ML20031B382
| ML20031B382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1981 |
| From: | Jaske R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031B379 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8110010313 | |
| Download: ML20031B382 (9) | |
Text
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f ? i Federal Emergency Management Agency 1 QL,/,N Washington, D.C. 20472
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SEP 181981 MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian Grimes Director Dis is2on of Emergency.Eseppredness
' Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear flegul,atory'Commiacion
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Robert T. Jaskp/ \\ ' Acting Directg;.M.,/.
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FROM:
Radiological Emergency Prep redness Division Federal Emergency Managemen Agency
Subject:
Interim findings and Dete'rmination Relating to the
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Status of State and Local Emergency Preparedness Around the Three Mile Island (TMI) Fixed Nuclear Facility for York County On Ju6.e 16, 1981, this of fice provided you with interin findings on of f-site preparedness relating to the above facility.
York County in Pennsylvania did not participate in the joint exercise of June 2,
1981.
For that reason, our finding that the State's overall capability exceeded minimum standards contained an exception for York County.
York County subsequently conducted an exercise on August 29, 1981, arranged by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA).
This exercise has been evaluated by the FEMA Region III and their observations and recommendations are attached.
The exercise evaluation found that York County's capability met or exceeded minimum standards of capability to protect the citizens in the event of a radiological emergency, even though there were a number of recommendations for improvement.
The level of the County's response capability was in line with that of the other Pennsylvania counties as reported in our nemorandum of June 16, 1981 and should be understood in the same context.
As with the four other counties impacted within the 10 mile EPZ (Dauphin, lancaster, Lebanon and Cumberland), this was York County's first experience in a radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
The evaluation identified a number of deficiencies, most of which can be corrected with additional drills and trainire.
The others were in the area of resources, such as the need for more telephone jacks, better displays etc.. none of which are major so as to reflect upon the county's overall capability.
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A number of conclusions are clearly evident from the Region's evaluation.
Public of ficial support and participation was excellent with full participa-tion of the county commissioners.
There was evidence of the officials' knowirg what was in their plans and how to use them.
Staffing was adequate to sustain a prolonged operation and coordinating fenctions were carried out generally according to the plans.
This indicates York County fully supports the radio-logical emergency preparedness program.
In summary, we f2nd that York County does now possess an adequate standard of capability to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency.
This finding is to be understood in the context of our memorandum of June 16, 1981, in terms of State and local preparedness in Pennsylvania site specific to the THI nuclear facility.
Attachment es stated
1 PENNSYLVANIA REP EXERC15Z SITE-SPECIFIC TO IM1 OBSERVATIONS AND RECO>tMENDATIONS SEPTEMBER 11, 1981 YORK COUNTY Inj.yoduction The June 2, 1981 Radiological Emergency Prepa edness (REP) exercise for Three 3
Mile Island did not include one of the plume zone counties, York County. A separate exercise for York County was conducted on August 29, 1981. Six (6) municipalities participated with the county.
The Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC) fielded ten obsehvers from FDIA and NRC.
Observers were located at the State, County and municipal EOCs and various field locations to observe public alerting and notification, mass care, medical care l
and decontamination.
The team observations have been divided into the following categories pertinent to the county and local response operations:
i I.
Notification and Alerting IV.
Protectisc Actions II.
Direction and Control V.
Communications III. Exposure Control VI.
Public Information i
There are 18 recomendations.
In most cases they parallel the recommendations from the June 2 exercise and, in fact, some recommendations are duplicated from I
June 2.
The level of response capability exhibited by York County is in line with s se overall Pennsylvania capability observed on June 2.
In general, the County's capability was found to meet or exceed minimum standards, the impcrtance of the recommendations notwithstanding.
1 I.
NOTIFICATION AND ALERTING Notification of county and municipal officials and key personnel generally war; satisfactory and accomplished according to the plans. Some telephone numbers of key officials were found to be wrong and were corrected on the spot. Alterr.2te key personnel were contacted when a primary could not be reached.
The county EOC used the emergency services (Pleenon) network for initial noti-fication of municipalities through local fire services.
In a fast moving inci-dent, the fire services would have provided a notification fanout to officials and principal staff in each municipality; however, in this case the county EOC J
executed the alerting list in addition to the radio notification. The alerting list tool 45 minutes to complete.
Route alerting of the public was variable. East Manchester completed route alerting in approximately 50 minutes but they did not know they were to tell people to turn on their radirs. Newberry took two hours for route alerting. (The fire in Goldsboro may have affected the alerting.) The routes in Manchester Township were too long and the crews were unsure of the message to give. In general, the routes were not run as slow as they should have been to pass a voice sessage with clarity.
