ML20031F328
| ML20031F328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1981 |
| From: | Pigott D ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8110190544 | |
| Download: ML20031F328 (27) | |
Text
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i 4-l' 00CMETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11 OCT 15 P1:35 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r,- m e r - e r c....
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD:
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-361 OL
)
50-362 OL SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
)
)
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
)
Station, Units 2 and 3)
)
)
APPLICANTS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW POWER TESTING DAVID R.
PIGOTT EDWARD B.
ROGIN SAMUEL B. CASEY JOHN A. MENDEZ Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE A Professional Corporation 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone:
(415) 392-1122 CHARLES R. KOCHER JAMES A.
BEOLETTO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY P.O.
Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Telephone:
(213) 572-1900 Attorneys for Applicants, Southern California Edison Company Dated:
October 12, 1981 and San Diego Gas & Electric an; t-g r
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DAVID R. PIGOTT EDWARD B. ROGIN SAMUEL B. CASEY JOHN A. MENDEZ Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE A Professional Corporation 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone:
(415) 392-1122 CHARLES R. KOCHER JAMES A. BEOLETTO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY P.O.
Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Telephone:
(213) 572-1900 Attorneys for Applicants, Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-361 OL
)
50-362 OL SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
)
)
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
)
Station, Units 2 and 3)
)
)
APPLICANTS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW POWER TESTING Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas &
Electric Company, City of Anaheim, California and City of J
Riverside, California hereby submit their preposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of " Alternative Motion of Applicants Southern California Edison Company, et al. for an Operating License for Fuel Loading and Low Power Testing."
(" Low Power Motion".)
The following proposed findings and conclusions are filed pursuant to stipulation of the parties confirmed by order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Board").
(TR. 11,357-59.)
I.
INTRODUCTION 1.
Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, City of Anaheim and City of Riverside
(" Applicants") are co-owners of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3 (" SONGS 2 & 3").
Applicants were granted Construction Permits for those two units on or about October 18, 1973.
2.
On or about March 22, 1977, Applicants filed their Application For Operating Licenses For SONGS 2 & 3.
Pursuant to said application, operating license hearings were commenced on certain contested issues on June 22, 1981.
3.
On August 31, 1981 during the hearings on the contested issues in the above docket, Applicants filed
" Alternative Motion of Applicants Southern California i ison Company, et al. for an Operating License for Fuel Loading and Low Power Testing" (" Low Power Motion").
Said motion was 2
made pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.57(c) and seeks authorization, with prior written approval of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to: (1) load fuel, (2) proceed to initial criticality, (3) perform start-up testing at zero power, and (4) operate SONGS 2 for testing at reactor core power levels not in excess of 5% of its rated power (169.5 megawatts thermal)
(" low power testing").
4.
SONGS 2 will be ready to commence fuel loading and low power testing prior to issuance of a full power operating license.
5.
On September 1, 1981 Applicants proposed as the appropriate issue for hearing with respect to the Low Power Motion the following:
Whether there is reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the public during fuel loading and low power testing, considering the risk to the public represented by those activities and the emergency preparedness in place during those activities.
(TR. 8658.)
6.
On September 3, 1981 the NRC Staff proposed slight modification to Applicants' proposed issue as follows:
Whether there is reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the health and safety of the public during fuel loading and low power testing, considering the risk to the public presented by those activities and the level of emergency preparedness during those activities.
i 7.
On September 3, 1981 $he Board orally ordered
]
that the issue, as proposed by NRC steff, tentatively be adopted as the issue to be tried with respect to the Low 3
O Power Motion.
The Board further allowed Intervenors GUARD and Carstens, et al. to submit in writing additional proposed issues and briefs in support of said issues by September 9, 1981.
(TR. 9233-34.)
The Board further ordered that prepared direct testimony with respect to the Low Power Motion be filed by September 21, 1981.
8.
By letter dated September 9, 1981 to Chairman James Kelley, Intervenors GUARD and Carstens, et al. proposed two additional issues with respect to the Low Power Motion:
1.
Whether Applicants have sufficiently demonrtrated that a radiological emergency at SONGS 2 & 3 could not cause a radiological emergency at SONGS 1.
2.
Whether Applicants have met the requirements of the TMI action plan as regards:
(a)
Instrumentation for inadequate core cooling.
