ML20031C469

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Supplemental Significant Deficiency Rept SD 413-414/80-02 Re Deficient SCRs in Solid State Protective Relays & Trip Devices.Scrs in Relays Used in Safety Applications Will Be Replaced by 830431 to Reduce Probability of Random Failures
ML20031C469
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/28/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8110070180
Download: ML20031C469 (2)


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~g ' /' N Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director

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[si OCT Atlanta, Georgia 30203 G 198I" Re: Catawba Nuclear Station

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached a supplemental response to Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/80-02.

Very truly yours, fj'l,fll)7)0.,

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William O. Parker, Jr.

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cc: Director NFC Resident Inspector Office of Inspection and Enforcemarit Catawba Nuclear Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission i

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DL'KE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION REPORT NO.:

SD-413, 414/80-02 REPORT DATE:

September 28, 1981 FACILITY:

Catawba Nuclear Station - Units 1 & 2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

Solid state protective relays and trip devices - deficient SCRs SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT:

This report is a supplementto the repcrt of June 17, 1981, in which it was concluded th:t no corrective action would be required; however, after further consideration it was decided that since the failure mechanism, for those random failures experienced, was time and temperature dependent, that they may not be easily identified during our testing. Therefore, the SCRs in relays used in safety applications will be replaced.

This decision is based on future schedular considerations and the desire to reduce the probability of random failures.

It is anticipated that the replace-ment of these SCRs will be completed by August 31, 1983.

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