standard Reg. Guide 1.60 or NUREG CR/0098 spectra which we nomally would recomend for use.
In this case it is'my understanding that the licensee and his consultants have employed Reg. Guide 1.60 spectra (84.1 percentile) anchored at 0.12 g horizontal ZPA for safety related structures and the reactor coolant loop; such spectra do contain reasonable accelera-tion and velocity amplifications and I concur with their use.
Even so, when reviewing the physical resistance of critical Safety systems in such cases as this, namely older plants, I-recomend particular attention f
be paid to the margins that may be present to resist overloading from seismic However it is only fair to note that in the case of anticipated low effects.
seismic activity, as in this case, the loading contribution from seismic effects is normally only a small fraction of the total strassing at critical locations, especially when compared to allowables.
I subscribe fully to da content of the April 24, 1981 USNRC letter and shall not repeat the conterts of that letter herein. The site visit reveals that much of the equipment has been reviewed for adequacy of anchorage and sup-port, which is comforting, but much remains to be done (as for example, the walk-through i io... which involves limited inspection at test, indicated a need for anchoring the control room cabinets, anchoring cranes,. anchoring fire extinguishing equipment, and anchoring some batteries); coments made the tour suggested that some portions of the equi; ment have not been exam-c::
ined as yet.
In any event, it is my recommendation at this program of up-grading be pursued rigorously, systematically and pru ?,t'y.
Obviously I believe the total.syst:r integrity at the reactor coolant pressure boundary should be examined carefully as soon as possible on a documented In this connt: tion I am concerned that the fire water system by system basis.
system with its stardard threaded pipe which is relied upon to provide post-incidence emergency w% - injection from the intake well, may not possess the desired inherent resistance. This system may not possess the resist-ance to seismic excitation that is believed to exist, and I strongly suggest that an upgraded system be developed and installed in the very near futare, with some degree of redundancy as to water sources, water paths and pumping capacity.
It appears to me that such upgrading can be done at minimal ax-pense, but care must be exercised that the system is anchored to scand structural support systems, i.e. not walls which can fail or near walls which could affect the system perfomance. Alternatively it may be necessary to strengthen some walls.
In conclusion, the system as it currently exists may not be as inherently resistant to seismic excitation as believed by the licensee.
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4 promptly develops a plan of action to review and upgrade systems as noted in the USNRC letter of 14 April 1981 and takes steps to execute the re-quired upgrading promptly, then in view of the perceived low seismic hazard I recommend continued operation in the interim (near tem).
Sincerely yours.
[tINM W. J. Hall WJH:efh W. T. Russell, USNRC cc:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that Intervenors Reply to Licensee's Motion and Staff's Response to Intervenors Additional Con-tentions and Reply to Licensee's Separate Motion Concerning Contention 9-1 was served on the attached list by delivering copies to the business office or mailing copies to them, first class mail, postage prepaid, the 9th day of October, 1981.
l t u,n HERBERT SElB1EL U N
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Ater.ic Safety and Licensing JerspF Cal'c., F. squire Scard Fanci Inha, Linen 3n and Beale 3
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1220 Connecticutt' Ave, N.W.
Cot.. ssien Suite 325 Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 Herbert Grossman, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C.
20555
- q Dr. Oscar H. Paris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Docketing and Service Section Commission office f the Secretary Washington D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Mr. Fredrick J. Shon Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing John O'Neill, II Board Panel Route 2, Box 44 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Maple City, MI 49664 Commission Washington D.C.
20555 Janice E. Moore, Es:-
Counsel for NRO Staf f U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Cor.r.i s sion Washington, D.C.
20555 l
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