(b)
Environmental qualification of electrical equipment.
(c)
Thermal shock.
(d)
Small break loss of coolant accident.
(e)
Ignitor hydrogen ignition system.
(f)
Release [ sic) and safety valve testing.
Said proposed issues were not supported by any briefing at that time.
9.
On September 10, 1981 a conference call was had between all parties and the Board.
The issue proposed by 4
Applicants, as modified by NRC Staff, was approved for hearing.
Said issue, as well as those proposed by Intervenors, were discussed.
Intervenors were given further time to brief the issues they had proposed.
Applicants and NRC Staff were allowed further time within which to respond to such briefing.
Ultimately, Intervenors filed " Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Intervenors' Proposed Issues Relating to Low Power License" dated September 14, 1981.
In response to said memorandum, there was filed "NRC Staff Response to Intervenors' GUARD, Carstens, et al.
Request for Consideration of Two Additional Issues in the Context of Low Power Licensing" dated September 18, 1981 and
" Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Intervenors' Proposed Issues for a Motion for Fuel Loading and Low Power Testing License" dated September 18, 1981.
10.
On September 23, 1981 oral argument was held before the Board on the issues proposed by GUARD.
As a partial determination of the questions posed at that time, Intervenors voluntarily withdrew their issue related to TMI matters.
(TR. 9949-9973) 11.
On September 24, 1981 the Board denied Intervenors' proposed issue relating to interrelation of SONGS 1 and SONGS 2.
(TR. 10099-10102) 12.
On September 30, 1981, hearing was held on the Alternative Motion of Applicants for an Operating License for Fuel Loading and Low Power Testing.
5
.. ~.
II.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 13.
Applicants' direct case was presented by the following witnesses and the exhibits sponsored by such witnesses:
1.
Richard M.
Rosenblum (TR. 11,136 et seg.).
2.
David R. Buttemer (TR. 11,242 et sgg.).
3.
David F. Pilmer (TR. 11,279 et seq.).
Applicants' witnesses sponsored the following exhibits:
1.
Exhibit 160, (RMR-1) " Low Power Testing Program" 2.
Number 161 (DRB-1) " Analysis of Postulated Accidents During Low Power Testing at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 2" 3.
Exhibit 162 (DFP-6) " Letter of July 10, 1981 from NRC, Region V to Southern California Edison Company" 14.
NRC Staff testimony was presented by the following witnesses:
1.
Kenneth Nauman (FEMA) (TR. 11,304, et sgg.)
2.
G. Norman Lauben (TR. 11,316, et seg.)
3.
Patrick D.
O'Reilly (TR. 11,316, et seq.)
4.
Brian Grimes (TR. 11,338, et seg.)
6
4 5.
John Sears (TR. 11,338, et seg.)
Kenneth Nauman, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsored Staff Exhibit No. 13: Memorandum addressed to Brian Grimes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from Robert Jaske, Acting Director of the REP Division of Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Subject:
" San Onofre Nuclear Power Facility."
15.
Intervenors did not present either direct testimony or documentary exhibits with respect to the Low Power Motion.
III.
FINDINGS OF FACT CONTENTION Whether there is reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the health and safety of the public during fuel loading and low power testing, considering the risks to the public presented by those activities and the level of emergency preparedness in place during those activities.
16.
Richard M. Rosenblum, the Start-up Superviser for SONGS 2, testified concerning the staffing of the start-up effort at Unit 2 and the start-up tests proposed for that unit.
(TR. 11,136, et seg.)
17.
After fuel loading, the testing will be supported by personnel from four primary organizations.
Applicants' licensed operators will perform the hands-on activities supported by a group of about 20 Southern j
7
California Edison Company start-up personnel.
Approximately 10 Combustion Engineering start-up personnel also will be on hand as well as technical experts from Southern California Edison Company and vendors of the major components, as required.
Additionally, SCE Shift Technical Advisors routinely provide technical nupport to the licensed operators on a 24-hour per day basis.
(Rosenblum, written testimony, p.
2.)
18.
The fuel loading and low nower testing is divided into four general activities:
(1) fuel loading, (2) post core-loading hot functional testing, (3) initial criticality and low power physics testing and (4) power escalations to 5% of full power.
(Rosenblum, written testimony, pp. 2-5.)
The tests to be performed are detailed in Applicants' Exhibit Number 160, (RMR-1) " Low Power Testing Program".
