ML20031A881
| ML20031A881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000471 |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1981 |
| From: | Dignan T, Gad R, Stowe W BOSTON EDISON CO., ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109280341 | |
| Download: ML20031A881 (14) | |
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7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA b ( g [~,
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before the "O '
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 9
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In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-471
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(Pilgrim Nuclear Generating
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W Station, Unit 2)
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s SEP2 1 19g, 7, APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS 2
AS TO EMERGENCY PLANNING b c/tg AND TMI-2 ISSUES n &g I.
EMERGENCY PLANNING L
A.
The General Principles As aeen below, it is the position of the applicants that a number of the " emergency planning" contentions put forward for litigation in this proceeding by the two inter-venors we not proper subjects for litigation herein.
In large part, these contentions seem to spring from basic misunderstandings as to the regulatory requirements with respect to the level of detail to be included in a PSAR and the characteristics of an EPZ.
We discuss the prin-ciples involved immediately below.
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1.
The Cleeton Emergency Planning Contentions This is a construction permit application.
As a result, the contents of the application (PSAR) insofar as emergency planning is concerned are governed by $ II of 10 CFR 50, App. E (Appendix E) as opposed to $$ III and IV of Appendix E which governs an FSAR in support of l
an operating license application.
Section II of Appendix E does not require the submission of a detailed emergency plan.
It does not require the designation of specific persons or organizations to perform certain duties.
It requires for the most part, descriptions of what will be as opposed to what is.
The above principles dictate that all of the emergency planning contentions raised by the Cleetons (Nos. 1-10) should be excluded from consideration.1!
Cleeton Contention No. 1 is:
1.
Boston Edison, et al, have not clearly demonstrated that an ade-quate emergency response and evacuation plan is possible since no actual test or drill of the current emergency response plans 1/ The Cleetons put all of their contentions in a single document filed under date of August 21, 1981.
A total of 17 contentions are set forth; Nos. 1-10 deal with emergency planning; the balance involve TMI issues. s
for Pilgrim I has ever been con-ducted; only telephone tree simulations.
In addition, we question that the site specific plans as set forth by Boston Edison Co. would assure sufficient space and manpower for the antici-pated needs of those evacuated from any or all of the sectors in the emergency response. plans.
NRC regulations do not require a " clear demonstration" of an adequate emergency response by drills for Pilgrim I in order that Pilgrim II get a construction permit.
Cleeton Contention Nos. 2-7 are as follows:
2.
Boston Edison, et al, have not identified specific public or private buildings out to a 50 mile radius, nor have they cer-tified to anyone that authority to use those buildings in the event of an emergency.
3 Boston Edison, et al, have not identified authorities and per-sonnel who have been advised and trained to respond to any influx of evacuees into their facilities and buildings.
4.
Boston Edison, et al, have not indicated where nor in what manner or method, procurement of and stcrage of emergency supplies and provisions have been or will be made.
l 5
Boston Edison, et al, have not indicated by what policies and priorities such emergency pro-visions and supplies shall be
. I
distributed to what segments of the pcpulation, other than those designations of personnel associa-ted with the operation of Pilgrim I and proposed Pilgrim II and thereby have failed to give required pro-tection for the health and safety of potentially affected populations in the event of an accident.
6.
Boston Edison, et al, have not explained nor stated whose fiscal responsibility, nor verified any acceptance of any such responsibility, to fund and purchase and store emer-gency supplies and provisions, out to a fifty mile radius, including all of Cape Cod, nor even in the ten mile immediate evacuation zone.
7 Boston Edison, et al, have not stated by what manner nor method security forces would be emplaced in the evacu-ated area (s) to assure private property holders that their property and valuable possessions would remain safe when ordered out of their places of dwelling and business for reasons not of their own choosing.
Eacn of these contentions seeks details as to which specific buildings, personnel, supplies, methods of distri-bution, if any, and methods of protection will be utilized in the Pilgrim 2 emergency plan.
