ML20031C893
| ML20031C893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308, 07200001 |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1981 |
| From: | Rooney M GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., MAYER, BROWN & PLATT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8110090105 | |
| Download: ML20031C893 (22) | |
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Dated:
October 2,
1981 G
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UNTTED STATES OF AMERICA g fd p
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 70-1308
)
72-1 Cona Meration of Renewal of
)
e Materials License No. SNM-1265
)
,e 8 Issued to G.E. Morris Operation
)
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'3 Spent Fuel Storage Facility
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DCT 8IggI,Yo GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY'S REPLY IN r
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION $ v,,, NsDi AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO ILLINOIS' b.
MOTION TO STRIKE STATEMENTS OF MATERIAL FACT y
74 Introduction On February 27, 1979, almost three years ago, General Electric Company
(" General Electric") filed its timely application for renewal of its Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-1265, authorizing receipt, storage and transfer of irradiated nuclear fuel at a facility near 1
Morris, Illinois.
The renewal application calls for no amendments to the license, but merely seeks a 20-year renewal to perform exactly the identical functions that have been carried on with no adverse impact on the public health and safety at the Morris Operation for ten years.
Dilatory conduct by two intervenors has repeatedly delayed, confused and vexed the orderly progress of this proceeding.
At 8110090105 811002 PDR ADOCK 0700130g ID I PDR I
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i 1
length, the Board (
.ssed one group of intervenors, required completion of the much-belated discovery from the remaining intervenor, the State of Illinois
(" Illinois"),
and set a schedule for consideration of summary disposition.
Pursuant to the schedule, on August 28, 1981, General Electric filed its Motion for Summary Disposition on all nine of the pending contentions in the proceeding, and the portion of a Board Question directed to it.
The Motion included a memorandum reviewing in detail General Electric's painstaking analysis cf each contention, and so much of Illinois' scanty basis as discovery revealed.
Pursuant to regulation, the Motion also included a supporting affidavit, a statement of the material facts as to which there was no genuine issue, and rigorous references to a prodigious evidentiary and documentary record in ti' proceeding itself, including depositions, NRC publications, d the application for renewal of the license.
On September 22, 1981, the NRC Staff filed its detailed answer to General Electric's Motion ("NRC Response"),
supporting the Motion as to every particular.1/
In 1/
One of the affidavits annexed to the NRC Response notes that one NRC analysis yields a result different by two-tenths of one percent (0.2%) from General Electric's analysir.
Consequently, the NRC concludes that a serious sissile-penetration accident in the spent-fuel pool would result in an offsite radiation dose of thirty-two-ten-thousandths (.0032) of the regulatory limit, while General Electric maintains that tha dose VCant'd) - -
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addition, the NRC Response included ten affidavits buttressing se..rral Electric's analysis of the issues.
With the trival distinction noted in footnote 1/, General Electric adopts and accepts the NRC Response ni all of its supporting documentation.
On the same day, Illinois filed its response to the Motion for Summary-Disposition
(" Illinois Response"); it takes the position that General Electric's submissions do not satisfy the legal standard for summary disposit.on, and i
elects to stand on a Motion to Strike General Elactric's Statement of Material Facts, traversing only one such j
statement of the 74 submitted.
The Illinois Response is also accompanied by an argumentative affidavit, containing few facts and extensive conclusions and opinions.
Most importantly, the Illinois Response abandons all of Illinois' previous arguments and documentation, which were completely refuted in General Electric's initial filings with the j
pending Motion.
Clearly, the time.
come to bring this proceeding to I
a close.
With the instant filing the record on the Motion for Summary Disposition is complete, and Illinois has i
would be only twelve-ten-thousindths (.0012) of the limit.
(Affidavit of A. Thomas Clark, p.
2, to the NRC Response.)
The difference is attributable to differing assumptions upon which the two calculations are based.
Other than this extremely small, and, in any event, irrelevant difference, the NRC fully supports General Electric's Motion..
patently failed to raise even the slightest doubt so as to suggest a litigable issue on any material fact regarding any contention.
Illinois' Response to the Motion for Summary Disposition Illinois places much reliance on the appeal board's decision in C1'eveland Electric Illuminating Co.,
et,al.,
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAS-443, 6 N.R.C.