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_ RECOMMENDATIONS (Notification and Alerting):
1.
Steps should be taken to shorten route alerting times by shortening routes j
and adding vehicles.
It is recognizcd that route alerting will be a back-up means l
of alerting the public when the complete siren system is installed.
2.
A prepared message telling residents that sheltering or evacuation has been 1
ordered and that they should turn their radios to the EBS station shcald be developed by the county and distributed to all route alerting organizations.
1 II.
DIRECTION AND CONTROL The central area of the county EOC was very cramped and thus added confusion to the response. Other rooms were available for use but produced problems in terms of status updates and coordination between officials. Internal information was adeqt.ste but needs to be improved. Maps of the 10-mile EPZ were on display but did not have directional references which would have helped in plotting the path of the plume. Updates were listed on a chalkboard but were not made promptly during the early part of the exercise. This was remedied at a later point.
Public official support and participation was excellent. Except for an initial problemi, the county commissioners (especially the President of the Bovrd) were kept closely in' formed by the Bnergency Management Coordinator of all events and
'were brought into the decision-making process whenever necessary.
Coordination went well considering the ciretanstances of the compriaved time schedule cad the EOC set-up.
The Bnergency Managener.r Coordinator (PMC) recog-I nized that message distribution among the county EOC staff could be improved up-on and planned for periodic updates St couldn't due to the compressed time frame of the scenario.
Plans were consulted frequatLy with the County Coordinator demenstrating a thorough knowledge, although,tilieing the plans to refresh his memory.
The issue of staffing was discussed at the conclusion of the exercise, with the Emergency Management Coordinator ecating that every individual in charge of a functional area has a deputy with shifts based on 12-hour rotations.
Security was excellent (with one minor wxception), with a County Sheriff's de-l puty at the door throughout the exercise.
In addition, the county had its own system of passes which all individuals in the EOC were required to wear.
Newberry: The EOC size Ibited activity to a small area, easily coordinated by six staff menibers who know their jobs. There were no displays; however, mes-sage handling and recording was excellent. Facility access control and security were meager although the plan calls for it.
A township supervisor was present for the exercise. The EMC knows the plan and coordinated its use well.
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3 Coldsboro: The EOC and its steffing is adequate. There were no dis-plays but message handling seemed smooth. Maps were not necessary since the community is very small. Bora officials supported the exercise. The plan was used extensively.
Manchester Tganship: The EOC was fully staffed, and would have had suffi-cient personnel to srMatain a 24-hour staffing rotation, on 12-hour shifts. A designated security officer provided good EOC access control. The facility it-self was adequate, with the exception of not enough telephone lines. However, all the communicatio a at the EOC were routinely handled by radio.
Internal information exchange was poor, and displays of the information were non-existent.
Public official support was excellent
/ith all three township super-visors participating. Coordination and management decision-making were edequate, with good interface between tha EMC and Deputy EMC. County and municipal plans were available, and were used and understood.
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East Mancheste_r,: This township did not have a plan inich was one reason that it took part in the exercise. The facility lacked operational areas, dis-plays, and phones, (jacks were ordered). The elected public officials did par-tief pate and support the " idea" of prep 5 redness for dealing with a future in-11Jent at TMI.
Security was exceptional as identification through a locked door:
was carried out. There was little decision-making due to the inexperien:o of j
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Energency Management Coordinator. Without a plan the EMC had no central under-l l
stInding of the situation to the point that the township did not understand the significance of the county's message to evacuate.
Evacuation was delayed until the EMC was questioned (and therefore prompted) by the observers.
l Mt. Wolf: The EMC should be commended on his knowledge of his plan and EOC operations.
Idestification was required, inforuation shared internally through the use of display boards, and support areas for 24-hour staffing were demon-strated and noted. Public official support was not evident.
RMOMMENDATIONS(DirectionandControlf:
3.
Periodic updates for EOC staffs should be conducted to inform ev2ryone of the current status of the accident, significant occurrences at other hwels of govern-ment, and actions taken by the cour.ty.
4.
Messages to be aired via RACES or EMA communiotions need to be edited and shortened for the users. In souc cases technical information which may have been beyond the understanding and need of recipient was openly aired.
Since the public has access to these nets such items as M/R reading and whole body and thyroid dose, unless defined by relative risk, could cause undo confusion and anxiety even fer the emergency workers. Compression of time in the scenario al-most required York County to merely rebroadcast PEMA situatica reports without localizing them or re-editing them to the audience they were delivered to.