None of these details is necessary at the PSAR stage.
Cleeton Contention Nos. 8 and 9 are the following:
8.
Boston Edison, et al, have not indicated under what statutory i
d i
i authority anyone may be. ordered to leave their property or premises in the ever.t of an ordered evacu-ation.
9 Boston Edison, et al, have not indicated any studies or research that would indicate that anyone would leave if they had to choose between undetermined risk to health and the protection of valuable lifetime possessions or property that cannot be removed on short notice.
The short answer is that at least, absent his or her endangering someone else by staying, no one can be forced to leave their home unless the Governor acts under Mass. Acts
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1959 c. 639 which gives him the power to direct and en-force an evacuation.
Absent such a declaration, both the federal and state law protect one's right to one's property, and if one is willing to risk life or health I
to stand in the door of one's castle, one has a perfect right to do so.
Cleeton Contention No. 10 is:
i 10.
Neither Boston Edison, et al,;
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; nor the Department of Defense has indicated whether or not the National Guard or other s'curity forces would be allowed, required or ordered into the evacuated. area already judged to be unsafe for ordinary citizens.
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No regulation requires any of the named agencies to indicate anything as to the duties or actions of 'he National Guard.
2.
The Commonwealth's Emergency Planning Contentions The Commission's Regulations, 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2) define EPZ's for LWR's as follows:
" Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall con-sist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in. radius.
The exact size and configuration of EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emtrgency response needs and capabili-ties as they are affected by such cond1ETons as demography, Topography, land,haracteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries."
(Emphasis added.)
This sane definition appears in 10 CFR 50, App. E, n.1 in the following language:
"EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016 ' Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,' December 1978.
The size of the EPZs for a nuclear power i
plant shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capa-bilities as they are affected br such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics. access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
Generally
the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion path-way EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius."
(Emphasis added.)
When the Commission promulgated 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR 50, App. E in their present form, it was noted:
"The EPZ for airborne exposures has a i
l radius of about 10 miles; the EPZ for contaminated food and water has a radius of about 50 miles.
Predetermined pro-tective action plans are needed for the i
l EPZs.
The exact size and shape of each I
EPZ will be decided by emergency planning officials after they consider the specific conditions at each site.
These distances are considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed."
45 F.R. 55402, 55406 (August 19, 1980)(emphases added).
A review of NUREG-0396, which is the sour' a document relied upon by the Commission th prcmulgating the current emergency planning regulations, is also instructive as to the EPZ concept.
The Task Force which wrote NUREG-0396 absolutely rejected the concept of picking EPZ's by utilizing an analysis of one particular accident sequence.
NUREG-0396 at 4-5 Rather, it was decided to bound the planning
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requirement by reviewing a spectrum of accidents, id.,
which included so-called Design Basis Accidents, and Class 9 Accidents (particularly those analyzed in WASH-1400).
E. g., NUREG-0396 at 5, 16, 18, App. I at 4 The rationale for stopping at 10 miles for the plume exposure pathway EPZ was the fact that calculations showed that up to about 10 miles there was a sharp decrease in dose with an in-crease in distance and a much slower inverse variance there-after; in addition, Design Basis Accident analyses showed whole body doses at 10 miles to be 0.1 rem for the median plant and very few plants with doses greater than 0.5 rem at that distance.
NUREG-0396, at I-34.
In short, the rationale was that within the 10-mile area, real dose reductions could be achieved by advance 'mergency planning, whereas beyond that distance the return on investment was much lower:
.. it was the consensus of the Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic dis-tance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such accidents.
Beyond the generic distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considera-tions that went into the initial action determinations."
NUREG-0396 at 16.
In addition it is stated, as part of the EPZ definition, that: -
"In relation to emergency response an EPZ is an area in which best effort is performed making use of existing emergency plans and is not an area in which particular criteria must be met."
NUREG-0396 at 27 In short, it is not necessary to show,.for example, that an EPZ or a certain part thereof, can be evacuated in a certain time.