19.
The overall fuel loading and low power testing program is anticipated to consume approximately 16 weeks.
(Rosenblum, written testimony, pp. 2-4.)
20.
Fuel loading and low power physics testing will require approximately 14 weeks.
Power escalations to 5%
of full power will require approximately two weeks.
g (Rosenblum, written testimony, pp. 4-5.)
21.
David R. Buttemer testified concerning safety analyses of potential low power accidents performed for the SONGS 2.
The results of his calculations are set 8
forth in detail in Applicants' Exhibit Number 161 (DRB-1)
" Analysis of Postulated Accidents During Low Power Testing at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2".
22.
Mr. Butt.emer calculated core temperature responses for the Zollowing accident sequences: (3) large loss of coolant accidents, (2) loss of steam generator heat sink accident with the safety valves remaining open, and (3) loss of steam generator heat sink accident with safety valves maintaining pressure at 2,500 psia.
(Figure DRB-A.)
These analyses assume that the active safety systems, mainly the auxiliary feedwater and emergency core cooling systems are not operational.
This is an extremely conservative assumption.
(Buttemer, written testimony, p.
9.)
It was Mr.
Buttemer's testimony that these accidents constituted the
" bounding" accidents for low power operations.
(TR. 11,235.)
23.
Mr. Buttemer also performed a qualitative evaluation of the risks associated with fuel loading and low power operation relmtive to those associated with full power operation.
Mr. Buttemer considered both the likelihood of an accident sequence occurring and the potential consequences associated with such a sequence.
Primarily because of the substantially lower core fission product inventories present at low power testing versus full power, and thus the much lower fission product decay heat levels, it was concluded that in the event of an accident, the lower decay heat results in very slow heat-up rates providing substantial time 9
for mitigative action.
At 5% power, the core temperatures were much lower than at full power, the stored thermal energy of the core being about 5% of that of full power.
These factors provide much greater thermal margins to the design limits, which are established based upon full power operation.
(Buttemer, written testimony, pp. 5-6.)
24.
Because of the low reactor power levels and short operating times planned in the low p?:er test program, the fission product inventory within the core itself is a small fraction of that which would exist during normal operation.
Short-lived fission product inventories would be about 1/20th of that which would occur during normal operation.
The longer-lived fission product inventories would be less than 1/20th of that during normal operation.
(Buttemer, written testimony, p. 5.)
25.
Mr. Buttemer could not identify any factor peculiar to low power testing that would increase the potential accident consequences relative to full power operation.
(Buttemer, written testimony, p. 6.)
26.
Mr. Buttemer concluded that the probability that an accident could be initiated during low power operation would be about the same as during full power operation.
However, because of the slow accident progression, there is ample time for diagnostic and corrective operator action.
For these reasons, it was concluded that the probability of accident sequences leading 10
to core melt would be lower than at full power operation.
(Buttemer, written testimony, pp. 6-8.)
27.
The probability and consequences of core melt accidents are smaller during low power testing than at full power and thus the risk to the public is lower at low power than at full power.
(Buttemer, written testimony, p. 8.)
28.
Mr. Buttemer's conclusions are set forth tr Figure DRB-A, " Summary of Accident Analyses - SONGS Unit 2 Low Power Testing Program".
That summary indicates that petential accident sequences would progress sufficiently slowly to allow taking effective action to prevent serious accidents or to take offsite protective actions.
More specifically, the shortest period of time from accident initiation to the time when excessive core temperatures would be reached is some 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> for a large LOCA.
The amount of water makeup required to prevent such excessive temperatures would be 2.2 gallons per minute.
The other accident sequences provide longer times to excessive core temperatures and smaller water make-up requirements.
(Buttemer, written testimony, Figure DRB-A.)
29.
Even in the event that the core should heat past the initial degredation temperature of 1,560 F and no subsequent corrective action is taken, under the worst case, there would be an additional 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> before sufficent hydrogen is generated to the 11.al where it could result in extensive burning.
This would give a total of about 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> 11
after the accident is initiated, to hydrogen burn, which may st 11 not result in jeopardizing the structural integrity of the containment.
(Buttemer, written testimony, pp. 11-12.)
30.
NRC St&ff witnesses G.
Norman Lauben and Dr.