This is not to impiv that less inforratk u be provided to the municipalities but that more usable internation should be provided.
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5.
The County coordinator should survey municipal EOCs and suggest upgrading possibilities to EMCs, e.g., telephone jacks, adequate displays, EDC layout, security, etc.
6.
East Manchester needs to complete its plan to provide needed guidance for the EMC and to assign opcrt'cional duties to specific individuals and organizations.
Following this, a table-top drill of East Manchester should be conducted by thc county EHC.
III. EXPOSURE CONTROL The distribution of dosimeters and record keeping were adequate 4r cost locatf ans.
Some emergency workers were not issued record keeping forms and in seme cases emergency Vorkers were not sure of the procedures for use of the dosimeters. TLDs were not available for distribution.
An emergency worker decontamination center was established at the Manchester Town-ship EOC/ fire station. Decontamination procedures were demonstrated on a sicu-lated, contaminated and injured individual; however, the RADEF Officer was care-less in applying the procedures. The probe was not covered by a plastic bag; the probe touched the patient a number of times; the patient had an open wound but was requirei te shower before being transported to the hospital.
York County Hospital procedures for contaminated, injured patients were adequate; however, precedures could be enhanced.
Scracning of the patient was done in the outpatient ares, security personnel came in contact with the potentially contam-inated equipment, and the radiation detection probe was not protected (e.g., no plastic bag).
7r.terviews with the doctor in charge and hospital administrator clearly demonsttsted a thorough knowledge of medical priority and from whom they would seek support if necessary. The hospitel is outside the EPZ znd is not planned for evacuation nor is it slated as a support hospital.
An evacuee decontamination center was supposed tc be set up at the Suaquehannock l
Reception Center in accordance with the plan. No decontamination personnel were l
at the center and no evaluation of the decontamination team's capability could be made. Following the exercise it was learned that the team was at the Clen Rock firehouse awaiting instructions from the Glen Rock EOC to report to the Reception Center.
RECOMMENDATIONS (Exposure Control):
7.
All personnel essigned to fic3.d operations in the EPZ must heve:
a.
The proper dcsimetry issued at an early stage of the emergency. The best means is through predistribution to the lowest organizational level.
b.
Training in how to read the dosimeters.
c.
Specific instructions for regular, periodic reading of their dosimeters and recording of doses, if any.
d.
Specific instructious for reporting doses and obtaining advice on haz.
ardous conditions.
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3 i Fur'ther,i all jurisdictions must have appropriate procedures for maintaining s
the dose 'Ircords 'of :beit workers and retaining tbse records for an appro-priate period.
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8.
All decontaminatbu personnel should be given craining in the proper pro-cedures for 'dete: ting radiation cn in:lividuals and equipment as well as suit-able decontamination methois.
9.
York naspital should modify its examination procedures to include relocating hospital entry for potential contaminated patienta, modify security personnel assistance procedures and insure the integrity of the detector's probe. All hospitals designated in the plan to care for radiation patients should be pro-vided with a short procedures training course by the State Bureau of Radiation Protection as called for in the plan.
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IV.
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS During the Site Emergency phase the county decided to instruct the populace to take shelter. This decision wa: no: discussed with the state EOC. The county made this decision on their oea believing that it was better to be conserva-tive in the face of a lack of information from the state. The notitication of municipalities acd public notification appeared to function smoothlye The county kept up-to-date on the status of motification by the municipalities and issued the proper EBS messcges contained in their plan.
Implementation of a general evacuation took place quickly and smoothly from the county level. The recornmendations of the state were considered and concurrad in by the Cotanissioners and Beargency Management Coordinator and the alerting and public notification procedures were then initiated. The county EOC com-tacted local bus companies, that have agreements with the county, to stand by.
The municipalities were asked to provide transportation requirements above the municipalities resources'.1 No unset neeIds tsere provided to the county except from the school syste:n. ;Most of the municipalities did not atter pt to decern I
their transport., tion needs fcr invalids, nursing homes, those without POVs etc.
(East Manchester, developed a partial list.)
If these requirements vers known and met by the municipalities with their own resources, it was not evident to the observers.
The school district evacuation capability was adeonately demonstrated. The i
i Northeast School District Superintendent was very knowledgestle con:erning his responsibilities and the procedures necessary to carry them out. The school syster.'s procedures are based on the superintendent's experiences frra tbe 'DiI incident in 1979.