Rather, it is only necessary to show that the best plan is in place which optimizes dose reduction.
The protection of individuals is not of con-cern here.
That is handled by the criteria in 10 CFR 100 which operate to encourage engineered safeguards to reduce the LPZ where reasonable assurance of protection of individuals must be shown.
From all of the foregoing a number of principles would seem to be apparent.
First, the EPZ concept is one which does not make the choice of EPZ in any way dependent upon the calculated consequences of any par-ticular accident or accidents or size of reactor.
l Second, while minor adjustments may be made as a result j
of particular factors at a particular site, no sig-nificant increase in size of EPZ's is contemplated.
Therefore, the responsibility to set EPZ boundaries lies with emergency planning officials, not NRC, which it f r l
i 1
appears should review that choice essentially only for a total abuse of discretion.
i Given these principles it would seem that a number 1
of the Commonwealth's emergency planning contentions are inappropriate subjects for litigation herein as set forth below.
With respect to Contention No. I, the contention as stated appears to be appropriate assuming that what is being talked about is a " fine-tuning" of the boundaries.
However, the contention should be rewritten to make clear that it does not encompass exploration of the evacuation of Cape Cod and to completely exclude any issues raised under subparagraphs D, H and I, all of which assume analyses of specific accident scenarios.
Contention No. II should not be admitted.
The isst.a of whether protective action is " feasible" with respect to releases from PWR-1 to PWR-7 accidents is not a litigable 4
issue.
No plant and site specific analyses of the con-sequences of specific accidents is required.
Contention III should be excluded on the same grounds.
j Contention IV should be admitted.
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L l 2
f II.
TMI-2 ISSUES A.
The Cleetons None of the Cleeton TMI-2 contentions (Hos. 11-17) should be admitted into hearing.
Each and every one of them are statements to the effect that NRC and/or the Applicant do not fully appreciate or understand the long term effects of TMI-2.
However this may be, these raise no issues litigable under the "TMI-2" rules.
10 CFR S 50 34(e).
B.
The Commonwealth No objection is raised to the Ccmmonwealth's Contention I on TMI-2 issues.
Contention II as stated should not be admitted.
The
" inevitable impact" of construction on the basis of the information and commitments in PSAR Amendnents 42 and 43 and approved in SER Supplement No. 6 are no different than the impact which would arise if some different information or commitments were given or made.
Contention III.A should be excluded.
There is no..
l e.
requirement that the staff document deviations in a SER.
No objection is made to Contention III.B.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
/s/R.
K.
Gad III Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
R. K. Gad III Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Telephone:
(617) 423-6100
/s/ William S. Stowe William S.
Stowe Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Telephone:
(617) 424-2544.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the Matter of
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BOSTON EDISON COMP ANY
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Docket No. 50-471
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(Pilgrim Nuclear Generating
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Station, Unit 2)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G. Dignan, or., one of the attorneys for the applicants herein, hereby certify that on September 18, 1981 I made service of the within document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Andrew C. Goodhope, Esquire Henry Herrmann, Esquire Chairman Room 1045 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 50 Congress Street 3320 Estelle Terrace Boston, MA 02109 Wheaton, Maryland 20906 Mr. and Mrs. Alan R. Cleeton Dr. A. Dixon Callihan 22 Mackintosh Street Union Carbide Corporation Franklin, MA 02038 P.O. Box Y Cak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 William S. Abbott, Esquire Suite 925 Dr. Richard G. Cole 50 Congress Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P ston, MA 02109 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Patrick J. Kenny, Esquire Environmental Protection Division Edward L. Selgrade, Esquire Public Protection Bureau Deputy Director Department of the Attorney General Mass. Office of Energy Resources One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor 73 Tremont Street Boston, MA 02108 Boston, MA 02108
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Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Chief Librarian Plymouth Public Library North Street Plymouth, MA 02360 Stephen H. Lewis, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Thomas S. Moore, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Christine N. Kohl, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Thomas G.~Dignsh, Jr.