741 (1977), which Illinois contends requires dentai cf summary disrosition in the instant case.
In Cleveland Electric, the applicants had moved for summary disposition on a single issue, having to do with a contended geological anomaly underlying the plant site, and offered in support the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report
("SER").
In relevant part, the SER referred to a geological analysis prepared by the applicants' architect-engineer.
That analysis, "the Gilbert Report," had been submitted to the NRC Staff (apparently in discovery) with copies to the licensing board.
It was not properly acknowledged.
After telephone conferences with the applicant, the licensing board determined to consider the Gilbert Report together with the SER as part of the record on the summary disposition motion.
The board then granted the motion.
On review, the appeal board noted that the Gilbert Report was not properly acknowledged as required of affidavits by 10 C.F.R.
S 2.749 (b), that the SER vas too i
dependent upon the Gilbert Report to support summary disposition itself,.2/ and that therefore the motion was improperly granted.
In view of the nature of the licensing board's error in granting the motion -- absence of a proper acknowledgement on one document -- the appeal board did not revoke or even suspend the construction permit, but merely gave the applicants 10 days to furnish a properly acknowledged copy of the Gilbert Report and renew the motion for summary disposition.
When the applicants did so, the appeal board granted the motion and affirmed the licensing board's grant of the construction permit.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Cg., et al.,
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-4 4 9, 6 N. R.C. 884 (1977).
Thus, viewing the whole case, rather than just two pages of one opinion out of context, Cleveland Electric clearly does not not stand for the proposition for which Illinois cites it, that summary disposition should be denied here.
Nevertheless, there is only one document in the instant case which has a position similar to that of the Gilbert Report in Cleveland Electric:
Illinois' own MHB Report, which constitutes the entire basis for virtually all of Illinois' contentions.
Like the Gilbert Report, the MHB l
jb/
Significantly, both the licensing board and the appeal 1
board assumed that the SER was admissible in support of the motion for summary disposition.
Report is not acknowledged,3/ and was only furnished to the Board in discovery.M Reply To Illinois' Response on Each contention Turning to Illinois' argument on the contentions, its response is a fabric of distortions, overstatements, and miscomprehensions of underlying law.
First, Illinois endlessly repeats, withOct any explanation, what is apparently its theory that General Electric has not satisfied the legal standard for summary disposition.5/
To argue' simply that General Electric has not met its burden adds nothing.
Presumably, had Illinois 3/
It is improbable that Illinois could admit the MHB Report into evidence, whether or not acknowledged.
That report was prepared three years ago for an entirely different proceeding considering entirely different issues and as such is irrelevant to the matters now before this Board.
J/
In contrast, as is demonstrated below (pp. 16 eti seq.),
all of the documents supporting General Electric's Motion for Summary Disposition are either self-authenticating or admissible under applicable law.
The Motion for Summary Disposition is also abundantly supported by General Electric and NRC affidavits.
5/
The words " General Electric has not met its burden" or the like, are repeated in nine places in the Illincis Response without any further argument or explanation.
Similarly, Illinois twice asserts, without explanations, that its contentions are not attacks upon the applicable regulations.
Yet, it is silent as to why 10 C.F.R.
S 2.758 does not require summary disposition on these contentions as well as on others where it failed to respond at all to General Electric's position that Illinois was merely attacking existing regulations. - - -
any reason to say why this was so, it would have.
Illinois' silence is more telling than its assertions.
The legal standard for summary disposition is clearly stated in 10 C.F.R. S 2.749 (b) which includes the following language:
"When a motion for summary decision is made and supported as provided in this section, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer; his answer by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact.
If no such answer is filed, the decision sought, if appropriate, shall be rendered."
None of the cases cited by Illinois varies this rule in any way.
The Board ought therefore to consider this argum;.-'
'a light of the fact that Illinois has made a substantive response to only one of General Electric's 74 Statements of Material Fact.
Although General Electric readily concedes that it has the burden of proof in the pending Motion, Illinois has done nothing to diminish General Electric's evidentiary presentation and has provided no " specific facts" even suggcsting that a genuine issue of material fact exists.
A second technique used throughout the Illinois Response is to distort General Electric's statements.