Patrick D. O'Reilly testified chncerning the significant events which could occur at San Onofre Unit 2 which could potentially affect public health and safety associated with low power testing.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony,
- p. 2.)
31.
The NRC Staff analysis concluded that based on results of the Reactor Safety Study (Wash 1400), the dominant events for a PWR such as San Onofre are (1) small break LOCAS with loss of the emergency core cooling system, and (2) transients involving total loss of feedwater.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, p. 2.)
32.
The NRC Staff analysis estimated that there would be an overall reduction in risk to the public at 5%
power as compared to continuous full power of a factor of 500 to 10,000.
This conclusion was arrived at as a result of an evaluation of the probability of an event occurring given the extended period of time a reactor operator would have to correct any loss of important safety systems and the reduced fission product inventory for operation of an initially unirradiated core at 5% power for a period of six months.
Additionally, given the short period of time during which low power operation would take place, there was a further risk 12
reduction by a factor of about 2 and it was therefore concluded that the public risk due to fuel loading and the proposed low power test program is less than the public risk due to full power long-term operation by a factor of about 1,000 to 20,000.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, pp. 3-4.)
33.
A bounding calculation was performed for a large-break LOCA.
In this analysis, with no pumped ECCS, it was letermined that the period of time before significant n
m1 water reaction would occur would be at least 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
(This also assumes 180 days prior operation.
(TR. 11,335))
This is a miniumum period of time available for remedial action even for this highly unlikely event -- a large-break LOCA coupled with ECCS failure.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, p. 6.)
34.
The NRC Staff and Applicant analyses are compatible.
The separate approaches reached comparable results.
This is reflectad in the NRC Staff witnesses' testimony that their analysis would, in effect, add another data point to the Applicants' large LOCA analysis that would show 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to the time when significant core damage begins, assuming 180 days of prior low power operation.
(TR.
11,325.)
35.
With respect to more credible smaller breaks, the period of time prior to severe core damage was increaeed.
The time available at low power for the operator 13
to take corrective action is more than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> in the event of a small LOCA.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, pp. 6-7.)
36.
It was concluded that the probability of a small LOCA resulting in excesive fuel damage and significant radiological release is reduced by a factor of 400 to 8,000 for low power operation as compared to operation at full power.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, p. 7.)
37.
The overall conclusion was that a period of at least 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> is available to take corrective action to mitigate or terminate the most likely scenarios which could affect public risk during low power testing.
For some sequences of concern at full power, no action would be required during low power operation to prevent public risk.
Under these conditions, the risk is so small that there is virtually no need for a qualified emergency plan.
(Lauben and O'Reilly, written testimony, p.
9.)
38.
David F. Pilmer testified for Applicants that based on the limited potential for offsite consequences, the current state of emergency preparedness at SONGS Unit 2 is adequate to protect the public health and safety during fuel load and low power testing.
(Pilmer, written testimony,
- p. 1.)
39.
The on-site emergency plan for SONGS Units 2 &
3 (Exhibit Number 51) will be in effect prior to first fuel loading activities.
The key emergency response personnel 14
will be in position in the event of emergency activity.
(Pilmer, written testimony, p. 2.)
40.
SCE's emergency response capability has been inspected by the NRC staff and with respect to Unit 1, has been found to be in compliance with NRC requirements.
Such compliance is reflected in Applicants' Exhibit Number 162 (DFP-6) " Letter of July 10, 1981 from NRC, Region V to Southern California Edison Company".
This inspection and compliance shows that the key on-site management, supervisory and senior technical personnel that would make up a large portion of the on-site emergency response capability are in place for SONGS Unit 2.
(TR. 11,252.)
41.
Given the short period of time during which the reactor will be critical and the very low levels at which it will be operating, there cannot exist a set of conditions that could constitute a General Emergency as defined by Section 4.1.4.
of.the Emergency Plan during the period of these activities.
The planning to deal with accidents classified as " site emergency" or less will be in effect for the 14-week period during fuel loading and low power physics testing.
(Pilmer, written testimaay, p.4.)
42.
During the final two weeks of low power testing, it is possible, although highly improbable that a Class 9 accident sequence could occur.
Because of the long time period required to develop such a Class 9 accident sequence, rapid notification and response on the part of 15
offsite agencies is unnecessary.
