ML20031F587

Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Safety Assessment Rept for SEP Topic XV-11, Inadvertent Loading & Operation of Fuel Assembly in Improper Position. Rept Acceptable

ML20031F587
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/19/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
References
TASK-15-11, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8110200175
Download: ML20031F587 (4)

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Mr. W. G. Counsil. Vice President ok(?

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company i

Post Office Box 270 flartford, Connecticut 061 01

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE 1 - SEP TOPIC XV-11 INADVERTENT LOADING AND OPERATION OF A FUEL ASSEMBLY IN AN IMPROPER POSITION Dy letter dated June 30, 1981, you subnitted a safety assessment report for the above topic. The staff has reviewed this assessment and our con-clusions are presented in the enclosed safety evaluation report, which completes this topic evaluation for Millstone 1.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. The evaluation may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating keactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

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NRC FORM 018 10-80) NRCM 02 o OFFIClAL RECORD COPY usam u.i-m.eo

Docket Nos, gg;ygg 50-245 Jir. W. G. Counsil cc William H. Cuddy, Esquire Connecticut Energy Agency Day, Berry & Howard ATTN: Assistant Director Counselors at Law Research and Policy One Constitution Plaza Development Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Department of Planning and Energy Policy Board of Selectmen 20 Grand Street Town Hall Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Haddam, Connecticut 06103 Resident Inspector Northeast Nuclear Energy Corapany Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station ATTN: Superintendent c/o U. S. NRC Millstone Plant East Haddam Post Office P. O. Box 128 East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 U. S. Environmental Protection Natural Resources Defense Council Agency 917 15th Street, N. W.

Region I Office Washington, D. C.

20005 ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 l

Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC Superintendent P. O. Box Drawer KK Haddam Neck Plant Niantic, Connecticut 06357 RFD #1 Post Office Box 127E Waterford Public Library East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Rope Ferry Road, Route 156 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 First Selectman of the Town of Waterford j

Hall of Records 200 Boston Post Road Waterford, Connecticut 06385 John F. Opeka Systems Superintendent Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06:01 Mr. Richard T. Laudenat Manager, Generation Facilitit s Licensing Northeast Utilities Service Crpany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 e

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5 FUEL MISL0ADING iVENT AT Mll.LSTONE 1 (XV-ll)

I.

INTRODUCTION The fuel misloading event consists of the inadvertent loading and operation of a fuel assembly in an improper position. Two different events are considered - a fuel assembly loaded into an improper core location, and an assembly loaded into the proper location but it.ipro-perly oriented (i.e., rotated by 90 or 180 degrees). The consequences of these events have been analyzed in spite of the low probability of their occurrence.

r II.

REVIEW CRITERIA GDC 13 " Instrumentation and Control" requires that instrumentation and controls be provided to monitor variables over anticipated ranges for normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety.

10 CFR Part 100 provides guidelines on offsite dose consequences resulting from events causing Fuel Rod Failure and radiological rel ea ses.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS None IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES Ti.e review of this event was conducted in accordance with Standard-Review Plan 15.4.7.

To satisfy GDC 13, the plant should include provisions for 'usinf reactor instrumentation to search for potential fuel loading errors after fueling operations.

For a possible undetected error, analyses are done to ensure that if fuel rod failure limits could be exceeded during normal operation, the offsite consequences are a small fraction of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

V.

EVALUATION The mislocated bundle error is no longer analyzed for plant-specific cycles since the fuel vendor (General Electric), using the statistical Haling method, has shown that there is a 95% probability, with a 95%

confidence limit that a mislocated bundle will not result in a minimum CPR less than the safety limit CPR in GE Boiling Water Reactors.

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e' The worst fuel loading (misoriented) error is analyzed for each reload cycle to ensure that the safety limit critical power ratio (CPR) is not violated.

The analysis procedure employed for this event by Millstone is described in NEDE-240ll, " Generic Reload Fuel Application." This is a General Electric topical report which describes the procedures which are used to perform reload analyses for BWR reactors.

This report has been reviewed and approved by the staff and presents the procedures used for accident and transient analyses including initial condition assumptions, input parameter assumotions, analysis methods, results, and acceptance criteria. These procedures are current state-of-the-art for boiling water reload analyses and they specifically apply to the Millstone Unit I reactor.

The Millstone 1 Technical Spe.ifications require that source range monitors be provided to guide the operator during fueling operations.

One SRM is in and one is adjacent to the core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved.

VI.

CONCLUSION Since the safety limit CPR is not violated, the fuel rod failure limit is met. We therefore conclude that the current analyses for this event at Millstone Unit 1 meet the criteria which are applied to the present generation of boiling water reacters and are acceptable.

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