For example, Illinois treats General Electric's statements regarding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station's agreement to provide emergency water supp_ies to Morris as an admission of interdependence of the two facilities (Illinois Response,
- p. 6), a conclusion which can only be reached by ignoring General Electric's uncontested statements about its own enormous makeup water supply.
Again, Illinois twists General Electric's statement that a radiation hazard could conceivably exist in only one controlled area in the practically impossible event that basin water were drained below the level of the fuel, into an admission of radiation hazards beyond that "immediate" area.
(Illinois Response,
- p. 7.)
of course, there is no such hazard.
- Further, Illinois attacks General Electric's statement that advanced explosives ire only fractionally more destructive than conventional ones (Illinois Response, p. 8), after continually refusing to identify in discovery what advances in explosives' technology were intended to be raised by Contention 2.
It is only Illinois' refusal to provide any more than unsupported allegations that prevent General Electric from quantifying its response any further.
A critical reading of Illinois' out-of-context references to General Electric's materials -- and only a few examples are addressed here -- reveals that Illinois' arguments are fallacious.
Third, Illinois' reliance on the Affidavit of Gregory C. Minor is misplaced; the substance of that so-called
" affidavit" is entirely argument.
Under 10 C.F.R. S 2.749 (b), it was Illinois' burden to establish " specific facts,
i l
showing that there is a genuine issue of fact."
(See p. 7, above.)
Instead, the affidavit states irrelevancies and advances arguments.
For example, in paragraph 5, the statement, "The CSAR has only considered such influences and interaction within the limited range of DBA releases" is patently not true; CSAR S 8.1.2, although not required by regulation to do so, goes beyond desiqn-basis accidents.
Again, paragraph 3 does not contain " specific facts," but inflammatory rhetoric and an irrelevant analogy:
"The Licensee's argument that such an event has a low probability of occurring is, perhaps, true on paper, but, in light of the TMI-2 experience, it deserves attention in the CSAR."6/
In no way can the affidavit be considered as setting forth the specific facts required by S 2.749(b).
Turning to Illinois' arguments on the specific contentions, General Electric does not believe it is appropriate to repeat those materials from either its initial papers or the NRC Response which squarely refute every allegation raised in both the Illinois Response and Minor's Affidavit.
It will, however, briefly reply to those allegations as to which General Electric believes a reply 6/
The balance of the affidavit is:
(1) irrelevant --
"The site is in the top 5%
. with regard to population density.
(2) vague -
"(regarding Dresden] serious transients and blowdowns," and (3) apocryphal -
" release may occur at any time." __-
will expedite the Board's consideration of this Motion.
Contention-1.
The two paragraphs of Minor's Affidavit referred to have nothing to do with the allegations of the contention.
Contention 2.
In addition to what was stated above (p.
9), General Electric believes that Illinois' argument is nothing more than a transparent attempt to penalize General Electric for providing a sabotage analysis when it was under absolutely no requirement to do so.
Contention 3.
In addition to the adequate support in General Electric's submission, General Electric's motion is i
supported by the Affidavits of A. Thomas Clark (Attachment 1, pp. 12-18) and Edward F. Branagar (Attachment 4, pp. 1-3) attached to the NRC Response.
Further, Illinois simply chooses to continue to ignore that the document on which part (e) (1) of Contention 3 is based is totally irrevelant to the contention, and that Illinois' reliance is due to a misunderstanding of the document.
(See footnote 25/ of General Electric's Motion.)
Similarly, regarding subpart e(ii) or Contention 3, Illinois chooses to ignore the uncontroverted evidence that it is unnecessary for General Electric to monitor Krypton 85 specifically and continuously because of the adequacy of the monitoring methods utilized at the Morris Operation.
(See Affidavit of A. Thomas Clark, pp. 17-18 (Attachment 1 to NRC Response).)
Contention 4.
Illinois' position seems to be based l
upon Minor's belief that removing residual radioactivity "may prove difficult", which is unfounded speculation and irrelevant, and his statement that past and future leaks of radioactive contamination are not provided for in the Decommissioning Plan, which is untrue (see CSAR, Appendix A, l
SS A.7.2.2, A.7.3.4).
Furthermore, these obligations which l
Minor seeks to impose are not required under applicable regulations.1/
l Contention 5.
Illinois relies on paragraph 10 of i
Minor's Affidavit, which is concerned with the fuel basin l
1/
Illinois' only statement of material fact as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be heard (see 10 C.F.R.