What is necessary, is the means to communicate witn offsite authorities in the event an accident may produce offsite consequences.
Because of the length of time available should an accident occur during low power testing, offsite authorities for SONGS would be well able to carry out any recommended protective actions without additional detailed procedures or special training in a manner that would adequately protect the public health and safety.
(Pilmer, written testimony, pp. 5-7.)
43.
The position of the Federal Emergency Management Agency was set forth through the testimony of Mr.
Kenneth Nauman and Staff Exhibit No. 13.
(TR. 11,305 -
11,308.)
44.
Mr. Nauman testified that the Federal Emergency Management Agency considered offsite preparedness at SONGS 2 adequate to protect the public health and safety during fuel loading and low power testing.
This position also is reflected in Staff Exhibit No. 13 which relies on the fact that the State of California Nuclear Power Prior t
Emergency Response Plan has previously received NRC concurrence.
(TR. 11,304-11,305.)
45.
NRC Staff witnesses Brian Grimes and John Sears also testified that, as set forth in Staff Exhibit No.
13 and Exhibits A and B to the prepared testimony of John R.
Sears, with respect to the state of emergency preparedness for SONGS 2, it meets the NRC Staff criteria for low power 16
licenses.
(TR. 11,340, et seq.)
46.
Mr. Grimes testified that the NRC and FEMA criteria for low power operation have been mutually agreed upon and include a qualitative assessment of the risk from low power operation.
The NRC Staff has taken note of the fact that there has been substantial effort and preparedness put into place at the San Onofre site in conformity with upgraded NRC Staff requirements as set forth in NUREG 0654.
Given this offsite capability in conjunction with the onsite emergency capability, it is the NRC Staff's position that fuel loading and low-power testing at SONGS 2 does not present an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(TR. 11,342-11,343.)
47.
The NRC Staff reviewed Applicants' state of emergency preparedness under the criteria of NUREG 0654.
This review was generally limited to the state of onsite emergency preparedness.
The NRC Staff's review is documented in 6 13.3 of the Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3, NUREG 0712, February 6, 1981 (NRC Staff Exhibit No.
1); $ 22 of the Supplement No. 1 to the SER, NUREG 0712, dated February 25, 2982 (Staff Exhibit No. 2), and Supplement No. 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG 0712, dated September, 1981 (NRC Staff Exhibit No. 12).
The NRC Staff conclusion is that Applicants have achieved an acceptable state of emergency preparedness onsite which meets the 17
requirements of the Commissions' regulations and conforms to the guidance contained in NUREG 0654, Revision 1.
(Sears, written testimony, pp. 3-4.)
48.
The current FEMA-NRC emergency preparedness criteria for low power testing is that the public health and safety is adequately protected if the facility is located in a state which has received a concurrence under the previous voluntary concurrence program administered by the NRC and based on evaluation by a multi-agency federal regional advisory committee and if the operator plans are consistent with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 1, March, 1977 and the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, December 24, 1970, as amended January 11, 1973 (old Appendix E).
(Sears, written testimony, p. 5.)
49.
The rationale for a lower level oi emergency preparedness for a low power testing is that a more stringent emergency preparedness criteria is not required due to the reduced risks associated with low power testing.
This is I
reflected in the extended time period that would be necessary to beat the fuel to the melting point given even an extended power operation at 5% of full power.
Given this extended ti.me period, plus the fact that the core fission product f
ir.ventory is small as a result of low power testing, it has l
I been determined that a lesser degree of emergency preparedness is sufficient for low power testing.
(Sears, written testimony, pp. 5-6.)
18 l
50.
NRC Staff confirmed the testimony of Mr.
Nauman to the effect that Applicants meet and exceed the current criteria adopted by FEMA and the NRC Staff for low power testing.
(Sears, written testimony, p. 6.)
IV.
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT 51.
Operation of SONGS 2 for fuel loading and low power testing as set forth in Applicants Exhibit 160 (RMR-1)
" Low Power Testing" will pose significantly less risk to the public health and safety than full power operation.
52.
Analyses of postulated accidents at low power operation demonstrate that even in the event of the most severe postulated accident, even assuming 180 days prior low power operation, at least 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> would be available for corrective diagnostic and mitigation measures before core damage would occur.
For the more probable events, approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> would be available before core damage would occur.
53.