-The superirtendent's coordination with the school bus contractor's transportation office and the dispatching of bus drivere was according to the plan. A short-fall in buses was corrected by the addition of "YATA" buses obtained through the g
county EOC. Communications is maintained through a RACES transceiver to the county and the school system's mainteaance radios to the bus contractor und bus staging area.
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- 4 Although there are no private schools in the district, about 140 private students are bussed to other districts.
Responsibility for those students belongs to the district where they attend class, according to the superin-tendent.
3 h ss Care: The has Care activity was coordinated through a Mass Care Coor-dinator located at Red Cross Headquarters in York. The observer tsaat was not informed +n advance that this would be an "actAon location" and only became awarc of its play while visiting the Reception Ccnter at Susquehannock at the tail end of the exercise. Annex I of the County plan states the Coordinator will report to the EOC. The coordfaator's fu9ationo could not be evaluated directly; however, questioning of pennuel n the Fception Center determined that the coordinator was aerively involved with the center.
Interface was by telephone and RACES radio.
The Susquehannock Reception and Mass Care Cer.ter was opened and ready for oper-stion at Alert Stage. Annex 1 calls for mass care centers to bi activated at General Emergency and is silent on activation of the Reception Center. The High Gehool principal and local Red Cross representative at the Center stated
?he Mass Care Coordinator in York provides a basic cadre to staff the centers ud that they (local Red Cross and school principal) would provide necessary support to this cadre. This concept is not stated in the Mass Care Annex, nor did these cadre members come to the center during the exercise to demonstrate their functions. The capability of the center to care for evecuees could not be adequately evaluated.
RECOMMENDATIONS fProtective Actions):
10.
PEMA should meet with all county EMCs to discuss the countics' predilection for. initiating independent protective actions without crordinating with the state.
This was evident. both on June 2 and August 29.
This might be avoided by pro-viding the counties with information on a " negative" decision for protective action, e.g., "No pratective action necessary at this time."
11.
It is not clear that the municipalities know their unmet needs for those without POVs and those with impaired mobility and that they can satisfy thos+
requirements. The county should conduct a tabletop drill on transportation re-sources for evacuation.
12.
The Mass Care Coordinator should be located at the EOC or the plan should I
be changed to show the proper location.
If the coordinator did play from the EOC during the exercise, then the local mass care support personnel should be made aware of the plan contents.
- 13. Activation of centers should be done at the proper classification level.
County EMC should discuss situation with Mass Care Coordinator.
- 14. Future exercises must include complete mass care staffing without simulation of key center cadre.
15.
The riass care function should be drilled saparately before participation in the next full scale exercise.
. V.
COMMUNICATIONS The RACES consnuaications was excellent. The fire services net and RACES were used for direct en and control. When the fire in Goldsboro tied up the fire net, RACES demonstrated its adecuate back-up capability.
,RECCHMENDATIONS (Comununicationsb 16.
A c >unty-wide !!MA consnuaications net for direction and control should be developed separate from the fire net.
The RACRS net could then be an operational net for EMA field cleinents as well as directica and control back up.
VI, p BLIC INF0fCTION The Carnissioners Meeting Room was set aside as a press briefing area. The FIO did actually brief media during the exercise but was not ree. f red to be in the press area and appeared to be so busy with EBS messagu (coordination with Cow issioners and the EMC) that absence from EOC to use press area would have been a problem. The county had a prepared briefing package and was fully invcived with PEMA press releases and exercise traffic. This facilitated localization of EBS messages.
Rumor Control phones, were manned and the operator was provided with press release information. When significant EBS traffic was being provided, rumor control only instructed the caller to tune to the EBS station.
Communications between the York County ECC and the EBS radio station (WSBA) is by means of a remote pick-up circuit (RFU). The interface and trender of informa-tion went well. The EBS station personnel were enthusiastic and knowledgeable concerning EBS and their role; however, their knowledge of classification levels and plan content is limited. The county RACES cest was monitored by the WSBA EBS officer throughout the exercise. The meca ge content of the five different uses of the EBS was adequate. The general evacuation aessage at 10:31 was quite de-tailed and lengthy. After the evacuation announcement by a county commissioner, the York County PIO read through the specific instruerim for each area, but the information was given tco i.sst to be picked up by the pope 13.ce without some difficulty.
RECOMMENDATIONS (Public Information):
17.
The EBS " canned" messages should be read slowly with the intent to allow the populace time to understand and record the instructions.
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- 18. The EBS stetion personnel would have a better understanding of the signi--
ficance of each classification level and York County's expected actions at each level if the county could provide a briefing on the basics of the plan.
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