S 2.749 (a)) is proposed in connection with Contention 4 (c) :
" Morris could be abandoned because of an accident at Dresden."
The statement, which is supposed to contradict General Electric's Statement of Material Fact No. 49, is said to be based upon unspecified portions of Minor's Affidavit.
A review of that entire document reveals that the only reference to that subject, in paragraph 5, does not support the statement:
"It is conceivable that a Dresden accident could.
. contaminate the M.O.
l site
. and limit access of personnel.
Anyway, neither General Electric (Statement of Material Fact No. 50) nor the NRC (Affidavit of A.
Thomas Clark, pp. 18, 21, (Attachment 1 to the NRC Response)) dispute that the Morris Operation could conceivably have to be evacuated for a short time, but both demonstrate that this would have absolutely no impact on the public health and safety (11.).
- Thus, 3
Illinois' " contested" Statement of Material Fact is clearly unsupported by the record, irrelevant, and simply another smoke screen.
)
becoming filled to such an extent that empty spaces in the storage grid, which he alleges are required in the event that repairs to the basin or the liner are necessary, are unavailable.
Putting aside the fact that Illinois never disclosed, in the entire course of discovery, any hint that it would rely on this theory,8/ it is specious.
That entire paragraph of the affidavit is based upon speculation.
It argues that far in the future the basin "may" become overcrowded.
Of course, the affidavit provides no factual support for this assumption; indeed there is none.9/
The paragraph goes on to call for a " contingency plan" and destination for the spent fuel in such a situation.
There is no regulatory or factual requirement for such a plan, nor has Illinois provided any showing of why such a plan 8/
Recognizing the unfairness of this surprise tactic, Illinois' attorney twice assured the Board at the last Pretrial Conference that Illinois would not employ it:
"Obviously we cannot present anything that we have not provided in discovery.
"[ General Electric] could move to strike anything that Illinois submits in its response to [ General Electric's] Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that it was not provided in discovery."
(8/14/81 Tr. at 1
171, 182.)
Without waiving its objection to Illinois' use of matter not provided in discovery, General Electric will address this argument substantively.
9/
Minor's Affidavit itself, paragraph 3, provides sworn testimony that presently the basin has more unoccupied than occupied space..
should even be drawn up.
Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact as to the adequacy of the Morris Operation emergency plan is raised.
Contention 7 Illinois argues that summary disposition is " premature" under the Order Ruling on Contentions of June 5, 1980.
On the contrary, the intent of that order, as lthe Board is well aware, was not to foreclose summary disposition, but to permit discovery on the contention and to allow the NRC Staff to determine whether it considered preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")
necessary.
Subsequently, the NRC Staff properly concluded that a negative declaration under 10 C.F.R.
S 51.5(b),
rather than an EIS, would suffice, and issued its Environmental Impact Appraisal, which is part of the record in this proceeding.
Indeed, the NRC Staff now concurs that Contention 7 may be decid'.d favorably to General Elect ric on its motion for summary disposition.
Discovery having been completed and "all other evidence [being] substantially in the record," Contention 7, like all the others, is ripe for decision.
Contention 8.
Illinois mischaracterizes General Electric's position in an attempt to create an issue of fact.
One of Illinois' interrogatory answers claimed that access routes to the control room were not discernible.
(See IllJncis' Answer to General Electric's Second Set of Interrogatories, No. 1 (b).)
To refute this improper conclusion, General Electric submitted facts to show that.-.
t access routes exist and are discernible.
(See voiland i
Affidavit, paragraph 6.)
Of course, if there were any doubt as to the accessability of the control room, that doubt could best be resolved by the Board's viewing.the facility,
(
not by an evidentiary hearing.
More importantly, Illinois' attempt to create a material factual issue does not succeed.
As stated in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, S 3.12, (a document filed in this proceeding) and in l
l the Affidavit of A. Thomas Clark,. pp. 20-21 (Attachment 1 to the NRC Response), occupation of the control room is not necessary for the safe operation of the facility.
Cantention 9.
Illinois' argument is a distortion of fact.
Because the regulations do not require a specific minimum score does not mean that General Electric has not established a method for determining trainee proficiency.