Because of the low power levels and short duration of irradiation of the core, the fission product inventory in low power operation is significantly smaller than during full power operation.
54.
For all the above reasons, it is concluded that the fuel loading and low power testing program proposed by Applicants will result in much lower risks to the public-19
health and safety than full power operation.
55.
Onsite emergency preparedness at SONGS 2 meets current NRC criteria as set forth in NUREG 0654 (Revision 1).
Such onsite emergency preparedness is adequate to protect the public health and safety during fuel loading and low power testing.
Additionally, the record developed in this proceeding amply demonstrates that the state of offsite preparedness is such that given the time periods necessary for development of an accident at low power, adequate measures can be taken to protect the public health and safety in the unlikely event of a severe accident.
V.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 56.
The Board has considered both the oral and documentary evidence submitted in support of the " Alternative Motion of Applicants Southern California Edison Company, et al. for an Operating License for Fuel Loading and Low Power Testing".
Additionally, the Board has considered the entire record of this pro,eeding and, based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Fact, determines as follows:
1.
There is a reasonable assurance that the activities authorized within a fuel loading and low power testing (up to 5%) license can be conducted without endangering the public health and safety, 20
2.
Such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's Regulations, and 3.
The issuance of a fuel loading and low power testing license will not be inimical to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
October 12, 1981.
Respectfully submitted, DAVID R. PIGOTT EDWARD B.
ROGIN SAMUEL B. CASEY JOHN A. MENDEZ Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE A Professional Corporation CHARLES R.
KOCHER JAMES A.
BEOLETTO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY Attorneys for Applicants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY By David R.
Pigott One of Counsel for Applicants 0
21
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING EOARD In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-361 OL
)
50-362 OL SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
)
EDISON COMPANY, E_T AL.
)
)
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
)
Station, U. nits 2 and 3)
)
)
[ PROPOSED)
ORDER GRANTING OPERATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW POWER TESTING IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and U.S. Nuclear R.
.atory Commission regulations, and based on the findings and conclusions set forth herein, that pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (c) the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized to issue to Applicants Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, City of Anaheim, California, and City of Riverside, California, upon favor-able determination of the matters set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S 50.57 (a) (1), (2), (4), (5) and that part of (6) relating
1 to the common defense and security, a license authorizing fuel loading and low power testing (169.5 megawatts thermal).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 2.764, this Order is effective as of the date issued subject to review pursuant to the Commission's regulations.
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD James L. Kelley Chairman Dr. Cadet Hand, Jr.
Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson Dated at this day of November, 1981.
2
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL I declare that:
I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco, California.
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 600 Montgomery Street, lith Floor, San Francisco, California 94111.
On October 12, 1981, I served the attached APPLICANTS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR AN OFLRATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW POWER TESTING in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in the United States mail at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
(except where indicated by *)
James L. Kelley, Chairman Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Administrative Judge c/o Bodega Marinc Laboratory University of California P.O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson Administrative Judge Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O. Box X, Building 3500 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
David W. Gilman Robert G. Lacy San Diego Gas & Electric Company P.O. Box 1831 San Diego, California 92112 Robert Dietch, Vice President Southern California Edison Company P.O. Box 806 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Alan R. Watts, Esq.
Rourke & Woodruff j
California First Bank Building 10555 North Main Street Santa Ana, California 92701
- Lawrence J. Chandler, Esq.
Richard K. Hoefling, Esq.
Donald F. Hassell, Esq.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C.
20555 Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq.
California Public Utilities Commission 5066 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 Mr. Loyd von Haden 2089 Foothill Drive Vista, California 92083 Mrs. Lyn Harris Hicks GUARD 3908 Calle Ariana San Clemente, California 92801 James F. Davis State Geologist Division of Mines and Geology 1416 Ninth Street, Room 1341 Sacramento, California 95814 Richard J. Wharton, Esq.
University of San Diego School of Law Alcala Park San Diego, California 92110
I i
Phyllis M. Gallagher, Esq.
1695 W. Crescent Avenue, Suite 222 Anaheim, California 92801 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Richard K. Hoefling, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555
- Charles E. McClung, Jr., Esq.
23521 Paseo de Valencia, Suite 308 Laguna Hills, California 92653 WID R. PIGGIT DAVID R. PIGOTT One of Counsel for Applicants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO, served by Federal Express
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