The Operator Training And Certification Program, page F-4, l
l (Attachment F to General Elecdric's application for a 1
license under 10 C.F.R Part 72), which was submitted in this proceeding under oath and as required by 10 C.F.R. S 72.92, establishes that passing grades must be attained on written, as well as walk-through, examinations.
Contention 10.
Illinois apparently does not understand that nothing in 10 C.F.R. SS 72.16 or 72.33 prohibits I
receipt of damaged spent fuel at the Morris Operation.
(see Affidavit of A. Thomas Clark, p.
24, Attachment 1 to NRC Response.)
Regarding this contention, Illinois apparently.
8 l
l chooses to rely on its bald allegations and offers nct contrary evidence.
Finally, in considering the Illinois Response it is significant that Illinois has abandoned at least three more contentions; these are Contentions 3 (d), 5(c), and Board Question 1.
In addition to these Contentions, Illinois admits a number of Statements of Material Fact in regard to various other contentions.
These are Statements 19 Contention 1(b) (ii)), 32 (Contention 2), 39 (Contention 3 (e)), 46 (Contention 4 (b) ), 55 (Contention 4 (e) ), 66 (Contention 9), and 69 and 71 (Contention 10).
Certainly, Illinois' Response does nothing to raise any genuine issue of material fact in light of General Electric's and the NRC's exhaustive evidentiary submissions in support of the pending Motion.
Response To The Motion To Strike The only real defense Illinois has advanced to General Electric's Motion for Summary Disposition is a non-substantive procedural ploy, a Motion to Strike 62 of General Electric's Statements of Material Fact. Quite without regard to the substantive merits, Illinois has moved to strike statements that General Electric is a New York corporation, owns the Morris Operation (No. 1), and statements found in Illinois' own MHB Report (Nos. 51-54),
as well as all the others.
j i
The motion does not state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 2.730 (b), but as best as General Electric can determine from Illinois' references to " authentication" and the Cleveland Electric case, Illinois is taking the position that only affidavits and depositions are " proper evidence" which can support a motion for summary disposition.
That position is preposterous; it amounts to an assertion that the Board should not be allowed to consider the very documents on which this license renewal application proceeding is based.J0f 10/
In addition to utilizing affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and deposition testimony in support of the pending Motion, General Electric relies upon three categories of documents, all or which may be properly considered by this Board.
First, there are documents such as the CSAR, the Operating Experience Report, the Physical Security Plan, the Radiological Emergency Plan, and the Operator Training and Certification Program, all of which were submitted either as part of the application or in connection with the application and as such constitute " filings in the proceeding."
Second, there are documents such as the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, Enviromental Impact Appraisal, (both also filed in this proceeding),
Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel and Commentary on Spent Fuel Storage at Morris Operation.
All these constitute self-authenticating government publications and as such are admissible.
(See discussion below, p.
18 jui seq.)
Finally, there are documents such as the Sabotage Analysis, which was l
authenticated during the deposition of Eugene E.
Voiland (pp. 22 and 24-26).
I i
o First, Illinois' motion flies in the face of the plain terms of 10 C.F.R. S 2.749(d):
"(d)
The presiding officer shall render the decision sought if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers tct interro'gatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as tc any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
[ Emphasis added.]
It is indeed puzzling how Illinois can interpret thia rule as limiting the record on summary disposition to affidavits and depositions.
Virtually all the documents relied upon by General Electric are " filings in the proceeding."
Those that even arguably are not are authenticated by the affidavits submitted with the NRC Response.
(See, e.g.,
Affidavit of Russell R.
Rentschler, p.3.
(Attachment 3 to NRC Response) regarding the Physical Security Plan.)
Second, to the limited extent that the Cleveland i
Electric case requires documents submitted with summary disposition motions to be " authenticated" (see discussion above, pp. 4-5, of Illinois's total mischaracterization of Cleveland Electric), many of the documents relied on in General Electric's motion are self-authenticating.
For instance, Illinois singles out the Environmental Impact Appraisal, cited in connection with Contention 1(b) (i) and prepared by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as "not properly authenticated."
Illinois is apparently unaware of Federal Rule of. Evidence 902 which provides in relevant part:
" Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
" (1)
Domestic public documents under seal.
A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States,
. or a polit'eal subdivision, department, officer, c; agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.
" (5)
Official publications.
- Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by public authority."
Pederal Rule 902, which renders many of the documents General Electric relies upon self-authenticating, was held applicable to NRC proceedings by the appeal board in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, et al., (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-5 20, 9 N. R.C.
48, 49 (1979).
("We perceive no good reason why Rule 902 should not be followed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings.
Accordingly, the exhibit should be deemed duly authenticated.")
This rule, of course, was tacitly followed with respect to the SER in the Cleveland Electric case (see footnote 2/ above).
Third, to the extent that any documents referred to by General Electric are not self-authenticating, they are a part of the evidentiary record in the proceeding under controlling law.
That is the purpose of 10 C.F.R.
l SS 2.743(g) and (h), which permit admission of NRC Staff documents as follows:
" (g)
Proceedings involving applications.
In any proceeding involving an application, there shall be effered in evidence by the staff any report submitted by the ACRS in the proceeding in compliance with section 182b of the Act, any safety evaluation prepared by the staff and any Detailed Statement on environmental considerations prepared by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards as appropriate, or his designee in the proceeding pursuant to part 51 of this Chapter.
"(h)
Official record.
J.n official record of a government agency or entry in an official record may be evidenced by an official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record and accompanied by a certificate of his custody."
General Electric's documents which do not fall expressly under those regulations include General Electric's application, the CSAR, and relateti documents, all of which were submitted as part of the record in this proceeding, under oath by the General Electric officer under whose direction they were prepared, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 72.ll(b).
These also are admitted under the rule of Bostor. Edison Co.,
(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-83, 5 A.E.C. 354 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Union of_ Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, 499 F.2d 1069, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
There, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeala rejected an intervenor's objection, on foundation and reliability grounds, to admission of the applicant's FSAR.
Judge McGowan held:.
"The argument is specious.
[ citing then-10 C.F.R.
' S 2.743 (g)]
Even in the absence of such a provision, we do not see how reliability can be established prior to at least conditional admission in a proceeding in which reliability is the ultimate issue."
Finally, all of General Electric's documentary evidence is authenticated and corroborated by General Electric's own, and the 1RC's extensive affidavits, which Illinois admits are " proper evidence."
These affidavits authenticate and establish the admissibility of all portions of every document upon which General Electric relies.
Obviously, there is no ground for the Motion to Strike.
Conclusion This proceeding involves a simple request for the renewal of a license to continue to perform the same activities t,5at have been conducted at the Morris Operation with an exemplary refety record for the past ten years.
Since its intervention in the proceeding, almost three years ago, Illinois has failed to present one single reason why General Electric's license should not be renewed.
Illinois' inability to offer factual support for any of its i
I allegations continues through the filing of its response to General Electric's Motion For Summary Disposition.
The NRC Staff, by its total support of General Electric's Motion, recognizes this fact as well.
For these reasons, General Electric requests the Board to dispose summarily of all the issues in this proceeding l 1
1 e
in General Electric's favor and renew the license for the Morris Operation without a hearing.
Respectfully submitted, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By:
/[
O
- 2 Matthew A.
Rooney j/
Dennis A. McMahon Its Attorneys OF COUNSEL:
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 231 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 782-0600 l 1 l
o
' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD a
In the Matter of
)
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 70-1308
)
72-1 Consideration of Renewal of
)
Materials License No. SNM-1265
)
Issued to GE Morris Operation
)
Fuel Storage Installation
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that he served the above and foregoing GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO ILLINOIS' MOTION TO STRIKE STATEMENTS OF MATERIAL FACT, in the above-captioned proceeding on the following persons by causing copies thereof to be deposited in the United States mail at 231 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois, in plainly addressed and sealed envelopes with proper first class postage attached before 5:00 P.M. on October 2, 1981:
Andrew C. Goodhope, Esq., Chairman John Van Vranken, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General 3320 Estelle Terrace 188 West Randolph Street Wheaton, Maryland 20906 Suite 2315 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Dr. Linda W.
Little (by messenger in lieu of mailing)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 5000 Hermitage Drive Marjorie Ulman Rothschild, Esq.
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Forrest J. Remick Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 305 East Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Board State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Washington, D.C.
20555 Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Section Washington, D.C.
20555 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 (2 copies)
/
lf L ! t t i!
L A_ t hn Dennis A.
McMahon